

KNOWLEDGE, LIFE
AND REALITY

—
GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD



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KNOWLEDGE, LIFE AND REALITY



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AN ESSAY IN
SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY

BY

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OF CONDUCT," "A THEORY OF REALITY,"
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PREFACE

THE service which it is hoped that this book may in some measure accomplish, can best be explained by a reference to the life-work and life-purpose of its author. For more than a generation it has been his daily duty to observe, read, teach, and reflect, within the field covered by problems which are somewhat vaguely grouped together under the word, "philosophy." During this period the conviction has been growing that Plato, when he remarked a likeness between the fitting attitude of the soul toward these problems, and the most tender, absorbing, and important, of human personal relations, spoke to the world of men something more valuable than a taking, but extravagant hyperbole. I am well aware that this is not the popular estimate of philosophy at the present time; and the fact that it is not, is by no means wholly due to an adverse spirit in the age. It is almost equally due to the way in which its interests have been "exploited" (I use the word intelligently and deliberately) by many to whom the care of philosophic culture has been especially entrusted.

Formerly, the teachers and writers in the field of philosophy,—especially of ethics and the philosophy of religion, but also of general metaphysics, and even of the allied subjects of psychology and logic,—were chiefly, and indeed almost exclusively, the presidents of our colleges and others who had received an education in theology. Many, and perhaps the majority, of their pupils and readers, were either intending to enter the ministry, or were already enjoying the opportunities, and bound by the duties, of the ministerial office. What they had to gain from the class-room, or from the reading of books on philosophy, was expected to be useful, in an important and im-

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mediate way, as preparation for their professional life. The others, and indeed all, who were having what was then called a "liberal education," were required to study the same subjects; and thus to get at least some dim and inchoate conception of the nature of philosophy, and some appreciation, either favorable or unfavorable, of its application to the ideals and the conduct of a truly successful life. Now, however, for a considerable time, it has been quite the fashion to complain of the work done in this way, as dull and depressing; and to discredit the results, as tending to discourage, rather than elicit and encourage, a taste for prolonged reading and serious study of the issues and the problems of reflective thinking. And doubtless, there is much truth of fact to warrant this lowered estimate of a now old-fashioned regard for, and use of, the discipline of philosophy as an essential for making a noble manhood, and for imparting a truly liberal and fine culture. But I am inclined to think that there is also much misunderstanding and even misrepresentation as to the real facts. I believe that the maturer impressions are more favorable as to the results actually achieved by these now abandoned methods. But, however this may be, about one thing there can be no doubt. The intention of the age was to make reflection a duty, and its results an important factor in the better and nobler life.

And in very truth, the study of philosophy, however conducted or however far carried, cannot be safely undertaken with either intellectual or moral indifference. Indeed, I am willing to adopt Plato's figure of speech and to put its statement into more modern, but not more genuinely devout terms. Problems having to do with the validity of human Knowledge, the ideals of human Life, and the ultimate nature of Reality, are "not by any to be entered into unadvisedly or lightly; but reverently, discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of God." In the case of these problems, most emphatically, truths arrived at by speculation on a basis of experienced facts, cannot be separated from truths that demand from us the guid-

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ance of our practice and the control of life. Such truths are, indeed, something more than “pragmatic,” in the present, current conception of this uncertain and much-abused word. On the one hand, they require the profoundest use of reason for their discovery, defence, and elaboration; on the other hand, they exercise the profoundest influence upon the satisfactions, the character, and the destiny, of the soul. The age, therefore, which neglects philosophy is sure to be sensuous and vulgar. The age which treats philosophy flippantly is sure to be shallow and, at the end, dissatisfied with its achievements. The age that takes its philosophy seriously, and even passionately, gains thereby an enormous accession of motive power for either evil or good results. It is a matter, then, which the author has upon his heart and conscience, to make this book of some help to its readers by way of appreciating and illumining those questions which every rational being ought to ask himself; and which are here brought together under the title: “Knowledge, Life, and Reality.”

That our common purpose may be attained the better, I have two requests to make of my readers. The first of these is that they will not assign me to any so-called “school,” or to any master as his pupil,—at least, not prematurely. I have learned, indeed, from many sources; and not in smallest measure from my own pupils; who, being themselves educated under varying intellectual and social influences, Occidental and Oriental, have discussed with me and with one another, all the major, and most of the minor problems of philosophy. In doing this we have, of course, made use of the writings of the great masters both in ancient and in modern times. But, so far as I am aware, I have never allowed myself to do, what I have earnestly striven to prevent them from doing,—namely, form an uncritical and fixed attachment for any system of reflective thinking, taken as a whole. The motto of the classroom and of the private study has ever been: *Nullius jurare in verba magistri.* Besides this, my own development of any at-

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tempt at systematic results, which has been rather abnormally slow, has been preceded by prolonged study of the separate problems, the solutions of which need to be combined in the total result. However all this may be, my request is simply this: "Let us both, reader and author, abjure all deference to the 'idols of the theater,' as well as to the 'idols of the cave,' and try to frame and judge our philosophical opinions according to the harmony of the truths that are expressed in them."

One other request seems to me equally reasonable. It is that a fair amount of candid reflection shall determine the meaning, and the truth of the meaning, which has been put into the words. There is no inherent reason why philosophical opinions should not be made intelligible to any intelligent and thoughtful, not to say educated, reader. But this desirable end cannot be reached without a genuine effort at co-operation. Profound philosophy may be taught in poetry, drama, and even in the novel. But if it is to be got out of these captivating forms of its presentation, the author cannot do all the work. In this book I have, for the most part, carefully avoided all technical language; and I have taken pains to make my meaning clear. But the very subject—since philosophy *is* the product of reflective thinking—requires the studious and reflecting mind on the part of those who make use of the book. If in any places it shall seem more difficult to understand—not to say, essentially obscure,—than the nature of the discussion itself makes reasonable, I shall stand ready to confess my failure and to bear the blame. But I cannot promise or hope to be understood by those who care only to be, for the moment, entertained; or who have neither the inclination nor the leisure to give to my efforts any measure of careful and thoughtful attention.

To those who are already at all familiar with the other writings on philosophy by the same author, as well as to those who may possibly be attracted to some of those writings by reading this book, a further word of introduction may prove helpful. During the last twenty-five years, I have treated of the leading

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questions, the more prominent aspects of philosophy, in a series of monographs. Several of these have been designedly technical and elaborate treatises of particular departments of general philosophy. But in this one volume I am putting into semi-popular form the system of reflective thinking which has been evolved and published previously in separate volumes. The reader who desires a more detailed exposition and defense of this system should study it in these monographs. To them, however, not infrequent reference is made in the present volume.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

NEW HAVEN, *August*, 1909.

*“From the unreal lead me to the real.
From darkness lead me to light.
From death lead me to immortality.”*

BRIHAD ARANYAKA UPANISHAD, 1, 3, 27.

“Intellect relies on Reason, Faith on Authority; opinion defends itself by probability alone. These two comprehend the sure truth; but faith, in closed and involuted, intelligence, in exposed and manifest, form.”

BERNARD.

CHAPTER I

PHILOSOPHY: ITS CONCEPTION AND ITS PROBLEMS

IN its more general and vague, but most adequate and human meaning, the word "Philosophy" may be made to include all the products of man's reflective thinking. And since man, as we know him in history, has always been given to reflection, fragments of thought which bear the characteristic marks of the philosophical interpretation of experience, exist from the beginning. Indeed, if we discard all uncertain conjectures with regard to that mythical being, the so-called "primitive man," and the yet more uncertain conjectures as to some order of beings half-human, half-animal, we must agree with Aristotle: "All men by nature reach after knowledge." But this sentence occurs at the beginning of his work on Metaphysics, or First Philosophy; and the kind of knowledge to which he refers is the distinguishing pursuit of the philosopher. To philosophize, then, is to be human. For in the words of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson: "The need to philosophize is rooted in our nature as deeply as any other of our needs."

As a matter of course, however, men began at first to reflect upon those facts of external nature, and those inner experiences, which seemed of most immediate and pressing interest. As a matter of course, too, both the method used and the results of their reflection, were vague, confused, and indecisive. But in saying this, we must be careful not to do discredit to the intellectual acumen and intellectual interests of the most undeveloped races or barbarous and uncivilized peoples. Modern research seems rather to be widening than closing up the gap between the least civilized known races of men and the most intelligent of the lower animals. And at the same time, it is

increasingly emphasizing the essential spiritual unity of the human race. Their language, customs, folk-lore, and attempts at scientific explanation and philosophical interpretation, show these so-called primitive peoples to be lacking, not so much in intellectual quality or ethical sensitiveness, as in the enjoyment of the accumulated resources of a long line of ancestral efforts, under the more favorable physical and social circumstances—which we at present enjoy. Nor are they altogether deficient in power to make some of the most essential philosophical distinctions. The untutored man, the member of a somewhat isolated savage tribe, has little inducement, and less opportunity, for cultivating any of the particular sciences after the modern method of experiment and induction. He attributes the direction and flight of his arrow to the strength of his bow and the pull of his arm; the grateful sensations of warmth to the sun or to the fire; the birth of children to the act of procreation; the drift of his canoe to the currents of water and wind. But to him the wind, the sun, the fire, are themselves mysteries too deep and high for solution by any formula that summarizes facts of invariable or customary sequence; therefore he naïvely and instinctively resorts at once to the metaphysical interpretation of his experience; he makes gods out of these natural objects, who must be propitiated or obeyed. How, indeed, should he arrive at a scientific explanation of phenomena which are increasingly difficult and baffling even for modern physics to explain? Why, also, should he not, failing of modern science, recognize at once what this science itself is compelled to recognize—namely, that, back of all its formulas, there is a Being of the World, which the human mind is compelled to interpret as like itself, and yet superior to itself? And as to the phenomena of birth, and life, and death, this need of the philosophical interpretation, as something additional and yet working, as it were, in and through the scientific explanation, is surely no less great for the savage than it is for the most learned of modern biologists.

It is not strange, therefore, that even among the most gifted and progressive peoples, philosophy did not earlier separate itself from other cognate forms of human endeavor, as a sort of independent discipline. It was, at first, the rather, all intermixed with literature, in the form of myth, legend and poetry; with crude attempts at history, and with the uncertain beginnings of the particular sciences; but above all with theology and religion. Indeed, a large proportion of the philosophizing done at the present time, and that by no means the least important, does not recognize in any practical way the necessity for making this separation. In India, which has been characterized for centuries by a kind of speculative genius, philosophy is chiefly an attempt at a deductive theology, which may be made a matter of science resting upon personal experience for the more profound thinkers, but which is given to the people in the form of religious myth. In China, philosophy is either a science of politics, as related to heavenly powers and to the spirits of deceased ancestors; or else it is a conglomerate of geomancy or other forms of divination, based upon a crude and antiquated conception of nature. In Japan, apart from the importations of Western speculative thought, philosophy consists either of hair-splitting distinctions in the pantheistic systems of the various sects of Buddhism, or in the distinctive development given in that land to the Confucian ethics by the demands of its feudal system. While all over the Muhammadan world, philosophy is a rigid and uncompromising doctrine of either practical or mystical monotheism. But these countries comprise, not only the majority of the civilized races, but also some of the most interesting and choice developments of reflective thinking.

It is customary to say that the Greeks were the first to cultivate philosophy as an independent discipline. Hence we flatter ourselves by deriving our descent from these gifted ancients, along the lines of reflective thinking and its product in the form of systematic philosophy. This is largely, and yet only

partially, true. But as Zeller has shown, even the indefiniteness of the term "philosophy" among the classical Greeks, and yet more among their degenerate successors, proves that the thing itself had scarcely as yet appeared as a "specific form of intellectual life." When the earliest Greek writers separated so-called philosophy from its traditional form of religious myth and poetry, they made of it a sort of crude metaphysics of physics. The term "natural philosophy," which persisted down to the more recent times, has, therefore, a legitimate birthright. There was no attempt among the Greeks, however, to distinguish between science and philosophy. Indeed, in the modern meaning of the words, there was as little science as philosophy. And the moment—as was inevitable—that the insufficiency of any material principle like water, air, fire, or the "unlimited" of Anaximander, "The infinite mass of matter out of which all things arise," became apparent, something spiritual in the way of a Divine Being, or Mind, was assumed as necessary to interpret the sum-total of phenomena. That is to say, the need of something super-sensible, if not strictly supernatural, in order to complete the explanation, was fully recognized. Even Plato and Aristotle did not hold a conception of metaphysics favorable to its claim to a domain distinct from the particular sciences. The former did, indeed, recognize a system, or kingdom, of "ideas," which under the supremacy of the Idea of the Good was to furnish an explanation of all that men esteem actual in occurrences, or real in existence, as tested by their daily experiences. But this doctrine supersedes by abolishing all that the modern man considers essential to the conceptions and working methods of the particular sciences. Plato's definition of philosophy makes it a certain attitude of mind rather than any systematized collection of the fruits of reflective thinking as guided by the principles and discoveries of the particular sciences. With Aristotle, however, philosophy, or as he sometimes called the same thing "wisdom" (*sophia*), was identified with science in general. It, therefore, included the

theoretical sciences of mathematics, physics, and theology, and also the practical sciences of ethics and politics. But this greatest of ancient thinkers also recognized a "*First Philosophy*,"—a pre-eminently philosophical discipline which comprised the systematic and critical knowledge of the most general and fundamental principles of Being. In modern times we should call this "metaphysics" in the narrower meaning of the word; or "ontology."

After Aristotle, and until comparatively recent times, little or no advance was made in limiting or clearing up the conception of philosophy. During the mediæval period in Europe it was almost completely identified with the defence or attack of churchly dogma, or the prevalent and authorized systematic theology. Descartes, who is popularly called the "father of modern philosophy," in his three principal works included the discussion of topics which would now be divided amongst treatises on logic, theory of knowledge, metaphysics, theology, and physics. Spinoza and Leibnitz did not distinguish between philosophy on the one hand, and theology and the particular sciences on the other hand. Locke, and his successors in England and France, did not separate the metaphysics of mind from psychology and a theory of scientific method. Indeed, in England almost down to the present time the use of the word has been so loose as to justify the sarcasm of Hegel, called forth by an advertisement promising to teach, for seven shillings, "The Art of Preserving the Hair on Philosophical Principles."

It was Immanuel Kant who undertook the more precise limitation of the province of philosophy. This he thought to accomplish satisfactorily by his customary method of hard- and fixed-line divisions. All knowledge, he held, is either historical or rational; the former sets out from empirical data, the latter from principles. Again, of this rational knowledge, one kind is based on concepts; the other is based on the construction of concepts. The former alone is philosophical, the latter is mathematical. Thus does Kant with two strokes mark out the

domain of philosophy, as distinguished from the empirical sciences on the one hand, and on the other from pure mathematics. He then proceeds to divide philosophy, as related to the ends of reason, into moral philosophy and cosmical philosophy; as to its objects, into the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of morals; and as to its methods, into pure and empirical.

Careful reflection, and even a superficial acquaintance with history since Kant, convinces us that his distinctions cannot be justified in their original rigidity; nor can the divisions which grew out of them be comprehensively maintained. The development of human reason, too, has its history; and the empirical sciences have no history except as they are germinated and illuminated by the same human reason. No form of knowledge, least of all either cosmical or moral philosophy, can be "based on concepts" that are not themselves empirically derived, or based on experience.

If we were to follow in detail the various attempts which have been made since Kant by the more or less distinguished writers on philosophical topics, to define strictly their conception of their pursuit as at least a relatively independent and separate discipline, the result would be only to add to our disappointment. The inquiry, "*What is philosophy?*" cannot be answered by a direct appeal to history. Neither can we find any great authority in either science or philosophy who has succeeded, either theoretically or in his own practice, in completely and clearly dividing off the domains rightly allotted to these two forms of intellectual endeavor. All the sciences are still, either naïvely or intelligently, metaphysical;—that is, they are actually interested and concerned in the development of the oldest and most persistent branch of philosophical discipline; and no branch or school of philosophy can even begin its investigation and display of material, without a concealed or frank, but always absolute, dependence upon the positive sciences.

When, then, we hear Hegel and Trendelenburg defining phi-

losophy as the "science of the Idea"; while another writer declares that it is "the rational science of reality"; and yet another identifies it with the "metaphysics of the unconscious," or with a "theory of universal knowledge," or with "self-knowledge," or with the "systematic arrangement of the necessary *a priori* elements or factors in experience," or dubs it "the return of Metaphysic upon psychology";—we need not be dismayed or wholly discouraged by the failure to unite all authorities in the use of common terms to define their conception of divine philosophy. The authorities in science do not unite upon a definition of any one of the so-called "positive sciences"—not even of mathematics, the most *positive* of them all. Neither has any of them a favorite theory which commands a quite universal consent. While it is notorious that if one wants an infallible expert opinion regarding some complicated, concrete case to which these principles may be applied, inquiry for it is apt to result in the increase of one's confusion of judgment.

It would be a gross violation of the spirit and method of philosophy, however, to conclude that nothing is to be learned from history about its conception and its problems. On the contrary, the vague but historically true declaration that philosophy is a term which may be used to cover all the fruits of man's reflective thinking, and that it is human to philosophize, may now be converted into certain statements more strictly defined and technically correct. History teaches us—that of the particular sciences as well as the history of philosophy—that the human mind has never been, much less is it now, satisfied with those explanations of experience which terminate in the relating, causally, and concatenating of phenomena, under terms that lay claim to more or less of mathematical exactness. The intellect seeks for some more ulterior and fundamental, for some more nearly ultimate and final, explanations of human experience. The heart craves, and the conduct of life demands, such interpretations of the Being of the physical Universe, of

the natural objects and laws that are progressively revealed to human observation, and of the significance and destiny of human life, with its relation to unseen forces and agencies, as shall be in accord with humanity's most important and persistent ideals. All the positive sciences are obliged to recognize these æsthetical and quasi-moral, as well as more purely intellectual demands. Hence they are all, both in their foundations and in their upper reaches of theory and speculation, essentially philosophical. Physics and chemistry have their theory of reality as truly as does religion. The doctrine of the ether, or of the atoms, or of the ions, as the builders of the world of inorganic and organized existences as it appears in experience, is as much a system of metaphysics as was Plato's kingdom of Ideas, or Hegel's self-evolution of necessary and rational concepts. The assumptions of the physical and natural sciences, their categories and principles taken for granted, require and merit criticism, and even sceptical inquiry, as acutely and persistently as did those of the mediæval theology. It would be a desirable and beneficent thing for human knowledge, if the experts in these sciences would themselves undertake this task of critical philosophy; just as it would have been desirable for the theologians of the Middle Ages to have looked more sceptically upon their own presuppositions and contested principles. But neither science nor theology, nor any form of the so-called "humanities," can properly claim to lie outside the domain which is to be kept open always to the critical explorations of that form of reflective thinking which is called philosophizing.

But now the question recurs: Can we define philosophy as an independent and separate science or discipline? Certainly not, in any strict meaning of the words "independent" and "separate." The attempt to do this, and thus exalt philosophy as the so-called "science of the sciences" to the position of judge and arbiter, or even of sovereign, over the particular forms of intellectual life which arrogate to themselves the title to be

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called scientific, has been one of the chief causes of the modern contempt and rejection of philosophy. Thus philosophy has recently exhibited the pitiful spectacle—to borrow a phrase from Lotze—of “a mother wounded by her own children.” But after all, this may be only a part of the general tendency of an age which exalts the young and relatively thoughtless to a supremacy over the aged and more mature. And there are some plain and gratifying signs that the hostile or negligent attitude of science and philosophy toward each other is only temporary. This attitude, indeed, must ultimately pass away; since both start in the same sources of human nature and have the same final purposes in view. Only the emphasis is different; and also the extent to which each carries its endeavor to realize its own somewhat peculiar ideals.

We shall then understand better the true nature of philosophy if we consider more closely the relations in which it stands to the particular sciences. And here the first thing to notice is the important and even essential and permanent resemblances of the two. As has already been indicated, both science and philosophy arise in the rational, human impulse to understand—that is, to explain and interpret—the totality of human experience. In their most successful form, both must largely employ the same method of carefully guarded and systematic reflective thinking. In order, however, to separate between the two, and thus to establish in its more modern form the claim for philosophy to have a place among the intellectual and practical interests of the race, as a somewhat independent discipline, it is necessary to emphasize further certain of their more important differences. At the same time, it can scarcely be too often repeated that these differences, no matter how much they are accentuated by the progress of both, can never render science and philosophy more than relatively independent of each other. In the first place, then, the particular sciences are distinguished from philosophy, by their standing in a more intimate relation to the phenomena, or facts of experience, and to the formulas

which express the relations ascertained to exist, with more or less of uniformity, among the phenomena. It is by selecting certain groups and orders of these phenomena, and by making of them a special study, that the so-called *particular* sciences come to exist. They are also sometimes called *positive* sciences, because they are supposed to limit themselves to undeniable affirmations of fact, abjuring all metaphysics or appeal to occult causes and to other doubtful sources of explanation. As a matter of fact, however, no form of human knowledge can render itself strictly "particular," or separate from other branches of scientific endeavor. Each *part* is part of a *whole*. The universe is that whole; and every particular science soon finds itself involved with phenomena, and confronted by problems, which belong almost equally to the domain cultivated by some other particular science. Physics and chemistry cannot be kept wholly apart; chemistry is part of biology; biology is complicated with psychology; anthropology and sociology cannot be cultivated except in dependence upon psychology; then follow such pursuits as literature, history, law, theology, etc., which, whether we call them sciences or not, are less "particular" and "positive," because of their sharing in so many and such complex groupings of inter-related phenomena. No wonder, then, that there has never been any agreement reached as to a special scheme for the strict classification of all the so-called sciences. No wonder that the modern scientific expert strives to specialize in the knowledge of some limited class of phenomena, while at the same time paying respectful attention to what other experts have to say about facts and laws in parts overlapping his own, but in which these others have chosen to erect claims to special expert knowledge. In fact, no mining district in the West is more confused in respect of superficial and underground claims, both legitimately "staked out" and also "jumped," than are the fields of modern science.

Now, modern philosophy does not invade this field with any claim to a special part of it as its very own. It is not a "par-

ticular" science; above all it is not "positive," in the positivistic meaning of this much-abused word. It is general; it aims to be universal. This, too, must not be understood as a claim to possess or to dominate the fields belonging to the different sciences. The philosopher does not aspire to be the president of a syndicate which shall have bought up, or grabbed, all of the separate mining claims. On the contrary, he just wishes to know how much, and what, genuine product—pure gold, etc.—has been extracted and coined from them all. To translate the figure of speech: Modern philosophy, in its effort to vindicate its right to an important place in the intellectual and practical interests of the race, is a humble inquirer, sitting at the feet of the particular sciences. It has laid aside its former pride of superior lineage and larger heritage. Indeed, the aspect of modest confidence and half-expressed awe with which many youthful philosophers are looking up, as into the face of some divinity, toward the "scientist," to catch his approving though somewhat scornful smile, is not by any means always justified by the certainties of modern science as contrasted with the uncertainties of ancient philosophy. But the would-be philosopher who knows his business is well aware that the attempt to deduce the facts and laws of the positive sciences from some form of a theory of the Idea, or of the Absolute, must be forever abandoned. Such an one knows also that philosophy must take the world as science finds it. For it is the *real world*, and not any merely conjectured or might-be world, which philosophy desires to help science more profoundly to explain, more fully and satisfactorily to interpret. And since the philosopher cannot possibly become an expert knower at first hand in every branch of human knowledge, cannot carefully survey all the groups of phenomena, subject them, wherever intrinsically possible, to experimental testing, and formulate the uniform sequences and causal relations existing between them; he gratefully receives all this at the hands of the most competent authorities. Even in this way, if he aims

at the completeness of the true philosophical ideal, his task is infinitely complex, and destined to ceaseless undoing,—although it may be only partial,—and to doing over again in better form by other hands. But this is only to say that philosophy, like science, is an affair of development, the conclusion of which cannot be foreseen in time; and the final form of which cannot be predicted with precision. Hence the need which modern philosophy has of the particular sciences in their modern form is urgent and indispensable. So far forth, philosophy is absolutely dependent upon the particular sciences for the material which it assumes to treat by the method of reflective thinking, in order to vindicate its own right to be regarded by these sciences as of important interest to them all.

Not only for its material, but for its method also, modern philosophy is largely indebted to the particular sciences, as they are themselves cultivated in modern form. Philosophical speculation, which has its head in heaven or in the clouds, without having its feet upon the ground, is no longer tolerable. But it cannot be forgotten that the methods of the particular sciences are themselves a comparatively modern affair. When science and philosophy were more frankly mixed, or unconsciously muddled, than they now are, unverifiable conjecture or groundless speculation were thought quite adequate to establish the opinions of each in the minds of the majority of the devotees of both. And if science is at present more insistent upon method than is philosophy, this may be due quite as much to differences in the intrinsic character of the two pursuits as to differences in the spirit and temper of those who pursue them.

Doubtless, in modern times the tables seem to have been completely turned against philosophy. And, indeed, it is not Positivism alone, of the more formal sort, which proposes entirely to dispense with philosophy. Plainly its divinity is much hedged in, wherever it is not wholly dethroned. Just about as plainly, this distrust and contempt are largely the fault of

philosophers themselves. For the "mother of the sciences" has been as much discredited by the mob of the immature and unscrupulous within her household, as have the particular sciences which owe to her so largely their birth and early nurture. Perhaps the proportion of quacks is no greater in the one than in the other. At any rate, there can be little doubt that philosophy has suffered in the loss of consideration and prestige, even more than have the sciences, from sensationalism and the attempt to be interesting without being careful of exactness and truthfulness, as setting the standards of the highest success. Just as we once heard one of the world's greatest mathematicians say that no person ought to deal with the conceptions and formulas of the higher mathematics, who did not appreciate and revel in their beauty; so do we think that no one has any business to undertake the technical pursuit of philosophy who does not have, and keep, the serious and reverent spirit toward its conceptions and its problems. If there is any kind of human undertaking for which one ought to prepare one's self by thinking soberly, long, and hard, it is writing or speaking on philosophy.

It is only necessary, however, to understand, even superficially, the nature and achievements of the modern so-called positive sciences, in order to discover how the tables may again be turned. For, indeed, their need of more sound philosophy is very evident and very great. In fact, the whole body of them is either penetrated with, or incorporated of, the products of reflective thinking,—and this, in philosophy's most despised branch of metaphysics. That this is necessarily so, and how it is so, will be made clearer when we come to treat of metaphysics as including every assumption, however unverifiable, and every theory, however scientific, which deals with the nature and relations of what we call "real," or "actual," whether of things or of minds. Even to mention this fact with regard to the most ordinary and approved doings of the workmen in the

different particular sciences is to call attention to two important offices for science in general which philosophy may fulfill. In the first place, it may criticize the categories, or fundamental conceptions of the particular sciences. In the second place, it may criticize the syntheses of the particular sciences, and may supplement them by, or even substitute for them, syntheses of its own.

How naïvely, and even confusedly, current scientific conceptions are employed, becomes abundantly evident to the most superficial inquirer. In vain have the authors of scientific treatises striven hitherto in their efforts to agree precisely upon what they mean by their terms as applied to actual events and real existences. The right of each author or investigator in science or philosophy to define for himself the conceptions which he proposes consistently to attach to the terms he uses, need not be contested. But the claim that he is using them in the way most appropriate to the correct functioning of the human mind, and to the truths of nature's processes and laws, always admits of further critical examination. Moreover, the underlying assumption of the student of any positive science is that his conceptions and conclusions may be brought into some kind of harmony with the conceptions and conclusions of the students of other and kindred positive sciences. If, therefore, science will undertake, and carry to a successful issue, the criticism of its own categories, with all the metaphysical implicates which these categories involve, no one else should greet the achievement with so supreme satisfaction as the devotee of philosophy. But such work of criticism requires a profound knowledge of psychology, logic, the theory of knowledge, and metaphysics. And why a mind equally gifted and equally studious should not acquire, by life-long devotion, some technical skill and superiority of method and achievement, in these subjects, as well as in those treated by the physical and natural sciences, it is difficult to see. We conclude, then, that modern

science pre-eminently needs modern philosophy for the criticism of its own (as of all) categories.

Another urgent need of philosophy by science is closely connected with the foregoing. The positive sciences do not stop, and ought not to stop, to consider the nature, laws, limits and guaranty of all knowledge. They have neither the right, nor the duty, to be sceptical as to the possibility of discovering the actual facts and true causes (*verae causae*) of what they regard as an "external" and independently existent "Nature." The proper scientific attitude toward natural phenomena is one of naïve trust or unquestioning confidence. To express it in more strictly philosophical terms, the scientific attitude toward natural phenomena is that of common-sense realism. But all the assumptions of this attitude, and all its conclusions with reference to the essential nature and ultimate meaning of the physical universe, are profoundly affected by the opinions which one holds with regard to the nature, laws, limits, and guaranty of all knowledge. A critical investigation here is undertaken by another branch of philosophy, which calls itself epistemology, or theory of knowledge.

Thus far we have confined the consideration of the relations of science and philosophy to the natural and physical sciences, in the narrower meaning of these terms. In the more genial, but defensible meaning of the word "science," however, there is a large class of the so-called psychological and ethical sciences with which philosophy has even more important and mutually helpful relations. In all these cases, the remoter relations are mediated by the intimate and essential relations which exist between philosophy, on the one hand, and psychology and ethics, on the other. Indeed, it is only until very recently, and even now not at all universally, or in any case very successfully, that the effort has been made to cultivate psychology and philosophy apart. Locke's *Essay* has been pronounced—however without warrant—"the most important offspring of modern philosophy." And even since the time of

Locke, in England and Scotland, psychology and philosophy have been inextricably mixed. The same thing has been scarcely less true in Germany. Even Herbart, who initiated one of the most fruitful attempts to subject mental phenomena to a strictly scientific treatment, declares: "The whole series of the forms of experience must be investigated twice over, metaphysically and psychologically. Both investigations must be side by side, and be compared together long enough for every one to see their complete difference so plainly as never to be in danger of confusing them again." But in saying this, Herbart meant that mental phenomena, in their appearance in consciousness, differ as greatly from their true causes, their *real* explanations, as physical appearances do from the atoms, ions, and invisible forces, which are evoked in their explanation. Wundt, also, the chief figure in modern experimental psychology, has declared the relation of this science to philosophy to be so close and peculiar that "the partition of sovereignty between the two is an abstract scheme which, in the presence of actuality, always appears unsatisfactory." The extreme followers of the empirical tendency in Germany, France, and America, who have proclaimed the possibility and the necessity of a science of "psychology without a soul," have invariably showed themselves in fact to be just as naïvely and crudely metaphysical as their brethren in the natural and physical sciences. This is so of necessity; for the presence of an agent—call it a mind, soul, spirit, or what you will—whose are the phenomena, and who manifests its reality to itself in and through the phenomena, renders it absolutely and forever impossible to cultivate a science of psychology without the metaphysical implicate of a "soul." Even to use the term science without implying this inference from self-consciousness is absurd. Psychology may, however, behave, though with less propriety and chance of success, as physics and chemistry behave. It may accept the uncritical view of common-sense realism, and go about its business in the form of discovering and concatenat-

ing the phenomena. Even thus, however, all the phenomena are to be explained only in terms of the self-recognitions of a so-called soul.

The study of ethics, too, cannot free itself from the obligation to become a moral philosophy. For the study of the phenomena of human conduct,—the noting, tabulating, and statistical handling of the customs and social relations of men—is not ethics at all. We do not touch the border-land of man's *moral* nature and *moral* life, until we consider these customs and relations as themselves related to ideals. To study *what is* simply,—this is not to study ethics. That-which-is must be looked at in the light of human conceptions and principles as to *that-which-ought-to-be*. But this is at once to lift us from what is merely phenomenal into the sphere where the phenomena themselves are saturated with thoughts and sentiments and implicates, having reference to realities which, by their very nature, cannot be given a concrete presentation in consciousness. The sources, underlying principles, and the sanctions, of these ideals afford unfailing stimulus to, and make unceasing demands upon, the cultured insight and disciplined reflective thinking of the reflective mind.

In these and other ways do all the psychological and ethical sciences appeal for help to philosophy. The more complex these sciences become, the more distinct and imperative is the appeal. Thus it is still, and probably always will be, more correct to speak of a philosophy of literature, a philosophy of history, a philosophy of art, than to speak, with any strictness, of a science of either of these subjects. Even that conglomerate of scientific fragments which is called "sociology," or by some similar name, is much more dependent on psychology and on ethics for any approach to an independent scientific form, than upon the application of scientific method to any separable groups of phenomena.

There is a second important respect in which the particular sciences, both the physical and the psychological and moral,

are in need of philosophy. This is for the undertaking of the supremely difficult, and indeed never to be completed, task of attempting a synthesis of human knowledge. The hope of making a speculative leap to the height of that one Principle, or indissoluble corporation of principles, from which we may deduce with a quasi-mathematical certainty, the explanation of all human experience—whether this hope be turned toward the scientific imagination for its latest and most perfect construction of the Ether, or to theological faith for its most rational conception of God—may quite properly be abandoned. If it is the province of either science or philosophy ever to realize this hope, its actualization is obviously to be indefinitely delayed. It may be that there is no such principle in reality. Indeed, the picture of an ever-developing Universe, as well as the conception of an Absolute Person, is not favorable to so machine-like a process. That is no genuine development which contains all in the first; that is no true person, who predetermines all by one act of Will.

All the particular sciences strive, however, to gather together their discoveries in some unifying way; they aim to reduce to the smallest number the kinds of entities, the efficient causes, the formulas called laws, or principles, with which they have to deal. In a word, they aim at unification, at synthesis. They are jealous of differences and contradictions; they abhor gaps and inconsistencies; they are provoked and stimulated by exceptions; they feel in duty bound to expand their formulas, to modify their hypotheses, and even to alter their conceptions of law, when newly discovered and incompatible phenomena seem to demand this. In their relations with one another, however, the attempt to reconcile differences, to adjust claims, and by introducing some larger measure of harmony, to approach with better spirit, if not with larger success, the higher and highest possible forms of synthesis, is not an easy task for the scientific mind. As we have already said, it is not an *easy* task, but a supremely difficult task, for any form of reflective thinking. If, however, the student of philosophy, in its historical

development and in its scientific foundations, is not somehow especially qualified for undertaking this task, then the fault is his own personal fault. For the philosophical spirit and the study of philosophy are the best possible preparation for making such difficult speculative syntheses.

It would seem plain, then, that modern science and modern philosophy are reciprocally dependent, and in constant need, each of the other. Philosophy needs the spirit that applies the scientific method to all the ascertained truths and verifiable conceptions, which the particular sciences can impart. These sciences, in turn, need philosophy as the teacher of psychology, logic, and ethics, as the critic of their fundamental conceptions and underlying assumptions; and as an aid to harmony and unification of the facts and laws which are the more special possession of each. And if science and philosophy, in these modern times, do not actually fraternize and greatly assist each other, the fault and the disgrace cannot be charged to the nature of either, but must be laid at the door of certain ignorant and crabbed students of both.

The attempt has customarily been made to render the definition of philosophy clearer by stating it in terms of the solution of some one Problem. This attempt, too, has led to no little confusion. For the inquiry, "What is *the* Problem of Philosophy?" admits of as many different answers as there are different views concerning the nature, sources, and method of philosophy. Of course, its problem, since its method is that of reflective thinking upon the facts and laws of human experience, is one of explanation and interpretation. But all the problems of the particular sciences have a similar end in view. Thus science and philosophy agree in their effort to investigate the grounds of Being and of Knowledge; and thus, more and more, to make the organism of human thinking a faithful representative of the organism of the world.

It would seem more profitable, then, to speak of the problems of philosophy, and to postpone for the present the attempt to summarize them all in the statement of one supreme and

all-inclusive problem. This may be done in dependence upon the distinctions already made, which, however, only suggest the vague and movable boundaries between the fields of the modern particular sciences and the domain claimed as peculiarly its own by modern philosophy. From this point of view, therefore, we need to recall what has already been said about the relations between these sciences and the attempt to render philosophy a quasi-independent discipline. First of all, then, there is the Problem of Knowledge. What is it to know? What can man know? What view must we take of the claims of Dogmatism, Scepticism, Criticism, and Agnosticism—of all the more prominent attitudes of the human mind in respect to a theory of cognition? Inseparably correlated with this, and indeed a sort of other side to the same shield, is the so-called Problem of Being, which is proposed by the naïve or reasoned metaphysics of ordinary knowledge and of the positive sciences. What are the categories, or—so to say—necessary qualifications of a claim to belong to the really existent? How shall we interpret these categories, and harmonize them in one Theory of Reality, which may be found to be really, though unconsciously, assumed by all of the particular sciences? There are, also, then, the problems afforded by the Ideals of humanity in the two principal forms of the Ideal of Ethics and the Ideal of *Æsthetics*. It will be found that these ideals, not only afford sources and principles for the regulation of human conduct and every form of artistic endeavor, but that they also interpenetrate and largely control the assumptions and inductions of the physical and natural sciences. And, finally, there is the Problem of the so-called Absolute—that supreme but never perfectly attainable goal of human endeavor, recognized as such by both philosophy and science. This may also be called the Problem of the Ideal-Real; for its solution, if it could be found, would help us to interpret aright the more nearly ultimate meaning of the answer to all the other problems.

CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHY: ITS METHOD AND ITS DIVISIONS

THE most essential thing about the method of philosophy is its spirit. Without the right spirit no high measure of success in philosophizing can possibly be attained. It was this thought which the great Greek thinker, Plato, forever embodied in the very term "philosophy." The wisdom (*σοφία*) which is identical with absolute knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), belongs to God alone; to man it belongs, the rather, to be a lover of knowledge. And since in Plato's thought, philosophy moved in the sphere of the Idea, which is the aesthetically and ethically perfect of its kind, the highest in the kingdom of ideas is the Idea of the Good. Therefore the true philosopher is he who sets his affections on what is most real and good; and the impulse to philosophize is a deep and passionate longing of human nature to have the most intimate intercourse with what is noblest and best in the realm of truth and reality. The root of philosophy is *Eros*—the effort of mortal man to attain the immortal. Such is the thought also of some of the Upanishads.

This fanciful and figurative way of characterizing the nature of philosophy and the spirit which belongs to the true philosopher has, when translated into sober prose, been on the whole, illustrated and enforced by its history. In general, thinkers and writers on philosophical problems have regarded their task as one of high moral and intellectual concernment. Oftener than otherwise, they have considered it as arising from an impulse intimately related to the sources of religious experience; and they have looked upon philosophy itself as a sort of hand-maid, or partner, or faithful critic and censor, of religion. In fact, also, the distinction between theology and one of the

most important branches of philosophy cannot be defined or practically enforced. A spirit serious, impressed with the mystery of the world of external nature and of human life, passionately—however fallibly—devoted to the exploration and defense of the most comprehensive and important truths, has, with few exceptions, qualified that distinguished line of thinkers who have most influenced the reflective thought of the race. Even where they have been sharply, or perhaps scornfully, critical of the existing dogmatism in morals and religion, the display of this temper has been most frequently motived by the true spirit of philosophy. The spirit of frivolity, of contention, of scoffing criticism for its own sake, of selfish seeking for distinction, of ambition for mere novelty and of bidding for applause, are not the spirit of the philosopher.

Briefly analyzed, the true philosophical spirit shows itself, first of all, as a spirit of freedom. It demands the rights of reason absolutely untrammelled by *extraneous* bonds or obligations. But this is because of its faith that human reason is the organ of Divine Reason, the source of the light that “lighteth every man coming into the world.” In this respect, at least, every kind and school of philosophy is rationalistic. As Chalybäus has well said, the free critical movement which prevails in all the sciences of the day is essentially philosophy. It is probable, that modern science owes its freedom more to the devout and truth-loving heretics, who revolted against the principle of extraneous control of reason by authority, than to any other class of men. But the positive side of this philosophical freedom is an obligation to examine critically all the presuppositions of every particular form of human knowledge. The obligation extends even to those postulates of all reason on which philosophy itself is founded. The end desired and approached, however, is the confidence of reason in itself progressively to attain to truth, when open to the Source of truth and faithfully obeying its own laws. The freedom of philosophy, therefore, does not imply the possession by reason of

the power to be either more or less than human reason. It is chiefly because Kant attacked this problem with such diligence, acuteness of criticism, and complete renunciation of previously existing authorities, that he took so controlling a place in the development of modern philosophy.

The spirit of philosophy is also one of complete and unselfish devotion to truth. This spirit also it shares with the best of the students of the particular sciences. Nor is the essential duty to maintain such a partnership at all abridged by the undoubted fact that the professional teachers of both science and philosophy have not infrequently had an eye on their own fame and advancement, or on the security of their tenure of office, and their standing with the appointing power, rather than both eyes, with a single heart, solely on the truth.

From this spirit of devotion to truth, as in the case of science so in the case of philosophy, there arises a spirit of humility and teachableness, mingled with independence. The great discoverers in science have in general had this philosophical spirit, just as the greater minds in philosophy have been willing to sit at the feet of science and be taught its discoveries and learn the proper application to their subjects, of the so-called scientific methods. Neither can afford to be arrogant in the presence of the other. It is confessedly true that philosophy must have the humble and docile spirit toward science. And, conversely, there is truth in Haeckel's complaint of "the lack of philosophical culture of most of the physicists of the day," as of those who "cherish the strange illusion that they can construct the edifice of natural science from *facts* without a *philosophical connection* of the same." For the prophecy of Herbart will always come true: "It cannot be otherwise than that the neglect of philosophy should result in a frivolous or perverted treatment of the fundamental principles of all the sciences." With the spirit of humility and teachableness goes, as a matter of course, the spirit of patience.

For reasons such as these the dependence of philosophy upon the mental and moral characteristics of the philosophical thinker is especially close. More than in any of the particular sciences, it is the man himself, as a rational self-conscious spirit, who, in philosophy, chiefly determines the correct and successful use of the method. It follows from the very nature of philosophy and of its problems, that the ideal of a completed philosophical system will never be realized; but the contribution toward it which every workman can make depends in no small degree upon the wealth of his experience, maturing into personal character.

It must not be concluded, however, that thorough acquaintance with, and faithful use of, the proper philosophical method is of small importance. This method can be described in its main features as being scientific, although it has not the same definite and restricted characteristics which belong to the method peculiar to any one of the positive sciences.

The methods of research and of testing results, as employed by each of the modern positive sciences, are developments which have proceeded hand in hand with the developments that constitute the body of truth ascertained by the same sciences. In many of them, instruments constructed upon the principles of the science, as already discovered, have become indispensable for making new discoveries. This, for example, is true of the microscope, spectroscope, and all the modern methods of analysis, in the physico-chemical sciences; of microscope, cultures, methods of obtaining and using staining fluids, serums, etc., in the biological sciences. Plainly, we cannot speak of the use by philosophy of any similar forms of the scientific method. The so-called "introspective method" in psychology, which is the indispensable adjunct of every other method, more nearly resembles the way of arriving at conclusions which is appropriate to philosophy. And, indeed, let the individual thinker strive as he may to free his mind from prejudice, and to broaden and deepen his thoughts so as to include all that is

most profound and universal in the experience of the race; it will still remain true that the stamp of his individuality will be upon the results of his philosophizing. In some real meaning of the words: Each man's philosophy is his very own. But in a similar meaning of the words: Each man's world is individual, peculiar, his very own. In the religious life, each man's *God* is *his God*. Were it not so, the narrowness and pettiness of each individual series or collection of uniform experiences would witness to the poverty of Reality and of its Ground. The temperamental limitation of all systems of philosophy is indeed a necessary characteristic; but it is by no means an unmixed evil. For every man must, in large measure, find the solution of the problems of philosophy as they lie within his own experience.

In these days, however, for any individual thinker to attempt to evolve a system of philosophy from his own "insides," as it were, is to merit failure and even contempt. The world is old; and there is a long history of speculative thinking lying behind the men of the present day. Again, the world is new; and this new world which the modern sciences are disclosing in ever-varying and increasingly amazing forms and proportions, chiefly concerns the philosopher of the modern type. The philosopher aims to think for others, and not for himself alone. The rather, does he aim by his thinking to stimulate and guide others to think for themselves, with a genuine philosophical spirit, over the problems which belong in some special way within the philosophical domain. He must, therefore, prepare himself with even greater care than is demanded of one who aspires to be a discoverer and leader in any of the particular sciences.

There are three classes of studies, an acquaintance with which is requisite for the successful use of method in philosophizing. The first of these is so-called "rational psychology," or the philosophy of mind. Experimental psychology has no special affiliations with philosophy, or special value as an equip-

ment for the successful pursuit of philosophy. It is, the rather, allied with the physical and natural sciences. But the more ultimate problems raised when one inquires as to the existence and nature of the soul, and as to the soul's relation to the body and to the external world, are not only in themselves considered, among the most profound of philosophical problems, but they are also metaphysical inquiries of such a nature that one's attitude toward them essentially influences, if it does not strictly determine, one's conclusions with regard to all the problems of philosophy. The reason that is in you and me is indeed our own; but it is also our share in the universal reason.

The second subject with which the would-be philosopher must be familiar in order to make the best use of method in philosophizing, is the history of philosophy. There is no intellectual interest of the race,—not even any one of the most *positive* of the sciences,—which can be understood, much less cultivated, in its larger aspects, without an acquaintance with its history. If, for example, the modern physicist could be made to appreciate how, in the historical development of his science, the vain attempt has been frequently made, to explain the phenomena while dispensing with either of the three categories of "Substance," "Force," and "Law," he would not be so likely to contribute one more effort to the same inevitable result of failure. Entity theories, that have no dynamics in them; dynamical theories that deny substantial existences; and both, when they overlook the immanence of mind;—all three are refuted by the history of physics. More emphatically true is this certainty of failure when any system of philosophy neglects to take account of either of those greater truths, the exclusive or too emphatic recognition of which, has given rise to the endless succession of schools in philosophy. Some few such works have indeed had the characteristics of those great pieces of literature to which the race has attached the rare fame of securing a value for all time. But most have resembled the

modern novel, which becomes popular by pandering to the craving for sensationalism, and is the more quickly thrown aside when it ceases to satisfy even this craving.

The study of the works of the masters in philosophy, and the tracing of the currents of reflective thinking as they have swept back and forth, or have stagnated in certain quarters, is part of the preparation essential to the modern method of philosophizing. Our philosophy to-day is only to-day's fragment of the reflective thinking of the race. The historical and pragmatic view of man's development in reflective thinking is a necessary organ of philosophical research.

An acquaintance with the particular sciences in their modern form is the third requisite for the successful pursuit of philosophy. This must be understood, however, with many grains of allowance. With the endless details and technical methods of these sciences, it is an impossible task for any human mind to keep up even a superficial acquaintance. Indeed, to attempt the task would render one unfit for the successful pursuit of philosophy. But it is not with these details and technical methods that philosophy chiefly concerns itself. Philosophy's concern is rather with the underlying assumptions of all human science, and with its most general categories and principles. To learn these, as has already been explained, philosophy sits at the feet of the sciences, in a humble, teachable, and patient, but free critical spirit.

It has already been repeatedly affirmed that the method characteristic of philosophy is the extent and thoroughness with which it makes use of the mind's powers of rational reflection. This vague statement may be still further defined by speaking of the method of philosophy as both analytic and synthetic. The analytic part of philosophical discipline concerns itself chiefly with the collection and critical sifting of material. This material comes from the three sources of rational psychology, the history of philosophy, and the particular sciences on the side of their postulates and most general conceptions

and principles. In philosophizing we discern, select, and freely criticize as much as possible of this material.

But attempts at synthesis follow the work of analysis; and the conceptions, truths, and principles discovered by analysis are the ground of standing from which, so to say, the synthesis of philosophy takes its flight. Just as all the particular sciences aim at a harmonizing synthesis, which shall accomplish a more complete appearance of unity within each one's allotted sphere, so does philosophy aim at a still higher and more completely harmonizing synthesis, which may result in the semblance of a unity covering all their particular spheres. Every time science speaks of a Universe, a Nature, or a World which is in any manner or measure One, it gives the hint of a similar attempt at synthesis. Philosophy aims to expose the content of this Unity; to show how, in more precise manner and larger measure, this "Universe," this "Nature," this "World," may be conceived of as *really* one.

In a word, then, the method of philosophy may be described as an attempt by reflective thinking at the highest and most complete synthesis of principles, based upon the most thorough and exhaustive analysis.

The division of the different intellectual interests of humanity, and of their products, depends upon the definition of each, and upon the method employed in the cultivation of each. Thus the proper classification of the positive sciences still affords a problem to be fought over by those who, for the most part, prefer logical arrangement to substantial knowledge. The same thing is true, in only smaller degree, of the so-much contested method of making divisions, or fence-lines, between these sciences; and of breaking up into small allotments the larger domains previously assigned to each. But nature does not draw fixed lines for the classification of her products, whether Things or Minds; and her seemingly most reasonable achievements do not easily submit to a logical schematizing. "Divide and rule," is indeed a well-worn maxim for the stu-

dent of physical and vital processes; but for science, the dividing is profitable, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the concentration and increase of intensity which the limitation permits. Indeed, excessive attention to mere classifying tends to pettiness and to an exaggeration of the value of specialization rather than to the gaining of a firm grasp upon those greater problems of science, toward the solution of which all the particular sciences have their contribution to make. Too frequently, also, it arises out of an ambition on the part of the so-called discoverer to signalize the distinction with his own name.

What is true of division between and within the particular sciences is true—although to a less extent—of the Divisions of Philosophy. But there cannot easily be quite the same confusion and debate over this subject as over the classification of the particular sciences. For the details of the actual world—the infinite variety and cross-divisions, the seeming cross-purposes and baffling contradictions, of Reality—have already been reduced to some order when they are handed over for further reflection by science to philosophy. Thus philosophy escapes many of the annoyances and perplexities which follow from continuous wranglings over the often unimportant matter of making divisions.

For our part, we take little interest in debate about the best method of arranging the several groups of philosophical questions; and we have no disposition at all to quarrel with any one who prefers a different arrangement from our own. While we cannot wholly agree with Lotze when he says that each one of these groups “appears to be self-coherent and to require an investigation of a specific kind”; we are entirely of his opinion that “little value” is to be attributed “to the reciprocal arrangement of the single groups under one another.” The history of the subject shows, however, that certain great divisions have been recognized from the beginning of systematic philosophy down to the present time. It also throws light upon the fun-

damental and unchanging truth that the principles of Being and of Knowledge may be treated as giving rise to two somewhat distinct groups of problems; and yet that these groups are everywhere in contact, and are dependent for their life and formative energy upon each other, at many vital points. Still further: In both the realm of physical nature and the realm of thought, man recognizes the influence, and the presence in concrete form, of ideals. The distinction which is thus forced upon our consideration, between the fact of what-is and the idea of what-ought-to-be, has also served as a basis for another way of arranging the groups of philosophical problems.

It is only, then, as a matter of convenience that the following Divisions of Philosophy, or groupings of its inter-related problems, are proposed in the form of a Table:

I. Philosophy of the Real: Metaphysics, in the wider meaning of the term, as belonging to all the particular sciences.	II. Philosophy of the Ideal: Idealology, or Rational Teleology.
1. Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology).	1. Ethics, or Moral Philosophy (the Ideal of Conduct, sometimes called Practical Philosophy)
2. Metaphysics, as Ontology.	2. Aesthetics (the Ideal of Art)
A. Philosophy of Nature.	III. The Supreme Ideal-Real, The Absolute. The Final Problem of Synthetic Philosophy, —especially in the form of Philosophy of Religion.
B. Philosophy of Mind.	

And now dropping all technicalities, let us gather together and express in more popular form, the results of our inquiry into the sources, nature, method and divisions of philosophy. The roots of the impulses which have led in comparatively modern times to the attempt at cultivating systematic philosophy as an intellectual interest separate from the particular sciences, lie deep in human nature. They are so deep as to be ineradicable. The brain of humanity would have to be reor-

ganized, the heart of humanity torn asunder, and the life-blood cooled in its veins, in order wholly to destroy these impulses. The first and most pressing demands for knowledge on the part of the race do, indeed, concern the practical problems of physical needs and physical comfort. The better gratification of those demands furnishes a call to the study of the forces and products of nature which contribute to the satisfaction of these needs and to the increase of this comfort. But such impulses alone do not account for the rise and the development of the particular sciences. The desire to *know*, for the sake of the mind's satisfaction in knowledge, furnishes an impulse as old and as universal as the history of the race. In this impulse chiefly it is that the particular sciences have their birth.

No form of science, however,—and the less, the more precise and particular it is,—can fully satisfy man's desire for knowledge. This is true of knowledge, whether regarded as wisdom, and leading to right and successful practice of affairs, or regarded as so-called "knowledge for its own sake." For the human mind, when once aroused, longs to know the world as a whole, as a unity which shall somehow solve the puzzles and contradictions of man's concrete experiences. To live the fullest life and to obtain the completest satisfaction, we seem to require, as something over and above every particular form of adaptation to environment, an adaptation to the Universe in the large.

How shall I adjust myself to air, water and soil, to forest, brook, and sky, so as to live in comfort and plenty? How shall I adapt my actions so as to propitiate and gain the benevolent, while avoiding the evil, influences of the invisible spirits which people and vitalize all these material objects? These are questions which stimulated the desire for knowledge of the so-called primitive man. But when, through the progress of the sciences or of the religious creeds, which gather and impart such items of knowledge, the conception of man's environment changes and expands, the desire to reap the full benefit of a

more satisfactory adjustment to this environment also changes and expands. The knowledge of physical forces becomes more complex and profound. The mastery of these forces becomes more complete; they are made more manageable and serviceable to mankind. Why should I not share in this knowledge, to the better satisfaction of my intellectual interests, and to the increased benefit of the conduct of life? The laws of man's social nature and social development, the history of humanity's achievements, and the conditions of its moral improvement and welfare, are being disclosed. Why should I not learn how to rise in the social scale; and why not have the means for the realization of my ambition to rise placed within my grasp and at my disposal? But there is coming to humanity an increasing recognition of some sort of fundamental Unity, which may bind together and furnish the Ultimate Cause of my environment and my experiences; and not of mine only but of those of the race. Why should not I wish to know what others have thought about this problem; and why should I not, having such knowledge of others' thinking, resolve also to think reflectively for myself? Nor is the last problem purely speculative. On the contrary, according to the answer which I give to it—however doubtfully and tentatively—will largely be conditioned my estimate as to what in my own experience and conduct shall be esteemed of highest value. My theory of reality will inevitably go far toward determining the theory and practice of my daily life. But to reflect upon this class of problems is to philosophize. To come to conclusions upon them, however negative or sceptical the conclusions may be, is to have some theory as to the meaning of the World, and as to the correct interpretation of the values of Life. And to put such a theory into control over conduct is to live philosophically; or in other words, it is to live rationally, and as a man ought to live. For it is in these most exalted realms of thought and of conduct that philosophy unites with morality and religion to secure the fullest measure of the highest good for a rational mind.

CHAPTER III

SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

THAT the development of man's reflective thinking, which we call philosophy, should result in diverse answers to its inquiries, becomes a matter of course when we consider the limitations of the human mind and the essential character of philosophical problems. For the same reasons the thinkers themselves, the so-called philosophers, may be divided into groups which emphasize their similarities or their differences. Hence arise what historians are pleased to call "schools of philosophy." The existence of these schools, their perpetual recurrence in somewhat changed form, their ceaseless discussions and wranglings, and their failure, after all, to arrive at any considerable agreement, have been made the reproach of philosophy. Nor is there anything new in this. The earliest works in Greek reflective thinking abound in criticism of the popular or "common-sense" views of life and reality, and in gentle or more pungent sarcasms, directed toward the sophists as pretenders to scientific but uncritical knowledge. On the other hand, Greek comedy is full of passages ridiculing the substance of alleged truth, and the style of expressing it, which characterized the leaders and their disciples in "divine" philosophy. Then and there, as everywhere and at all times, much of the best and most influential thought took other literary forms than that of technical philosophizing. Indeed, in point of real merit, both for ideas and for the manner of their expression, the greater Greek tragedies have few peers in the literature of ethical philosophy. And in more modern times, Goethe's "Faust" is as truly a work of philosophy as is Spinoza's "Ethica."

There is much misunderstanding in the popular mind about

the nature and significance of schools of philosophy. No small part of this misunderstanding has been fostered by the pedagogical awkwardness and primness of the historians of the subject. For the writers on the history of philosophy, in their vain effort to give the appearance of a science to the narration of the truth, are prone, like other so-called "scientists," to deal with their material in a more imposing way by establishing in it a system of doubtful or imperfect classifications. Hence the manner of grouping (a grouping which is not infrequently a kind of inconsiderate throwing together) different thinkers and writers, under characteristics conveniently chosen to suit his purposes by the classifier himself. Briefly to explain philosophers as belonging to such and such schools is much easier, and sounds quite as learned, as sympathetically to interpret the totality of their philosophical thoughts. A further pretence of writing a scientific history may then be made by showing how each thinker's school was determined for him, mechanically as it were, by the physical and intellectual environment in the midst of which his thinking was done.

In order properly to understand the character and the significance of schools of philosophy, the following truths should constantly be kept in mind: In philosophy, as in war, science, and religion, there have been a few, but only a few, really great and epoch-making names. These men cannot be explained as the product of their own time; and while they undoubtedly manifest their personal qualities in the character of their thinking, they cannot fitly be spoken of as belonging to any particular school. To account for them, we may as well call them "inspired geniuses"; for they give voice and shape to the unexpressed, or only half-expressed, thoughts and sentiments of their times, and of succeeding times, regarding the most satisfactory interpretation of Nature and of human Life. This they do, because they are endowed with a blending of profound intuition with that ability for calm, prolonged reflection, which is pervaded with the free and reverent spirit of philos-

ophy. Such is the special fitness required for the highest success in this kind of intellectual and spiritual endeavor. Thus these geniuses become founders of *schools*, only in a modified meaning of the latter word. Their school-craft is not by deliberate purpose or because their thinking is confined within the limits of any one "school-form"; it is rather because they naturally and inevitably attract to themselves a body of disciples for some one or more of the principal aspects of their universal and eternally true thoughts. The following which they create consists of those who find themselves thinking essentially like these masters, in respect to some one or more of their dominating convictions and opinions.

On this fact depends another; for if we seek to know in its completeness what these greater thinkers have revealed about the various problems with which philosophy is chiefly concerned, we shall find that they have, in general, appreciated, and striven to blend in harmony, all the truths accredited by all the principal schools. The scholastic treatment of the average historian, therefore, does them injustice. In ancient times, for example, we are invited to notice the differences between the methods and conclusions of Plato and those of Aristotle; in more modern times, of Spinoza and Kant. These are then so sharply contrasted as apparently to make it necessary for the student to assign them to different schools of philosophy. But, in fact, both Plato and Aristotle were about equally idealists, as well as realists, and realists as truly as idealists; while both Spinoza and Kant strove, each in his own way, to satisfy the demands of a critical scepticism and an ethical absolutism. Among the multitude of lesser thinkers also, there is always a rational and a sentimental revolt against having their opinions on philosophical subjects classed as belonging to this or that school. And, indeed, what seems to afford so much satisfaction to the average critic or writer on the history of philosophy, is a source of dissatisfaction to every honest thinker on philosophical problems. For every such

thinker, classification of the currently adopted and tolerably rigid sort, is apt not to accord with the facts.

In truth, the diversity of philosophical endeavors and conclusions, and the subtlety of grades and transitions, are such that any approach to the kind of classification which the ordinary theory of schools of philosophy demands, is quite impossible. Instead of this variety being made a source of reproach to philosophy, it should rather be regarded as a testimony to its abounding life. And when the wealth of the material, and the complexity of the problems, in the form in which these sources are explored and made available for philosophy by the modern sciences, are largely increased, then, of necessity, diversities multiply in the details of the method and conclusions of philosophy. There are at present—to illustrate the matter by one of the particular sciences—perhaps some two hundred different theories of evolution advocated by different workmen in the field of biology. All these theories have alleged facts in their support; but all these theories united do not begin to account for, or successfully interpret, all the facts. For life is ever larger and more complex than theories of life. That-which-is far outstretches man's feeble efforts to tell what-it-is and how-it-came-to-be. If this is true of one limited domain of science, how could it fail to be true of human thought when dealing with the problem of the Being of the World in the large? This third contention, which discloses the essential life of reason, cannot profitably be forgotten in dealing with the subject suggested by the title—"Schools of Philosophy."

Yet again: amidst all the diversity of philosophical opinions, with its increase rather than diminution in modern times, there has been a certain growing tendency to substantial agreements. As to the general conception of evolution—its verity, immense range of application, and explanatory value—few, if any, students of the phenomena of plant and animal life entertain any measure of doubt. If they were all as ready to

discover and promote agreement, irrespective of noted names and notable theories, as they are to emphasize and exploit the divergences covered by the names and theories; some comprehensive doctrine of evolution would make a better showing than can now be claimed for any of the two hundred views, differing as they do in respect to details. The same thing, in an even more striking and larger way, we shall find to be true of philosophy. No realism can be so extreme as to take no account of the reality of the ideal. No idealism can remove itself so high above the ground of reality as not to touch it at many points. No dogmatism can wholly avoid self-criticism; and criticism cannot take its start from other than a dogmatic point of standing; while the scepticism in which it too often terminates is compelled, in self-justification, to resort to a species of dogmatism again. Schopenhauer cannot make the Will to be All, without introducing Intellect as a sort of second fiddle necessary to the universal harmony. The Hegelian Reason, in order to accomplish or explain anything, must figure as an active reason; otherwise, as an all-embracing and all-creative Will. The very foundations of so-called Pragmatism, with its foolish fury toward the systems called by their older and more respectable names, are themselves laid in Rationalism and Idealism. Its truths have all of them long ago been duly incorporated, as fragments, into both these so-called schools. And how shall one rationalize experience with the real world of things and minds, unless one finds the influence of ideals in this real world; or how shall one idealize this same world without taking counsel of the typical conceptions of human reason?

With this modified meaning of the term we may now briefly consider the principal causes and chief characteristics of the different schools of philosophy. The principal causes may be classified under two heads. These are, first, the limited character of all human thought; and, second, the complex and indefinite character of the problems proposed in the name of philosophy.

Every individual thinker has, of course, a certain temperament, a certain limited culture, and certain personal preferences and somewhat peculiar points of view. If the temperament is marked, and its tendencies habitually uncontrolled; if the culture is narrow and confined within the outlines of some one intellectual interest to the exclusion of others; and if the preferences and peculiar points of view induce unyielding prejudices; then the very individuality of the thinker determines within shrunken limitations the so-called school to which he must belong. Doubtless, even in the case of the most nobly free and universal minds, temptations and tendencies to the uncritical embrace of certain conclusions are not always successfully resisted. There is, therefore, something of the temperamental, the suspiciously individualistic and unduly prejudiced, in every one's philosophizing. Too much, however, may easily be made of all this. And there is no more reason why one's philosophy should be tainted with prejudices arising from these sources, than why one's science, or one's rules of conduct, should be ill affected in the same way. Indeed, to suspect your neighbor of yielding to temperament, and of showing bigotry, because he does not agree with you in an issue determined by reflective thinking, may be as ungenerous as to accuse him of immorality because he differs from you in a matter of the right and wrong of conduct. The mind truly embued with the spirit of philosophy is even more on the alert to guard against the errors which arise from prejudice, haste, confusion as to causes and issues, than is the mind trained in the method of the physical sciences. A part of every one's preparation for serious work of reflective thinking is the study of his "personal equation."

There are limitations of thought, however, which every thinker shares with all members of the race. These are limitations of human and finite thought. It does not need the elaborate mechanism of the Kantian *Critique* to make us aware of this truth. Poets, and writers on physics as well as on theology,

have been from of old convicted of this confession. The spirit of wonder and the spirit of worship are both born of this weakness. As we have already seen, it is the avowed purpose of one of the most difficult and important branches of philosophy to ascertain the conditions, extent and guiding principles in practice, of all human cognition,—of thought and knowledge, as such. This the Kantian *Critique* attempted to do, but failed, of course, in accomplishing perfectly. Of late it has been fashionable in certain quarters to denounce the so-called critical philosophy, and to sneer at those who still incline to cultivate epistemology, or to take an interest in a theory of knowledge. But without this critical knowledge of the essential nature and limitations of human thought, no would-be philosopher can either comprehend just where he is himself standing or fitly bring before others his special, pet theory of the nature and meaning of the Universe. Moreover, one's conclusions on this problem of philosophy determine one's entire view of what philosophy is, and of what philosophy can do. A relatively well-thought-out system of opinions, that hang together, and serve as well as any individual mind can, to interpret man's experience with nature and with himself,—this is all that any school of philosophy can claim to furnish.

Besides these temperamental and cultural tendencies to prejudice which one may largely escape, and besides the limitations of human thought from which, under existing conditions, no escape seems possible, there are those restrictions upon the completeness and thoroughness of any man's thinking which belong to his physical, intellectual, and social environment. Among the latter, we may enumerate native capacity, opportunity for gathering material and reflecting upon it, inducements other than those furnished by the inward impulse to philosophize, and any special bent of interest toward some one class of the several problems which are proposed for systematic philosophy.

Finally, in the most recent times, the same tendency to spe-

cialization has manifested itself in philosophy as in the particular sciences. Each one of these sciences is developing its own characteristic philosophy. Physics is trying to account for the Being of the World in terms of the quantitative measurement and geometrical arrangement of electrons, strains, etc., in the one all-pervasive Ether. The biological sciences are striving to solve their more difficult problems by a theory of Evolution which is either pretty strictly expressed in terms of chemico-electrical mechanism, or else yields to the necessity for giving more room to psychological explanations under terms that assume a certain kind of soul-life for plants as well as animals. And, indeed, by both the physical and the biological sciences, atoms, electrons, and living cells, are virtually now endowed with sensitive souls; while the historical and social sciences seem to be returning from the extremes of a purely mechanical philosophy to a philosophy which takes more account of considerations derived from the sciences of psychology and ethics.

The student of philosophy in these days must, therefore, quickly become aware of the limitations which are put upon the success of his peculiar task by the diversity of philosophical opinions urged upon him, with an imposing array of confirmatory facts and impressive arguments, by the experts in the particular sciences. And if these experts are not agreed—as, indeed, they are not—over the philosophical foundations and the more important principles of their own sciences, how shall he reach a satisfactory conclusion as a professional expert in the so-called “science of sciences”? That such an one feels with peculiar keenness the limitations of his own mind which are due to the fact that he continues human, while the problems, both scientific and philosophical, which come before the race are hourly growing more complex and seemingly insolvable, is a sign of philosophic calmness, modesty, and good-sense. But the almost inevitable result of the attempt to match his human weakness of intellect, and human limitations of capacity and opportunity, against the ever-expanding and

indeed infinite task of modern systematic philosophy, is the espousal of certain one-sided and partial views. The thinker is thus tempted to join some "school." In this way his seeming influence will, at least for a time, be considerably increased. The advocates of his school among the particular sciences, or the antagonists of opponent views among theologians and religionists, will the more readily welcome and commend him. By the character of one's own temperament and education, and by the pressure of thoughts kindred to those now enticing one under promise of a hastily completed symmetry to one's attempts at philosophizing, it is difficult to avoid being influenced profoundly. It is easier to "take up with" the thoughts that find one, rather than patiently to persist in the effort to find for one's self such thoughts as are true. As Fichte said: "The kind of philosophy which one chooses depends on the kind of man one is. For a philosophical system is not a dead bit of furniture which one can take to one's self or dispose of as one pleases; but it is endowed with a soul by the soul of the man who has it."

As an intellectual exercise, therefore, the tendency to that incompleteness and one-sidedness which results in schools of philosophy would seem necessarily to be upon the increase. There is no proof that the essential capacity of the human intellect has expanded, since man began to be known in recorded history. Judged by the tests of a genuine intellectual greatness there are as few Aristotles and Platos to-day as there were more than two-thousand years ago among the Greeks. And two-thousand years earlier than they, Egyptians and Orientals appear to have shown as keen intuitive insights, and as logical reflective qualities of mind, toward the problems of morality and religion as are in exercise at the present time. But in both science and philosophy, while the limitations of the human intellect, the promptings of the human heart, and the practical necessities of the human will, have remained essentially unchanged, the demands upon the student of science or

philosophy have enormously increased. Both the main reasons, therefore, for that incompleteness of which the existence of schools of philosophy is a witness, have correspondingly increased. The result has been that all tendencies and schools, and all grades and shades of opinions within or between the various so-called schools, are flourishing to-day as never before in the history of philosophy. No wonder that the confused looker-on, who is curious to know what all the debate is about, thinks of the philosophy of the schools as having gone to pieces entirely. And yet there is more philosophy concealed underneath, immanent within, and penetrating through the particular sciences, and probably also more philosophizing on the part of the common people, than ever before in the history of the race.

In spite of all this confusion, however, we may reduce the phenomena to some good degree of order by noticing how largely the differences are matters of emphasis; and by emphasizing the agreements rather than the differences.

And, first, it should be understood that several of the terms applied to distinguish the different schools of philosophy are not properly applied. Such are the terms, Dogmatism, Scepticism, Criticism; and especially the terms Agnosticism and Eclecticism. The first three of these terms apply to the different methods of arriving at conclusions by the process of reflective thinking rather than to those differences in the conclusions themselves which characterize the so-called schools of philosophy. A doctrine of method does, indeed, go far toward determining the results of philosophizing. And in this doctrine there may be concealed a latent and unconscious tendency, or an expressed adherence, in favor of realism, idealism, or dualism. The very character of the mind of the thinker upon philosophical problems, whether it be dogmatic, sceptical, or critical, goes a certain way—and sometimes a long way—toward determining the class of opinions with which he will feel compelled to ally himself. But in the technical meaning

which philosophizing gives to these three terms, they apply to *methods* and not to results. As methods, the dogmatic, the sceptical, and the critical, must be used more or less by all thinkers, irrespective of the school or the age to which they belong. They stand for essential "moments," factors, or forms of functioning, by every human mind, no matter what the subject of its thought. And all philosophical reflection must make use of them all. For example, we call Immanuel Kant the founder of the modern critical school; and we have good reason to do this, if we understand correctly what is meant by our words. Kant's greater philosophical writings are all called by the term "*Critique.*" They all applied the critical method, as their author understood it, to the intellect and logical faculties, to moral judgment and ideals, and to what Kant called "judgment" in the aesthetical realm (using the word "aesthetical" in a wide and loose significance). But Kant was also a sceptic, with a curious touch of uncriticized realism, in matters of so-called science; a lofty idealist and man of faith, in matters of morals and religion; and he held to an unanalyzed mixture of realism and idealism with regard to the application of the teleological argument to the beauty of nature and to the existence of God. Not infrequently the most pronounced sceptics with reference to the claims of the ideals of morals and religion are the most uncritical dogmatists in matters of scientific speculation; while no one else knows so much about the remotest and obscurest regions of things terrestrial as many of the most pronounced agnostics with reference to the plainest facts of the inward life. But the fuller expounding of these "moments" of human thought belongs to that chapter in a theory of cognition which will deal with dogmatism, scepticism and criticism, as all alike necessary to the acquisition, growth, and testing of every form of human knowledge.

That agnosticism cannot be classed with idealism, realism, and dualism, as a co-ordinate school or system of philosophy, is still more evident. Agnosticism, in so far as it remains

agnostic on good and reasonable grounds—that is, from lack of the right kind and amount of evidence—cannot be distinguished from the critical or sceptical attitude of mind. Quite too often, however, as has already been suggested, it degenerates into a kind of sullen or despairing dogmatism. Or if it takes up a positive position with regard to any of the greater problems of philosophy, it ceases so far forth to be agnostic and falls under the head of some one or other of the true schools. Eclecticism, as the very term signifies, unless guided by some principle of selection, in philosophy as in medicine and morals, results in a conglomerate of assumptions and opinions, that can by no means be reduced to the state of a consistent system.

Therefore, all the terms to which reference has already been made, although they have often served the purposes of classification, really designate differences of method in attacking the problems of philosophy, or in the mental attitudes assumed toward one or more of these problems, rather than differences in "schools" properly so-called. Indeed, the opinions of all the schools, if intelligently arrived at and held, involve both scepticism ending in agnosticism, and also criticism leading to an affirmative or dogmatic conclusion. The same thing is not true, however, of those more or less carefully compacted systems which fall under the titles of Realism, Idealism, and Dualism. In a different and more appropriate meaning of the word, these may be called the three principal schools of systematic reflective thinking. Under changing forms and with differing degrees of mixture, they have existed during the entire history of philosophy. From the very nature of the case, they must continue to exist. And yet it can scarcely be insisted upon too much, that no one of them has ever been held, or can possibly ever be held, in perfect purity and separation from elements more properly belonging to the other schools. This the following brief exhibit of their characteristics and relations will make more clear. For its completer proof a thorough

study of the history of philosophical speculation is essential. The subsequent more detailed discussion of the problems of philosophy will also show how this classification into schools arises out of the very nature of philosophy itself.

Realism, in its most boorish and crude form, is the primitive philosophy. Without prolonged reflection or scientific criticism it takes the existence of "Things," as they appear to so-called "common-sense," to be ready-made. Its theory of knowledge is that these things, by some process of copying-off or making and receiving of impressions, are given to the mind in substantially the same form as that in which they are ready-made. As to the reality of things, common-sense has no doubt. The uncriticized testimony of universal experience allows of no scepticism about so obvious a conclusion. But since the aim of reflective thinking, in even its earliest and crudest efforts, is to explain and to unify experience, some one kind of a "Thing-like" reality becomes the hypothesis of a beginning philosophy. And if the water of Thales, or the undifferentiated mass of matter proposed by Anaximander, proved quite insufficient to account for the complex and varied world of sensation, the atom of Lucretius, with its inherent tendencies and "hooks" for attachment to others of its fellows, seemed to promise a more satisfying principle for explaining the hidden nature of all that really is. When the physical and natural sciences, with their increasingly accurate and searching means of analysis, develop further, material things are found to need a far more elaborate explanation. For the essence of things is by no means so simple as it appears. On the contrary, when called by another name, the "constitution of matter" is found to be infinitely subtle and complex. Where modern chemistry, with all its marvellous advances, fails to explain by complicating the construction of atoms, and by endowing them with an ever larger equipment of qualities, modern physics comes to its aid. And now the most powerful imagination, in its loftiest flights, can scarcely suffice to picture the constitution and inner work-

ings of that mysterious Ether which the philosophical realism of to-day would establish in the seat of parent and producer of all material things.

But realism, even in its most primitive form, cannot wholly evade the call of the sensuously invisible and of the ideal. Indeed, a certain form of idealism is older and more universal than any crudest form of philosophical realism can claim to be. This is the form of idealism which is called religion. Things visible and tangible seem satisfactorily to explain very little to the religious wants of the primitive man. He, therefore, looks for the satisfaction of these wants to invisible spiritual agencies which his imagination constructs after the pattern of his own self-conscious spirit—like himself—and yet, at least, in some respects, superior to this spirit. Since these can determine his weal or woe, while the methods of their operation are concealed and even their presence and places of abode are hard to detect, he fears and propitiates them, or welcomes them with pleasure to the hearth and to the family or tribal feast. Thus the oldest and most widespread form of philosophy is the philosophy of religion. As the civilization and culture of mankind advances, and as the object of reflective thinking in the unifying and harmonizing of the different fields of human experience becomes more obvious, a spiritual Ideal contests with the physical, for the claim to be the supreme reality. Since the roots of religion are quite as deep down and strongly interlaced in human nature as are the roots of the physico-chemical sciences, there is not the slightest reason to suspect that philosophy will ever relinquish its claim to afford an explanation of experience through the reasoned faith in a spiritual ideal. And as our further discussions will show, the most adequate form of modern scientific realism experiences more keenly than ever before the necessity of admitting into its conception of the Being of the World the truths of a philosophical idealism.

But to know visible things and explain the world of experience as the product of their interaction, and at the same time

to believe in invisible spirits and to attribute largely to their action so many of our experiences in this same world, is to proclaim a sort of Dualism as the last word of philosophy. Things *and* spirits, or spirits *in* things, are two; and the end of reflective thinking is, if possible, to discover some essential union, if not an identity, of the two. Indeed, the very beginnings of all experience are made in the experience of an undeniable dualism. This is, at first, the dualism between things and myself; and, afterward, it is the dualism between a part at least of this thing-like body of mine and the real me. The crude thinking of primitive or uncultured man has no trouble with the hypothesis of a soul that is separable from the body. On the contrary, in order to explain all his experiences with himself, and with his environment of things and spirits, he seems to need two, or three, or even more, souls. Separated from *this* body, however, he cannot conceive of them, or of their doings while separate, except in terms of other bodily qualities and shapes. And yet these are not precisely the same thing which he means to indicate by speaking of spirits or souls. Essentially the same dualism, however differently expressed, cannot be transcended by modern philosophy. It lies at the basis of all the particular sciences, both physical and psychological. Especially is it controlling in that attempt to establish concrete terms of relation between the two "moments" of body and spirit, which calls itself psycho-physics or physiological psychology. Such a science must assume some theory as to this relation. This is true whether the result takes the form of a theory of parallelism, or of interaction, or of a virtual materialism, or of egoistic idealism. The two non-convertible classes of phenomena are *there*; their existence in experience cannot be denied. The moment the attempt is made to do away with the differences between them, the problem vanishes; and with it vanishes all hope of a science that shall establish relations between the two. In the larger field of the final philosophy of the Being of the World, however, the difficulties of overcoming

this persistent tendency to dualism take on another form. There the contest becomes for the most part a contest between a monistic Idealism and a materialistic Realism.

The inevitable and legitimate tendency of philosophical development is toward some form of Monism. Centuries before our immediate ancestors had achieved any result worthy of the name of a system of philosophy, the gifted race which invaded Northern India had evolved all the principal thoughts which characterize and help to classify all the different systems. These thoughts they expressed, indeed, in figurative and mythical form; and the chief interest of all the schools centered in the field of the philosophy of religion. But, making the proper allowances for this form, we can scarcely exaggerate the meed of admiration to which these speculative thinkers, considering the lack of all scientific development in their time, are justly entitled. All the schools, as we have said, were represented in these early days of philosophy in India. But the prevalent and more truly characteristic school was a thorough-going idealism. This world of things which, to the early Greek and to the modern scientific mind seems so real, and which with its forces and material elements is so capable of explaining and interpreting all experience, to the Indian mind seemed a sphere of illusion, seemed Mâyâ and no genuine reality. Only the One Ideal was truly real: all particular realities existed only as its ever-changing and rapidly fleeting ideas. To the inquirer after the true account of existence this Ideal One replies: "Earth, water, fire, air, space, mind, understanding, and self-consciousness—so is my nature divided into eight parts. But learn now my higher nature, for this is only my lower one. . . . I am the creator and the destroyer of all the world. Higher than I is nothing. On me the universe is woven like pearls upon a thread. . . . Know all things to be from Me alone, whether they have the quality of goodness, of passion, or of darkness. I am not in them; but they are in Me. . . . Hard to overcome is the divine illusion which envelopes me,

while it arises from these qualities. Only they pass through this illusion who come to Me alone. . . . I am the inexhaustible seed. I am immortality and death. I am being and not being. . . . I am glory, fortune, speech, memory, wisdom, constancy, and mercy . . . I am the punishment of the punisher and the polity of them that would win victory! I am silence. I am knowledge. There is no end of my divine manifestations."

This impassioned and mystical cry of an idealistic monism sounds to the modern Western ear like a demoniac call on reason to fling itself from the rock of reality into a bottomless abyss shrouded in impenetrable mist. And from it or from any invitation resembling it, modern scientific realism turns away to accept the embraces of an all-creating and all-explaining Ether, or some other quasi-material principle. In its extreme form, however, almost every word among those just quoted as descriptive of the ancient Indian Idealism might be put into the mouth of the apostle of the modern Western Realism. We say, "in its *extreme* form"; that is, when this realism assumes to have discovered in Matter, or in Ether, or in a Being of the World which somehow mysteriously combines the qualities of both, an adequate explanation and a "*soul-satisfying*" interpretation of the totality of human experience.

"Wherever," says von Hartmann in his "Philosophy of the Unconscious" (ii, p. 234), "we may look among the original philosophical or religious systems of the first rank, everywhere do we meet with the tendency to Monism; and it is only stars of the second or third magnitude which find satisfaction in an external dualism or still greater division." The same writer insists that, in all schools of philosophy of the modern epoch, we see "this tendency to Monism more or less perfectly realized in one fashion or another." These statements are substantially true as matters of historical fact. The reasons for the truth, especially in its application to the modern epoch, are chiefly these three: (1) The positive sciences are more and more both

assuming and demonstrating the substantial unity of the Being of the World, as known to them all in terms of the various kinds of phenomena; (2) philosophy is more and more feeling the pressure of evidence from the divergent schools of speculation, in the form of a compulsion to unite in some Theory of Reality that shall accredit and comprehend the fuller truth, which is only partially credited and imperfectly comprehended by each one of these divergent schools; (3) religion is seeking, and in the form of the increasingly dominant systems of theology, religion is finding, such a conception of its Object as shall harmonize the various moral and emotional impulses in which the religious experience has its sources and its guiding forces. In a word, science, philosophy and religion are striving to unify all experience in One Ideal-Real.

Dualism, as a claimant for the position of a rational and consistent system of reflective thinking, is, therefore, undoubtedly being discredited by the progress of the age.

But the considerations upon which all dualistic systems in the past have chiefly insisted, can no more safely be neglected by the modern epoch than by any other epoch or age in the history of human thought. Certain distinctions, which very readily take the form of oppositions and contradictions, still persist with undiminished energy. These distinctions lie at the base of human experience; they seem incorporate with the very structure of the universe itself. The universe is *one*, is indeed a true *uni*-verse; but there are two times two principles, and as many kinds of forces, which perpetually re-appear as contrasted in their intrinsic qualities and as contesting each other's fields of influence. Hence any monistic speculation, whether predominatingly idealistic or realistic, which treats slightly, or annuls, these distinctions is destined to show rents and seams when viewed in the light of a full-orbed experience. The cleavage cannot be concealed with untempered mortar; the cleavage is made more distressingly apparent by the very attempt at concealment.

There are, indeed, two fundamental distinctions, on which

all human experience depends, that serve as the exciting causes of the perpetual recurrence of dualistic systems. They are the distinction between matter and mind, and the distinction between moral good and moral evil. It is the fear that, if these distinctions are made less effective or wholly abrogated, disastrous practical results will follow, which drives thinkers of a timid speculative character away from every form of monistic philosophy. On the other hand, those who have the fuller courage of confidence in human reason constantly adhere more closely to philosophical monism. Forms of monism, therefore, which do not accord its full value to the distinctions between the reality, *me*, and the reality that is *not-me*, cannot prevent the persistent recurrence of rival dualistic schemes. While to blur, diminish, or deny, the essential and eternally true distinctions of a moral sort, is to furnish an elixir of renewed life to an expiring dualism; it is even to equip it with an avenging sword.

The task of Monism with reference to the claims of all contending dualistic systems is, therefore, not obscure, however difficult it may be of successful accomplishment. These claims must be admitted, and their full value assigned to the aspects, or classes, of human experience in which the claims are found. In the world of our daily experience, material bodies and their component elements, and spiritual agents as potent forces, must both be admitted to be real existences. The physical and the psychological sciences imply and involve both kinds of existences. But monism must discover, and as far as possible reveal, some one Principle, some supreme Reality, which may serve to explain and interpret both kinds of existences, in their reciprocal reactions and forms of behavior. For if there be a Universe, it is certainly known to man only as built out of the two kinds of existences. The distinctions which separate the two in our daily experiences of both cannot, therefore, be held in such a way as to deny the oneness of the work in which the two co-operate.

Undoubtedly, the most difficult and serious work which any

monistic system has to achieve in the way of overcoming the inconsistencies of dualism, lies on ethical ground. Scientific dualism must, as we have seen, be accorded its full rights on its own grounds. These are the grounds of so-called "common-sense" and of the positive sciences. The same thing cannot be said, however, of dualism as an attempt at a final philosophy. Plainly, *one* world cannot be accounted for as the product, or the expression, or the evolution, of two independent and eternally existent principles. Yet more plain, and even shockingly plain, is the truth that the genesis and reality of moral evil cannot be accounted for, in such a way as to satisfy the demands of rational thought, by positing an eternal principle of evil on an equality with, and over against, a good God; or by denying in any way the constant dependence of all finite personality upon the Life of God. In this way does dualism introduce the germs of pain and trouble at the very beginnings of monistic philosophy, in both its realistic and its idealistic forms of development.

The result of mixing dualistic considerations with those which lead to realism or to idealism is to produce a further variety of intermediate schools. The students of the particular sciences are accustomed in these days to disclaim the title to authority, and even the pretence of interest, in subjects lying outside of their own chosen domain. The metaphysics of chemistry is for chemists; the metaphysics of physics is for physicists; the metaphysics of biology is for biologists, and so on. Especially emphatic is the disclaimer of knowledge and interest customarily made by the devotees of the physical sciences when speaking of the so-called sciences of psychology and ethics. But all the sciences which deal with material things are interdependently related; and since science itself is an achievement of the human mind, none of them can wholly disregard the discoveries and tenets of psychology. Certain ethical considerations also become important to them all, as soon as we regard scientific discovery and the formulation and

defence of scientific truth, as a species of conduct. It happens inevitably, then, that both forms of monism have to recognize the claims of dualism. But, in general, realism and idealism recognize the dualistic assumptions and experiences in different, or diametrically opposite, ways. Realism inclines strongly to espouse the cause of matter; idealism to espouse the cause of mind. Thus materialistic Monism becomes the principal school within the larger school of Realists; idealistic, or spiritual Monism becomes almost, or quite, identical with the entire body of Idealists. The former tends toward determinism and empiricism in morals; the latter decides for some, at least, modified theory of free-will, and for a certain personality independent of the material organism. Thus the three schools of philosophy (see p. 44) which aim to find the explanation and interpretation of all experience, in some one Principle (or at most two principles), become still further differenced by many shades of opinion held by mediating schools.

For, in truth, the extremes of both Realism and Idealism serve to correct each other; and Dualism, while it constantly preserves its right and its power to intervene and check a too hasty and inconsiderate synthesis, must uniformly succumb, when it attempts to raise itself to the position of a rational and consistent system. The perpetually recurring, but never finished task of philosophy, as it is attempted and only partially and temporarily accomplished by any thinker upon its problems, thus becomes clear. It is to discover and expound such a monistic system as shall both satisfy the claims of a scientific dualism, and also interpret the world of experience in a manner to establish the reality of rational ideals. Our human thinking must keep itself face to face with the realities of experience, from its first beginning all the way toward the goal which it will never reach. Its desire is, by humble, docile, industrious, yet free and critical inquiry to know Reality in the large, to understand what the Being of the World really is. It must never, then, for one moment cease to welcome facts, or

fail to learn the valid conclusions of the particular and positive sciences. Philosophy must be, and must remain, realistic to the core. But reflective thinking soon discovers that human ideals in science, conduct, art, and religion, are psychological and spiritual facts and forces—facts most indubitable, forces most potent and resistless in human history throughout. These rational, æsthetical, and moral ideals, reflective thinking sees to be more or less clearly suggested, more or less perfectly realized, in the evolution of external nature and in the development of the race. Ideals, too, have a valid claim to reality. In all concrete realities their presence, as a witness to immanent reason, speaks to the reason of inquiring man. Therefore, philosophy cannot fail to be idealistic; and Idealism in some one of its many forms has always been the “school” (?) which has commanded the adherence of the choicest spirits, as well as the most thoughtful minds.

For these reasons it is that schools of philosophy, in general, are the persistent forms in which the efforts at solving the problems of philosophy arrange and display themselves. But the more philosophically complex is the thinking of any age or race, the greater the number of the carefully graded and qualified groups of opinions which will unite together, and separate from others, the adherents of these so-called schools. There will always be those, however, who have failed to think their way through the dividing lines and forbidding barriers of a common-sense or a scientific dualism to some form of monism. And there will always be those who have obliterated these lines and leaped over these barriers, in their determination to reach the goal of monistic philosophy by the shortest possible path. In any form of monism also, there must be either elaborated or concealed elements from both idealism and realism. For a purely realistic or a purely idealistic system of philosophy cannot be maintained. Any position approaching more or less nearly to that of complete and uncompromising realism, or the same kind of idealism, is tenable only as a momentary point of

standing. For the goal after which the human mind is reaching is such an elaborated and reasoned conception of the Being of the World, as shall comprise all concrete realities and, at the same time, satisfy man's highest ideals.

That this goal has never been reached by either science or philosophy is confessedly true. That it never will be reached by either science or philosophy is, doubtless, equally true. But the spur of desire to go forward toward it is not less effective because of the distant and unattainable character of the goal. Movement, development, is the very life and satisfying reward of the student of philosophy, as it is of the student of the particular sciences.

Certain practical truths which have to do with our aims and method in the study of philosophy may be derived from this survey of the nature and meaning of so-called schools in philosophy. And, first: Neither history nor modern learning can instruct anyone as to what ready-made system of philosophy he should adopt. Much less can one safely follow the exhortation to "take up with" the system that "finds us"—meaning by this the system which most strikes one's fancy or seems best to suit one's temperament or passing mood. For those inclined to suicide, Schopenhauer or Nietzsche may indeed seem to speak most true. To men who do not care to think, Pragmatism may appear the least expensive, through-express route to the terminal station, whose station-master is the realized hope of the ages. While the poet will continue to revel well content in the dreams of Plato or of some mystic of the Middle Ages. The student of philosophy, however, should be eager to be taught, but not easily fooled. The distrust which he has of his own temperament will to some extent measure the caution with which he will adopt any one ready-made system of philosophy.

And, second, the student of philosophy will recognize the full significance of the conviction that the schools of thinking, which result from diversities of method, and those other schools which

emphasize differences of result, must *all*, without exception, have a large measure of facts and truths to testify in their behalf. Dogmatism, scepticism, criticism, agnosticism—these are all, on various occasions and toward various assertions and doctrines, whether in science or philosophy, proper attitudes of the reflective mind. Dualism and monism, whether in the form of realism or idealism, stand for experiences which in themselves considered cannot be gainsaid; and which, in respect of many of the conclusions derived from them, cannot be successfully disputed or safely disregarded. There is a “soul of truth” in them all, and so far as we can see, it is an ubiquitous and immortal soul. But the recognition of this truth should not send us to a vender of half-baked dough or of stale crusts for our bread. The facts do not necessitate a hotch-potch of pickings from many different authors of philosophical works. By thoughtful study of the masters and of the truths themselves, we may find our own way—if not to a completed system of philosophy, at least to many a reasoned philosophical opinion affecting profoundly and favorably our attitude toward nature, toward God, and toward humanity. For philosophy, like science, if it cannot solve all its own problems, can in some respects tell us how to live more worthily of the rational powers with which we are equipped. There are certain “riddles by which our minds are oppressed in life, and about which we are forcibly compelled to some view or other in order to be able really to live at all.” And as a modern writer has said: “We have to distinguish two kinds of philosophy; the one manifests itself by the speech, and the other by the conduct, of the man. . . . The latter it is—the realization of wisdom by the man in his social intercourse—which has recently been brought, as philosophy in deed, to more general recognition.”

CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

PHILOSOPHY aims at a certain kind and degree of knowledge. Its success is, therefore, most intimately connected with a correct doctrine of knowledge. What is it to know, as respects the essential characteristics of the *cognitive* act, in distinction from conjecture, opinion, or as yet unverified theory or hypothesis? What are the guaranties of knowledge; what its limits, if it has limits; and what are its underlying principles and presuppositions? All these questions either lie in the path which we must traverse in order to form an adequate and safe conception of philosophy; or else they constitute prominent and essential parts of philosophy itself? The first in this series of questions, is, however, the rather psychological and only preliminary to the study of philosophical problems. The others belong to that department of philosophy which has already been referred to as epistemology or the theory of knowledge.

There has been much idle and rather fruitless debate as to which of the two—metaphysics or the criticism of man's knowing faculty—ought to come first in systematic philosophy. Kant and his disciples have argued that the *critique* of reason must precede metaphysics as a theory of reality; Hegel and his disciples have rejected all such claims of criticism to precedence. Thus with the former, criticism ending in scepticism is accustomed wholly to displace a systematic ontology; with the latter, logic as the doctrine of the self-evolution of reason, is assumed to be identical with metaphysics as the theory of reality. Siding with the one, we ask ourselves: How can I reason with confidence about the ultimate Reality, unless I

have previously determined by a process of criticism, the capacity and limits of human reason? How can I say what the Being of the World, extra-mentally or really considered, is; unless I first know that somehow the cognitive faculty has application beyond the sphere of its own phenomena? On inclining to the other side, however, I ponder well such inquiries as the following: How shall I criticize reason without trust in the powers of the very reason I am criticizing? Surely I may assume that, without trust in itself, reason can neither make legitimate use of its own capacity, nor even know when it is transcending this legitimate use. There is no other critic of reason than reason itself. Self-criticism implies self-confidence. Or to employ a well-worn figure of speech: How shall I, being a man and not a fish, venture into the water without first knowing that I can develop the capacity to swim? But how shall I surely know that I can learn to swim, unless I first venture into the water?

A historical survey of the treatment given to the problems of epistemology and of metaphysics proper shows that they have always been considered and solved in a kind of mutual interdependence. The treatment, however brief and unsatisfactory on any writer's part, of either of these branches of philosophy shows that this interdependence is essential to the nature of both. It does not much matter, then, which of the two is treated before the other; if only in the treatment of each, the bearings of the intimate relations to certain problems of the other are kept in mind. One's metaphysics, or rather one's entire attitude toward any theory of reality, will be determined largely by one's theory of knowledge; one's theory of knowledge will always be compelled to pay respect to one's metaphysics. Which shall first receive technical treatment in any attempt at systematic philosophy is perhaps a matter of convenience.

The failure to give full credit to the psychology of knowledge has been a primitive cause of failure in many otherwise notable schemes of epistemology. Eminently true is this state-

ment of the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the founder of the modern critical school, the man of strong faith and lofty ideals in morals and religion, in whose name and by force of whose genius, however, the modern movement toward an ethical and religious agnosticism has largely prevailed. In all his *critiques*, and especially in his marvellous "Kritik of the Pure Reason," Kant strives in the interests of moral and religious truth to reconcile the rival claims of the extremes of dogmatism and criticism. The effort was most commendable; and the result of the keen and profound work of analysis which this great thinker performed, and of the new view of the most intricate problems of philosophy which the analysis introduced, was epoch-making in the history of human thought. Beyond all his predecessors Kant conceived of the problem of knowledge in a clear and comprehensive way; employed the critical method in its solution with an unparalleled thoroughness; and kept to the end a tender regard for the effect of his answer to the problem upon the moral and religious faiths of mankind.

What, then, was the cause of the principal defects in Kant's theory of knowledge; and what has been the cause of similar defects in the modifications introduced by his disciples since his time? It has been with them, as it was with their master, a lack of clear insight into the matter-of-fact nature and the actual development of cognitive faculty in the individual and in the race. In a word, it has been disregard, almost amounting to contempt, for the psychological point of view. It was virtually assumed by their leader that we know the world by thinking according to the terms of pure logic; or—more technically said—that intellect alone constructs the world of reality, for both Things and Minds, according to the so-called "categories," or constitutional forms of its own functioning. Kant did, indeed, hold as vital to his theory of mediation, that sense and intellect, intuition and concept, are both necessary to knowledge. His celebrated saying ran as follows: "Without intuition concepts are empty, without conception sense is

blind." But all that intuition contributed was finally reduced to the mere, blind impression that somewhat extra-mentally real exists; and even this impression is treated as though it were of doubtful validity in many passages of the critical philosophy. Thus knowledge is separated by an unbridged gulf from reality, and is reduced to the methodical arrangement of so-called phenomena. Even knowledge of the Self is confined to the phenomenal Ego; my true and real Self is as much hidden to my own cognition as is the reality of the external world. Intellect manipulates the phenomena so as to give them objectivity, or the appearance of reality; but the only reality known to man is, after all, the reality of being objective, an object of the intellect, a phenomenal reality. In the large, then, we have to say, that all the particular sciences, both physical and psychological, are only the intellect's way of connecting together phenomena; and whether they truly reproduce, or faithfully represent, the Being of the World, as It is, and the processes of nature as they are, we can never say. Thus criticism ends in scepticism so far as science is concerned. God, freedom, and immortality, must be rediscovered and rehabilitated, as it were, by an analysis of reason's fundamental beliefs,—the conceptions guaranteed by a rational faith. The inconsistencies involved, as between the truths affirmed and the truths denied, need not occupy us further at the present time.

The lesson to be learned from the result of criticism in its application to a theory of knowledge is the necessity of studying cognition more carefully as a full-orbed and vital activity of the human soul. We use the old-fashioned word "soul" because we mean something much more than can be easily comprehended under the words mind, or intellect. Instead of knowledge being the result of a logical arrangement of phenomena that are due to a cause, we know not of what character; knowledge, the rather, comes through the feeling-full commerce of an intelligent, self-conscious will, which finds itself in relations of action and reaction with other purposeful

wills. This is the fact of experience, although we can only partially explain it as fact. This is the truth with regard to the development of experience, although we can never wholly clear up the mystery of such a development. But all origins and forms of growth defy science to give them a complete and final explanation; and not least of all, the origin and growth of knowledge in the individual and in the race.

An analysis of any act of knowledge shows that the whole soul,—to accept the customary three-fold division of so-called faculties—intellect, feeling, will, is involved in every such act. To say the same thing in another way: The knower is an intelligent, self-conscious agent, knowing himself as doing something, and his object as doing something to him. Lest this division of the soul into so-called faculties should seem to impair its unity, and to cause the act and object of knowledge to fall to pieces or disintegrate, we may try various ways of expressing what every act of knowledge implies as to the knower. In knowledge, the knower appears to himself as an active and sensitive intellect. The knower feels sure of the existence of himself and of his object, the thing known; he is certain of his painful or pleasurable feelings, and of those feelings we call sensations, which are in him but which he nevertheless attributes to the object as their *external cause*. The knower is above all an intelligent will. He knows his object, the thing known, as he acts upon it, moves it, moulds it, makes or destroys or modifies it; and is himself moved, moulded, or otherwise affected by it. Without intellect there is no knowledge; without feeling there is no knowledge; without doing, and experiencing the effects upon ourselves and our object, of this doing, there is no knowledge. And yet, these elements, or factors, are all given together in the unity of the act or process of cognition.

Still bearing in mind that we must not allow our analysis even to seem to separate in experience what is really united in every act or process of knowledge, let us consider the truths

stated in the foregoing sentences, somewhat more in detail. And we will begin with a brief consideration of the relation of thinking to knowing.

That little, if any, advance in knowledge can be gained without more or less of logically correct and prolonged thinking is a practical maxim which no one familiar with the successes of modern science, or the requirements of modern education, would be inclined to dispute. And, in truth, without some thinking no knowledge whatever can be gained. For all knowledge implies judgment; what we know, or think we know, we judge to be true. Indeed, knowledge can only express itself in terms of affirmative or negative judgment, in terms of Yes or No. On the other hand, that there is much knowledge which cannot be gained by *mere* thinking is a maxim scarcely more to be held in doubt. And most of what children know—or the adults who for the most part belong to the unscientific and uncritical minds—is acquired with very little thought on their part. They learn how to manage their own bodies, and so indirectly what the qualities of these bodies are, chiefly by an unthinking imitation. They are told the names of things, and know them by believing what they are told. Even the elements of scientific knowledge, such as the race has acquired by many centuries of experiment and thinking, they know chiefly by remembering what they have been taught. But above all else, in order to get a true conception of the origin and nature of human knowledge, must it be borne in mind that the human being learns *really to know* things only as he has dealings with them by actual commerce of energy, that causes or resists the impulse to motion. His toys, his tools, the furniture of the room, the objects in the outside air, the reality of his own playmates or rivals in the test of strength, the boy learns to know by a life full of motion, due to impulse and accompanied and followed by pleasure-pain sensations, rather than by processes of a correctly logical character. And yet, if he is a heedless, unintelligent, or thoughtless boy,

he does not really or successfully learn to know. Thinking is, then, a factor indispensable in knowledge; but it is by no means the whole of knowledge.

If now we try to describe the essential nature of thought, as thinking becomes an essential element or factor in all knowledge, we are first of all compelled to notice this fact: *To think is to relate.* All thinking is a relating activity. To say that all things and minds are known only as related to other things and minds is a truth as universal as it is barren of concrete scientific results. That things and minds are necessarily known as standing in relations follows from this characteristic of knowledge, that the thinking which enters into all knowledge is a relating activity. To carry the description of the essential nature of thinking further back into the origin of mental life, we may say that the first exhibition of intellect which we can detect in the human infant is that it begins to make discriminations. "Discriminating consciousness" is the primary phase of the so-called faculty of thought. In more familiar language, the child commences to give attention to, and to notice, differences and resemblances. Which of these two forms of discrimination, differencing or assimilating, comes before the other, or whether they are not necessarily and invariably joined together, is a matter of no importance at the present time. But the result of the two, which are different sides of one primal activity of discrimination, is to establish more or less firmly fixed relations within the field of experience; or rather, it is to establish *experience* as distinguished from a mere series or jumble of unrelated sensations.

This primary form of the relating activity of intellect, these earliest and most unintellectual acts of discriminating consciousness, do not constitute knowledge until they terminate in more or less definite forms of judgment. Without the exercise of judgment there is no knowledge. To know is to judge; and the activity in judgment, in order to contribute to

knowledge, must be purposeful. The earliest judgments, however, are in the form which is sometimes, and not inappropriately, called the "psychological judgment," in order to distinguish it from the more definitely logical judgment with its more clearly self-conscious and experience-full recognition of the resemblances and differences which belong to classes of objects. Yet in all judgment, however concrete and immature, there is recognition of qualities and modes of behavior common to several objects. This affirmative or negative recognition of the particular thing, as coming up, or failing to come up, to a certain standard of likeness, is essential to every, even the lowest form of knowledge.

It must also be noticed that the activity of judging is a kind of synthesis. It is a putting together of otherwise diverse elements of experience. In saying this, it is not meant, of course, that these so-called "elements of experience" have a separate, concrete, real existence, and can therefore be united by some agent standing outside of and above them, as chemical elements may be synthesized in a chemical laboratory. But the judgment recognizes that certain qualities, or modes of behavior, which may exist separately from each other, are actually united in some particular one Thing. The one book is red, and heavy, and shaped so, etc.; it is somehow a synthesis of several qualities like those belonging to other books, to the toys, to some stones and pieces of wood. Judgment is reached, when the intellect in the exercise of its discriminating activity, in the form of recognition, accomplishes a corresponding synthesis. In all the earlier acts of cognition there is an unreflective leap to judgment, rather than the arriving at judgment by a deliberate and purposeful logic. The same thing is true of the vast majority of the so-called practical judgments of the adult mind. But such is the essential nature of all judgment, and such the part which the activity of judgment takes in every act of cognition, that we may lay down the following principle: *Knowledge is born of thinking which has arrived*

at the pausing place of a judgment—a finished product of synthetic activity.

It is not necessary for our purpose to describe the development of thinking as it results in the formation of so-called abstract conceptions, of logical judgments, of the discovery and statement of laws, or principles, whether as applied to things or to minds, and of scientific system. As real processes gone through in consciousness, as actual performances of the knower, they all no more resemble the formulas of logic, whether expressed in words, or mathematical terms, or other symbols, than the actual concrete things of nature resemble the most schematic representations of the scientific textbook or the drawings of the lecturer upon the blackboard. In reality, no thing, no process, no transaction between things, answers precisely to any conception, logical judgment, or statement of a law. In reality there is infinite diversity, and ceaseless change. This is true whether we speak of the realities which we know in external nature, or the realities of which we become aware through the consciousness of self. Yet without this kind of thought, which calls itself abstract, there could be none of that kind of knowledge which calls itself science. The faculty of abstraction and generalization is, then, essential to science. Its faiths, and guiding principles, and necessary presuppositions, must be subjected to critical examination in other connections.

That thinking alone can never result in knowing, and that thought is not the whole of knowledge, has been implied in much which has already been said about the activity of knowing, and the nature of thought. The very word "activity," and the terms "discriminating consciousness," "judging faculty," etc., imply the presence of will in all knowledge. We do not, indeed, approve of this word "Will" to express, as it were, a separate faculty, or class of faculties, of the human soul. The rather, in psychology as in ethics would we call attention to the patent truth that the very essence of the soul, so to say,

is to be a will; that for man, to be is to be an intelligent agent. By affirming that will is present in all knowledge, therefore, it is intended to teach the truth that all the processes which result in knowledge are active processes. Never is the knower merely the passive recipient of impressions. Always, on the contrary, is the knower an active agent, a producer of his own knowledge.

This active aspect of all knowledge reveals itself chiefly in two ways. The first of these is purposeful, selective attention. In the beginnings of knowledge the direction and fixation of attention are largely forced; they are determined by the character of the object with respect to the intensity of the sensations which it awakens, and the character, and strength of interest its presence awakens in the observing mind. But without a certain degree of voluntary and selective attention, as we have reason to believe, no knowledge, even of the most primary sort, can be gained through sensory impressions. The whole doctrine of attention, as it is elaborated for purposes of success in education and in scientific discovery, emphasizes the part which voluntary and selective attention plays in the acquisition and development of knowledge. A different set of words for each sense makes emphatic for the popular mind a distinction which involves the same important truth. Look intently and carefully observe, if you would know by seeing; listen and note well, if you would learn by hearing; touch and handle attentively, if you would discover the tactful and muscular qualities of things. In gaining knowledge by experiment, whether in the study, shop, or laboratory, or on the street and in the field, you must give attention; you must select the materials and conditions and control of your experimentation, if you would have it result in additions to your knowledge.

Quite as obvious in respect of its importance for the growth of knowledge is another example of its dependence upon the will of the knower. So conclusively has modern psychology

demonstrated the part of the motor system in its relation to all our sensory impressions, that the very word impressions can no longer be applied to experiences with its old significance. Sensations never arise as *impressions* without an accompaniment of motor activity, or of the revived images of previous motor activities. Seeing is never merely the receiving of visual impressions. Hearing, the apparently most passive of our senses, is never merely the receiving of auditory impressions. Active touch with contracting and relaxing muscles, moving limbs, and a constant readjustment of the organs to one another and to outside objects, are indispensable to all growths of knowledge, both of ourselves and of things. And just as there is no ordinary and so-called practical knowledge without activity, under control by the motor organism of the knower, so there is no physico-chemical or biological or other form of science, without the same kind of activity. In manipulating things, we know that they really are, and what they are. In moving our own bodies we know that we are and that we are not the things which we know to be not-ourselves, chiefly through the differences in their relations toward our power to produce motor changes in them. Even the pure science of mathematics could not come into existence, since its essence consists in the act of counting, unless we were ourselves capable of control over a motor organism. And all the applied mathematics, the numbering and measuring of natural forces, depends upon this same form of purposeful activity in the knower. Only beings that have wills of their own can know. And the beings which these will-full beings know as other than themselves, are known only as they are recognized in terms of opposing wills.

We shall see, subsequently, that it is this experience with ourselves as active agents, as wills, producing effects in other and different active agents, or opposing wills, on which all man's knowledge of the real world depends. Indeed, without just such an experience, no real and substantial world could

be known; for no real knower, and no real world to be known, could exist. To be real *is* to be active, to do something, to produce and to experience change. Dead and inactive substances are not substances, are not realities at all. But above all is it true that such purely hypothetical and dead entities, mythical beings, if existent, could not be knowers. For knowledge implies voluntary activity in the direction and fixation of attention, and in the control of a motor organism that can be made to assume a variety of relations toward other selves and toward things.

The principal deficiencies of that sceptical theory of knowledge which resulted from the Kantian criticism are due to a failure to recognize the important part played by the feelings in every act of cognition. Intellect, in Kant's restricted use of the word, if left to itself, would be as blind as feeling alone is blind. Pure activities of reason could only give a world as unreal and illusory as that Mâyâ which is regarded as a fleeting show of sensory impressions separated from the immanent reason and will which is truly manifested in them all.

The manifold ways in which feeling, not only influences knowledge, but also enters into the very constitution of every act of cognition, are difficult to analyze; they can be described only in terms which make an appeal to the immediate experiences in which the feelings consist. For, strictly speaking, no form of feeling can be defined; nor can knowledge be gained by mere description as to what it actually is. The essence of feeling is in its being felt. This is conspicuously true of that knowledge of ourselves which comes only through experiences of feeling. What is it to be a human soul? Surely, this question can never be fully answered by describing the processes of reason, or by analyzing and criticizing the categories, after the fashion of the Kantian critique or of the Hegelian logic. To be a soul is to love, to hate, to aspire, to long for, to grieve for, to suffer the various complex forms of appetite, passion and sentiment, which have most to do with individual-

izing the human race, and with determining the social relations and achievements of each individual in the race. What is true in the most absolute manner of these fundamental forms of feeling is relatively true of the various shadings and secondary varieties of the same feelings as they are differenced by the different social relations. Thus the feelings of the parent, of the lover, of the friend, must be experienced in order to know what it is really to be parent, lover, or friend. To regard these experiences as merely phenomenal of an unknown substance, the existence and qualities of which must be established by argument, and sustained by philosophical criticism, is to juggle with experience. In having such experiences the soul *is* real; in that intuitive recognition of them, which self-consciousness not only implies but in which self-consciousness consists, the soul knows that it is, and what it is.

Among these feelings—or shall we not rather say, as a “tone” characterizing them all—are our various degrees and kinds of pleasures and of pains. It was a favorite contention of the philosopher Lotze that self-conscious personality was impossible without the experience of pleasure and pain. However this may be as a matter of abstract reasoning with regard to the possible and the impossible, there can be no considerable doubt about the matter of fact. It is as beings experiencing pleasure and pain by adjusting ourselves to changing relations with other beings that we come to know what we are ourselves, and what manner of world constitutes our environment. The pleasure and the pain are peculiarly ours; they cannot be attributed to other subjects than ourselves. We may modify them by changing the point of regard, by varying the object on which attention is concentrated. We may avoid or remove them by changing our relations to their causes. But so often as they recur, and as long as they persist, the pleasure and the pain are known as really and undoubtedly our very own. I am therefore known to myself as a being capable of enjoying pleasure and of suffering pain. Indirectly also, through these

experiences of pleasure-pain, we greatly increase our knowledge of the world of things. The child and the savage attribute to things the capacity for pleasure-pain as confidently and promptly as the capacity for purposeful activity. The same conception of a reality which is by its very nature full of feeling, is as firmly held by poetry and pictorial art to-day as it was ever held in the most primitive times. Religion, from the earliest records of its views down to the most recent theology, believes in the "whole creation groaning and travailing together"; it also believes in a suffering God. As to the scientific validity of this conception of things not-ourselves being subjects of pleasure and pain, in the case of those animals which are organically complex, we do not doubt. Only as we know them by interpreting their motions as signs of feelings similar to our own, do we know them as they really are. They have appetites, passions, desires, and even some measure of the higher intellectual feelings, such as curiosity, interest, etc. Indeed, the only conception which we can frame of actual experiences in either man or animal, corresponding to the vague and indeterminate word, "instinct," is given in terms of feeling rather than of ideation or thought.

Most prominent of all the experiences on which we base our knowledge that we are, and what we are, and our knowledge of things, that they are, and what they are, is the so-called "feeling of effort." From the physiological point of view, this feeling is correlated with nervous processes both centrally and peripherally initiated. The substance of the brain, from the very beginning of the life of the brain, is always active; the substance of the brain, from the very beginning of the life of sensation, is always being stirred to activity by sensory impulses from parts of the body external to itself. In our complex experience, we know that we are real, and that things are real, because we know that we are striving, and that our striving is opposed. This knowledge, in both its aspects, is dependent upon an analysis of the complex feeling of effort.

By willing changes in things, and in our relations to them or in their relations to one another, and by having to work in order to effect these changes, we know both ourselves and them. On the side of will, or voluntary activity, this factor of knowledge has already been referred to. But *our* activity is never in its results a pure and unopposed activity. Our will meets in things a somewhat that wills not as we will. The emotional element in the transaction is the feeling of effort. The inference is a leap of the intellect to an external cause. Thus it is that knowledge of all realities combines feeling and intellect.

The entire theory of localization, both of the different parts of the bodily organism and of external things in spatial relations to this organism, is based upon the fact that active "discriminating consciousness" takes account of an infinite variety in the grades and shades of the experience of feeling. Neither the plain man nor the man of science gets his first information as to where things are, and as to what is their size, their shape and relation to other things, by processes of reasoning about them. He looks, or listens, or feels, to discover where they really are. So integral and inseparable a part of the complex transaction called knowledge of location, is the emotional element that we express it all even more truly in terms of feeling than in terms of intellect. The child feels the difference between right arm and left, between leg and either arm; between breast and back, and toe and finger, etc. In cases where the knowledge is not gained by sight we naturally express the action in terms of feeling. But psychology gives us to know that the delicate shades of feeling which accompany and control the positions and movements of the two eyes are an indispensable part of localization by vision. In all the grosser operations of obtaining the direction, size, shape, and relations in space of large or distant objects, motions of the eyes, over different arcs, and even of the head and trunk, with their accompanying changes in localization feelings, are

an indispensable factor in the whole transaction. The more refined measurements of science, which are customarily made in, or reduced to, terms of the visual sense, are dependent throughout on the same kind of discrimination of feelings, or feeling of discriminations,—we may use either term with almost equal propriety. It is only when we rise into the world of concepts, on which all experimental science even has its eye, that reasoning with abstract thoughts and symbols, brings growth of knowledge about the real world to the human mind.

Two classes of the more definitely "intellectual feelings" may be recognized in this connection. These are such as spur the intellect, and such as accompany, guide, and estimate its activities. The feeling of intellectual curiosity is not, indeed, an integral part of every act of cognition; it can scarcely be spoken of as an essential factor or concomitant of all knowledge. But it incites to those activities, of both an intellectual and an emotional sort, which determine, in the individual and in the race, the attainment and the growth of knowledge. Under its influence the child searches into the nature and uses of things. To it, far more than to any selfish or mercantile motive, modern science owes its splendid triumphs. Of its possible intensity Augustine bore witness when he declared: "My soul is on fire to know." Plato made desire, or *Eros*, the only avenue to philosophy; and the Prussian Queen was eager to die that she might know the things which even Leibnitz could not tell her.

There are certain feelings, however,—and those of the higher nature,—which enter in an integrating way into the very substance of knowledge. One class of these may be called logical. There are peculiar feelings with which we affirm, and different feelings with which we deny. Even when we are, as we are accustomed to say, intellectually convinced, we cannot make a genuine affirmation or denial without an experience of these feelings. Affirmation and denial are even connected with definite forms of feeling dependent upon bodily attitudes. The

smooth, logical flow of our trains of thought is partly a matter of feeling; hitches, or pauses, in these trains are emotional as well as intellectual attitudes of the mind. Feelings of recognition, feelings of attraction or repulsion, feelings of certainty or uncertainty, enter into every process of thought.

Feelings of satisfaction do not simply announce and guaranty for us the solution of a problem; they constitute an important part of the solution itself. It is with no vain or unmeaning voice that we inquire after the truth of a proposition by asking: "Are you *satisfied* with the correctness of your solution?" In the ultimate tests of all truth, both the apparent correctness of the logical processes involved, and the steadfast character of the emotions which the result evokes, combine to constitute what we call a satisfactory issue of the inquiry.

The demand for a cause, with all the stimulus which this demand affords to the intellectual activity of the race,—of which, indeed, it is the principal and the perennial source—is an experience of an emotional rather than of an ideational type. As we shall see later, it is in the feeling-full experience of ourselves as wills that the notion of cause has its origin. The so-called principles of "sufficient reason" is no outgrowth of ratiocination. If it were such, it could never seem to let us into the mystery of the constitution, and relations of action and reaction, of different kinds of energies, which we, of necessity, believe we find in the real world. Here Schopenhauer's sharp criticism of Kant for dismissing the part which feeling plays in giving "objectivity" to phenomena with the sentence, "Objects are given to us through our sensibility," is not without justification. And to speak of any reality, Thing or Self, as though it were merely a thought-object is to be false to the full content of the simplest act of cognition. The rather is Riehl justified in saying: "For being is in no wise a constituent of an idea; it is experienced, felt, lived, not ideated or thought."

The mighty part which æsthetical feelings play in all our knowledge of the world has rarely, or never, been sufficiently estimated by either psychology or philosophy. That our judgments about the beauty of natural objects, as well as the beauty of works of art, are chiefly prompted and guided and made in terms of æsthetical emotions, has indeed been recognized by writers on æsthetics and by students of art. This fact has also frequently been appealed to as an argument for the purely subjective character of such judgments. This scepticism affirms that beauty is in man as a matter of appreciative feeling only; but it denies that beauty is in nature, as a quality of the external object. How inadequately this æsthetical scepticism answers to the psychological analysis of the judgment which affirms beauty, and also to our philosophical notion of what the Being of the World really is, as known in terms of this judgment, will be made clear in a subsequent chapter. At present we are calling attention to a yet more general and important truth connected with the psychological view of knowledge. Æsthetical feeling enters into the very substance of knowledge. Both truths of fact and also many fanciful departures from truth of fact are apprehended and appreciated with a certain glow of feeling which is æsthetical in character. It is largely the satisfaction, which the myths and legends and fanciful conceptions, both religious and non-religious, give to æsthetical feeling, that causes them to be regarded as true. The fair and æsthetically pleasing, or the terrible and æsthetically appalling or awe-inspiring, has the preference for human minds, over such conceptions and judgments as afford no obvious point of contact with man's artistic emotions.

To suppose that modern science has excluded or diminished the active and efficient presence of æsthetical feeling in our conceptions of nature and of humanity is a serious mistake. On the contrary, the nobler and higher forms of these emotions were never before so obvious and powerful as in the

positive sciences of the present day. More and more these sciences are all being re-constructed in terms corresponding to æsthetical ideals. Order, proportion, infinity and the infinitesimal, the reign of law, the unity which is through infinite variety, the conception of the all-embracing, all-producing Ether, the very mystery and awfulness of the limitless areas of time and space in which ceaseless changes, involving life and death to countless beings in innumerable worlds,—these are all constructs of imagination which are born of æsthetical emotions and which forcefully appeal to the mother whose children they are. That science is constantly advancing in the proofs of their realization in the Being of the World is scientific evidence that this Being is itself constituted after the type furnished to our minds by æsthetical ideals. That science, in spite of seeming proofs of many exceptions to these ideals, still trusts its power in the future to reconcile the conflicts produced by these exceptions, is evidence that the knowledge which calls itself "science" is influenced and shaped by the emotions which recognize the value for reality of these ideals.

That ethical and religious emotions take no insignificant part in many forms of human knowledge could easily be made equally clear. But the evidence for this truth is more conveniently to be examined when we are treating of the subjects of moral philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

Two important truths for our theory of knowledge may be deduced from this survey of the nature of knowledge as viewed from the point of standing taken by the psychologist. And, first: Knowing involves, in a living commerce, all the so-called faculties of the human soul. It is not thinking alone, or feeling alone, or willing alone. Indeed, neither of these so-called faculties can even have the part it plays in knowledge accurately described without reference to both the others. Intellect is active and feeling-full, in all cognition. Feeling must prompt, guide, and accompany a more or less volun-

tary process of thought, in order that cognition may be the result. Will must direct attention and control the motor organism, in the intellect's feeling-full effort to discriminate the qualities of the object, and to judge its relation to other objects. To say all this is, indeed, a weak and imperfect and halting way of describing that complex and mysterious achievement which we call our knowledge. For the soul unites in a single grasp of consciousness those many and subtle forms of her behavior, which psychological science, with all its mechanism for analysis, can only partially detect and faultily describe. But, however lame in its description science may be—and this impotency to match successfully the speed and complexity and hidden art of nature's processes is not confined to psychological science—every plain man, who has arrived at adult self-consciousness, knows to some good purpose what it is for him to know. It is sorry work for the psychologist to be ceaselessly trying to show how that cannot be true, which everybody knows is true; how the soul cannot possibly do what every knower is immediately aware of the potency and the fact of himself as doing. But this is what the extremes of an idealistic egoism and of a crude common-sense realism in psychology both are fond and proud of seeming to accomplish. The one cannot conceive how a merely ideating subject can *know* a material object; the other cannot conceive how a real thing can become the object of an ideating Ego. But in truth and reality, the knower is not a mere ideating subject but an embodied thinking, feeling, willing Soul; and the object known is no construct of dead matter, but an incorporate idea. In all knowing, subject and object are not loosely and indirectly joined by inference or idea; they are united in terms of an active commerce which serves to express more or less fully the characteristic being of each. What it is to know cannot be known by any analysis of the categories; what it is to know, in order to be known, must be experienced as a complex, vital fact.

The second truth is this: In knowledge, reality and idea are not separated and so in need of being subsequently united by judgment, conception, inference, or syllogism. The finished act of knowledge leaves no gap between the real and the ideal which science or speculation must subsequently see to having bridged. In every act of knowledge, the idea and the reality are present in the very act itself. Is it knowledge of myself that I am gaining? The very nature of the activity called self-conscious is such that it grasps together the Self as subject and the Self as object, in the unity of one cognitive process. The proof that this cannot be, which is derived from the abstract possibility of dividing up the time required to come to self-consciousness into an infinite number of infinitesimal moments, is as silly from the points of view held by both common-sense and genuine science, as was the argument of the ancient sceptics that Achilles could not overtake the tortoise. The vaster part of human knowledge, both of Selves and of Things, is indeed not of this so-called intuitive or immediate sort. It is remotely inferential and composed of more or less doubtful, or if true, only approximate inferences explanatory of these intuitive experiences. It results in constructing a Being of the World in terms of a complex metaphysical theory. But it must all be referred for its support back to the immediate knowledge which results from an intuitive but complex and developmental process of cognition.

CHAPTER V

KINDS, DEGREES, AND LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE

So far as the essential forms of mental life which enter into the act of cognition are concerned, there is only one kind of knowledge. The amounts of voluntary control of attention and of the bodily organism, the intensity and variety of the feelings, and the proportion, so to say, of intuition and of inference, may vary greatly; but the character of the total process and of its resulting judgment admits of no radical change. Thus to know at all is a development; and all knowledge, whether of the practical or of the more strictly scientific sort, is a growth, both in the individual and in the race.

When, however, we consider the different acts of cognition from the point of view of the objects known, the case is by no means the same. A division, or "direnption" (not as an act of violence or revolution, indeed), takes place so early in the mental life that its origins and causes are exceedingly difficult for psychology to explain. But the accomplishment of this process results in two kinds of knowledge which later seem to divide between them all known objects in the world of our experience; which distinguish and classify all forms of human science; and which become the occasions and explanatory causes of two rival and perpetually recurring systems of metaphysics. These two kinds are the Knowledge of Things and the Knowledge of Self.

It has just been said that psychology has difficulty in explaining how this more or less radical division of knowledge into two classes, according to its objects, originates; and what are all the subtle and hidden influences which bring it about. With the newly born human infant there is, of course, no *knowl-*

edge whatever, whether of itself or of other selves or of things. It must "get to know" by an activity, at first impulsive and involuntary and not self-purposeful. The storm of new sensory impressions, both painful and pleasurable, which the forces of its natural environment call forth in consciousness, must be reduced to some kind of order and somehow classified and "objectified," before the achievement of knowledge, properly so-called, can be reached. But since memory and self-consciousness are themselves forms of knowledge, and conditions, as well, of its higher development, no first-hand description of what takes place in the earlier stages of its development ever reaches the attentive ear of the inquiring psychologist. He has forgotten how it was with himself as he learned to know; for when it was thus with himself, he had as yet no cognitive memory formed, and was in fact no true Self. And no babe who is now learning to know can tell the psychologist how it is with itself; because to know one's self, and to describe this Self in terms of self-consciousness, is to have passed quite beyond the stage in which the origins of knowledge lie concealed. It is only then by a combination of data derived from observation and experiment, that psychology gives a confessedly doubtful and incomplete picture of that growth of knowledge in and through which every human cognitive consciousness distinguishes between its own Self and other selves and things.

The differences in the two characteristic processes involved in making this most primary of all cognitive, objective distinctions lead to a doctrine of sense-perception on the one hand, and on the other, a doctrine of self-consciousness. And yet, a more careful analysis shows that without sense-perception self-consciousness could never be attained; while the development of the consciousness of a Self is indispensable to a knowledge of things. The two kinds of knowledge grow as one at first; then as two branches from one root; then as two trunks united at their base; then as really separate and distinct species

in the garden of the universe. Yet always, selves are known to themselves as having certain essential qualities like things; other selves are known to every individual Self through the manifestation of changes in things; and all things are known to all selves only as they manifest more or less perfectly their own self-like characteristics. In this way we are compelled to believe in the reality of both, in the actuality of their relations of action and reaction, and in the essential unity of a world which embraces innumerable selves and infinitely numerous things.

When psychological science studies the differences in the material, or "stuff," of knowledge, in order to see how and why the mind persists in dividing its objects into these two great classes, its search for facts and probable causes is better rewarded. Differences in the "feeling-tone" which is attached to different kinds of sensory impressions; differences in the relations which these sensory impressions sustain to our volitions; differences of both in their relations to changes in the bodily organism; differences in the character and persistence of the revived mental images and in the thoughts conceived, and the processes inferred:—all these and other differences are seen to account for the division which the knower insists upon establishing and maintaining between himself and other selves and things. As the logicians would say: the content of these two classes of objects is greatly different. It is visual and tactal sensation-complexes, with the memories, imaginings, thoughts and reasonings, referring to sensation-experiences, which characterize the content of so-called external cognition. But the knowledge of Self has its content, not chiefly in sensations at all; but in mental images, thoughts, feelings or volitions.

Especially important is the difference in the relation toward what is called the "conative consciousness," which is sustained by these two classes of objects. This difference involves the compelling power which the object has over the attention,

and the relation it sustains to the motor organism, with the changes in the feeling of effort, and in the pleasurable or painful tone of our sensations, which accompany the control of the organism. The pleasure is mine; the pain is mine; but that which gives me the pleasure, although only under indirect or remote control by my will, or which causes the pain in spite of my felt muscular effort to remove it—that is “not-me.” For in the vital, full-blooded experience of reality, there are no abstract conceptions of either Self or Things: there is the “I” that wills to strive for, and to have, and to enjoy; and there is the “that-which” strives with me, and too often hurts or discomforts me, because it wills not as I will.

In the earlier stages of self-knowledge, it is the feeling of the moving body which chiefly answers to the idea of the Self. What is here and now, what is not simply seen to move in sequence upon desire and volition, but is felt in vital contact with something else which the same desire and volition cannot move in like manner; what is warm with emotion, and suffers definitely localized pleasures or pains;—that is the present known Self of the child. The Self of its seemingly intuitive cognition is now present in arms, or legs, or back; and now in some region vaguely conceived of as within the abdominal or thoracic cavities. But even young children and the least developed savages do not wholly identify any one part of the body, or all the known parts taken collectively, with what they mean by “myself,” or “I.” And if, in the one aspect of experience, I seem obliged to feel that I am in the arm, the leg, the trunk, the vaguely localized internal space; in another aspect, both child and savage learn to know the leg, or arm, or trunk, or heart, as not Me but rather mine. Instead of the child and the savage being incapable of conceiving of a Self as a soul separable from the visible and tangible parts of the body; both savage and child perform this distinguishing act of imagination with too great freedom from the bonds of scientific accuracy and of respect for the testimony of a care-

fully analyzed experience. The savage imagines himself a spirit which can wander far afield from his physical organism, and which can easily survive its dissolution; while the child develops such a wealth of conscious self-hood, that it can endow with its own feelings, its toys, its playmates, and all the natural objects of its enlarging environment. In the history of the intellectual development of the race, this *spiritualizing* of things, by imparting to them a kind of self-hood which is not necessarily embodied in an organism like our own, but which is thought of as separable from any particular form of material expression, has been an ever-persistent and powerful factor. Science chastens, refines, and extends, the cognitive activities in which this anthropomorphizing imagination bears so prominent a part; it does not, and it cannot, free itself from essentially the same kind of anthromorphism. By knowledge the knower distinguishes himself from that which he knows; and yet that which he knows is known to him only in terms of correspondence to the knowing Self. *Not-me*, and yet somehow *like-me*, is the character with which knowledge stamps all its objects, whether selves or things.

Just here, however, two very important distinctions emerge. These are, first, a distinction in the amounts of intuition, the degrees of immediacy, in the two kinds of knowledge; and, second, a distinction in the amount and certainty of the knowledge gained as to the real character of the object known. In a word, the knowledge of Self is, of all kinds of knowledge, most intuitive, immediate, and most characterized by the conviction of certainty; of all objects, the Self rather than other selves or things, is most fully known as it really is.

The first of these distinctions is illustrated and emphasized by all the experience of self-consciousness. As has already been said, this kind of cognitive activity is not a ready-made gift from nature's hand, but an achievement in the form of a development. In spite of the mystery, however, which shrouds its origins and earlier growth, its important and distinctive

characteristics are manifest beyond doubt. When *I* am *in* pain, or *in* a state of pleasurable excitement; when *I* am *feeling* any form of passion, affection, or sentiment; when *I* am *indulging* or *pursuing* any train of associated ideas or logically connected thoughts; then simply to say, "pain is," "passion is," "ideas or thoughts are," does not by any means accurately describe the finished experience. I know that I am pained, am angry, loving, aspiring, am imagining or thinking, as the case may be. And within certain limits I can examine these conscious conditions, and thus learn more accurately what they are, as states or activities attributed to myself. To be sure, in the very effort at reflection I to some extent, and often almost completely, modify the conscious conditions which I examine; and if we refer to the relatively fleeting character, in time, of all our experiences with ourselves, we may say that, to speak with mathematical accuracy, it is the just past condition of the Self which is imperfectly remembered rather than the now present condition of the Self which is envisaged and intuitively known. But experience, whether with ourselves or with outside things, is not given in those infinitesimals of time and space with which calculus can deal, but of which human souls know nothing either by sense-perception or by self-consciousness. And all such argument, or conclusion from such argument, cannot diminish the confidence in its immediacy and certainty which the experience called self-consciousness imparts and justifies. That I may know, and at times do most fully and assuredly know, myself as being here-and-now in such and such a state, is a proposition on the validity of which not only all knowledge of Self is based, but also all knowledge of every sort whatever. Indeed, without admitting the significance and the validity of self-consciousness, we can form no conception whatever of what it is to know. This is a truth upon which philosophy can scarcely insist too often. A knower, who is incapable of self-consciousness, is as much a contradiction in terms as "wooden iron" is.

The principal characteristics of self-conscious knowledge are about as plain as is the fact of its experience. They are of the nature of what we may call an "envisagement." They may be summed up in the two words, immediacy and indubitableness. When *I* know *me*, as being so or so affected or as being active in such or such a way, there is nothing, so to say, between the "*I*" who knows the "*me*" and the "*me*" who is known by the "*I*"; and when analyzed so as to discover without exaggeration the value of the experience, doubt cannot attach itself successfully to the validity of the experience. To tell me that I am not in pain, when I know that I am, is to mock me; although the end of the mockery may induce me by the withdrawal of attention, or use of other expedient, to modify the painful state.

From this distinction in the way of knowing, and as chiefly dependent upon it, there follows a distinction in the fullness with which the real nature of the object is known. In self-consciousness, knower and object known are one and the same soul. In this act of cognition, the full nature of the object at the moment of cognition is made known to the subject. A pained, or passionate, or thoughtful "*me*" is the really existent and indubitably known object of the self-conscious "*I*." As the experience of the Self with itself, and with other selves and things, increases in both extent and depth; as more and more objects are known by the Self, and as all known objects are more thoroughly and accurately known; the same kind of reflection makes us aware of a larger outfit of the powers of self-hood and of a greater complication in their exercise, and a greater wealth in their achievements. We know ourselves as experiencing forms of affection and sentiment of which the child is incapable. We know ourselves as having ambitions and aspirations that rise above and reach beyond the earlier and more primitive animal wants and desires of infancy and youth. We know ourselves as imagining things and events in times and spaces, of which the undeveloped

mind could never dream or apprehend the meaning of as they are imaginatively depicted by others. We know ourselves as gaining practical knowledge or making scientific attainments by observations, experiments, and trains of thinking, quite superior to anything possible in the earlier years of mental development. We know ourselves as having conceptions and sentiments and ideals of art, duty, and religion, of which only the faintest traces, or no traces whatever, can be found in the memories of one or more decades ago. Yet all these experiences of suffering and doing, of acting and being acted upon, are known only as they are attributed to the same Self as the subject of them all. And if I am asked what now, with the years of infinitely richer experience, I know myself to be, I must add greatly to the description of my self-known character. But everything I add, will belong as truly as ever to what I indubitably know myself really to be. For these experiences of suffering and action, however highly developed and complexly organized, are all *of* myself, *with* myself. They make up, together with the inferences which may be based upon them, the conception of what I really am. Whether the inferences are justifiable, or not, may indeed be questioned; but that I really am the subject of these experiences, and that I really am what they, as a basis, show me to myself to be, cannot be called in question. Since these experiences have not yet reached a fixed limit, and especially since imagination and intellect do not find themselves exhausted in their inferences from these acts of self-knowledge, there is warrant for believing that the personality is really something more, perhaps much more, than it now knows itself to be. The development of this truth about the connection between knowledge and reality must be left to the metaphysics of mind. The fact of this truth is essential to note in forming a correct and tenable theory of knowledge.

With the knowledge of other selves and of things, the case is not the same. Things are known by sense-perception and

not by self-consciousness. The distinction, however, does not amount to a complete separation in the character of the two kinds of knowledge, or in the two kinds of objects that are known. There is a certain immediacy and sureness of conviction about the knowledge which comes through the senses. A completed act of sense-perception, like self-consciousness, leaves no doubt as to the real existence of the object known. Indeed, for the earlier developments of knowledge what we sense is the very type of what we most immediately and indubitably know. Psychological analysis shows, indeed, that this kind of knowledge is also a development; that things do not exist ready-made, for the passive mind to be impressed with; that knowing things is no mere copying-off process. And the physico-chemical sciences are revealing—during the past two decades in ways of wonder never even dreamed of before—how unlike anything which our senses can immediately envisage is the infinitely complicated and hidden constitution of things. Yet all this science is based upon the same confidence in the immediacy and indubitable character of the experience of sense-perception, when correctly analyzed and properly understood. From that undiscoverable moment, when the baby perceives any object which, however dimly and imperfectly, it sets outside of its own consciousness; when it locates any painful or pleasurable feeling in some visible or tangible part of its own organism; especially when it bumps against, or pushes against, or enters into a muscular contest with its own object of sense; from that very moment there is the beginning of the knowledge of a world that is not-me. This experience it is which develops into a science of a world of things. And under the conditions which are fulfilled in every primitive but completed act of sense-perception, there is the irresistible feeling of immediacy, and of confidence in the reality of the object. The psychological interpretation of this experience has been briefly referred to in an earlier chapter. We have there found that it is, in its chief characteristic,

best described as the feeling of a will opposed, of a will experiencing a will which does not will as does the will of the knower.

The same immediacy cannot, however, be claimed for the development of this knowledge of things by sense-perception and of the knowledge of Self by self-consciousness. That there is something *not-myself* I indubitably and immediately know in the experience of sense-perception. What are the characteristics, the qualities, and the habitual modes of behavior of this something must be learned by a system of inferences. That I am really suffering pain when the coal burns me, I know; but what the coal is really doing when it pains me, I do not know except as physical science can inform me. That I see the glowing coal as extended in space, I surely know, and in the act of seeing I know what sight as an experience really is; but what it is to be in space, or how it is that that thing can cause me to see it as extended in just that space, I do not know with the same immediacy and certainty.

When, then, a more complete and truly inward answer to the question, *What are things *really*?* is required, there is no other resort than to analogy. We see them moving, changing their own shapes and relations to one another in space. While maintaining certain more or less relatively permanent characteristics, the individual things are ever altering the details in the manifestation which they make to our senses. These more permanent or more mutable forms of manifestation we know in terms of our own experience. But what are they *really* that so manifest themselves to us? That they are not really altogether what they seem, science is always more abundantly convincing us. But science can only interpret them, since science is human, in terms of human experience. It can only render more subtle and complicated the argument from analogy. For all our terms of experience are known, as to what they really are as *experiences*, only in and through self-consciousness. And here the human mind falls into a

condition of being puzzled and in doubt, from which the positive sciences have as yet done only a little to extricate it. Many things, which certainly are not ourselves, are known to us as other selves. This is matter of a system of inferences from signs, which is so complete and convincing as to solve all doubts. These thing-like beings, are really selves like ourselves —the human beings of our acquaintance, either personal, or through description, or in history. Then there are other not quite so self-like things: these are the animals of one species or another. The more self-like they are, the better we know them as they really are. The owner knows his faithful dog or horse, in terms of his own sensation, feeling, and thinking. But in what terms shall the human mind conceive how a clam, or a jelly-fish, or an ameba, senses, feels, and thinks, in its varying relations to other things? And then there are the plants: how soulful and intelligent is the behavior of some of them, and how do they seem consciously to rejoice in their own delicate beauty, or majestic strength! But are they really like us in these regards—which are the only regards under which we can present to ourselves the reality of their inward life? And shall we stop our system of analogical inferences with them? Is not modern science driving into the abyss of an absurd and impossible conception, all thought of “dead” matter, or of purposeless and inactive things? Why, then, should man not interpret the Universe as a totality, in terms of reality as experienced by himself; and that is to say, in terms of an experience of the life of a Self?

Especially important and even decisive, therefore, for a valid theory of knowledge is this truth: *The reality of the subject and the reality of the object, and also the actuality of that relation between subject and object which is essential to cognition, are an indubitable experience in every act, both of sense-perception and of self-consciousness.* The reality is not a matter of mere thinking, or of mere believing, or of merely mental representation. To use, while rejecting as appropriate,

the misleading Kantian phrase: It is no "phenomenal reality" which the knower knows himself to be and to cognize in his object. The relation established by knowledge is not an abstraction or an image of that which may, or may not be, actual fact. No merely grammatical or merely logical description covers completely any experience of knowledge, whether its object be the Self or some Thing.

Several kinds of knowledge which are based upon other principles of division than that which chiefly distinguishes the character of the object known, require a brief notice. But they are all of secondary importance; they do not change the essential nature of the cognitive process. Thus Schopenhauer soundly berates Kant (and, indeed, not without a show of reasons) for exalting conceptions so far above perceptual knowledge. He then himself reverses the position of conception and intuition so completely as to deprive the intellect of all claim to arrive at truth of reality. By a kind of non-sensuous intuition, such as Kant supposed only God himself could possess, Schopenhauer arrives at the conclusion that the essence of *Thing-in-itself* is "Will." But "*Thing-in-itself*" is no-thing, is nothing but an abstraction so "pure" that it leaves no mist of imagination to clothe itself withal; just as unconscious or subconscious, or non-self-conscious mind is no cognitive mind whatever; for consciousness, as we have seen, is essential to knowledge—in each of the several forms in which human beings can have knowledge, or even conceive of what it is to have knowledge. In a word, the very distinction between perceptual and conceptual knowledge is one of degrees only; and knowledge itself is impossible without both insight and inference. Man must both believe and think in order to know at all; the most abstract conceptions rest upon a basis of perceptions; the arguments by which the purest mathematics reaches the conclusions of its most abstruse and imaginary problems rise and fall upon a scaffolding of concrete sensuous experiences. In this respect the contention of

Schopenhauer is undoubtedly true: "The given material of every philosophy is accordingly nothing else than the empirical consciousness, which divides itself into the consciousness of one's own self and the consciousness of other things."

As to Degrees of Knowledge the principle of continuity applies in a most interesting and instructive way. It is customary, indeed, to speak of knowing as though it were sharply distinguished from believing, conjecturing, imagining, opining, or even from theorizing and arguing with one's self about the actuality of alleged facts or the truth of avowed principles. And at the extremes there is no difficulty, and no lack of confidence, in making such distinctions. But there is, in fact, only one sort of knowledge that can be called "absolute"; and there is no human knowledge that, by any stretch of courtesy or admiration for the wonderful capacity of man, can be called "perfect" knowledge. To ask in a sceptical, or even fairly critical spirit, the question "Are you *absolutely* sure?" is to sound the call to a long chase and a tedious hunt, if indeed any game at all is to reward the search by the close of the day.

There is one act of cognition, however, which, although it is, like all cognition, the result of a development that requires for its achievement all the processes which psychological science finds to belong of necessity to the very nature of cognition, merits the title "absolute" in the strictest possible meaning of the word. This is the consciousness of the here-and-now being of the Self; but it is not the equivalent of absolute self-knowledge. That I was then-and-there, can be known only by memory; and memory is not infallible. It requires much difficult analysis and subtle argument to expound the doctrine of personal identity. That I have been between the then-and-there of memory and the here-and-now of self-consciousness, can be known only by inference. And inference as to the continuance of the same existences through the passage of time is always subject to doubt; while to tell in

what sense I am really the same, notwithstanding the undoubted fact that in every important particular I have greatly changed, taxes all the resources of the metaphysics of mind. The highest degree of human cognitive experience, the type under which man must conceive of absolute knowledge, is given in the sentence: "I am here-and-now"—suffering pain or experiencing pleasure, mainly given up to an act of sense-perception, or indulging in imaginings, or active in thought. Of this concrete, but complex, fact of present experience, I cannot doubt. To doubt is but to affirm it in another form.

It was this experience of self-consciousness with its essential implicates, which Descartes intended to enunciate as the fundamental principle of his epistemology in the form of the celebrated maxim: *Cogito, ergo sum*. What criticism finds in this principle to serve as a cure for scepticism, and what scepticism may still demand of criticism with regard to the Cartesian and other implications of this principle, will occupy our attention elsewhere. It is enough at present to have pointed out the general characteristics of that experience in which a conception of the highest, most truly absolute and indubitable knowledge, is realized by man. *It is the experience of a soul with itself as its own object of knowledge*. Nor need we repeat again how powerless all sceptical analysis of self-consciousness is in its effort to destroy or impair the validity of this act of self-knowledge. What I know myself actually to be to myself, that I know absolutely.

In saying this, however, the word "absolute" is used to stamp this knowledge gained by self-consciousness with the one mark of indubitable certainty. Certain, such knowledge certainly is; not subject of doubt, such an act of cognition doubtless is. But this absolute knowledge is as meagre, unstable, and fleeting—or "relative"—as it is absolute. The very act of self-consciousness in which it is achieved is, from the point of view of psychological science as well as from that of the life-history of a soul, just a bare moment in existence

and then it fades away never to return. How can it, which is itself so evanescent and dream-like, establish the standing in reality of its own self, not to say, the reality of other things. For at this point, we might confess that the term proposed by psychologists who object to talking about souls as though they were really existent agencies, or free and relatively independent wills,—namely, “a stream of consciousness,”—is a complete misnomer. Indeed, a more unfortunate and misleading figure of speech could scarcely be employed. There can be no real “stream” of a physical sort, without an established and permanent continuity to the different sections or moments of the stream. If each preceding thinnest section of the stream is taken up before the next is laid down, then the process of laying down the sections may go on forever, but there will be no *stream*. In the soul’s life, however, there appears now an act chiefly of self-consciousness and then an act chiefly of sense-perception; now an experience of pleasure and then an experience of pain; now a state of consciousness characterized mainly by imagination, and then one of passion or of serious thought. But these all are a series of states; and in the series there is no one of many members of the series which remains in place so as to connect with its neighbor and thus maintain the actuality of a continuous stream. Neither does the *Ego* sit stationary upon the bank, as it were, and watch the stream go by; for, as we have said, there is no stream going by, and, if there were, the watcher could not separate himself from the stream.

Still further, this achievement of absolute knowledge, which is so temporary and so limited in content, must be learned, so to say; and it is a kind of learning, in the attainment and practice of which, for the bare sake of establishing a theory of knowledge, very few men—and fortunately!—have any particular interest. If, then, one refuses to accept as knowledge all cognitions which are not absolute, one may as well surrender at once the hope of knowing anything whatever. For all the knowledge which men have, and use, and develope,

—whether it is called practical or scientific, or philosophical,—is only relative with regard to the degree of certainty which can be attached to it. There is no escape, then, from the conclusion that in a valid meaning of the words, all human knowledge is relative:—namely, in self-consciousness we have given the absolute knowledge that we are, and what we are, but only just then and there; while in sense-perception we have given the conviction that something not ourselves is here and now, but what it is, we can never absolutely know.

The growth of all knowledge comes through inferences which land us, either by what seems a kind of unavoidable leap, or else by way of slower and often difficult and tedious processes of thinking, at the standing place of a system of so-called judgments. These judgments affirm or deny qualities and relations of things and selves; and they constitute for the individual knower a more or less orderly, but always considerably tangled and confused, net-work of knowledge *about* things and selves. But, again, unless we say that to “know about” is really to know, we must confine the realm of knowledge so strictly as to exclude from it all practical, scientific, or philosophical value, as real truth. It would seem, then, that higher and lower degrees of probability, as judged by the reasons which commend and certify our acts of knowledge, and somewhat corresponding degrees of scepticism or uncertainty, must characterize all the achievements of man’s cognitive faculties. For such is human knowledge; and he who will have none of it, because it is all qualified with the possibility of error, and stamped with the certainty of imperfection, must somehow make of himself either much more or much less than a man.

The different processes involved in these inferences, the methods of testing the resulting judgments, the assignments of amount of truth or error that is in them,—and, in a word, the descriptive history of *how* knowledge grows, in the individual and in the race; all this belongs to psychology and to

logic to investigate and to expound. Philosophy, in the branch of it called epistemology, however, is chiefly concerned with the limits and the guaranty of knowledge. But the application of the different standards employed to fix these limits, and to establish this guaranty, result in calling our attention once more to the varying degrees of knowledge as seen from somewhat different points of view. Thus, for example, there is so-called "practical" knowledge. The man who is lacking in this is said not to have common-sense. He does not know enough about things and about other selves to adjust himself properly to them, in what must be for them and for him, a common environment. A great lack of such knowledge, due to deficiency of native or developed knowing faculty, is idiocy. If, however, the failure in respect of such knowledge is rather due to lack of interest in, or of practice upon, this more common class of objects, the man is said to be awkward, odd, un-practical. Scientific knowledge, which aims to know about things and selves their more hidden and subtle, but often most essential, qualities and relations, assumes to itself the title to a higher degree of value. Sometimes its devotees claim to scorn the practical, and to pursue knowledge "for its own sake," and quite irrespective of the application to life of the truths which science discovers. But the conception of knowledge for its own sake is a figment, a myth; all human knowledge is of man, and for man's sake. Yet the satisfactions which come from knowing are among the choicest achievements of the human soul. This same statement applies to so-called philosophical truth, whether we consider the latter to be superior or inferior in the degree of its assurance, or of its worth and dignity, to scientific truth. From the point of view of value, as fixed by the loftiest sentiments and practical demands of the human soul, the truths of morals, art, and religion are supreme. From the point of view taken by him who insists upon clear perception of fact, experimental testing which can be carried on under strict control,

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and logical procedure leading to incontestable conclusions about comprehensible objects, these truths about human ideals seem to stand lowest in the scale of knowledge. Indeed, many would deny that they can ever be established so as to claim title to admittance within the properly guarded realm of human knowledge. They must, the rather, it is then asserted, be relegated to the realm of beliefs, or opinions, or conjectures, dependent upon the individual's attitude of faith. Here, once more, attention is called back to the psychological facts: Belief, opinion, conjecture, activities and products of imagination, influences from sentiment and prejudice, irrational tendencies to dogmatism or equally irrational tendencies to scepticism and agnosticism, mix with and control every act in every kind of human cognition.

There is one most important truth with which for the present we leave the discussion of this subject: *Knowledge cannot be considered apart from life.* Whatever kind of value knowledge has, and whatever degree is attainable in any particular kind of value, knowledge is also always a means to an end that lies above itself. That end is the life of a self-conscious person. But this life must be understood and interpreted in no niggardly fashion. Its aims, and satisfactions, and final purposes, are not to be found wholly in intelligent commerce with things; they are even more perfectly realized in an intelligent grasp upon, and in a rational appreciation and serious pursuit of, the invisible and non-sensuous ideals of morals, art, and religion.

No subject in philosophy has been productive of more unreasonable dogmatism on the one hand, or of equally unreasonable agnosticism on the other, than the discussion of the Limits of Knowledge. If in affirming these limits it is meant virtually to say that man has no other way of knowing than the human way, and that what lies beyond this human way must be unknown; then the statement is as undeniable as it is worthless. To know is to relate: therefore, we are told,

all knowledge is essentially relative and limited. But one may ask: What else would you have; or even conceive of as something better, if only it could be attained? Certainly, knowledge implies a knower, and an object known, and a relation established between them. The researches of psychology, logic, and epistemology are designed to tell us precisely what an experience of knowledge really is. Which of the three factors would the agnostic dispense with:—the knower, the object, or the relation in which the essence of the cognitive experience consists? To convert the relativity of all knowledge into an axiom, in order to create suspicion, or to breed ignorance, is exactly to reverse the conclusion at which an analysis of the nature of knowledge compels us to arrive.

That man's knowledge is limited, in respect to (1) the range of its accuracy and refinement, (2) the number of the objects which can be included in a single grasp of consciousness, and (3) the speed and trustworthiness of its inferences and conclusions, is undoubtedly true. In all these respects, however, we must at once supplement and correct words of discouragement by words of cheer and hope. There is no little evidence to show, not only that all knowledge for the individual and for the race is a matter of growth, but even that the extent to which the limits of human knowledge may be pushed out into the boundless ocean of the unknown, by the development of human cognitive faculty and by the extension and refinement of scientific methods, cannot itself confidently be limited at the present time. In his celebrated chapter "On the Ground of the Distinction of Objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena," Kant compares the whole domain of human knowledge to an island "enclosed by nature itself within limits that can never be changed." For around this island there is "a wide and stormy ocean," full of fog-banks and of ice: the ocean is "the home of illusion," but the island is "the country of truth." But in the Kantian theory, even the truth of this country is not truth, as either the plain man,

the man of science, or the philosopher, understands *truth*. It is only the truth which phenomena seem to have, when they are made "objective" by man's intellect in forms imparted to them wholly by the activities of the intellect itself. The island itself then is "the home of illusion"; and its limits are set by a fog-bound ocean, the very nature of which we cannot know, or trust the intellect correctly to dream about. Now all this, we submit, reverses the terms on which we have our actual experience of knowledge. The island is indeed "the country of truth"; but it is truly this because it is the domain within which we have commerce by knowledge, with reality. And the domain of the island is not limited by a wholly invisible and stormy ocean, "the home of illusion." Even the ocean itself is part of the same nature which we are constantly knowing better as it really is. Wide and limitless, if you please, is this ocean; but man is constantly navigating further and further into its expanses; and as far as he goes he knows better how both island and ocean are one Universe, in which is immanent One Mind, whom religious faith worships as God. Without introducing at this point the ideals of philosophy and religion, we are justified in saying that practical knowledge, such as men live and die by, as well as all the particular sciences, are in agreement as to a growth of knowledge of the One World, which cannot be arbitrarily limited in the *a priori* way of the thorough-going Kantian agnosticism.

A detailed consideration of all the factors and so-called avenues of human knowledge would bring us to the same reasonably modest, but hopeful conclusion with regard to the extension of the limits of knowledge. It was as customary for a now old-fashioned philosophy to discredit the knowledge gained by the senses, as it was for an old-fashioned theology to discredit the nature and worth of the body. We know, for example, that to the unaided, average eye, the limits in the color scale lie between the deep red and the violet rays;

and for the average ear, between tones of perhaps from 14 to a possible 40,000 or 50,000 vibrations in a second. These limits may perhaps be extended in the future developments of the organs of sight and sound. But whether the limits of seeing colors and hearing musical tones are much extended in these directions or not, the discoveries of the constitution of matter, of the nature of material processes, and of the laws of physical relations, in time and in space, which are made conceivable for these senses by means of modern instrumentation and experiment, admit of no such limit. Even now we are having actual experiences of minute divisions of material bodies, with astonishing speed of motion, and through formerly impenetrable media,—all of which might easily have been pronounced beyond the limits of human cognition, less than three decades ago. And to lament that such knowledge does not take us beyond the limits of the senses after all, is to turn silly for the pure sake of being sorry. That by sight we cannot get at things which are by nature invisible, or by hearing compass thoughts and melodies that are inaudible, is simply and appropriately to confess that there is knowledge which transcends the sensuous, and that can be reached and verified only in some non-sensuous way.

Less easy even would it seem to be to set arbitrary limits to the knowledge of those beings and those truths which reason apprehends and validates, in the exercise of its higher faculties of imagination and thought, and with the confidence justified by its loftier sentiments and ideals. The experiences of righteous conduct, of devotion to duty and of satisfaction in its fruits; the love of beauty and the intelligent appreciation of the products and ideals of art; the life of faith and hope and resignation as a steadfast attitude toward the Infinite Spirit, the conception of whom represents the religious development of the race;—all these forms of human experience furnish the material upon the development and increased wealth of which, reflective thinking extends with-

out assignable limits the knowledge of mankind. For here are facts; and knowledge of facts is the foundation of all growth of knowledge. And these facts, like all others, solicit and demand explanation by the human mind. Explanation of facts constitutes science—a term which can not properly be arrogated to the exclusive use of certain kinds of explanation for certain classes of facts. Although the methods of proof are not identical, and the character of the conclusions reached as well as of the feelings of certainty attaching to them are not precisely the same, we cannot exclude ethical, æsthetical, and religious experience from the domain within which real knowledge is possible. They are part of the island which is “the country of truth”; and as we have already said, the island is not “enclosed by nature itself within limits that can never be changed.” On the contrary, the very nature of the island is constantly to increase its domain by taking in more and more of the surrounding ocean. Nor is the ocean any longer “the home of illusion”; the less so constantly, as not only the physico-chemical sciences, but also the forms of knowledge known as ethics, æsthetics, and the science of religion, illuminate and interpret more of its infinite expanse and fathomless depths. Indeed, all these various ways of knowing the Being of the World are necessary to the fuller knowledge; for they all suggest and increasingly confirm the opinion that It is indeed the Ground and the Interpreter of them all.

There is, therefore, only one field of contention by conquering which agnosticism, in its most comprehensive form, can fix arbitrary and *a priori* limits to the future growth of human knowledge. And when this form of agnosticism has its claim critically examined, it is found that instead of setting *limits* to knowledge, it confuses and misstates the entire psychological doctrine of knowledge, and from the point of view of a philosophical theory, makes all knowledge whatever impossible. Such agnosticism, therefore, issues in a scepticism,

at once so really shallow and so seemingly profound, that it is convicted of reaching depths that seem impenetrable only because it skims their surface so hastily.

The denial of all real knowledge, whatever be the character of the object upon which the knower expends himself, or whatever the skillful and laborious industry with which the expenditure is made, requires a completely sceptical outcome to a criticism of the so-called "categories," or fundamental and constitutional forms of the activity of knowing faculty. In a word, this theory virtually holds that man's mental organism, naturally and necessarily, works illusion, or the appearance of commerce with reality, rather than a knowledge which is, first, an apprehension and then a growing comprehension, of the nature of reality. Taking the argument of Kant in his celebrated "Critique of Pure Reason" with a strict consistency, such universal and complete scepticism is undoubtedly its logical and avowed issue. But many assumptions, even in this book as well as the main tendency and principal conclusions of the other two *Critiques*, are corrective of, if not contradictory to, such a sceptical result. Whether the criticism of the categories legitimately leads to a sceptical outcome must occupy us in a later chapter.

CHAPTER VI

PRINCIPLES AND PRESUPPOSITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

DESCRIPTIVE psychology must be followed by criticism, if we are to arrive at any tenable theory of knowledge as a worthy part of systematic philosophy. This criticism at the very beginning reveals the influence upon all our thinking, and so upon all human knowledge, of certain principles. Continued still further, the same criticism discovers certain presuppositions, which are customarily only matters of feeling or of faith, and certain implicates which, although not ordinarily recognized, really lie hidden in every act of cognition. These principles, presuppositions, and implicates, must be subjected to reflective thinking in order to arrive at a philosophical theory of knowledge.

If now we turn to so-called "pure" or "formal" logic, in the shape in which it was cultivated and prevailed from the days of Aristotle downward until nearly the present date, we find that its authorities reduced the principles of all thought to the following two: "The Principle of Identity and Non-contradiction"; and "The Principle of Sufficient Reason." For its statement of these principles logic has, at different times, adopted different formulas; sometimes words, sometimes letters, sometimes numbers, sometimes geometrical figures or other symbols. As a true interpretation, or even description, of the warm-blooded, inconsequential, and fleet-footed life of real thought, all these formulas are as unsatisfactory as are the geometrical arrangements of the electrons made in order to explain the qualitative differences of the chemical atoms. Indeed, all such symbols, instead of explaining or faithfully describing the actual processes which go on in the formation and extension of those acts of judging which

men call "knowing," are too often misleading as to the essential nature of the processes themselves.

That knowledge is not all thought, nor the cognitive act all to be explained in terms of the logical processes, has already been made sufficiently clear. But it has been made equally clear that there is no knowledge, however intuitive it may seem, which does not involve judgment, and no growth of knowledge which does not require inference and the concatenation, or chaining together, of judgments. The real significance and influence of the two alleged principles of all thought just referred to must, therefore, be understood in order to interpret the nature, and guarantee the validity, of the human knowing faculty.

It was customary for the older treatises upon formal logic to throw the Principle of Identity into some such form as the following: *A* is *A*; and, then, the Principle of Non-contradiction could properly take the obverse shape in the formula: *A* is not *non-A*. Looked at more closely, three observations are at once suggested as helpful for elucidating the meaning for experience of this interesting, if exceedingly dry way of picturing a mental phenomenon; or rather, of stating a rule governing all mental phenomena, so far as they are phenomena of thought. And, first, that *A* is ("really and truly," as children say) *A*, and that *A* is not *non-A*, cannot possibly be made the subject of argument. For if I do not hold fast to the judgment or belief,—call it what one will,—that the first *A*, or *A* in the place of subject, *is A*, I cannot affirm whether it is identical with the predicate *A*, or not. It follows, in the same way, that the verity of the principle of non-contradiction cannot be argued. With regard to both *A*s, whose identity I am called upon to affirm, I can only state my confidence in the following terms: This subject-*A* is subject-*A*; and this predicate-*A* is predicate-*A*. And now I am ready to go the whole thing over again and end with an equally barren and unillumining result.

But, second, it is not in the spirit of jesting, or of mocking at the many well-meant attempts to reduce to symbolism the principles of the life of thought, that we affirm the misleading and untruthful character of the principle of identity, whether as applied to the reality of the Self, or of Things, or to the actuality of the relations happening between them. *A* is never really *A*; there is neither in reality nor in thinking any such identity or affirmation of identity as can be intelligently symbolized in any such way. Things are never identical with other things; much less even are selves identical with other selves. Indeed, here the maintenance of *being-at-all* forbids the establishment of such identity. Neither is any Self, or any Thing, so far as we know or can know, identical with itself, in the only meaning which, as it would seem, the formula "*A-is-A*" is fitted to express. The very life of the Self, the essential being of the Thing, consists in change. Strictly speaking, it is at all, only as it is *not* the same as it was—even at the beginning of that moment—the actual "is"—which is spanned by the grasp of a single act of cognitive consciousness. Still further: to think is to change. The knower cannot, even while knowing, remain the same with himself, in any such meaning of the word "same" as is fully symbolized by logical formulas. And to predicate *A* of any subject-Thing called *A*, is to recognize, in their effect upon our consciousness, certain changes which we are compelled to suppose are changes in the states and activities of the real thing. So far as concrete experience goes, therefore, we never come upon any example of identity in the form symbolized by logic. Thought discriminates similarities and diversities. As an accompaniment of all sense-perception, or rather as an essential element in the knowledge of things gained through the senses, the intellect recognizes or infers enough of likeness between the successive appearances which it localizes more or less definitely up or down, to right or left, near by or far away, to warrant attributing them to one and

the same thing. How much the similarity must be, or how rapid may be the changes that can take place without destroying the reality of the thing, only experience can help us to decide. Enough for practical purposes is ordinarily enough to satisfy the mind. Is this oak tree the same ("identically" the same) with that which I set out as a boy, now that I come back as an old man, to view it in my boy-hood home? Yes and No,—according to the point of view. Am I, who remember setting it out, and who am now sad or pleased at the memory, the same ("identically" the same) I, that I was then? Yes and No,—according to the point of view. But surely, if I cannot say, not only *I am I*, but *I that now am, this present I, am the same I that then was, and has been since then and now*, there is no possible warrant for my affirming the identity of the tree. Now all this is but to say that similarities are matters of experience, either through sense-perception and self-consciousness, or through memory and inference. But in all this there is no recognition of the principle of identity, as it is symbolized by logic and strictly so-called.

In the third place, we see that the principle which logic has tried to symbolize in so barren and unsatisfactory a way, may be re-stated as it is actually in control of the life and growth of the human intellect, in somewhat the following manner. In all judgment, truth requires a certain, at least momentarily fixed relation of agreement or disagreement between the subject and the predicate of the same judgment. We may change our judgments about both things and selves. Indeed, the growth of knowledge, the correction of error, the contradiction of falsehood, all require a change of judgments. If we represent any particular thing to ourselves by *A* as the subject of all judgments about it; then we must be constantly changing the predicate *As*, in order to express our knowledge of the subject-*A*. And as its predicates are changed, of course the thing as known by us cannot remain the same thing. But every particular judgment, affirming

or denying *A* of *A*, must have a fixed meaning for the subject-*A* and also for the predicate-*A*, if truth of experience is to be expressed in that particular judgment. For example, we may say that the same chameleon is now one color and then another; that it is reddish in one place and greenish in another; that it is now changing from red to green. But I cannot say that the same chameleon is both red and green at precisely the same spot and precisely the same instant of time. Why not? Because experience does not show me colored surfaces in this way. If now by the *A* in the place of the predicate, I mean one of two characteristics which experience has shown me to be, not only exclusive of each other, but to have opposed or contradictory significance; then I cannot affirm them to belong to the same subject-*A* at the same instant of time. In a word, the judgment must, in its meaning, correspond with the experience of the facts. Judging faculty is bound to consistency, since its whole intent and function is to represent the truth of reality. Lying and self-deceit illustrate this inherent obligation, which is of the nature of a necessity, a binding law, as explicitly and forcefully as do the most carefully prepared judgments of the exact sciences.

There is something more than this, however, which is indicated with reference to the procedure of the intellect in all its attempts to acquire a knowledge of things. This is a certain obligation to orderliness. One hears much well-deserved criticism of the average knower, because his thoughts are not clear, his observations are not accurate and complete; and the objects about which he speaks seem somehow to combine characteristics which science knows are either relatively incompatible or absolutely contradictory;—in a word, his mind is much of the time a hurly-burly, a “blooming confusion.” With such a mind, stubborn prejudices, wild conjectures, intolerable superstitions, hideous beliefs, are affirmed with all the confidence and apparent sincerity which should characterize only the most well-established of cognitive judg-

ments. With such a mind, it is often difficult to say whether there really is any definite conscious perception or conception answering to the subject-*A*; or any distinctly recognized similarity, or difference, or relation, corresponding to that which is seemingly affirmed or denied by the predicate-*A*. In what respect can such a mind be said to be ruled by the principle of identity and non-contradiction, in any strict and intelligible way? In answer to this question it must be replied that all the judgments of such a mind imply some sort of a successful attempt by the human intellect to bring order into what, if not thus intellectualized, would be an unorganized mass of experience;—would, the rather, be inconceivable chaos, and not experience at all. Insight into the nature of this ordering process of thought as it enters into all knowledge, is not afforded, however, by construing further the principle of identity. Such insight requires a criticism of the categories, or fundamental forms of that “ordering” of experience which knowledge involves; and which knowledge implies as belonging also to the reality of things. But this implied correspondence of those forms of human thought which are in control of the growth of knowledge to the forms of reality, is a *metaphysical assumption* and not a *logical formula*.

No one will be satisfied that the entire meaning of what is implied in the principle of identity and non-contradiction has been explained by saying what has already been said. Surely, something is permanent; all does not change; or at least, there is something which limits the change. Even the experiences which both assume and discover that the changes assigned to any subject-*A*, generally if not universally, follow some sort of order in respect of the character of these changes, imply as much. “*As a rule*,” *A* goes through the changes $A^1, A^2, A^3, \dots, A^n$; but does not change over into the series $B^1, B^2, B^3, \dots, B^n$; and *B* has equal respect for its own character and for the character peculiar to *A*. On this assumption, which both underlies and is confirmed by all ex-

perience, the various particular sciences proceed to develop themselves and so to increase the world's stock of knowledge. In this assumption, however, we find two conceptions of a highly metaphysical character. They are the conceptions of Law and of Being, or Substance—the ontological and not merely grammatical or logical subject of changing predicates. Thus the standard which the so-called principle of identity sets up for the cognitive judgment may be expressed in some such terms as the following: *The motive and the goal (the compelling law of its life) of the cognitive judgment is to connect together in the terms of judgment what has been cognized as being objectively, or really, connected together.* For the intellect of man is not puttering with its own sensuous impressions, ideas, and conceptions, in the effort to get them into an aesthetically pleasing logical form; it is trying, with much courage and hope, and with more or less of commendable and trustworthy result, to know things as they really are.

Where this so strange and evanescent notion of identity comes from, we do not have long or far to seek, when once we have taken the psychological point of view. As will appear later on, it comes from our experience with ourselves. But even at present it would seem to be reasonably clear that so much of identity as it attributes to things implies thus much of identity which it knows itself to have: The Self is a self-conscious life conformable to law, and maintaining its so-called identity by this conformity. With regard to the Being of the World, it will appear that modern science agrees with the thought of the ancient saying, however crudely expressed, of Chwang-Tsze:—

“The Tâo is always One, and yet it requires change.”

The Principle of Sufficient Reason, when we come to question its real meaning for the guaranty and the growth of knowledge, is scarcely less vague and troublesome to understand than is the principle of identity. What do we mean by

“ reason ” in this connection? And how shall we define “ sufficient,” or know what is really a *sufficient* reason in any particular case? The verbal and symbolical terms which formal logic has employed for the expression of its truths seem to throw little or no clear light upon the actual processes of the human mind in the growth of knowledge. For this “ sufficient ” cause, the modern interest in *truth* has turned almost wholly away from discussions and treatises of formal logic to concrete inquiries as to the methods which the particular sciences actually find successful in increasing the body of their accepted formulas. And, indeed, we almost never in real life argue our way to truth, about ourselves or about things, along the path marked out by any of the forms of the syllogism. We read, and learn the truths which the race has come to accept as the result of centuries of experience. We listen, or observe, or think,—always fitfully and with wandering attention and in random fashion;—and then all at once truths come flashing in upon, or slowly welling up from the depths before, the conscious mind. Arguing in terms of the syllogism is for the testing of judgments, for the confirmation of truth and the confutation of error. Even when thus employed, whether in scientific assemblies or legislative halls, whether in study, shop, or mart, argument convinces, if at all, chiefly by its offer of hitherto unknown facts, or by its suggestion of new points of view from which to reconsider the bearing of facts quite well known before. To say this is not to deny the work of intellect in the cognition of truth, or the part which inference plays in the establishment and growth of knowledge. It is simply to reaffirm the conviction that all abstract formulas quite completely fail to set before our eyes the complexity and subtlety of the actual life of knowledge.

The fact which underlies the statement of the principle of sufficient reason is plain. By steps, which we call reasoning and ascribe chiefly to intellect, starting from known facts of self-consciousness and sense-perception, we do reach hitherto un-

known truths of a more or less general application. In all the earlier developments of mental life the procedure shares little or none at all, in the characteristics of a truly logical process. There is little or no consciousness answering to the words "therefore" or "because." Accordingly, the growth of knowledge at this stage is not correctly expressed by the consciousness that *A* is *C* because *A* is *B* and *B* is *C*. In the stream of consciousness I find *A* is judged to be *B*; and then (meaning by this no recognized causal connection but only a fact of sequence in the next moment of consciousness) I find, for an unrecognized reason, that *A* is judged to be *C*. It is frequent repetition of these connected facts in experience which "rubs in," so to say, and establishes a mental connection between the ideas of, or thoughts about, the things experienced.

As experience develops and becomes more complicated, two results take place with regard to the connections in consciousness between the cognitive judgments. On the one hand, the judgments themselves become more complicated in character and in their tendency to run in a variety of directions: The *A*, which was simply, or chiefly *B*, and the *B* which was simply or chiefly *C*, are now known to be also *D*. *E*. *F*....*N*; either judgment (*A* is *B* or *B* is *C*) may, therefore, be followed in consciousness by any one of several judgments connecting it with *D*. *E*. *F*....*N*. The practical interests to be served will determine which one of these many judgments, it shall be. Indeed, in most of what is called "thinking" among human beings, and probably in all of what we call by the same term, in the case of the lower animals, the leap from judgment to judgment is as unreflective, as little truly *logical* in the higher meaning of this word, as is the leap to the single judgment which affirms a state of the self, or a quality of some thing. On the other hand, however, with the growth of variableness and heterogeneity among the judgments, there is also the more important development of uniformity and orderliness. Nature compels us to make fixed connections between our judgments;

and the intellect, at first chiefly in the interest of purely practical considerations, cheerfully responds. Our pains and pleasures, our gratified desires or disappointments, excite us to observe what things and what events are connected in reality; and those which are, either for our weal or our woe, actually connected become connected in our thought. With the child, it is relations between his bodily organs, in their uses, and between them and the things of his environment—his food, drink, toys, tools, etc.—which are earliest and most firmly bound together in judgment. With this increasing experience of uniformity, the fixing and deepening of expectation goes along. To this expectation, there are, to be sure, many surprises and disappointments, not only for the child but also for the adult; not only for the plain man's consciousness, with its more purely practical ends in view, but also for the scientific expert. But on the whole, the false expectations get corrected by experience; the correct expectations become confirmed; and thus the development of cognitive judgments and the growth of knowledge, in the individual and in the race, takes place.

If this were all of human thinking, the conclusions of the schools which resolve the principle of sufficient reason, and its correlate in reality, the principle of causation, into the flow of sensations and ideas, accompanied by feelings of expectation, along the channels worn by custom, would be adequate to explain the contribution of intellect to knowledge. But this is not all. At some time in the mental development—and doubtless, earlier in some cases than in others—the demand for an *explanation* of its own experience is made by the human Self. We wish to know, not simply *that*, in fact, our experiences are more or less uniformly connected in time, but rather the “real” explanation *why* they are thus connected. This demand for a real explanation is of the very essence of the life of man's intellect. It is intellectual curiosity, in the stricter and more appropriate meaning of this term.

Curious, indeed, are the higher animals, and prompted by this curiosity to a certain sort of investigation. The dog desires to know, whether this strange-looking object is good for food, or not; where the game he has been chasing has gone; how to open the gate through which his master has disappeared. Within certain rather indefinite limits, the animal will experiment and pass from judgment to judgment by mental processes which simulate the human forms of thinking, in its desire to attain certain practical ends. But that the animals, even the most intelligent of them, ever desire explanation for its own sake,—*i. e.*, for the satisfaction which it affords the intellectual nature, there is no adequate proof. Neither do they give evidence of an effort to ground this explanation in the causal relations of real beings. Man's curiosity, however, is intellectual; by thinking, he wills to find out the explanation in reality of his subjective states. Thus is the "principle of reason" discoverable in the character of the *motif* which induces and guides so much of the development of knowledge in the individual and in the race.

Little experience is needed under the influence of this motive of intellectual curiosity to discover that the real, and really most important explanations of many things, and many events, do not appear to the senses or to thought as in immediate and obvious connection with the things and the events themselves. The reason for the bird which I see now as a robin in the tree, being a robin rather than a thrush, is not to be found in the fact that it is the same bird which I saw a moment before in the bush. The reason for the being of the robin was in the character of the egg from which the bird was hatched, or in the characters of the parent birds from which the egg sprung. The reason why my tooth aches now is not simply the fact that it ached five minutes ago, but "something is the matter," as we confidently say, with that tooth. Thus, although we are always compelled, however abstractly we may argue about the relation of cause and

effect as timeless, to regard the effect as following the cause in time, *mere* sequence in time, even when it seems most immediate and obvious, does not of itself satisfactorily explain the connection in reality of our subjective states of knowledge. There is, then, a relation here which thought needs to recognize and to comprehend that is other than the relation of sequence in time.

As the growth of that form of knowledge which we assign to the particular sciences takes place, the connections which we feel the need of making in order to satisfy the demands of the intellect for the explanation of all experience, become infinitely complicated, subtle, swiftly changing or eternally existing; they become further removed from the senses and more imperative and arduous in their demands upon the imagination. Classes of things, and laws to rule over them, are thought to be established; in this way, for the moment, the reasons for the being of the things and for their uniform modes of action and reaction, seem simpler and more easy to be grasped. But the reasons for the existence of any particular thing being just what it is, being *that* and no other thing, are indefinitely multiplied by the discoveries of science. No law accounts for the definite concrete behavior of any Self, or any Thing: neither is the so-called law a real explanation; it is only the formula which symbolizes more or less accurately one of the myriad aspects of the behavior of an indefinite number of things, when these things are under certain more or less definitely fixed relations to one another. But every Thing, at every moment of its existence, and in respect of every one of its actual changes or forms of behavior, is obeying scores of different so-called laws, and is manifesting scores of its indefinite, and largely unknown, number of qualities and properties. This infinity of properties and possible relations, all of which must be regarded as knowable, not in their abstract form, but in their precise combination as applied here and now to this one thing, constitutes the com-

plete explanation which the intellect seeks as its ideal. This, if found out, as it never can be by the finite mind, would be the only quite "*sufficient reason*" for the particular thing, or the particular event.

How is it—we must still further ask ourselves—that 'one thing can explain another thing, or one event explain another event? By processes of thought, the intellect connects them together in a way which gives it satisfaction. We find "*the reason*," as we fondly say, and we feel gratified. Nor is this gratification due wholly to the fact that we may now know how more safely and effectively to use the particular thing; to procure, or to meet the coming of the particular event. Quite irrespective of selfish interests, or practical concernment, the mind of man is satisfied with having answered the question, Why? There is, therefore, another still more deeply lying question in which the philosophy of knowledge takes its chief interest while subjecting to its criticism the so-called principle of sufficient reason. This problem may be at least proposed, if not solved, in the following way.

What men eagerly seek for by examining experience in the interests of its explanation, is not the bare satisfaction of the intellect in seeming to attain what it is impelled to seek. It is not reasons for their own sake which thinking tries to devise. It is truth of reality which thought endeavors to find. To give reasons, which seem plausible, but which start from the mist and end in the darkness of invisible space, is sorry work. By thought, let us get at reality; and to do this the connections which thinking establishes between judgments must correspond to the connections which in reality exist between things. Logic, for its own sake, is poor stuff. Reflective thinking, which leads from observed fact to the truths of nature's existences and processes, and to the truths of human life, and of the relations between the two—this it is which men prize and try ever more and more to attain.

Kant confesses that it was Hume's sceptical analysis of the

idea of causality which aroused him from his "dogmatic slumber" and stimulated him to the task of criticizing more thoroughly the principles of human cognitive faculty. For Hume had found in this idea only the subjective fact of a series of sensations, or mental images, bound together by custom, and arousing expectations of future similar series, as matters of course. But such an explanation did not account, in the opinion of Kant, for the "objective" character of the idea. It was plain, he held, that the very nature of the connection subsumed under the titles, "cause and effect," was not to be regarded as obtaining in the ideas of the subject only; the connection, on the contrary, was affirmed, or rather known, as existing and operating between the objects themselves. And now since, according to Kant, the very constitution of the object is imparted to it by the constitutional activities of the intellect,—that is, mind makes its own objects according to mind's own nature, and what we call Nature in the large is the work of human nature;—we must find in this same intellect which attributes the causal connection to objects, the law that will account for the attribution itself. The problem then becomes: What is there in this particular form of sequence in time which makes it worthy to be considered as "objective"; that is, as a relation of causality between objects? Kant answers the problem as follows: The explanation of the causal connection attributed to objects is to be found in the fact of the sequence of objects *according to a fixed rule*.

This answer of the Kantian criticism, however, goes but little farther towards explaining our confidence that the relations which we establish by thinking between our judgments, represent relations really existing between things, than did the sensationalism of Hume. The principle of causality, as actually effective in a real world, cannot be substituted for the subjective principle of sufficient reason, in this off-hand fashion. Let us go, then, once more to the facts of experience. These

can be expressed only by admitting a new class of terms. We believe that we ourselves, and all the various other selves, and other things, stand together in one world on terms of action and reaction. This belief may be expressed in various ways. It may take the form of a doctrine of the transmission of energy, of power to do work, of energy kinetic and energy stored, or energy of position. We may drop this technical language of science, as we all, even including the men of science themselves, ordinarily do: and then we may speak of things and selves as *influencing* one another; or of their *doing something* to one another; or of their *making* one another do this or do that. Unless, however, we speak in some such way, we cannot even hint at what human experience really is, to say nothing of clearly and forcibly expressing its essential meaning. Yet in all this manner of speaking, elements are freely introduced which the objective sense-impressions do not supply. No one ever saw, heard, smelled, or tasted any energy, whether kinetic or stored. Things are seen to change their shapes, their positions in space, their spatial relations to other things. These changes in different things are sometimes simultaneous, sometimes in more or less definite sequence, sometimes apparently far separated both in space and in time. But the mysterious passing of influence, the compulsion of one thing as exercised over another, and as suffered by that other, nowhere sensibly appears.

To ascertain more completely what there is in this sort of experience, let us take an example or two. Here are the different parts of a building which are to be considered in their *objective* relations to one another. In time and space I may arrange my perception and thought of them at will. From top to bottom, from right to left, or in the reverse directions, I may run my eye over its different portions from *A*, *B*, *C*, and *D* to *N*; or from *N* through *D*, *C*, *B* to *A*; or skipping from *D* to *A* and back again to *C* or *N*. And I may be a longer and a shorter time about it, *at my will*. But I

know that *in the same time* all these different portions of the building actually stand together, each in a different space and in fixed spatial relations to one another; and all this knowledge of the object implies the object's independence of my will. This arrangement of the parts is fixed according to the nature of the object, and not according to my subjective procedure in knowing or thinking the object. I may further direct my attention to more invisible, but not less important relations between the various parts of this same object. From below upward, *A* is "sustaining" *B*, *B* is sustaining *C*, and so on to *N*; and from above downward, *N* is "pressing" upon the part below it, and all above is pressing upon *D*, and *D* on *C*, and so on down to *A*. Or sideways, *B* is "binding" *A* to *C*, and is itself "separated" from *D* by *C*; and so on to *N*. What now would be expected in case there should be developed any great efficiency in the *power* of important portions of this same building to "sustain pressure," to "bind together," and to "keep asunder"? Experience allows no uncertain answer to such a question as this. The solution of such a problem is not dependent on human senses or on the laws of the human intellect. Nature spells "ruin" as the answer.

When we ask after the source from which, ever fresh and inexhaustible, comes our knowledge of things as causally related, we need not go far astray. The explanation has been suggested, if not given with sufficient fullness, in the previous analysis of the nature and origin of all human cognitive activity. It is the experience with ourselves as causes; it is the knowledge of ourselves as agents with feeling-full and purposeful activities, more or less effective, more or less resisted and ineffectual, in all our daily commerce with other selves and other things. And just as we should never seek any explanation of such experiences and never find it by weaving together judgments in trains of reasoning, without intellectual curiosity; so we should never give reality and life

to the explanation without the consciousness of an activity belonging to the nature of the Self as a will, that is limited by other self-active wills.

Physicists and psychologists both know perfectly well what men really mean when they naïvely and without prejudice talk of causes and effects. All men think of things as, each one, doing something to some other, and as having something done to them. Less popularly expressed, everybody believes, and must believe, that both things and selves are real; that both things and selves are, in varying degrees, both active and passive; and that both have the forms and precise terms of their activity and passivity, conditioned in a limited way upon the activity and passivity of other selves and things. The "laws" which science discovers and announces *are* nothing but the known or conjectured, more or less uniform, modes of the behavior of selves and things in their changing relations to one another. All this is, of course, anthropomorphic; if by being anthropomorphic we mean knowing realities, or thinking about them, as only man can know and think about anything at all. Nor is it simply anthropomorphic, as a purely intellectual human form of knowing and thinking; it is also anthropopathic. It is explanation made blood-warm and effective with feeling, often rising to the intensity of passionate effort and passionate suffering. But such factors derived from the experiences of a feeling and voluntary Self are as necessary to knowing what we men really are, and what the world of our environment really is, as are the rationalizations of that mythical "pure intellect," to which some would bow down in a cold and unmeaning act of worship. Any attempt in the name of science to purify the causal conception of the elements contributed by emotion and will does not in the least help science to clear itself of the charge of either anthropomorphism or anthropopathism. On the contrary, it reduces explanation to a lifeless body of abstractions and empty formulas which give no real account of anything;

—least of all, of the reasoning processes from which the abstractions and formulas come.

What the principle of sufficient reason means, then, for man's knowledge of the real world is this. Its Nature is known, and every being and event in It is known, and known only in terms of doing and suffering, or having something done to it. So far as we know these terms, we know the "nature" of any being, or the "causes" of any event. Its known or conjectured modes of behavior, under known or conjectured relations, are at any moment in the growth of knowledge, the practically "sufficient reason" with which to satisfy the intellect's demand for explanation. But the *real* reason is never sufficient, and intellectual curiosity is therefore never wholly quenched. Quite *sufficient* reasons are known to God alone; and He does not get at them by slow and doubtful ratiocinative processes, or other human means of calculation.

The fuller meaning of this instinctive or rationalized metaphysics will become apparent when we come to treat in subsequent chapters of metaphysics in general, and of the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Man. It is enough at present to state the conclusion which must be incorporated into our theory of knowledge. He who rejects the validity of the knowledge of the real world of selves and things, which comes to him only on these terms, rejects the validity of human knowledge altogether. And the absurdity of the position in which the intellect thus becomes involved will soon appear. Both the logical principle of Identity and that of Sufficient Reason show man's confidence that his own essential being as will, and his own experienced relations as an active and suffering agent, afford the type according to which he may rationally judge the essential nature and real relations of all other beings in the one World. Causality itself is no invincible bond that, as it were from the outside, seizes hold upon things and forces them into a kind of unity. Neither is it necessary to get beyond our daily experience in order to realize the nature

of that causal *nexus*, in the confidence of which all our reasoning about things continually proceeds. When analyzed and criticized, this *nexus* appears not so much like the external and merely visible connections of a machine, as these lay themselves bare before the eye of sense. It is the rather like the interiorly recognized and felt connections of a conscious and purposeful Self.

Besides those logical principles, or rules of the behavior of intellect in all the growth of knowledge, which have already been discussed, there are certain hidden and yet more fundamental presuppositions, or implicates. What does any man take for granted, whenever he claims to know, or know the truth about, himself, or other selves, or other things? When questioned in this way, the answer should doubtless be: It is taken for granted that there is some evidence, or proof for that which is affirmed to be known. But neither question nor answer reach down deep enough to serve the present purpose. How uncertain, rambling, and constantly changing, are human ideas as to what is evidence and proof! The "sufficient" of to-day, is insufficient to-morrow. The accepted science of one age is the resisted superstition of another. There are accepted facts of physics at the present hour, the bare announcement of which a few decades ago—for example, electrons, ions, Roentgen and X-rays, etc.—would have gained for anyone the title of lunatic or liar. On the contrary, there are multitudes of commonly accepted judgments of the past that would have hard work indeed even to gain a hearing for their alleged proofs at the present time. And in all ages, they who will not listen to Moses and the Prophets will not believe though one should rise from the dead to assure them. All this is rebuke to dogmatism, food for scepticism, urgent call for criticism. But it has absolutely no influence upon those assumptions which are made alike by dogmatist, sceptic, and critic; or upon those implicates in which all three of these attitudes toward evidence find themselves inextricably in-

volved. For this kind of presuppositions underlies doubt and negation, as truly and as surely as it affords foundations for believing and affirming.

Since the presuppositions of this character exist, for the most part, in the form of beliefs, and since all such beliefs are chiefly matters of feeling, they are not brought into clear consciousness by all our ordinary acts of knowing; neither is their significance clearly reflected from the customary procedure of the sciences in their attempts at the growth of human knowledge. Philosophy can do little more with them than just to mention them. For that manner of reflective thinking which calls itself philosophy, even in its most sceptical or agnostic form, is as dependent upon the validity of these assumptions as is the most abundantly certified form of either ordinary or scientific knowledge.

The attempt to state precisely what are these invincible beliefs, these unquestioned implicates, of all human knowledge, is accompanied by peculiar difficulties. To a certain extent, all thinkers must be the advocates of a so-called "faith-philosophy." Reasoning about reasoning itself comes to an end somewhere. Proof that proof is possible, or—much more—that proof is impossible, takes for granted what cannot be proved. Any strict and mutually exclusive separation between faith and knowledge, even in the form in which it was attempted by the Kantian criticism, must somewhere base itself upon foundations where both faith and knowledge are elements lying together in a kind of reinforced cement. Yet we are not unmindful of the sarcasm which made Schopenhauer speak of Jacobi, the champion of a "faith-philosophy," as one "who only has the trifling weakness that he takes all he learned and approved before his fifteenth year for inborn ideas of the human mind." We are even the more warned against this "trifling weakness" by the fact that the physical sciences are now setting up some of their most recent, and as yet even doubtful discoveries, as *a priori* truths, "innate ideas" inevi-

tably attaching to "Nature" (when writ large with a capital) by every sane and rational mind. Let us be modest and cautious, then, in the attempt to discover those primary beliefs which underlie, and interpenetrate, and both limit and guarantee, all the growth of human knowledge.

And, first, there exists a certain wonderful and almost audacious confidence of human reason in itself. The times in which this confidence has been misplaced, and its rights refuted, are already infinite in number. Common folk are always going wrong,—and not least of all in respect to their judgments about things where they think their knowledge is most trustworthy and complete. Even the particular sciences advance chiefly through correcting their past errors and inaccuracies. While in respect of those most important truths of ethics, aesthetics, and religion, by which men live and die most worthily, it often seems as though the entire history of the human race were one long record of misconceptions, blunders, whims, and injurious mistakes. Yet as often as human reason is confounded, and stumbles, and falls, she never lies prone and despairing. She always rises to her feet, and goes on her way with renewed determination; and generally with renewed confidence as well. With the maturing of experience—an experience so largely of failure and mistake—she has a yet greater, though chastened, belief in the possibility of a triumphant result. In the individual and in the race, credulity may decrease while wisdom grows. But what is most important is this: the conditions, limits, tests, and guaranties of knowledge become better known through the very failures themselves. And this kind of knowledge is the best endorsement of the faith of reason in itself. To say that the mature mind does not any more surely know, and widely know, than the mind of the child, is to speak foolishly. To say that the race, as represented by the most highly developed centers of scientific, artistic, and moral culture, knows no more about the world of men and of things, than did the more primitive

men of thousands of years gone by, is to speak even more foolishly. Nor can we limit this growth of knowledge to sensible matters alone. Thus the experiences of history confirm and strengthen that confidence of reason which, in the form of an innate belief, belongs to the very nature of man's cognitive powers.

This presupposition of all knowledge, in the form of belief, is not, however, a purely subjective affair. It does not appear in the character of an illusion; it is not like the belief in fairies or ghosts. It includes presuppositions which have an irresistible reference to the character of the object of knowledge; it is fraught with ontological implicates. The knower believes in the *actuality* of the event which he knows, in the *reality* of the object of his cognition. This belief is immediate and irresistible. Its truthfulness is the presupposition, the implicate of a reality, which is essential to the very nature of knowledge. Some actual happening, either within myself or to myself, as caused by something, or between some things or selves other than me, is presupposed in all knowledge. Some real being—if not myself alone, then also some other selves, or other things—is implied in the objective reference of all knowledge. I may sense the event imperfectly, and describe it inaccurately; but something happens in reality to some real being, every time an act of knowing takes place in my consciousness. Call it for the present *X*, an unknown quantity, if you will. It belongs to science and philosophy to explicate this *X*. But the belief in *X* is an ever-present, however silent, presupposition of all human knowledge.

It is plain, then, that when any critical theory of knowledge pretends to have told the whole truth of the experience of knowledge by saying, "All objective cognition has its source in our mental representations," or again: "All objective cognition consists of our mental representations,"—it may prove false, in an important way, to the fundamental and invincible faith of reason. This faith rejects the analysis which resolves

the presence of *X* into a mere mental image, or into an abstraction, or into a dialectical process striking against a limit, like the nose of a blind fish running itself against the bank in a pool of muddy water. This invincible faith of reason, on the contrary, recognizes a reality, of the Self and of that which is not-Self, in that experience which is given, whenever the life of consciousness takes the form of a completed act of knowledge.

Objections may indeed be raised against speaking of the form which the ontological implicate of all knowledge takes, as a "belief"; and if by the word "belief" we mean any mental attitude resembling that with which he holds to certain opinions, about the truth of which he is doubtful for lack of evidence, the word is not fitly employed with reference to man's confidence in the reality of the objects of his knowledge. Psychologists have long differed as to what term should be employed to represent the nature of this confidence and the way in which it is derived. Of all these theories, that is most reprehensible and promptly to be rejected which would convert the faith into a sort of inference, based upon the mediation of an idea. According to this theory, the intellect argues its way to reality as something, so to speak, back of the screen on which the ideas are thrown by a camera of unknown construction situated back of another screen. Upon this view, that of Schopenhauer is a manifest improvement. According to Schopenhauer, the intellect proceeds upon the *a priori* principle of sufficient reason to a kind of envisagement, or seizure, of the concrete reality in the act of perception. But this philosopher then proceeds so to expound the whole work of intellect as illusory with regard to the nature of reality, as to undermine his own position. Other modern psychologists have done better; they have agreed rather with the thought of Augustine, the early Church Fathers, and the ecclesiastical writers of the Middle Ages. In their view, the ontological implicate of all knowledge is an act of faith, or rational belief. If, however,

we use this term, we must not think of knowledge as made up of separate elements, some of which can be abstracted and yet leave the essential nature of knowledge unchanged. In the growth of knowledge, inference proceeds with reason's faith in itself and also with its faith in the reality of the object of knowledge; but the faith is never a matter of blind feeling, any more than it is a matter of pure inference from sensuous impressions. The very essence of knowledge, in its existence and in its growth, requires the exercise, in a living unity, of all the so-called faculties of the knowing Self. Or, to invert the statement and make it more technical: The entire complex condition of the Self, in the act of cognition, involves and guarantees the reality of the Self's object of cognition.

One other important truth emerges clear and consistent from an analysis of the principles and presuppositions of all knowledge. All communication of facts of experience from one mind to another, all that imparting of the information and discoveries about things and selves, in which the growth of science consists, implies an ontological conviction which is common to the race. Other selves have experiences, and reason from these experiences to general truths about nature and man, in the undoubted belief that the active, living logic of human thought is adequate to the true representation of the reality of things. For *science* is not your individual opinion, or mine, or that of any other individual. In its most assured form it consists of those organized and systematized judgments which best represent the experience of the race. And the underlying presupposition, the ontological implication, which makes this racial growth of knowledge possible, is a world of selves and things, *extra-mentally* correspondent to the thoughts about these selves and things, which have somehow become accepted by the race.

CHAPTER VII

SCEPTICISM, AGNOSTICISM, AND CRITICISM

THE three words which form the heading of this chapter indicate attitudes of mind which must at different times characterize the growth of knowledge in every individual and in the entire race. It is true that there are persons, who, either from temperament, or from the effects of education, or both, are more sceptically inclined than are the majority of their fellows. Oftener than otherwise this inclination is especially emphatic as a reaction or recoil from some extreme of dogmatism. Thus at the same time, and in the same community, pronounced dogmatists and pronounced sceptics are likely to be living side by side. There are epochs in human development when, especially in the field of moral and religious conceptions and truths, an unusual proportion of avowed agnostics are to be found. And yet, we repeat, every man must be at all times dogmatic in making some judgments, sceptical about others, and agnostic with reference to most of the opinions which constitute his daily mental environment. Ruin would quickly follow for any man who attempted to be either an unquestioning dogmatist, a thorough-going sceptic, or an invincible agnostic, at all times, and toward every alleged fact, generalization, or law, belonging to the organized body of human knowledge.

It is scarcely necessary for the student of psychology, or indeed for any person of intelligence and common-sense, to prove at length how man's knowledge grows in dependence upon doubt and upon the further inquiry which doubt suggests and commands. The demand for doubt exists, not only in the interests of knowledge for its own sake, but also in the interest of obtaining the good things of life, and even of preserving

life itself. The infant who does not early learn to be sceptical as to whether things really are, what at first they seem to be, is doomed to a wretched and unsuccessful life. He is, and without the awakening shock of doubt, he remains, an idiot. Intellectual curiosity, the spirit and the practice of the hunt for truth that has practical results, as well as for the truths of science, go hand in hand with doubt. Indeed, as to the part which scepticism plays in the development of the particular sciences, we may say that distrust of the first and more obvious testimony of the senses, and doubt as to what are the real facts underlying the illusion and affording its explanation, are absolutely indispensable to the first steps in this development. Thus psychology, psycho-physics, and physics, all unite in attacking the common-sense view of the testimony of the senses as to what things really are. And the realities with which they, by processes of criticism, underlay and explain these illusions of sense, are products of an imagination so subtle, refined, and difficult, for the ordinary and even for the trained scientific mind, that the conclusions reached, however dogmatically affirmed, may have to remain subjects of a scepticism more thorough than that with which the processes began. But knowledge grows in this way; and knowledge can grow in no other way.

“It is man’s privilege to doubt:”

But only

“If so be that from doubt at length,
Truth may stand forth unmoved of change.”

This legitimate and indispensable scepticism of which we have been speaking has its rightful issue in a process of criticism. If it may be called man’s privilege to doubt, it must be called man’s duty to criticize. To criticize is but to use one’s judgment; and to criticize, most originally and significantly, means to inquire, to search into and to distinguish between good and bad (*κρινω*, I judge). Without the ceaseless

and strenuous use of critical judgment, knowledge cannot grow; without distinguishing between good and bad, from the evidential point of view, convictions as to truth and reality cannot be reasonably sustained. Thus, there is profound philosophical truth in calling the man who does not use judgment in practical matters, lacking in "common" sense; he is deficient in that kind of critical faculty which obligates a man to distinguish between the good and the bad, the well adapted and the unfit for the uses of his daily life. So, also, he who lacks critical judgment in matters of science, art, morals, or religion, is said to have no "sense" about such matters—no such *sense* as is rightly expected of a man. To utter quite completely uncritical judgments about anything is to "talk nonsense." He who is not a critic, in respect of all the more important judgments for living well, or for success in his particular pursuit or profession, is less than a man ought to become.

Of course, however, since different judgments are supported by immensely different amounts, and widely differing kinds, of evidence; and since the evidence on which many judgments must be made up is very frequently confused and not rarely conflicting; agnosticism, or an avowal of inability to pronounce a cognitive judgment, is the inevitable and rational result. If he who has none of those affirmative judgments which constitute a fairly compact body of accepted truths, is a fool for lack of judgment; he who is not agnostic about innumerable matters is a fool for rashness of judgment. On the vast majority of alleged truths which concern the conduct of our daily lives, or the interests of science, art, morals, and religion, the agnostic judgment is the only true judgment. And he who refuses to say, "I do not know" is convicted of being either self-deceived or a liar.

All the foregoing statements, however valid from the point of view of logic and of the practical life, do not solve the problems which arise in the very midst of a philosophical theory

of knowledge and which attach themselves to such terms as *philosophical* criticism, scepticism, and agnosticism. This theory proposes to itself two important questions with regard to all these attitudes of mind toward truth. The first is this: "What are the limits, if any, to the sceptical, critical, and agnostic judgments? And, second: Which of these attitudes, if either, must be held toward the principles and presuppositions of all knowledge?"

With regard to the limits of scepticism, they may be reached in either one of several different ways. In many cases they are reached, whether with a complete logical satisfaction, or not, through the pressure of practical interests and of practical necessities. All life may be conceived of as consisting in an endless series of problems. These are primarily such as, What to eat; What to drink; What to wear; How to get where I want to go; How to obtain what I want to use or to enjoy. With regard to the solution of most of the problems of this class, it is not argument that supplies the explanation. About them, if we say, "In the beginning was the *thought*," and then study "this first line's lesson," and ask ourselves: "Is it the *thought* does all from time's first hour?" our answer at once must be:

"I dare to read,
And write: 'In the beginning was the *deed*.'"

Small boys cannot be forever sceptical as to which dogs will bite, which bright things will burn, what other boys it is safe to challenge to combat. Can I walk? It is doubtful; but I solve the problem by walking—or I discover I have motor paralysis. Can I succeed in this business? It is, indeed, doubtful. But I must do something; and I try and succeed, or the effort is followed by a lamentable failure. Thus in the conduct of the entire life, the mental condition of doubt which either does precede, or which might reasonably precede, the concrete act, is limited, not by the argumentative solution of

the doubt, but by the results of experience. In a word, the doubt for lack of evidence as to what will be, is banished by the experiment which converts it into a memory of what has been. Were not this kind of pressure brought constantly to bear upon us all, and were we allowed the right to a "sufficient reason" for all our deeds before we entered upon the experiment of the deeds themselves, we should be most of the time like the ass of Buridanus, starving to death between the two equally attractive bundles of hay. The necessity of living by action is an imperative guardian over the limits of scepticism.

But experience has also set certain limits to scepticism by the abundance of practical rules and groups of more or less consciously interconnected and dependent judgments which it has furnished on grounds of evidence long since accepted as sufficient. We know that things do work in certain ways. If the average man is asked *how* he knows it; and *knows* it so well as habitually to stake life and life's interests upon the knowledge, he may be puzzled for the answer. Sceptic, he certainly is not, with reference to these items of knowledge. But neither is he dogmatical because he has been sufficiently critical of them and therefore knows well their grounds. If, then, he is pressed for a "sufficient reason" with which to certify his cognitive judgment, he may begin a vague appeal to his conception of nature; or he may quote authority; or he may summon to his help a certain amount of generalized experience of his own. And if he is further asked, whether he *surely* knows anything about the future, whether in fact there can be such an experience for the human mind as knowledge of the future, he will probably be trapped into saying, "No." He may thereupon be reminded that there is no *absolutely sure* knowledge about either the past, or even the present, beyond the immediate consciousness of myself—whether for the moment, dogmatist, sceptic, critic, or agnostic, it matters not. The logical result of which is that into the bottomless pit of such scepticism falls all human science,

and all the results of the countless centuries of the experience of the race. In view of so serious a consequence of carrying scepticism to its logical conclusions, any sceptic may find a sufficient reason to recover a sane condition of mind. He will see that the very demands for evidence, in order to assert knowledge, must themselves be reasonable; and that the principle of "sufficient reason," properly interpreted, is a valid limit against maintaining the sceptical attitude of mind toward many of our judgments.

If now we ask ourselves how much and what kind of evidence is necessary in each case to supply a sufficient reason for changing the attitude of doubt to an attitude which warrants the affirmation of knowledge, no general answer can be given. The more correct answer depends, in each case, upon a number of conditions. Of these conditions, the most important, perhaps, concern the kind of judgment, or matter of reasoning, about which knowledge is sought. For the knowledge which the physical sciences have achieved, the grounds of evidence are for the most part known only by those familiar with the scientific methods of each. The result in such cases is the fixing of the limits more carefully in accordance with the evidence; then follows the accompanying of each cognitive judgment with an avowed or silent feeling of doubt as to the precise degree of its accuracy. Thus in these sciences, hypotheses come to be either rejected or elevated to the rank of theories and, finally, to the position of accepted laws. But the reasons for the laws are scarcely ever sufficiently understood to establish a claim to constitute a part of the body of scientific knowledge, properly so-called. Thus the fact and law of gravitation are known; but why all masses tend to move toward each other as the law surely affirms that they do, is a subject about which no tenable hypothesis has yet been discovered. The expert in science knows also that none of his laws can be affirmed without an allowance, so to say, for a certain limit to their accuracy. They are true,—

that is, they correspond to the reality; but only within certain assignable limits.

With regard to all this class of cognitive judgments the only available course of the average man is to accept them on the authority of the consensus of experts; and thus to make them a part of that equipment of knowledge which is necessary for the more successful conduct of life, as well as for laying claim to the title, "well-informed," or "intelligent." If he will know as nearly as possible when *his* sun will rise and set to-morrow, he resorts to the almanac or to the columns of his daily paper. If the minutes given by his authority do not precisely correspond with the evidence of his watch, he may suspect the latter of being incorrect. Or he may add further to his knowledge by learning that a fraction of a degree east or west of the parallel for which the record was made, is "bound" to make a difference between his private experience and the scientific record. The more he learns about the conditions under which these astronomical estimates are obtained, about the degree of certainty which attaches to them, and about the limits within which errors are possible, the more nearly does his knowledge approach that of the man of science. With regard to the weather-wise predictions of either almanac or newspaper, experience will soon teach him on what different foundations of knowledge these guesses are based.

But both the unscientific man and the man of science may be said to know *that* the sun will rise in the east and not in the west, on to-morrow's morning;—the latter, however, much more surely than the former, because he also knows *why* it is compelled to rise in just such a place and what an inconceivable upsetting of the entire universe it would mean to have a reversal of the sun's apparent procedure really take place. Indeed, with the savage or primitive man, such so-called knowledge can scarcely be called more than expectation, "rubbed in" by accustomed experience. With science, however, the knowledge is placed on grounds which afford a quite sufficient

reason, since they involve a knowledge of the entire solar system, and of considerable parts of the universe beyond.

Even the man of science, however, cannot fail to see that his knowledge thins out, so to say, as the attempt is made to stretch it, either forward or backward, over the infinite extensions of time and space. Did the forces which physics and chemistry recognize as the destroyers and rebuilders, in a ceaseless process of change, of the material world as known according to present experience, combine to work in subjection to the same laws of action and reaction, during the myriads of centuries gone by? Do these same forces exist and follow the same laws in infinite spaces that are as yet concealed wholly from human observation, and may be quite beyond the powers of human imagination? In answer to such questions, science cannot return an affirmative answer with the same assurance as that which it accords to the body of its accepted truths touching the behavior of things in the world of its compassable experience. There is not a single thing, or force, or law, or element, known to the physico-chemical sciences which has the "hall-mark" of eternity stamped upon it. However, this much we may comfortably and confidently say: The more that science grows, the more does it appear that all realities somehow hang together in a rational unity, irrespective of the limitations of time and of space. Stated in other and somewhat more figurative terms, we may say: The Being of the World is more and more known as a self-limiting and law-abiding Unity, in spite of the changes which are observed to take place in its endless times and its limitless spaces.

About many things in the physical sciences, however, we find the experts themselves in doubt; or, if each one seems confident of the truth of his own judgments, there is no consensus of judgment, on the authority of which the unlearned man may depend for his knowledge. About such matters, suspension of judgment—that is, agnosticism in the more acceptable meaning of the word—is for all men the reasonable

attitude of mind. Here there is not sufficient evidence for a judgment, which shall have even enough of probability to warrant its entrance at the foot of that ascending scale by which we test the ever-varying degrees of what we call our knowledge. Here, then, is a case where, if the expert is more "cock-sure" than the outsider feels that he can reasonably be, it is the expert who is in the least reasonable and trustworthy attitude of the two. In matters of mooted truths within the domain of the physico-chemical sciences, the attitude of trust with which the unscientific man approaches the man who, somehow—but not always by any means fairly—has attained a reputation for knowledge, is often pathetic. In all such cases the present limits of doubt are set in the following ways: knowledge of the fact that there is conflicting evidence; knowledge of what the evidence on both sides really is; knowledge of the directions in which, and methods by which, experience may be made to test, and to corroborate or to correct, the conflicting evidence; and, finally, the conviction that the reasonable attitude of mind is one of further inquiry, and pending such successful inquiry, the attitude of agnosticism. All this, under the circumstances, is the most valuable form of knowledge.

In all those cognitive judgments which belong to another group of sciences, such as, from different points of view, are called the biological and psychological sciences, the limits both of scepticism and of knowledge fall under somewhat different rules from those which we have been discussing. Up to the present hour, these sciences remain almost purely descriptive. They can recite the series of the phenomena which they observe: as to those general causes which, if known, would serve as more or less sufficient reasons for the phenomena, and for the character of the series in which they occur, these sciences are obliged, for the most part to remain discreetly silent; or to indulge themselves in hypotheses which, when examined, are found to soar on wings of fancy into regions of thin air,

rather than to walk steadily and erect upon a firm grounding in all the observed facts. This is even much more true of the strictly so-called biological sciences than it is of those which are more clearly entitled to the cognomen "psychological." Indeed, much of what constitutes the science of so-called biology is really applied psychology. For within certain rather wide limits, experience gives us in a relatively immediate and certain way the true and satisfactory explanation of the changes in our own inner life; these reasons, which are themselves psychological, we may then—although here the limits of safety are very indefinite and difficult to fix—use in explanation of the observed actions of the lower animals. As to the fact of their legitimate application in general to the human species, we have the highest degree of certitude next to that given in self-consciousness. We are, indeed, often in doubt as to the precise form of application. But there is nothing outside of *my* Self which I know so surely and can explain so fully, by reference to its real causes, as the doings of the others who belong to the same species. I *know* that they have feelings, thoughts, strivings, and conscious volitions, like my own; and that in these experiences of theirs must be found the real ground for the experience I have of them. That my own desires and volitions explain many of my deeds, I am sure; that similar desires and volitions explain the deeds of other men, I am almost equally sure; that somewhat similar internal processes explain the behavior of my horse or dog, I am fairly—we may even say—sufficiently well convince to say "*I know.*" But what explains the behavior of the amoeba when it seeks its food, of the phagocytic corpuscle when it finds its way to the destructive bacteria, of the spermatozoon when it seeks the ovum, of the tendril of the plant when it seeks support, of the root when it reaches out for nourishment?—and so on, with all the thousands of similar inquiries which the descriptive history of biological phenomena incites. About the psychological answer to such inquiries, which has at different times commended

itself, and then lost its favor among the professional students of biology, we may still remain in doubt. But deeper by far is our scepticism, and at present more helpless as to the future, when we ask the physical and chemical sciences to give us, in terms strictly their own, an explanation of such biological phenomena. Therefore, for the present, we continue to push back the limits of our knowledge of life, as something physical and chemical, by making more accurate, minute, and numerous, our descriptive histories of how living things appear to us to behave. In this way scepticism retreats, knowledge advances, but the mystery of life deepens, the limits of our agnosticism widen, curious and eager inquiry is quickened; and a certain softening, refining, and elevating effect upon our entire mental attitude toward the Being of the World is happily secured. All this, too, is knowledge; but it is knowledge appropriately and reasonably kept within its specific limits.

In spite of the truths just presented, it is customary with students of the physical, and even of the biological sciences, to remark—usually with distrust and not infrequently with scantily concealed scorn—upon the uncertainties of so-called psychological science. To them, material things and physical events appear to have a quite superior reality; and the knowledge of and about these things and events seems to have an incontestible validity, which cannot be approached or even simulated by those existences we call “souls,” or by those experiences of these souls with which the student of psychology busies himself. This assumption is, indeed, partly justified; but it is even more largely due, on the one hand, to the faults and mistakes of psychologists, and, on the other, to the ignorance and prejudice of the students of the physical sciences. Doubtless, physical substances can be observed, analyzed, and manipulated, for purposes of scientific investigation, as souls cannot. Equally beyond all doubt is it that the obvious qualities and relations of such substances are more stable and, as it were, open to common observation than are the qualities and rela-

tions of the sort with which psychology has to deal. On the other hand, it is only through these very evanescent and subtle changes in his sense-impressions, and the relations established between them in which his experience consists, that man knows anything at all about the nature and modes of the behavior of physical substances. And it is the limits of human capacity for such sense-impressions, and for the activities of human imagination and thought, which fix both the limits of doubt and the limits of knowledge for the natural and physical sciences. But psychological science deals directly with these sense-impressions, imaginings, and thoughts—their nature, limits, and the grounds for trusting or doubting their deliverances. Within the limits of this kind of knowledge—the psychological—consciousness probes these activities and relations to the very bottom. What it actually is to see, to hear, to feel, to imagine, to think—this every man knows, although the physical conditions and concomitants of these experiences afford subjects for difficult, scientific research. This general fact compels the psychologist in his turn to resort for help to the physicist, the chemist, or the physiologist.

When, moreover, we come to inquire more curiously into the essential nature of the existences with which we are dealing, the answer of psychology is, of all the sciences, much the most clear. For to speak truly, in both the name of science and in the name of common sense, the nature of the soul *is* essentially just what it most indubitably and clearly knows itself to be. But here is where too much of modern psychology is ready to sacrifice its birth-right. That parts of the brain, or of the spinal cord, or of the ganglia of the thoracic or abdominal cavities, *may be* in familiar relations with a consciousness not our own, is indeed a proposition fraught with seemingly insolvable mystery, and doomed to unabated and everlasting scepticism. To speak, however, of a “subconscious Self,” or of an “unconscious Self,” or of a “doubly self-conscious Self,” is to couple words together which are in their very nature

contradictory. [Further consideration of this subject is reserved for another chapter.]

The limits of that kind of knowledge which is not merely descriptive, but which includes either a demonstration or a more or less convincing collection of evidence for the establishing of "causes," have been greatly extended in modern times by the doctrine of evolution. This extension of knowledge, however, has not restricted, but has rather enlarged, the domain of scepticism. The complexity of the known phenomena needing to be explained has grown even faster than the imagination, based upon multiplied observations and experimental data, has been able to supply the needed explanations. In a word, much more is known about the descriptive history of living forms, as they are distributed and interrelated in the spaces of the earth's surface and the times of the earth's formation; but there is still needed a larger number, or a more intricate complication, than has yet been afforded by the scores of theories that claim to account for this history. It would be an unworthy perversion of the facts to say that the race is not gaining an increased knowledge of the mystery of life. But scepticism and agnosticism are still the only reasonable attitudes of mind toward the majority of the important theories of evolution; and the "reason" for them will probably continue quite "insufficient" through years, and perhaps centuries, of future scientific criticism.

When we consider the reasonableness of the attitudes of mind called, respectively, scepticism, agnosticism, and criticism, toward those convictions and opinions which are grouped under such titles as ethics, æsthetics, and religion, we find ourselves engaged in a somewhat markedly different field of inquiry. Here it has been customary to contend that man must be content with faith only, and can never hope to attain to knowledge. Indeed, the entire course and outcome of the Kantian criticism is largely based upon this distinction. But Kant himself was far enough from intending to give an advant-

age to scientific knowledge in its controversy with the ethical and religious beliefs of mankind. For, in his critical philosophy,—as we have already seen,—such knowledge is, essentially considered, only the intellect's constitutional way of arranging the phenomena of sense; and the island of scientific knowledge, "the home of truth" about phenomena, is surrounded by the impenetrable ocean of the unknown Real. By a faith, on the other hand, which envisages the presence and the meaning of an indubitable moral law, we are convicted of the practical necessity of living *as though* God, Freedom, and Immortality, were realities independent of either human knowledge or human faith. But it has already been made clear that the very nature of human cognitive faculty, and of its operation, is such as to render false and misleading any such complete distinction between faith and knowledge. Knowledge itself exists, and grows, only as it employs scepticism and incorporates faith; and a certain exercise of faith is one fundamental condition of the validity of all human knowledge. On the other hand, faith that is not based on knowledge, or is entirely void of knowledge, cannot even establish itself as faith. An attitude of "pure" belief toward any alleged fact, or uttered truth, would be absurd, were it not primarily inconceivable. In analyzing the conditions and grounds of any cognitive act, or even of the mental attitude of scepticism or agnosticism, the entire case may be stated by espousing either side of the controversy over the primacy of faith or knowledge, as it has raged among the theologians. I believe that I may know (*credo ut intelligam*), and I know that I may believe (*intelligo ut credam*);—both positions may be assumed as equally descriptive of the actual processes of mental life.

By affirming the inseparableness of faith and knowledge it is not meant, however, to deny the marked differences in the attitudes of mind which are reasonable, and indeed necessary, toward moral and religious truths and toward the truths of the natural and physical sciences. These differences have

their roots in differences essential to the different classes of man's experiences. The data of sense-impressions differ from those afforded by the moral and religious consciousness. Not that their data can be kept apart; or that the interpretation given to them by the moral and religious nature can be explained without reference to the workings of intellect and feeling in scientific research and scientific development. For the world is one, in some sort, from whatever different point of view it be regarded; and the human soul is a unity, of some sort, whether it be regarded as scientifically inclined and engaged, or as inclined to duty and piety. If there be any moral law, or moral principle having the right to command human conduct, it must have its seat and manifestation in this real, one world; and if there be a God, such as the highest type of the religious consciousness recognizes, this real world must be God's World. Nor does it require an impossible amount of research to discover that the physical sciences are themselves interpenetrated and profoundly influenced by quasi-moral and religious feelings and conceptions; while ethics and religion are chastened, corrected, confirmed, and illumined by the discoveries of the natural and physical sciences.

Notwithstanding the fact that knowledge in matters of conduct, art, and religion, shares the essential characteristics of all human cognition, certain important differences cannot fail to be recognized. Man's mental attitudes toward the alleged truths of ethics, æsthetics, and religion are normally and necessarily different from those held toward the truths of the natural and physical sciences. The causes of this difference are chiefly the following three. And, first, a large body of the accepted axioms of morality and religion—and to a less extent, of artistic matters—fall under the influences of an immediate and imperative call to action. In this respect, they are like those cognitive attitudes toward material things which men are compelled to assume in order to live at all. It is the "compulsion of the deed," rather than of the ratio-

cinative processes prolonged in any intelligent and self-conscious way, which makes men know what is true, because morally right, in conduct, or satisfactory in matters of belief and worship. In all the earlier and immature intellectual life of the individual and of the race, the apprehension and criticism of reasons that may afford sufficient logical support to their cognitive judgments plays as little part in morals, religion, and art, as it does in all the unquestioned customs of eating, drinking, hunting, fishing, marrying, begetting children, and burying the dead. That is to say, the conditions of the environment, and the most immediate satisfactions of desire and will, require certain mental attitudes to which experience contributes most of that kind of support which converts blind and instinctive reactions into rational beliefs, and into more or less intellectually reasonable conclusions. It is in this field, and in this field alone, that the doctrine of philosophical Pragmatism, as an attempt at an epistemology, affords any faintest semblance of an adequate solution to the problem of knowledge.

Second: the cognitive judgment in matters of ethics, æsthetics, and religion, is normally and necessarily more a matter of feeling, and of dependence upon the satisfaction of the feelings, than is the case with cognitive judgments in matters of the natural and physical sciences. This fact, regarded as a cause, is universally recognized by all attempts at a psychological analysis of such judgments in the two classes of cases. The fact that it is a cause, and that it operates so effectively as a cause, is one of the principal reasons for the presence of so much agnosticism in religion among those who are pleased to call themselves too exclusively and even discourteously, "men of science." But again, we must insist that the influence of feeling cannot be excluded from the mind in forming the most coolly scientific judgments about matters wholly indifferent to the interests of morality, art, and religion. We have just said, "wholly indifferent"; but in fact no scientific

truths are *wholly* indifferent to, or alienated from, these same emotional influences and their corresponding interests. Moral, æsthetical, and even quasi-religious emotions and interests, interpenetrate and largely influence all the highest conceptions and generalizations of the physical and natural sciences. Any depreciation of the profounder and more permanent forms of human feeling, with respect to the part they play in the formation and development of man's knowledge of the Being of the World, of the truest and realist of realities, is bad psychology and leads, both in science and religion, to a defective philosophy. The feelings are not simply causes for illusory and blind beliefs in ethics, art, and religion; they are, the rather, reasons for the truth of these beliefs. If there is any one profound and important principle which the biological sciences are requiring us to recognize and more fully appreciate, it is this: Living beings find their way to the satisfactions and higher developments of life along the paths of instinct and feeling rather than of conscious ratiocinative processes.

It is true that nature demands of man an apprehension, and an ever-increasing comprehension, of what ends he should strive after, and of the methods by which those ends may be reached. This demand is for intellect of a superior capacity. By somehow attaining this intellect, the animal has become human. By using and cultivating this intellect the human being develops as man. But it is also no less true that the human being has somehow received a superior outfit of so-called instincts and feelings, *especially* in the form which constitutes the basis for his interest in science, as well as in morals, art, and religion. The strivings and satisfaction of these feelings contribute largely to the specific qualities of his judgments in matters of morals, art, and religion. Without these instinctive strivings and the satisfaction of these higher forms of feeling, man would be as little human as if he lacked that development of intellect which is quite

too often supposed to be his only claim to superiority over the animals. Judgments toward which these strivings lead forward, and which afford satisfactions to them, are not indeed removed wholly from the conditions which satisfy the "principle of sufficient reason." But we have seen how vague and changeable are these conditions. And when—as one is always, in one's ultimate consideration of the problems of knowledge, forced to do—the teleological point of view is assumed; then it is seen how necessary and right, even from the logical standpoint, it is to regard the emotional causes of knowledge in the fields of ethics, art, and religion, as justifying reasons. In nothing else is the mind obligated to be more "reasonable" than in its demand for a "sufficient reason" to justify a cognitive judgment of an ethical, artistic, or religious character. Unless all human nature has gone wrong, and the larger Nature which encompasses and compels human nature is deceiving and Self-deceived, the satisfactions in the form of judgments, which these ethical, artistic, and religious, strivings of our human selves require, must be admitted into the field of a knowledge that has *sufficient* (or reasonable) reasons in its justification.

But, in the third place, the reasons on which a system, or a looser collection, of cognitive judgments in matters of morals, art, and religion, is to be built up, differ essentially in some other respects, from those which form the foundations of the physical and natural sciences. In the latter, we take our start from sense-perceptions, express ourselves chiefly in terms representative of sensuous experiences, and return for the testing of our judgments to the facts of sense-experience. Now, from the facts and truths of the physical and natural sciences, neither morals, art, nor religion, can free itself. Neither ought ever to wish to free itself from these facts and truths. But there are other facts and truths which can neither be envisaged, nor inferred, nor tested in the same way. And it is largely with these other facts and truths that the judg-

ments of a moral, æsthetical, or religious character, attempt to deal. Such are the facts of what the "old psychology" used to designate—and with commendable propriety—an "inner experience." All experience is, in its very nature, "inner"; and it is, also, always dependent upon conditions of experience for the human Self, that are "outward," or "outward-refferring." For this latter reason we cannot even conceive of morality, art, or religion, in any other environment than in a world of space and time and things. Moral conduct is *of* a Self toward other selves; and other selves are, for every Self, only a certain kind of things. Art can have no formal or concrete existence without ideals of beauty being incorporated in things. Religion is in, and *of*, a World whose Being is manifested in things and in selves, and as apprehended by selves. It is, however, still true that the original and impressive data of ethics, æsthetics, and religion, are experiences, not of sense-impressions, but of self-conscious states. It is from these inner experiences, regarded as needing interpretation and justification in the World of Reality, that the cognitive judgments of ethics, æsthetics, and religion, are derived. But these judgments may be more or less logically compacted into a system to be defended by argument, although they can never be resolved into demonstrations that will submit themselves to testing by the methods of the physical and natural sciences.

From this description of the nature of human knowledge in matters of morality, art, and religion, it may be seen how the attitudes of scepticism, criticism, and their sequence of agnosticism, or of more or less positive knowledge and reasoned faith, respectively, apply. In them all the private experiences of the individual are insistent and determinative. This is inevitable; for temperament, dominant modes of feeling, and early instruction or the effects of the habitual social environment, are the more powerful causes here. The data of experience in these matters are more exclusively individualistic. The attitudes toward the possible cognitive judgments are more mat-

ters of the satisfaction of emotions, strivings of will, and practical interests. But for philosophy here also, as truly—and even in some respects much more confidentially—as in the fields of the physical and natural sciences, the experience of the race justifies the affirmation of a certain content of knowledge. Here, too, history plainly shows a development of knowledge as already reached in the past, and encourages the cheerful and constant faith in a future yet larger development.

From a somewhat different point of view the mind is now led again to the conclusion which was reached before by making an analysis of the meaning, for the practical purpose of developing human knowledge, of the principle of sufficient reason. However *demonstration*, or what Kant called proof of the "apodeictic" sort, may be made to apply in problems of pure mathematics and pure logic, man can never attain any such incontrovertible grounds on which to place his cognitive judgments respecting the truths of the great world of selves and of things. Indeed, no one knows one's own Self, its true nature or its actual past, by the path of infallible demonstration. Self-consciousness, like sense-perception, is momentary and incomplete; memory is fallible, and so is inference. The growing body of knowledge, both for the individual and for the race, is rather like a living organism, in which the more obvious or quite secret and mysterious processes of metabolism are constantly taking place. Some parts are relatively stable; some are momentarily changing; and most parts lie between the two extremes, as tested by their stability and their serviceableness. That which can be appropriated in the organism, because it fits its essential nature and its practical uses, is the true; the harmful or poisonous or unadaptable elements of half-truths, falsehoods, and foolish conceits, are constantly being eliminated by the vitality and metabolic vigor of the organism.

The further more precise definition of those limits of sce-

ticism and agnosticism which we are now discussing belongs to logic,—not of the so-called “pure” or *a priori* variety, an exercise which, however mentally pleasing and invigorating, contributes little or nothing to either the growth or the defense of truth,—but to the applied logic of the positive sciences. Here, each science must have due regard, on the one hand, to the body of knowledge which it can claim to have already established by proofs satisfactory enough to command a consensus of intelligent opinion, and on the other hand, to the nature of the subjects with which it deals and to the character and amount of proof which it is reasonable to demand for them. Inasmuch as none of these sciences can be cultivated in isolation from all the others, but on the contrary, each one of them is likely to find itself in need of something from all the others; and because they all make up the sum of that which can be known about the Being and the Behavior of the One World; each particular science must grow in knowledge of its own, by attaining harmony with the others. Thus, just as the changing limits of scepticism, and the enlarging areas of intelligent and firm conviction, placed on grounds of sufficient reason, are adjusted by a continuous process of development in the experience of the individual; so readjustment and improvement take place in the larger, more comprehensive, and truer, experience of the race. The more that every individual mind opens itself with candor to this larger and truer experience, the greater and more trustworthy is its own growth in knowledge. This is to say that the development of knowledge is (1) a matter of degrees, limitations, and changing conditions; is (2) proved only with a larger or more limited degree of probability; because it is (3) constantly being tested, and confirmed or modified, by the growing experience of the race; and, therefore, (4) the truth as to the Being of the World is more comprehensively, definitively, and surely known through the strivings and achievements in history, of the entire community of self-conscious and rational minds. These last two

considerations bring us face to face with the undoubtedly teleological and social character of human knowledge, and of the conditions and causes of its development.

But Nature, both within man and without, has arranged for another and quite insuperable limit to the sceptical and agnostic attitudes of mind. For these attitudes inevitably reach a limit which cannot possibly be itself transcended, but which indisputably shows that every act of knowledge by a self-conscious Self is essentially transcendent of that Self. In a word, the very attempt to invade the field of knowledge by this kind of scepticism, with a view to establish an agnostic position, of necessity defeats itself. Or, to state the case in a somewhat enigmatical way: The experience of every individual Self includes the results and the confidences of a universal experience. "I"—the individual subject of the cognitive act, or state of knowledge—transcend the "me" in every such act or state, that has reference to other selves or to things. And, inasmuch as my individual experience always implicates, or explicitly involves, such a reference; this individual experience always passes beyond the individual and singularly limited factors of the experience, into the universal and the incontestably true. If, therefore, by philosophical (or epistemological) scepticism, or agnosticism, be meant the doubt and the denial of the validity of the principles and presuppositions of knowledge, in their applicability to the reality of things and of selves; then such scepticism and agnosticism become simply and undeniably absurd. They are more than simply impossible: they are intrinsically absurd, and they cannot state themselves for purposes of argument, whether by way of consent or of refutation; for in the very attempt to state themselves their own refutation is inextricably involved. Thus all that is properly involved in the Cartesian point of starting for an incontestable theory of knowledge, is equally involved in the statement of the positions of such a kind of epistemological scepticism or agnosticism. To say *dubito* (I am doubting), or

nescio or *agnosco* (I do not know) implies the *ergo sum* (the postulate of my existence) as necessarily and uncontestedly as to say *cogito* (I am thinking). Self-conscious doubt and self-conscious ignorance are as valid and indisputable affirmations of self-conscious existence as can possibly be made. And since even to state these sceptical or agnostic attitudes—not to say, argue them—implies the existence of other selves and other things, the limit which the fleeting moment and singular object of self-consciousness presents, has already been transcended. The individual has exercised his warrant for assuming his companionship in a universal, or at least larger, experience. His reason has made the bow of allegiance and submission to the encompassing and controlling Reason, in which the former “lives, and moves, and has its being.” And now if the agnostic, with reference to the fundamental beliefs and reasoned conclusions of this larger experience, avows not only the maxim “I-do-not-now-know,” but also “You do not know,” and “Nobody knows, or ever will know, or from the very nature of things can know”; then he is no longer agnostic, but has become the most conceited and irrational of dogmatists. He has taken the liberty to transcend his own particular and limited experience in order to deny the abstract possibility of such an act of transcending, on his own part, and on the part of all others. But how does he even dare to assume that there are other selves with whom he may argue the case by an appeal to their common reason; or other things about the existence and doings of which the argument may become, as it were, a valid transaction?

When scepticism has once, by an act of faith in reason, overleaped the boundaries of epistemological agnosticism, it is confessedly difficult to tell how far it may be compelled by argument to go in its concessions to the possibility of a valid knowledge of reality. It is now on common ground with the experience of the race. And the race is not, and never can be, agnostic after the fashion of this kind of agnosticism. That

the growth of man's knowledge itself constantly compels the rejection, or modification, of much of the dogmatism of mankind, there can be no doubt. The truth of such growth is a historical fact. The fact extends itself over all the fields of human knowledge and opinion—the scientific as well as, and perhaps even more completely than, the ethical, artistic, and religious. It certainly would seem, however, that scepticism must be unavailable with regard to the validity of those constitutional forms of the cognitive faculties which of necessity fix the limits to the forms of the qualities and relations of reality as known by man, and which both Aristotle and Kant called the "categories." These categories, *if only we could discover and define them*, would have to remain essentially unchanged and undisturbed in their reign over the kingdom of truth and reality, by any efforts to take toward them the agnostic position. And, in fact, we find that their unquestioned acceptance is at least a practical necessity. But as has just been indicated, both logic and the theory of knowledge have from the first found it difficult to agree upon the origin, number, and the interpretation of the so-called categories. Of late, especially, the attempt has been frequently made to criticize the categories as though they were themselves the products of evolution. However interesting such speculation may be made, and not only interesting but seemingly scientific, it is well never to forget the limitations under which all speculation is always itself placed. The theory of evolution is, of course, only an hypothesis; it is, the rather, a grouping of many hypotheses which are not as yet thoroughly assimilated and harmonized. So far as these hypotheses deal with events before human knowledge was, they are obliged to frame themselves, in terms only of human knowledge as it now is. Space was, Time was, and there were Relations of position and of action and reaction, involving Causation and Law; there was Matter, and Motion, and some semblance of Order; and the processes were teleological; they moved forward toward some

End;—all this, in the origins and ongoing of the evolutionary process before the human race came into existence.

Therefore, all possible hypotheses of evolution, as applied to a world where as yet no human knowledge is, must themselves imply the most tremendous and unlimited confidence in the valid applicability of such knowledge to the real Being of the World. No thorough-going evolutionist can be an agnostic with respect to the categories without becoming absurd. But *a fortiori* is all this true when an attempt is made to treat of the categories themselves in terms of an evolutionary hypothesis. We are then assuming to know, on grounds valid for all present knowledge, and beyond or beneath the limits of which no knowledge is conceivable, how knowledge began to be and got itself established, when as yet there was no knowledge. If there is any subject about which one may be an agnostic, surely it is just this: How did knowledge of any sort and about any thing, come to be? Surely also, if we know anything with assurance, we know that knowledge of the conditions on which the origin and development of all knowledge depended, can claim no exemption from the darkening or illuminating effects of the so-called categories. May I trust them, as representing and revealing Reality? Yes, or No? If I may, then I cannot be agnostic with reference to their present validity, and at the same time retain a foolish faith in respect to their applicability to a doubtful past.

There is only one conceivable way in which the most thoroughly sceptical examination of the problem in knowledge can even seem to end in what has been described as “epistemological agnosticism.” This is by a criticism which results in showing that man’s cognitive faculties are, by their very constitution, involved in irreducible and essential self-contradictions. Therefore, they cannot claim any indisputable authority for their functioning or for its products as truthful representatives of the real Being of the World. In other words, the moment it tries to attribute a valid ontological (or “extra-

mental") reference to any human cognitive processes, complete agnosticism finds itself involved in hopeless contradictions. In the developments of modern philosophy this view has taken shape in a doctrine of alleged "antinomies." In its later forms the doctrine of antinomies goes back to Kant; but it has assumed a variety of forms,—in general far cruder and less penetrated with critical acumen,—in the hands of such writers as Sir William Hamilton, Dean Mansel, and Mr. Bradley. In the case of each one of these writers, however, and even in the case of Kant, who was by far the greatest of them all, the contradictions alleged to be found in the laws which control the operations of man's cognitive faculty, really exist only between the barren and artificial abstractions which in no case truthfully represent either the real constitution or the actual operations of this faculty.

In a word, the doctrine of antinomies finds its grounds, not in the actual experience of knowledge, under its normal conditions and limitations, but in the attempt of the doctrinaire to press his sceptical criticism beyond the limits, where neither scepticism nor criticism can go.

We might, indeed, object to the word "antinomy" as a specious attempt to incorporate essentially contradictory conceptions under a single term skillfully selected for a sinister purpose. For, in truth, *laws* (*νόμοι*) cannot antagonize each other. Laws have only an abstract or ideal existence; they are generalizations which summarize the way in which, under certain conditions, realities are known or believed to behave themselves. In nature, every concrete and actual occurrence is, as it were, a summary of numerous so-called laws, which, by the employment of logical subtleties, may easily be made—as mere laws—squarely to contradict each other. Thus the flight of every arrow, the actual overtaking of every tortoise by an Achilles, solves the ancient and sophistical antinomy which proved such facts impossible. It is real things and real selves, which actually oppose each other; which strive

in contrary directions; which clash and act and react upon each other, under an infinite variety of conditions and in an infinite number of ways. This *is* the real world, as we indubitably *know* it to be. Our knowledge is for us the solution of the problem which every transaction in the real world concretely solves,—the problem, namely, of how many different things and selves can actually exist in the World which we—although always imperfectly, and, in general doubtfully, as to its precise and comprehensive manner—*know* to be some sort of a Unity.

It is not necessary or feasible here to consider in detail¹ the different forms which have been taken by the philosophical doctrine of alleged “antinomies.” It is notable, however, that the advocates of the doctrine all feel obliged in some way or other to open the door of the dark cage in which they have confined human reason as though it were a pair, or a group, of wild beasts whose very nature compelled them to ceaseless warfare and attempts at mutual destruction, into the sun-lit spaces of the kingdom of reality and truth. This the more humane and kindly disposed among these agnostics toward the intellectual strivings and emotional satisfactions of humanity usually accomplish by an appeal to the necessities of faith. Kant’s avowed purpose was to remove (the pretense of) knowledge, in order to make room for faith. He would have us believe that, and act “as though,” Reality *really* is what pure reason would seem to show it cannot be. In doing this, however, Kant virtually opens the back door to many of the psychological and epistemological truths concerning the nature and validity of all human knowledge, which he has before either rudely thrust out, or politely bowed out, of the front door of his critical edifice. But man cannot deal in this double way with his own reason. Human reason is either all,—or at least much more than Kant allows by way of so-called faith,—

¹ See the author’s *Philosophy of Knowledge*, Chapter XIV, where “the antinomies” of Kant and of Mr. Bradley are given a thorough criticism.

or it is nothing. And the Oriental doctrine of Mâyâ is really more consistent, however untenable and practically mischievous, than is the Occidental doctrine of antinomies. Thus when Mr. Bradley has convicted the constitutional forms of human cognition of being, in "their very essence," "infected" and "self-contradictory," in one part of his book, he cannot possibly succeed in establishing a rational ontology in another part of the same book. Such philosophical agnosticism and any kind of metaphysics—whether that upon which the "plain man" goes about his daily work, or the "scientist" conducts the experiments of his laboratory, or the "philosopher" discourses of the categories—cannot lie down in the same bed together.

Within the fitting limits, therefore, scepticism and agnosticism remain legitimate and valuable attitudes of the human mind toward all the objects both of knowledge and of so-called faith. Their legitimacy, and even their necessity for the growth of knowledge, is proved by the experience both of the individual and of the race. It is not simply that in this way only can error be discerned and separated from truth; but it is also and chiefly that the very life of the mind, in its most eager and successful pursuit of truth, necessarily follows the same path. But these attitudes are limited in respect to all forms of alleged truth, by the necessities of the practical life and by the growing experience of the individual and of the race. And inasmuch as no experience can possibly be mentally represented, not to say faithfully analyzed and adequately represented, as a purely subjective affair; all experience involves either an immediate seizure, or a more or less incomplete comprehension through processes of reasoning, of the existence, qualities, and relations, of real things and real selves. This growth of knowledge is a sort of progressive limitation of the attitudes of scepticism and agnosticism; while at the same time it opens up new fields to these same attitudes of mind. But when these attitudes are taken toward the principles and pre-

suppositions of all knowledge, toward the validity of the ontological reference and the truth-telling character of the cognitive faculties of man; then they involve themselves in hopeless confusions and self-contradictions; then a giddiness of intellect results which tumbles the whole fabric of human knowledge into a bottomless pit of both logical and practical absurdity.

CHAPTER VIII

METAPHYSICS, AS A THEORY OF REALITY

THE relation between a philosophical theory of knowledge and systematic metaphysics as a theory of reality is so intimate that they may almost be regarded as two aspects of essentially the same problem. The grounds for this intimate relation are laid in the very nature of knowledge itself. The consequence of the relation shows itself in almost all discussions of either of these two problems, or two aspects of one problem. For one's attitude toward the problem of knowledge is sure to be influenced by one's ontological theories; and, on the other hand, either the dogmatic, the sceptical, the critical, or the wholly agnostic, attitude pervades and influences the discussions of most writers on metaphysics. Kant, indeed, set out upon his prolonged journey through the several fields of human reason, in the critical way, and with the purpose of making a clear-cut distinction between this journey and an excursion in ontological speculation. Ontology, he proposed to treat in summary fashion, after he had tested the cognitive powers by the critical process. But his criticism ended in a complete agnosticism, so far as any valid ontology, or theory of reality was concerned; at the same time this entire process of criticism was itself permeated and influenced by uncriticized metaphysical assumptions and presuppositions. Thus the Kantian agnosticism excludes the possibility of metaphysics as even an approximately valid theory of reality; it reduces metaphysics to a dry and uninteresting tabulation of illusory categories and compulsory antinomies.

In the interests of clearness, then, it would seem desirable

to preface the following chapters on metaphysics as a theory of reality by a brief summary of the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters on the theory of knowledge.

And, first, we have seen what knowledge is from the psychological point of view: that is, what it is to know as an actual fact of human experience. In this datum all theories of knowledge must find themselves included: they are false and mischievous or defective and unsatisfying, if they exclude any of the essential features or implications of this datum. Now knowledge is never obtained or substantiated by the rationalizations of pure intellect alone. It invariably implies, and in its more immediate forms of self-consciousness and sense-perception it *actually is*, an experience which involves the entire active Self. It requires the felt strivings of a will, opposed by a reality that does not will as it wills. As being an active and suffering part of this world of things and selves, men know *that* they are, and *what* they are; and in increasing measure, *that* things *are*, and *what* things *are*. Any critic of knowledge who takes his datum of experience as other, or less, than this experienced fact, is doomed to wander from the very start; and he is more fortunate than most such critics are, if he pulls his wits together before he finds himself virtually insane, in the midst of the shadow-shapes of his own abstractions and speculative ghosts.

From this it follows, second, that all knowledge is *of* reality. Some *real* being—some Self, myself or some other self, or some Thing—is always the object of knowledge. There is no cognition which has not existence for its correlative. Neither is the real being which is the knower's object,—and made such by his cognitive activity,—to be resolved by any sceptical or critical examination into a dream without a dreamer, or a shadow without either substance or sunlight to account for its casting. Two words have, indeed, been particularly potent in developing and impressing a theory of knowledge which aims to render metaphysics as a theory of reality impossible by ren-

dering all knowledge illusory. These are the word "phenomenon" and the word "idea." For the philosophical misuse of the first of these words, in modern times, Kant is chiefly responsible. With him phenomenon was identical with the object of knowledge, and "noumenon," or actuality, or "thing-in-itself," was retired into the background as essentially unknowable and, therefore, forever unknown. For a somewhat similar distinction the words "appearance" and "reality" have been substituted by a modern writer. By forcing to a false issue this distinction one has at the last to face an impassable gulf between the apparent and the actual or real world (*die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt*). But the very distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon, the apparent and the real, arises only in the process of knowledge; and it is valid proof of the falsity of the agnostic position toward the authority for reality of the cognitive process. The very nature of the distinction—dependent, as it is, upon the nature of the experience in which it originates—shows that its two terms are mutually related, and dependent, each upon the other, for their meaning and for their application to every act of knowledge and every class of objects. There are no phenomena that are not of some real object, to some real subject; there are no appearances which are not of some real thing, or self, to some real self.

That kind of subjectivism, with its sceptical philosophy, which interposed some so-called idea between the knower and the object known, and then insisted that things and souls are so unlike that no valid commerce can be had between them, but that all intercourse must be rendered illusory, so far as reality is concerned, by being mediated through *images* of reality, may be said to have suffered a death that knows no resurrection. Its slayers have been the critical philosophy which emanated from Kant, and the splendid triumphs of the particular sciences which have proceeded with their work of increasing knowledge of the real world on the basis of a

common-sense faith in the cognitive powers of collective humanity.

But, thirdly, every one who attempts a systematic study of metaphysical problems must bear constantly in mind the degrees of knowledge and the limits which are normal with the different kinds of knowledge, in order to save himself at every point from those errors of over-confidence that are apt to characterize the philosophy of Absolutism. If not only the stamp of imperfection, but also the certainty of error, belongs to all our human attempts at comprehending the concrete realities of the World, even when these attempts are confined within the limits of some definite problem in the pettiest division of the smallest of the particular sciences; then, surely, the attempt to present a tenable and comprehensive doctrine of the total Being of the World should begin, proceed, and terminate, with a goodly show of genuine modesty. Such a system of metaphysics can never become a matter to be tested by the individual's self-consciousness or by the sense-impressions of the multitude of mankind. It must be the result of reflective thinking, which, so far as possible, brings together the experiences of the race in an effort to interpret them so as to satisfy their many-sided and most imperative and permanent demands.

On the other hand, however, the philosopher has certain reasons for an unusual confidence and a large measure of good cheer, when he turns to the subject of metaphysics proper. For, after all, it is here that he may force, if he is skillful, all his fellow thinkers—so-called "plain men," students of the particular sciences, and students of philosophy—into a certain large amount of agreement with himself and with one another. In truth, all men are naturally and necessarily metaphysicians. They are obliged to interpret experience in terms of some sort of a theory of reality. Their differences in the form of interpretation arise chiefly from two causes: (1) Some are occupied more seriously and intelligently with the interpretation of one corner or side of experience, and some with another;

(2) some are more bold than others and willing to go further toward an attempt at an ultimate and comprehensive interpretation, while others are timid and draw back. Thus those metaphysical wranglings of which agnosticism makes so much are largely due to differences of emphasis, and differences as to the point at which different thinkers get confused, or tired, and resolve to stop thinking.

And, finally, in attempting the problems of metaphysics as a theory of reality, the only safe way is to start from experience and always be ready to return to the testing of experience again. In saying this it is evident that we are using the word "experience" in a most comprehensive and, therefore, somewhat vague way. Out of experience, as the fleeting state of the individual's consciousness, considered as such, no knowledge, and *a fortiori*, no system of metaphysics can come. But this is not the whole of experience, in the larger and fuller meaning of the word. All that the race has acquired of knowledge, including the knowledge of its own instincts, emotions, strivings, habits, history, as well as of the qualities and relations and evolution of things, affords contributions to that theory of reality, which it is the aim of metaphysics to establish on ever broader and sounder foundations of experience. Thus it happens that we may know more about the meaning of this whole World as interpreted by the race's experience with It, than we can as yet know about the constitution of radium, or the causes that operate in the development of the sea-worm, or in the behavior of a white blood-corpuscle in its fight with poisonous bacteria.

Metaphysics is an attempt to answer by reflective thinking, on the basis of experience, what Matthew Arnold has declared to be a "first want": This is the "want to know what *being* is." Or as Ribot has well said: "Metaphysics is but a most noble and elevated way of conceiving things." All human experience of knowledge both assumes and enforces and illustrates the fact, with its various implications and convictions:—

Something is real. Nay, more: it all assumes and enforces and illustrates the vast and complicated general fact, that innumerable real selves and real things are known to be existent, and to be actually related, in One World. With reference to this assumption metaphysics proposes two questions which become its two most important problems in the effort to interpret the experience in which the assumption is involved. First: What are the qualities, or characteristics, possessed by all that makes a valid claim to be considered real? or, in other words: What is it to be real, as things and selves are known to be real? And, second: What kind of a unity actually belongs to this world of concrete and manifold realities? or, in other words: How shall we understand and interpret the Being of the One real World?

The moment the meaning of these questions is comprehended, it is seen that metaphysics is no side issue or adventitious and unimportant undertaking; neither is it an exercise for philosophers of the school, or of the den, alone to undertake. On the contrary, its problems are—some of them in their concrete forms, at least—solved each hour, and each moment, of every day, in the interests of the practical life and, indeed, to meet the demands of living at all. The inmates of no madhouse are so insane as would be the man who had absolutely no standards for distinguishing between the reality of his own Self and his own fleeting states, or between the reality of things or other selves and his own illusions or dreams. Moreover, every adult human being is absolutely convinced, let him be never so savage or near to the mythical being of the “primitive man,” that the world in the midst of which he lives, with all its diversities of phenomena and changes in appearance, is, after all, in some sort really one and the same world throughout. In a word: Every man is an unfaltering believer in reality; every man is a more or less skillful metaphysician. While, if the metaphysics could be taken out from under the so-called positive sciences they, too, would not be distinguish-

able from illusions and dreams; although they might have the distinction of involving a consensus of many dreamers and lunatics. But among all these classes of compulsory metaphysicians, there are none so dogmatic as the men who decline to tolerate metaphysical discussion at all. "Jacobi, Fichte, and Schelling, all belong," says Herbart, to the age when people were singing:—

"Hear ye! Things-in-themselves will be sold under the hammer!
Since Metaphysics lately deceased without leaving an heir."

To which elegant couplet Mr. Shadworth Hodgson has proposed to reply as follows:

"What though Things-in-themselves have been dispersed by an auction,
Who was the auctioneer? Why, Metaphysic herself."

There need be as little mystery about the method of metaphysical philosophy as about the nature of metaphysics in general. How the "plain man" arrives at his fragmentary and theoretically unsatisfying, but more or less practically effective notions as to the nature of its realities, and as to the oneness of the world of his experience, the analysis of knowledge has already shown sufficiently. The origin, nature, and validity of the naïve metaphysics of the physical and natural sciences, as well as the method which they employ, have also been indicated. But the method which criticism must employ is a deduction from the very nature of philosophy. Its metaphysical system aims to harmonize and interpret the assumptions and conclusions of the particular sciences with regard to the nature of *real* things, and *real* selves, and the *actual* relations and transactions existing between them. In a word, the method of metaphysics must be based on experience with concrete realities; it must follow with a docile and free critical spirit the lead of those sciences which deal with such realities; but it must tran-

scend these sciences in its effort to reach a theory of the Being of the World that shall harmonize and interpret the truths which they all proclaim. For—to quote again the pregnant sentence of Matthew Arnold: “We want first to know what *being is*.” He who contributes anything to the deeper satisfaction of this want adds something essential to the higher welfare of humanity. For man, being rational, does not, and cannot “live by bread alone.” The life of reason must live on the exercise and nourishment of reason. Thus the total interests of humanity demand a theory of reality which shall be, on the one hand, firmly founded in its cognitive experience, and on the other hand, well adapted to serve all its practical needs. Indeed, how men live and how men die, depends chiefly upon the character of their theory of reality and upon the manner of their holding it.

What has given metaphysical philosophy an ill reputation among so-called practical men, as well as scientific experts, has oftener than otherwise been its tendency to deal with mere abstractions; to rise with a bound to speculative conclusions on the wings of these abstractions; and then to refuse considerations primarily derived from the concrete realities whose existence constitutes that World, the “Being” of which metaphysics aims to know. What can man know about the Absolute, —*that it is*, not to say, *what it is*,—which is not known in and through the relative? The only obvious answer to this question is: “Nothing.” To claim more is to substitute for knowledge the pretence of knowledge. Thus much, at least, the Kantian sceptical criticism of metaphysics as ontology has made perfectly clear. But the student of the theory of reality may regain his confidence by returning to the point of standing which he has reached after carefully threading his way through the confusions of the sceptical theory of knowledge. For him, *the necessary forms of human cognition are no longer*, as scepticism holds them to be, *impotencies of the intellect*; they are, the rather, *potencies of reason*. They are not insuperable bar-

riers to a vision of reality; they are insights into the very nature of reality.

The traditional metaphysician—to adopt Hegel's figure of speech—is indeed apt to paint his entire picture in shades of gray (*Grau in Grau*); and this, as Hegel thinks, is because the artist has upon his palette only the “abstract essence of the categories” (*das ganz Abstrakte der Begriffe*). Let us, however, endeavor to escape—if only partially—the charge of trying to depict the concrete variety of form, color, and relation, which undoubtedly belongs to the world of human experience, with the dullness and monotony of abstractions (layer of gray upon gray, or beside gray). This we may do by a close questioning of some actually existing concrete thing. And any old, or new, “Thing” will do. For the mystery of real being (of “Thing-hood,” if so convenient but uncouth a term be pardoned) is incorporated, quite fully enough to exhaust the most prolonged and acute analysis, in every humblest and least conspicuous example. A flower “in the crannied wall,” a stone picked up by the wayside, a clod against which the toe strikes in the ploughed field, will do as well as a human organism, a jewel, or a fixed star. To this “Thing” we will put the following question: What is it that you, the object of *knowledge*, are, which compels me to know you as not *mere* object of *my* knowledge, but as having an existence of your own? In other words: What are those characteristics which this particular thing possesses in common with every other thing, and which entitle it to be known as real, and so capable of taking its part in the actual transactions of a real world?

The attempt to answer in the most naive and concrete manner an inquiry into the real nature, and the value for the world of actual events, of any individual thing, leads us at once to those conceptions which in their most abstract form, are the so-called categories of metaphysical philosophy. To try the issue with this one example; let it be a stone which I am striving to place on top of a wall. This stone is known to

me as "in space" and as "occupying space." However I may have come, from the point of view of psychological theory, to localize and measure things (whether this power is wholly the result of experiences of mine, or whether things have some original quality or vague "bigness"), I know this stone as something real, and as actually located and measurable with reference to its own size and its spatial relations to other things. I know the same thing as also existing "in time"; and I infer and believe in its continued existence in time, irrespective of the time during which I am observing it. My passionate conviction with respect to these spatial and temporal characteristics is endowed with all the qualities of an infallible knowledge. This thing, however, may be changed in position and in size; for in order to adapt it to its uses as a part of the wall, the effecting of such changes is the very transaction I am striving to bring about. But I shall have to use "force" for this; it will "cause" me a severe and perhaps painful strain as I cause it to break in pieces or to be hoisted entire to its place on the wall. And when I get it placed, although by the "action" of frost, or by some person's ruthless hands, it may subsequently be displaced (a transaction which may also be described by saying, "It has changed its place," or "Someone has changed its place"), I positively know that it will not grow hands and feet, over-night or in hundreds of years, and so descend "of itself" from the wall, by its own two hands or on all its fours. For this would be to violate all manner of "laws"; it would imply a change in its own "nature" which is absolutely forbidden by that larger Nature of which it is only a part. As a stone, it is "adapted to," and fulfills its "purpose" in part by being built into a wall with others of its own species or kind. It cannot be allowed to change itself arbitrarily; and then to undertake the fulfillment of purposes for which by its own nature and according to its proper legal relations to other things, it is in no respect adapted.

In some such manner the plain man might rehearse his un-

taught metaphysics, or theory of reality, as applied to the "Thing-hood" of the stone. And if it were any other material existence, whose claim to reality he was substantiating in terms of knowledge, he could not depart in any essential way from a terminology which embodies the same conceptions. Nor would the metaphysics of the "scientist"—physicist, chemist, geologist, or what not—differ essentially from that of the plain man. The scientific measurements of times and spaces would indeed be infinitely more refined and accurate; the scientific knowledge of the qualities, the possible or actual changes in the form and substance of the thing would be indefinitely more subtle and varied; the scientific grasp upon the laws regulating the changes and the relations of this thing to other things would be vastly more firm and comprehensive; science's descriptive history of the thing in the past, of the record of its life and development, would be, however tentative and doubtful, much more interesting and even amazing. But the man of science could neither transcend, nor contract, whether in number or in their applicability, just these same categories which the plain man would use. And any attempt on the part of science, either to misuse or to eliminate any of them, would most surely meet with defeat. For these are the forms which the cognition of things impresses upon things, in the belief that they are the forms of the real existence of things. Or, better said: These are the forms in which the experience of knowledge validates the real nature and actual behavior of things.

Quality, Relation, Change, Time, Space and Motion, Force and Causation, Quantity and Measure, Unity and Number, Form, Law, and Final Purpose,—such are the categories which, *if we have enumerated them correctly and exhaustively*, are given to all men in experience as the characteristics of each and every Thing which men know as real. They are all, as it were, present, or "immanent," and harmoniously operative, in every single thing. They *are* there; they *belong to*

the concrete reality. In experience the human mind becomes aware of them slowly, imperfectly, and one or two, or a few, at the same time, according to the wandering of the *Blickpunkt* of attention. Or it may with confidence infer them as existing in many real objects of which it has never had the experience of observing them, and of which it can never hope to have this experience.

But when it is said that every real being is known as real, because it may be present in experience under this same variety of thought-forms, it is necessary at once to add a something more. For there also belongs to the reality of every being given in experience, somewhat more than is obvious to all thought-forms. What this somewhat more is, can only be realized when it is remembered that the activity in cognition is not mere thinking; and that when this activity takes the form of a self-consciousness which reveals to the Self most fully the essence, as it were, of its own being, it does not make the Self known to itself as a pure intellect going passively through a series of thought-forms. Hence, it becomes in some sort a true picture of what the Self really is, when we say: It knows itself as *having* thoughts, but as *being* a will.

It is at once noticeable that we apply these characteristics of reality to things in much the same naïve but instructive way as that in which we apply them to ourselves. None of them is wholly identified with the reality of any one Thing; although every single real Thing is said to have, or to possess, each one of these characteristics in order that it may lay valid claim to be called real. Neither is the reality of any thing thought of as a mere and fortuitous aggregate or collection of all these characteristics; although, as we have seen, its thing-hood requires that it should manage to combine, or hold together the possession of them all. For example, we do not say that the thing *is* any one of its several qualities; we do not even consent to identify its real existence with the sum-total of these qualities. The qualities tell us *what* it *is*; and without knowl-

edge of these qualities we should not even know *that* it really is. There are no unqualified things; but, then, the qualities are "of" the things, or they "belong to" the things. What now is meant by the "It" which has the qualities. In much the same way we seem to be compelled to think of the relations of things,—both those which are internal and exist between the different parts and qualities of the same thing, and also those which exist between any particular thing and a vast multitude of other things. Unrelated things are *no*-thing; and yet we are not completely satisfied with Lotze's celebrated maxim: "To be" (in reality) "is to be related." Things stand in relations; but they are not composed of relations or wholly to be identified, in respect to the reality of their existence, with the sum of the relations in which, at any particular time, they are found standing. The very essence of their "thinghood" requires that they should be able to enter into new relations.

Still further in the same direction of an attempt to discover the metaphysical meaning of the conceptions which are implicit in all human thinking, it is to be observed: All these qualities and relations of things are entered into and possessed by the things, under the conditions and limitations of space and time. Hence things may be measured and numbered; and on the basis of this seemingly simple datum of fact the most wonderful systems of so-called pure mathematics, or of mathematics applied to all sorts of things, are confidently erected. And the reasonings of science in reliance upon the verity, or reality, of this form of mental activity, are confirmed by an ever-enlarging experience of things, in a way which only fails of being considered miraculous, because it is so supremely natural. The motions, changes, and forces exerted by and between things, are themselves measurable; but it is still the *things* which undergo, or effect, the movements and the changes, and which exert, or become subject to the exertion of, their inherent forces. Thus, with marvellous

systems of obvious or subtle and concealed actions and reactions, the real and living world is ever changing and reconstructing itself anew. For although the things are not to be identified with the laws which they obey,—and, indeed, law itself is only an abstraction from the more general and regular forms of the action and reaction of the real things; yet all things do conform to law, and this conformity is the condition, so to say, of their being permitted to form a part of, and to play their part in, the One World. To this unity of plan, however vaguely known and imperfectly conceived it may always remain to the mind of man, every individual thing must somehow be adapted in order that it may fulfill its manifold purposes in the same world.

We are accustomed to use the word "It" as a convenient summary for the subject of all those categories, or characteristics, the possession of which is necessary to establish the claim to reality of each particular Thing. In this one word "It," however, lurks the entire mystery of existence. This fact has led to the mystical and abstract language which metaphysics has found it necessary or convenient to employ in order to express its unclear but undisturbed conviction in the reality of the subject of all the qualities, relations, and changes, which are observed or inferred to be taking place in the world of things. This abstract conception of the Subject-Thing, of It, of that which has the qualities, which stands in the relations, which undergoes or effects the changes, etc., it has embodied in such words and phrases, as "Substance," "Bearer" (*Träger*—that is, of states), metaphysical or "ontological subject," "real being," etc. And at once, of course, all forms of phenomenism, or of the sceptical denial of the possibility of metaphysics, have asked in a sneering way the question: "What then becomes of the subject-thing when you abstract all its qualities, relations, and changes, both in time and in space? To which question only one answer is possible or even conceivable: "At once it becomes no-Thing." A better form

of the same answer would be: Without all these it could not be, or be conceived of as being, any real Thing. But the return question is just as inevitable and much more difficult to answer. For the searcher after this metaphysical mystery which lies in the very word "It," and which seems to be no mystery at all to the consciousness of the "plainest" of men, may renew his claims by starting from precisely the same standpoint of universal experience, and by making precisely the same appeal to this experience for the coveted answer. Why do you, in ordinary conversation, and as well in your scientific terminology, talk about things in the way to imply such a real subject for all the qualities, relations, and changes, in the particular things and in the world of things? What is the meaning of this "It," as *you* employ it? Why do you speak of "that-which," "whose-is," and pride yourself upon the ability to determine more precisely and comprehensively than the plain man can, the qualities, relations, changes,—in space and in time,—that are "of" the real things.

And now when we hark back to a certain point reached in the recent hunt after a satisfying theory of knowledge, we get a suggestion, at least, of where to look in order to discover the hiding-place of this mystery which confronts at the very threshold any attempt to discover a satisfying theory of reality. Is there any one of the so-called categories which may be connected with the subject-Thing, with this It of which all is affirmed, by a special kind of copula? Does any one of them, at least at first blush, seem to be nearer of kin to the very substance, to the real essence, to the "bone and marrow," of the Thing? Such a predicate, it might then be said, is It; instead of being content with saying that It *has* such a predicate, or that such a predicate *belongs to* It. At present let the experiment be made with the category—or rather with the complex conception—of causation. And surely, it seems to satisfy both the demands of the plain man's experience, as well as the severer demands of the particular sciences, to say

that things *are* really causes; whereas it does not seem satisfactory to express the datum of experience if the uncouth statement is made that causation is a specific quality possessed, as are color, size, weight, etc., by the particular thing. Indeed, both physics and psychology unite to resolve all these specific qualities, as far as they belong to any particular thing, into the various forms of the causal activities of the thing. To do something to other things, and to have something done to it by other things, would seem then to be the very essence of the reality which is ascribed to all things that are causes in the actual transactions of the One World.

The variety of ways in which particular things are causes determines their qualities, and explains the changes in themselves and other things, under the infinite variety of relations which their causal activity assumes. This is as true of atoms, and electrons, and ions, as it is of the more massive substances to which, as subjects, are assigned the more easily observable qualities, changes and relations, of ordinary things. When the causes are thought of as operative in space, and under measurable relations of space, and in degrees that are also measurable by movements in space, it is necessary to regard the things as "occupying space," or as "posited" in space; and in somewhat similar manner, things are known as causes operative in time and during longer or shorter times.

The analysis of the nature and meaning of the cognitive act gives the clue to the origin, nature, and meaning, of the conception of things as causes. In every cognitive act, the knower is a will, and knows itself as a will; in every cognitive act whose object is some Thing, the knower knows that thing as actually or conceivably being, what by self-consciousness he knows himself to be,—namely, a cause, as will, but not his will; an expression to him of another will than his own. Such, at any rate, is the preliminary view of the solution of this problem, which may be defended both by the psychology of knowledge, and also by the analysis of that conception of reality which

belongs to every meanest thing. That there would be no real selves and no real things for us, were we not made aware to ourselves and they made aware to us, as causes, acting and reacting, reciprocally determining the changes in the states and relations of one another, may be asserted as a prologue to a system of metaphysics, which does not easily admit of denial.

CHAPTER IX

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SO-CALLED “CATEGORIES”

THERE has been from time immemorial a difference of opinion as to the nature and the number of the necessary forms of human knowledge; and as well as to the precise way in which philosophy ought to discover and to criticize them. The sceptical and agnostic positions toward this problem of metaphysics have already been sufficiently discussed. It ought, however, to be recalled in this connection that any proposal to criticize the categories cannot properly imply that it is possible to look on them with a critical eye from a wholly outside point of view. In criticizing them, the mind is compelled to accept them; in criticizing the criticism of others, the mind employs them yet again. It is the business of systematic metaphysics, in spite of the inherent difficulties, to do what human minds well can toward harmonizing the different, and sometimes seemingly conflicting claims of those forms of all cognition; and, also, to expound and amplify their significance as bearing upon the ultimate aim of metaphysics, which is to frame a tenable, consistent, and satisfying theory of reality.

But how many, and precisely what, are those forms of human cognition, of man's way of knowing all things and all selves as real, which deserve to be classed among the categories? In his investigations into the nature of human thought, of argument, and of proof, Aristotle, the founder of logic in its Occidental development, constructed an elaborate doctrine of concepts. The fixing of concepts or definition (*ὁρισμός*), he held, rests in part on direct knowledge, which must be emphasized by induction (so Zeller). In order to attain a correct

and exhaustive conception of any generic object,—the definition of a class,—the mind must proceed logically. Since there are various points of view from which things may be contemplated, and since there is no one concept which comprehends all things under one head, it is necessary to discover the “main classes of assertions” which men, *knowingly*, make about things. Aristotle, in the passage where he gives the most definite treatment to the determining of these “assertive conceptions,” the so-called “categories” (*Katgoriai*), enumerates ten. They are the following: Substance, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, place, possession, activity, passivity. “He is,” says Zeller, “convinced of the completeness of this scheme, but no definite principle is to be found for its origin.” It is the categories, however, which form the subject for investigation in the “first philosophy,” or metaphysics, of Aristotle.

In other enumerations of the fundamental forms of all human conceiving of things, the great Greek thinker does not adhere strictly to this list of ten. It is evident to the most superficial criticism that these ten are not by any means all of the same rank; neither have they all the same value, whether for a theory of knowledge, or for a metaphysics which shall be a tenable theory of reality. The first four are the more important; among them the category of Substance stands primary and supreme. For in it is concealed the mystery of existence,—as has already been discovered by an analysis of the terms under which every real Thing is known. To be “substantial” and to be *real* are, in popular language, the same.

To the excessive zeal for a four-sided regularity, which amounted to a delusive “pedagogical primness,” of Kant, the looseness and vacillation of Aristotle with regard to the number and significance of the categories, seemed intolerable. In making out his own list, however, Kant adhered in the main to the divisions of the Aristotelian doctrine of the judgment. Only he added two more to the Aristotelian catalogue of the necessary forms of judging faculty. Thus he thought he had

secured a demonstrable list of the universal and external forms of the functioning of all human judgment in objective cognition. A table; four classes; three in a class; three times four, *i. e.*, twelve, and no more or less,—such in number are the Kantian categories.

It is not necessary to follow the discussion of this subject between Aristotle and Kant, or between Kant and the most recent contribution to its settlement, in order to show how uncertain are both the method of *a priori* demonstration in dependence on an abstract logical scheme, and also the method of a sort of off-hand picking-up of the categories. The difficulty accompanying either of these methods—or, indeed, the use of any method—for the construction of a complete list of the categories, is chiefly due to these two facts of man's experience with them. And, first, however we may wish to define their essential nature we can neither assign to them all the same rank nor the same essential significance for the growth of human knowledge. We cannot prevent their overlapping and mixing up, as it were, one with another. When the effort is made to harmonize them, by bringing them under the terms of any abstract principle, the effort seems to add to this confusion; although every concrete existence is, essentially considered, a harmonious realization of them all. For example, the category of relation appears to dominate, or mix in with, all the others. Spaces, times, qualities, quantities, notions and all kinds of changes, forces, forms, and laws—all are related in manifold ways. Only by the actualization of these relations is the World made One, out of an infinity of related beings, conditions, and activities. If it is held that the mystery of real being is concealed in the word Substance, or that the essence of every Thing consists in its being a Cause, it is necessary to add that qualities are known only as related to substances, and causes only as related, on the one hand, to their causes, and, on the other, to their effects. Even relations may be related. Indeed, the whole world is known to science and to ordinary

experience as made up of real beings, composed of related elements, and always in relation, as wholes, to other real beings. In saying this we are not indulging ourselves in abstractions of an amusing or startling character and calculated to increase the popular disgust with metaphysics; we are trying to express in the language of every-day life what every "plain man" knows to be true of every thing of which he has daily experience.

A second difficulty arises, whenever the attempt is made to enumerate and describe the categories, from the nature of the relation which they sustain to human experience. This relation is such that in the very effort to think about them clearly,—not to say describe them in detail or define them with commendable brevity and accuracy,—the conception of each one seems to involve at once many, if not all of the others. Indeed, this belongs to their very nature as categories, and to the normal relation which they all sustain to experience. If it were possible to isolate any one of these forms of cognition, or to reduce it to some other form, then it would properly lose its place altogether among the so-called categories. If time and its relations, for example, could be reduced to space and its relations, then the one of the two which submitted to this reduction, would drop out of the list of the absolutely necessary forms of the cognition of things. If all relations were those of quality, and there were no relations of number, then, of course, there could be no reality to which mathematics could be applied. Or, the rather—to turn the statement about—then there would be no mathematics, because there would be no things to measure and enumerate,—in fact, no things at all.

From this it follows that none of the categories can be dispensed with in any attempt to describe what his experience reveals to man with regard to the essential nature of every concrete reality. But the fact that the validity of these forms of knowledge is assumed, or presupposed, as of necessity in every cognitive experience does not contradict the other truth of

fact, that they are also all illustrated and confirmed by the growth of knowledge. With the growth of knowledge, in the individual and in the race, comes an increasing clearness and an enlarging confidence in the validity, for reality, of the human way of knowing the world. And here is the supreme example of the truth that man knows the real world—*that* it is, and *what* it is—not by sitting apart from it and reflecting (if, indeed, such a thing were possible), but by living in the midst of it and by actual dealings with its concrete realities. For the growth of knowledge is like that of a tree in a soil which is enriched not only by the gifts of the surrounding earth and the over-arching heavens, but even by its own foliage and dead branches.

The further work of metaphysical philosophy with the so-called categories should consist in the effort to interpret their significance with a view to establishing a theory as to the essential nature of all that is called Real;—or, in other words, an attempt to understand the Being of the World as it is manifest to the human mind through its growing knowledge of the nature and relations of the concrete realities of this One World. Here, in this problem, as in all of its problems, philosophy strives by reflective thinking to rise to the Universal from firm points of standing in the fields of the particular sciences.

If now speculation keeps close to the truths of human experience with concrete real existences, it may make three preliminary observations of a metaphysical character.¹

The, as yet, imperfect analysis of the categories, considered as those fundamental and irreducible forms of knowledge under which all men recognize the nature of concrete realities—real selves and real things—establishes these truths of universal experience. First: “Reality is always, primarily con-

¹ The next following pages, when quoted, are from the author's “A Theory of Reality” (Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1899), where a detailed treatment of the categories is given, pp. 57-393.

sidered, a datum of fact; it is, first of all, that which is known as *being in* sense-perception or self-consciousness." In every single cognitive experience of every human being, reality is a *datum*, is given, is there; and it is present with all that force to compel conviction which the satisfactions of the intellect and the exigencies of the practical life demand. From this immediate datum of experience, all our reasoned knowledge about things, remote in time and space, issues forth; and to it, for the testing of its validity, it is ever compelled to return again. Second: "Reality is always an actor or agent. Dead and do-less things are not real. We may, indeed, make a sort of abstraction, of all particular, conceivable forms of acting and doing, and may then try in imagination to convert this bare potentiality into a real existence. But this very potentiality itself is like a slumbering lion—acting in dream-life, and ready, at the first prick of the stimulus, to leap forth in the full strength of its awakening. It is the half-consciousness of this truth which makes much of the physics of the day so obscure and provoking, and yet so tenacious in its conception of 'potential energy.' And is not chemistry virtually compelled—and biology as well—to pack the atoms full of sometimes latent and sometimes active potencies? But what are masses, molecules, atoms, ions, electrons, *in reality*, when they have wholly ceased to be actors or agents; when in respect of the entire sum of all their qualities and changing relations, they are *merely* potential? Just nothing at all." Really to be in space, to have energy of position, or as it is significantly said, "to occupy space," they must continue to be self-existent causes, or centres of force, manifoldly related in an active manner, with other self-existent causes, or centres of force. But, third: "Reality is always connection according to some law." And in order to constitute a valid claim to be real, this connection cannot be one of thoughts, or ideas only; it must be a connection established in fact,—a connection, recognized indeed, or reasoned out, by the mind in

terms of order and so-called law, but a connection immanent in, or actually existent between, the things themselves.

If now, in view of these truths of fact, the question is raised, how they are made possible and made full of meaning, some additional clue may be obtained to a tenable and illuminating theory of reality. Let us in a more general and of necessity somewhat more abstract way, endeavor to realize what is implied in this "harmonizing of the categories" by every concrete real existence. We may then, perhaps, hope to approach more confidently the ultimate metaphysical problem: How shall the Being of the World, be interpreted in the large;—and in such manner as to justify the growth of that knowledge of the race which affirms it to be an intelligible and orderly system of real existences—of selves and of things?

The plain man, the man of science, the reflective thinker,—all believe in some kind of a real world. Something is real; such is the metaphysical datum which all knowers, from every point of view, accept as given in an irresistible way, in every cognitive experience. By the growth of ordinary experience, but much more richly and convincingly by the development of the particular sciences, a kind of ideal unity, a oneness of order and law, is ascribed to this "Something-that-is-real." All individual selves and things are known the better, the more knowledge grows, as actually existing in, and as contributing to, the reality of this One World. Let this larger and comprehensive Something be called by the term, "Being of the World." It is a vague term, designedly vague. Therefore, metaphysics desires to do something more toward clearing-up and interpreting its original vagueness. In this effort, which is commendable whether it can be made successful or not, let a return be made again to the point of view from which it became necessary to notice the particularity, the difference in values, and yet the necessary nature and harmony of all the so-called categories.

"The truth may be enforced by taking as a point of start-

ing any one of the so-called categories: Being in Space shall we say? But by being in space—*really* and not merely in imagination—we must understand some particular Thing occupying some particular portion of space. For it is not space as a mere abstraction, which is to be considered, but space as a form of knowledge,—that is, space as it is known, in application to real things. But nothing can be known, or thought of, as really in space, which does not define itself as ‘here’ rather than ‘there.’ Its being at all in space, as all real things actually are, involves its particularity; to be nowhere in particular in space, but everywhere in general, or to be all over space, is to be unknowable and unthinkable in terms of this category (The conception of ether as a *continuum* filling all space is not in the least exempted from this same necessity of its being known at all). But this particularity which every real Thing has, as a ‘being in space,’ involves its relation to other beings that are also in space.”

To be a particular Thing related to other real beings in space, implies the possibility of movement, of changes in this spatial relation; and so of measurable changes in the size and distances of particular things. Thus the path which lies open between the categories leads at once from the thought of being related in space to the thought of change. And a particular, recognizable set of qualities is necessary in order that any thing may be known as the same real Thing, although it has moved and so changed its position and relations in space. All that identification of realities, personal and impersonal, which makes not only science possible but any real living practicable, depends upon some at least relatively permanent possession of a set, or complex of qualities, in which the particular character of every real being is defined and conserved. If every thing changed indefinitely, not only science, but business and society would be impossible. But as to the extent to which the changes of position, relations in space, measurable spatial qualities, and other qualities, can take place, and yet the particular

Thing or individual Self maintain its claim to a real existence, there is no test possible except that of experience. And this test in most cases of the different classes of things is the test of practical expediency. The same remark applies to the grouping, or aspects, of the particular Thing which affords the means for both practical and scientific identification. For the mathematician or the tradesman, the categories of quality and number are most impressive. For the student of physics and chemistry, for the machinist and manufacturer, the same categories with the added conceptions of causation and force.

The way in which every particular thing attempts to maintain its real existence in a world of particular things by manifesting the peculiar complex of qualities and forces which enable men to identify it, leads the thought irresistibly to the actuality of order and law, as immanent in the Being of the World. No particular thing succeeds forever in accomplishing this task. It maintains its particular existence in reality, only for a time, and for that time only fitfully and irregularly. The conception of the older chemistry and physics was that of an indestructible and eternally unchangeable atom, out of the combination of which destructible and changeable particular things were constantly being made. Even atoms are now thought of as arising and passing away. But to preserve the Being of the World from collapsing in ruin, or from relapsing into chaos, the changes in relations, quantities, and qualities, of the particular things must observe some order, must conform to some law. This is as true of the explosions of masses of dynamite, or of the earthquake that wrecks Messina, as it is of the movements of the planets in the solar system, or of the combinations and separations of oxygen and hydrogen in the making and dissipation of a few drops of water. But it has already been seen, in the attempt to expose the meaning of the logical principle of identity and non-contradiction, when applied to the knowledge of real Things: A *may* change into A^1 , A^2 , A^3 . . . A^n ; but it *must not* change into B^1 , B^2 ,

B³ . . . *Bⁿ*. And yet for all particular things,—we repeat—only experience can determine the precise character of the series of changes through which any particular Thing may run. The complex of so-called laws which regulate these series we, in our ignorance, call the “nature” of the thing.

The Being of the World, then, so far as it can be comprehended in its totality, is a system of particular beings each one of which gets its reality in the system, under limitations of time and space, by a sort of participation in the categories. It is a *particular* real, by virtue of its being one among the infinite number of realities which come into existence, and pass out of existence, within the Unity of the One World. To turn this statement about: The Unity which a systematic metaphysics discovers in Reality is, so to speak, the *bond* which brings all the particular concrete realities into an orderly and law-abiding system. And now the inquiry would seem to be: What is the nature of such a bond as is competent to secure the unity that we know belongs to the one real world of human experience?

The application of such words as Bond, Connection, System, Unity,—all of which involve ideals of order and law,—to the entire collection of particular real beings, both selves and things, suggests a further advance in the problem of metaphysics. For these words imply that all these particular real beings which constitute the individuals for this Universal, whatever be their natures, somehow actively co-operate in that larger Nature which includes them all, and which must be attributed to the Being of the World. Some Force, or Causative Influence, unifies and systematizes the particular beings; and to unify or systematize is to connect together under the terms of some Idea. Now it is true that all the achievements of the particular sciences, since man began to observe, to experiment, and to think, have by no means mastered the intricacies or disclosed the mysteries of this system of real beings. It is even true that individual beings and single events—however numer-

ous or frequently repeated those beings and events may be—still resist explanation in terms that apply to the system in general. To speak in abstract terms, these realities appear thus far to refuse to conform to the ideals which science believes it has acquired the right to apply to the world as a whole. Their natures run, in some respects at least, contrary to Nature in the large. On the other hand, it is only as they are connected with or bound to other realities, of whose law-abiding natures man has some assured knowledge, that these beings of "the contrary mind," these events which constitute exceptions to the known order and the accepted laws of their fellow beings, can become known to man at all. Without conforming to the laws of light, they could not be known to man by sight; without conforming to the principle of gravitation, their weight could not be measured or calculated, etc., etc. And without being possessed of all the categories, they could not be known, or imagined, or thought about, as real. It is also a most significant fact of the historical development of all the sciences that they grow chiefly by noting, accepting, and explaining the apparent exceptions to those previously existing conceptions, hypotheses, and accepted laws. Thus a system of knowledges that corresponds better to the system of realities is obtained. But more and more tenaciously does the human mind, not only entertain as a pleasing conceit but insist upon as a presupposition supported ever more confidently by the growth of experience, the conception of an infinite number of particular beings somehow connected into the Unity of One World. And no more senseless trifling with the most assured results of human experience is possible than is involved in the attempt to minimize the content, and deprecate the value, of this conception of the World's Unity. Scientifically and philosophically considered, a "pluralistic universe" is an absurdity.

Among the categories there are three which are involved in the most important ways in man's expanding conception of the Being of the World. These are the categories of Relation,

Causation, and Law. As an infinity of agents, or real causes, actually related, under effectual ideas, or laws, the world-system of things and selves is constituted. Particular realities that are *agents*, or *causes, related*, not merely subjectively, or in man's processes of thinking, but *actually*, according to ideas that are *effectual*,—such are the prime conditions of the environment of which human beings are a part. As realizing to the full these conditions, the Universe is known to the mind of man.

What, then, is it "to be really related"? Of all metaphysical inquiries, this is in some respects the most quizzical and the most puzzling. The saying which has been attributed to different authors in philosophy is indeed not without significance: "Relation is the mother of all the categories." Manifestly we cannot hope to define, or even to describe this conception which underlies all knowledge, without making use of it in a form already sufficiently clear. For all definition and description are stated in judgments; and all judgments are achievements of relating faculty. From the subjective point of view, then, since all knowledge involves judgment, and all judging is relating, there can be no object of knowledge which is not related—both to the knower and to other objects. But it is not with the theory of judgment or of knowledge that we are now concerned. Theories of knowledge which would cut knowledge off from reality, or reduce the categories to merely subjective forms, have already been finally rejected. They cannot be taken back into our confidence. And to admit the subjective origin of the category of relation does not explain satisfactorily its title to be called "the mother of all the categories."

The metaphysical formula, or ontological doctrine, which corresponds to what has already been said concerning the subjective origin of relation, may be stated as follows: All things are known to be actually related. Real things stand to one another in actual relations, and not merely in relations of

thought culminating in judgment. These actual relations are of two sorts; relations to the knower as objects of knowledge, and relations to one another as existent together in the space and time of the One World. As to the actuality of one of these two sorts of relations, it would seem that no scepticism could be complete. That the object is actually related to the subject, in every completed act of knowledge, it is impossible to deny. The actualizing of this relation is the fact of knowledge itself. If, however, the actuality of this relation, and the real nature of the two beings thus related, is confined to the time and the content of the bare fact of knowledge,—as the extreme theory of subjectivism would have us believe,—then knowledge is not only vitiated at the start, but is rendered void of truth and absurd. Then there is no real science; then there are no foundations for the ethical and social order. For science, and morality, and the social order, require the actual existence of other selves, with whom the individual *Ego* may come into intellectual, ethical, and social relations. When this requirement is once admitted; then actually existent relations between real beings are also admitted. And if the distinction between truth and error be held vital in the commerce between different intellects; then the distinction between merely subjective relations and actual relations becomes a matter of fact. That is to say, it has become matter of fact that the intellect of *A* either does, or does not, relate *B* and *C* to itself, and to each other, as *A*, *B* and *C* are actually related.

Nor can the claims of this distinction (*i. e.*, between merely subjective relations and the actual relations of real beings) be arrested at the present point. For if knowers were, by their knowing activity to create all actual relations, and if things were not themselves actually related; then these knowers would belong to a world entirely apart from the world of things. Reality must, therefore, be conceived of as actually a system of relations. And all attempts to sink the actuality of the relations in an abstract conception of some unrelated, and

therefore, unknown and unknowable Being of the World, work the same destruction to man's knowledge as that which is wrought by a thorough-going subjectivism. To this thought there will be need to return when considering the use which philosophy has often made of such conceptions as are hidden in the terms: "The Absolute," "The World-Ground," "The Unknowable," etc.

In the system, or unity of the world, things are therefore really related, and not merely related by human imagination of them, or thought about them. The World is *known*—not merely imagined or thought about,—as a system of real beings, actually related. In other words, "It" is known as self-related and not merely as having its relations forced upon it by man. This is not very far from saying that really to be related is really to be as I know myself to be—a systematic and unitary thought-being. Or, to go still further and say: A System of Relations, conceived of as a totality and complete in itself, can only be actualized in terms of a Self. To this conclusion, at least in a tentative and anticipatory way, we have argued ourselves into assent, somewhat as follows: "The entire collection of concrete real beings—things and selves, actually known or only ideally conceivable—is known or conceived of as *inter*-related. Only thus can any one of these real beings be known; only thus can the collection be conceived of as a system, as constituting One World. What now must this category (namely, that of 'Relation') mean, when we yield to the compulsion which the inherent constitution of all human knowledge imposes upon us, and apply it to the collection of beings—to the One World. Nothing different from what we have already found it to mean. For the categories are not to be threatened or coaxed. They do not change their nature, when applied to the Nature of the World—not even if these words be spelled with capital letters. Neither do they bow to the demands of the mind that aspires altogether to escape their limitations, and begins to talk of 'the Absolute,'

or of God, in terms to which these limitations necessarily apply. On the one hand, then, we are justified in affirming the Self-like character of the conception which we apply to that Being of the World, in which they all 'live and move and have their being.'"

Man's point of view from which to know each concrete being as related to others, and as well from which to construct a theory of reality that shall be statable in terms of knowledge is, of course, "anthropomorphic." From this point of view of the Self, the entire System of Relations must be regarded as having a Unity analogous to that which the Self knows itself to have; all relations appear as alike interior to the System and yet as actualized by the related members of the System. But, on the other hand, this Self-like Being of the World as a System of Actualized Relations is not a *mere* ideal; much less is it an unauthorized and unintelligible conceit. For an actual system of relations, such as constitute the Unity of the World, can only exist within such a Reality as combines all the powers of an active intelligence, and is thus a living and unifying rational Will. This, essentially considered, is what we know a Self really to be.

In saying this we have doubtless overstepped our data, so far as they exist in the bare "brute fact" that the real things of the world are known to man only as actually related within the system of relations which he finds by experience to obtain everywhere. This over-stepping is in part, however, due to the very nature of the category of relation itself. Or rather, it is due to the truth that the world's system of related beings cannot be known as a mere system of relations. We say, "cannot be *known*,"—however it might be imagined or thought. It is true that I am at liberty, if I pay no regard to the real facts and actual events of which the race is having a continual experience, to imagine a quite different system of relations from that which exists in this world of ours. I can break the bond which Reality has imposed upon the different members

of the really existent system, and can substitute for it some bond which shall be only my own idea of how things might be, or my own ideal of how things ought to be, in order to make a better world than that which actually exists. This wilful effort of mine could doubtless set into space, and construct as co-existent or sequent in time, a very different from the real collection of material masses and of self-conscious selves. Go to, now: The solar system shall be built "on the square"; its bodies shall no longer be planets, for they shall not wander by elliptical orbits in space; and thinking souls shall not be encumbered with bodies, but shall fly among the spheres with inconceivable velocity and subsist on the violet rays. Perhaps, I may be able to construct a system of perfectly statical relations in space, and of unchangeable relations in time,—although this would certainly be more difficult. In the latter case, however, my imagined world would be a dead world, and in fact no real world at all; and in the former case, it would be not wholly dead and lacking any principle of motion, change, or life, but largely if not wholly unlike our known real world.

Again the mystery of real existence comes to the front and demands renewed attention. Particular things cannot be real—we found reason for saying in another place (see p. 170)—unless they are causes, centers of forces expressing themselves according to what is called the nature of the particular Thing. And now there appears reason for saying that these particular things cannot be united into a system unless some adequate Cause, or forceful Center of compulsion for their ever-changing mutual relations, can be found. Causal Unity, a unifying Force, is, therefore, a necessary demand for the realization of a World-System. Merely imagining, or planning, by an infinitely wise mind would never result in an infinite number of real things uniting to make One World.

"It is not possible longer to suppress a momentous truth which lies just below the surface of all the more superficial of

the categories; and which has been slumbering in the very bosom of the mother of them all,—the category of relation. The truth appears the moment that an endeavor is made to apply this category to the exigencies of a desire to account for the observed unity in the scheme of things. The particular sciences help themselves out by explaining the partial unifications which they discover, through attributing them to some one kind of Force.¹ There is, for example, the force of gravity, the force of electricity, the force of light, etc. And the most magnificent and persistent efforts are also made to unify these different forces by bringing them into quantitative relations under the terms of a universal dynamics. What the physico-chemical sciences are trying to accomplish by the methods of observation and experiment, as is their right and their duty to do,—just that, the metaphysical theory of reality finds to be hinted at, if not fully disclosed, in the very attempt to apply these universal forms of human cognition to the Being of the World considered in its totality as a system of particular beings. Each one of these categories, and especially the mother of them all, has given token of the intimate presence of a yet more spiritual and profoundly influential conception." For example, it was found that Qualities are neither known nor conceivable apart from something that is said "to have" or "to exercise" the qualities; and this vague "something," when questioned, gave back an unmistakable echo of a conception of Force in reserve, as it were, within the very depths of every particular being. Again, when Becoming and the various forms of Change were considered, it appeared that some active principle must always control the becoming, and thus account for the origin and character of every particular change. This principle of "a control of change" hints at the same conception of force. Relations, to be sure, sometimes seem so

¹ Here, as throughout the discussions of the following chapters, this word is used in its more vague and metaphysical, rather than strictly scientific signification.

calm, statical, and impassive, that they at least would not suffer if all forms of the manifestation of force were removed from the world. But at once we are reminded that the mental act of establishing relations, whether by observation or by argument, is about the most energetic thing which a human will can accomplish. Forceful, pre-eminent, is the mind that seizes and works out the most complex and subtle relations amongst the "stuffs" of its sensuous experience. And some objective relations unmistakably demand force for their establishment and their continuance or their change. Such are all relations, for example, of tension, strain, attraction, repulsion, suspension, etc., in physics; and all the ideal relations of cause and effect, means and end, influencing and being influenced, in the social world. Moreover, since no actual relations are perfectly statical and unchanging, the presence of *force* must be recognized in the midst of them all.

Finally, the conception of a differentiating and unifying force seems necessary in order to complete the actualization of the categories of time and space. For no real Thing can be "in space" without "occupying space"; and nothing without energy in-itself, so to say, can occupy space. So, too, things do not follow each other "in time" as mere unconnected sequences. They are, on the contrary, connected together as causes and effects in the time-series: and were not this so, the momently past world would have no influence over the world of the present moment; and the momently present would have no influence over the world of to-morrow, or even of the next moment. Such, however, would be an imaginary, or merely logically connected world; it certainly would not be the One Real World, as man knows it actually to exist in the time-series of its manifold events.

Now, what has just been said amounts to committing metaphysics at once to a position, toward the attainment and firmer hold upon which, science has for centuries slowly been working its way. *A dynamical view must be substituted for a merely*

statical view of the Nature of Reality, of the Being of the World. For all the universal and necessary forms under which man knows the World show but the surface of its nature, until this truth is recognized: The Being of the World is a Unity of Force.

But the phrase "unity of force,"—as employed by many (notably, by Mr. Spencer)—has no assignable meaning until it is further interpreted in terms of a living experience. And psychology points unmistakably to its true and only meaning-full interpretation. The experience out of which the conception of Force arises is that which I have when I will to effect a change, and have my deed of will accompanied or followed by feelings of effort and resistance, the cause of which I, either by observance or inference, locate in something other than myself. In other words—to repeat a now familiar phrase—it is the experience of myself as Will, resisted by that which wills otherwise than I will. This experience, when reflected upon, inevitably leads to the conception of reality as dynamic, as being a cause; and it compels the mind to apply this conception to all forms of change in the real beings which are observed to be so related to each other that their changes in space and time are statable in terms of some mutually applicable formula. "Force is action regarded as the cause of a change in relations. The action of any particular being, when regarded as the cause of subsequent changes of relations, either internal or external to that being, is its exercise of 'force' so-called." And since the appropriate use of the word "will" makes it equivalent to the entire active aspect of the Self, so that we are justified in saying, "as a doer I am a Will"; if we wish to give a real meaning to the term "unity of force," we must substitute for it the living conception of a oneness of Will.

Indeed, there is no *real* unity to forces that are located in an indefinite or infinite number of particular beings. Such unity is a mere abstraction,—an agreement to consider as really

one a multitude of existences that are really many. Abstract force is no entity; wills are, on the contrary, the very essentials of reality. Force here and there, then and now, has no unitary Being; it cannot act as a cause to bring about a systematic disposition and behavior of the many particular beings which exist in the world. The real Cause of the observed system of things must be found in One Will.

But, furthermore, it is an orderly system of things for which some sort of account is needed. It is a world whose unity requires a relative, if not an absolute permanency of forms, a dependable sequence and connection of changes in space and time, and a law-abiding action of the many forces at work, for which a theory of reality is demanded. Man's knowledge of this world, as it is obtained through the achievements of the particular sciences, will not allow him to imagine forms and conjecture laws, and then force them in an arbitrary way, or in a purely logical way, upon the real, known system of things. For all these Things *actually have* forms; they *really act* in formative ways upon one another; they *do actually obey* laws. Now what does all this way of talking, together with the convictions and knowledges, which compel it and "back it up," signify for a true theory of reality? Philosophy wants an answer to this question. The problem of metaphysics in all its breadth and depth is now before us, as it has been greatnessened and emphasized by the positive sciences. Under the forces of gravity, adhesion and resistance, chemical attraction and repulsion, electricity, etc., the various kinds of massive bodies, molecules, and atoms, of the earth's substance have been formed; and the human mind may discover the uniform qualitative and quantitative relations and determining conditions, under which these various formative processes have taken place. By the action of these same forces, and perhaps of other forces which might properly be called vital, in conformity to the laws of heredity, natural selection, and the undeterminate factor of chance-variation, the different families, genera, and

species, of the animal and plant world, are continually being formed. Each individual, of any species, has its own peculiar form; and thus it is known as an individual as well as a member of a species. No Thing can be real, without form. No formed thing, or thing in the process of formation, can escape the "reign of law." The way it forms itself, and at the same time exercises a formative influence on other things, is determined by its so-called "nature." And here again the mind reaches the place where mystery of ultimate fact, and human ignorance of the cause of the unifying action of innumerable causes, limit even the attempt to conjecture, or theorize, in terms of knowledge. Our mental picture of the forms and laws which we attribute to things, considered as a *purely* mental picture, is certainly worthy to be called an idea. But we do not believe that this mental picture is merely our idea; or that it gives notice simply of the activities of an ideating faculty in us. We believe that the forms do actually belong to the real things. We believe that the laws faithfully represent—although only in a partial and one-sided way—the actual behavior in a system of inter-related causes, of these same real things. If we may not say that we *know* this to be true; then we may not say that we know anything of, or about, the things of our daily experience;—much less of, or about, the kind of a system of things in the midst of which, and according to the Nature of which, we may have any growth of knowledge at all.

For the individual Thing, this universal fact of knowledge—namely, that it is known only in terms of an idea—undoubtedly means to express the conviction that it is itself an ideated thing. And, indeed, it may be claimed with confidence that, unless things were in-themselves "minded," man could not mind things. True ideas of real things imply the immanence of ideas in things. In a more abstract and figurative way the same conviction may be expressed by saying: "The 'immanent idea' joins hands with 'immanent' force, to explain to the mind the inmost nature of that real Being to which they both

belong." And the word *immanent* seems appropriate, because, just as there is no actual force, that floats about in mid-air or moves as a kind of subtle entity off from one thing to get over on to another and different thing; so there is no idea actually attributable to any one thing that is not realized in the being and behavior of the thing. *In order to serve as an explanatory principle the idea must correspond to the essential nature of the reality.* And this is what science really means when it talks about the nature of things—individual, specific, generic, etc.

Even to speak of a "system" inevitably implies the convergence, the harmony, brought about by some central control, of many ideas under some ideal plan. Any system—such is the nature of man's mind, and such the nature of a system—must appear to him as the actualization of some one's ideas. And the more complicated with regard to the number and constitution of its members and the number and intricacy of its laws, any system appears to be; the more exacting and imperative, as well as difficult, is the demand which such system makes for an interpretation in terms of ideas. This is true even of such a system as is the real world which every plain man knows some little about, and of which he makes use to some good purpose in his practical life day by day. The most ignorant fellow knows something about the actual forms of real things and about the laws, or uniform modes of action and reaction, under which they are causally related. But the modern sciences, taken in good faith as to their proclamations of knowledge, disclose a Universe whose vastness of extent, infinity of forms, rapidity and extent of change, subtlety and magnitude of forces, and multitude of laws, exceed the utmost stretches of the imagination of previous generations of men. This Ideal these sciences present, as not merely an idea of the "scientists" themselves, but as verifiable knowledge of the constitution and behavior of the real Being of the World. It is the *Reality*, which metaphysical philosophy, as well as science and common-sense, would understand by the term Be-

ing of the World. It would seem, then, that the unity of force, or One Will, must also serve as the real *locus* for the ideas, or ideals, that are shaping and controlling that complex of particular beings which man knows as his world. Will and Idea must be joined in Reality. As Teichmüller, in his "Darwinism and Philosophy," says: "The interaction of all the elements presupposes laws which go beyond the existence of each separate element, and embrace all particular things in a unity. Whoever, therefore, assumes any laws of nature whatever, must also assume a system of laws, and must consequently refer to one ultimate unity or ultimate end." The same thing must also be said of those forms and laws under which specific kinds of things come into being, develope in manifold changing relations to one another, contribute their share to the existence and ongoing of the same system, and then pass out of existence leaving the unity of the system unimpaired and even enriched.

And now, gathering together the conclusions which seem suggested, if not forced upon the mind by an attempt to interpret the significance of the categories, we affirm: "All Reality *is*—as known to man or conceivable by man—a system of beings and processes co-operating in the realization of ideal ends." Man, indeed, knows only a small number of these beings, and knows only very imperfectly such as he knows, or knows about, in any degree. The ideas which things realize are always only partially, fitfully, and dimly represented, by human ideas. The Ideal of the World which its Unity of Force is actualizing, under the conditions of space and time, is even more imperfectly, fitfully, and dimly presented in terms of some human ideal. But thus to limit the knowledge of reality is not to discredit it completely; indeed, it is not at all to discredit it, as valid for the convictions of intellectual faith, for the growth of the sciences, and for the conduct of the practical life. Science does not simply imagine that its interpretations of the categories may be true for real-

ity; it knows that they are true. All knowledge assumes, and all the growth of knowledge confirms, this conviction. And when it is declared that ideas are "immanent" in reality, the adjective is used with neither a spatial nor a purely figurative meaning; it is only asserted that ideas are a necessary factor in the explanation of reality. "For Reality, in general, is known as actually being a Unity of Force guided by ideas of form and law into processes that conform to ideal ends."

CHAPTER X

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

THE general theory concerning the nature of that system of real beings which is known as The World, as this theory was proposed at the close of the last chapter, obviously stands in need of further elaboration, criticism, and defense. This need is chiefly due to the following three causes: First, the distinction which it is necessary to make between mere things and true selves; second, the apparent difference between the meanings of the various theories which the particular sciences propose, and a metaphysical theory with its attempt to elicit the true significance of them all; and third, the vague but influential and wide-spreading objection to any view of the nature of Reality which is liable to be taunted with the charge of anthropomorphism, and so deemed puerile and worthy of prompt rejection.

This last objection to the metaphysics of idealism may be most promptly and effectually disposed of. For one may ask, with an intention somewhat more than facetious: What kind of a theory that is other than anthropomorphic do you expect from a mind which belongs to the species called *anthropos*? Indeed, what sort of knowledge can a human being claim, that is not human knowledge? The swiftest greyhound cannot outrun his own shadow. The worst fool does not try to ascend higher on any tree by cutting off from that same tree the limb to which he is clinging. The navigator does not more surely reach his desired haven by throwing overboard charts, barometer, and compass, instead of consulting the first, observing the second, and making the needed corrections in the pointings of the third. But when the intrinsic absurdity of discrediting any theory on the ground of its

anthropomorphism *merely*, is pointed out, it is customary to turn the direction of the objection, by aiming it against metaphysics in general. And this, in these days, is chiefly done by those who would place science and metaphysics in positions of sharp contrast, not to say open opposition. This turn in the objection may be just as promptly and successfully met and answered. It is the true and verifiable appreciation of what the Being of the World is, and the more comprehensive and practically available knowledge of the nature, relations, changes, and developments and uses of the particular beings existent in the world, which both science and metaphysical philosophy are seeking. But science is as apt to go wrong and subsequently to find itself confuted, in respect to its statement of facts, its definitions of natures and laws, and its more general hypotheses and theories, as is philosophy. Moreover, just as a philosophy not well grounded in the particular sciences is airy and baseless, so a science without a metaphysics of its own is baseless and unsatisfying. Metaphysics is, if wise, then more or less scientific; science is, of necessity, more or less wisely metaphysical. Both are seeking truth; both are of course anthropomorphic, since they are both products of the mind of man.

We acknowledge, however, the right of all the particular sciences to demand of any theory of Reality, that it shall conform itself to the truth of those, their particular and partial theories of the different kinds and transactions of real things, which fall within their respective provinces. In saying this it is meant to place special emphasis upon the word, Truth. Nor is the word used with a sinister meaning, or in a captious spirit. For metaphysics, as a Theory of Reality, aims to accept all the established facts, laws, and theories, of the particular sciences, and by detecting and elucidating the universals which they enfold to arrive at a more nearly ultimate view of the Being of the World.¹

¹With regard to the present need of a philosophy of nature, I

In treating the categories hitherto, they have been for the most part considered as they apply to so-called Things. And, indeed, the very word Thing seems consecrated to this most general use. The Ego as a Self, or—to use for a moment the terms of religious homily—as an embodied spirit, is some sort of a thing. All other selves are known to it, both that they really are and what they really are, only through the appearance and behavior of things. Even the knowledge by self-consciousness of its most purely spiritual existence and activities seems always, when analyzed, to bear traces of affects that must be ascribed to the thing-like body it calls its own; self-knowledge rests upon an obvious basis in the sensuous impressions, and mental images of such impressions, which are unmistakably of a thing-like character.

On the other hand, this “diremptive process,” with its continuous development in both of its two aspects, which makes

quote in full a note from the author's *Philosophy of Knowledge* (Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1897), p. 372. “There are few more alluring and promising fields for a critical use of the reflective powers in which philosophy arises than those afforded just now by the physical and natural sciences. I have several times already expressed my conviction that these sciences are more than ever full to the brim, and ready to burst, with ontological conceptions and assumptions of most portentous dimensions and uncertain validity. Surely scepticism and agnosticism, now nearly sated with feeding upon the ancient body of alleged truths in ethics and religion, will soon turn their devouring maw upon the structure generated and nourished by the modern scientific spirit as dominant in chemico-physical and biological researches. And if the strength of their appetite and the vigor of their digestion remain unimpaired, must we not fear that even the bones of this structure will disappear from view?

“Consider, for example, what would be left of the hypothesis of biological evolution, if a thorough critical and sceptical treatment were given to its metaphysical basis. Surely the way in which many students of these sciences vacillate between the most comprehensive professions of knowledge as to what the world is, and how it came to be, and the most abject confessions of ignorance, is little better than scandalous.”

one know one's Self as different from, in some sort the opposite of, and often the antagonist of, all other things, whether thing-like selves or mere things to which are not accorded the privilege of being selves, is the most complete of separations, whether actual or imaginable. In terms of it the Self conceives of all particular beings. Nor is this a matter of choice or of convenience. It is, as has already been seen, enforced upon all the cognitive acts by the very terms under which they take place; that is, by the fact that the categories apply to them all. All the particularity that things have, all their separate being as possessed of qualities, as measurable and numerable, as moving or standing in relations, and when acting as causes upon each other, or belonging to different species and genera, involves and depends upon this distinction between the Self and all other realities.

It would seem fitting, therefore, that any further elaboration of a theory of reality should acknowledge the most important of all distinctions of a cognitive, and so, of a metaphysical sort. This is the distinction between Things and Selves—a distinction which has its origin in that developmental process by which every human being comes, more or less clearly, to know himself as in some sort apart from all other real beings, both selves and things. Stated in more general terms, this need forces a further division of metaphysics into a philosophy of nature and a philosophy of mind. For the same process of development which compels the recognition of an essential separation of each Self, carries every self-conscious mind still further. Parts of the body are obviously less interior and more separable than are other parts, from the essential conception of a Self. *They*, at least, are *mine*, and yet *not-me*. And the more the path of such reflections is followed, and the refinements of self-consciousness are secured and trusted, the more interior and more sharp does the separation become between what is of the very essence of the Self, and what can be more or less readily known, or at

least conceived of, as dispensable without impairment or destruction of the real Self. Thus all of the complex being of the individual man with which the physical and natural sciences have to do may come to be regarded as falling under the domain of *mere* things. Then, on the contrary, the pure philosophy of the Self becomes the philosophy purely, of the soul or the mind. Now whatever may be objected to the validity or the value of such an extreme of separation between the elements which undoubtedly commingle in all the experiences of every human being, there can be little doubt about the impropriety of making the theory of the human body a distinct branch of science, apart from the chemico-physical and biological sciences. The metaphysical conclusions warranted by this particular collection of atoms into an organic mass, are no whit different from those warranted by any other living body. My body is a part of nature; it is only temporarily loaned to me, as a spirit, even if I may maintain for myself a continued spiritual existence after the loan is withdrawn, or even in independence of the loan while I am still in the enjoyment of it.

It remains now only to explain that in this chapter the word Nature is used in a restricted signification. In the larger meaning of the word, Nature is the equivalent of the Being of the World, men and animals as having minds, as well as all things that are supposed to be without any minds of their own. We are going for the time being, however, to speak of the philosophy of nature as the metaphysics of things,—but more particularly, under the terms by which things are known to the physical and natural sciences.

It will readily be seen that the theory of reality justifies a certain kind of the personification of things. So far as things are known at all by selves, they must be known as sharing in those characteristics which selves know themselves actually to possess. So much of anthropomorphism is involved, of necessity, in the nature of things as known according to the nature

of the knower. It is not necessary to be always reminding ourselves that human knowledge is *human*; and, therefore, that it is finite in the sense of its being both imperfect and limited by the nature of human cognitive powers. Now, individual things are known to be self-like, in that they are causes of change, in themselves and in other things, under relations of space, time, etc., and in accordance with their proper forms and laws. Interpreted in terms of experience this means that their essence is to be wills expressive of ideas. But these individual things are only individual in that they are elements, or parts, of a vast system, which is known as some sort of a unity; and known only in so far as it is unified by the progress of experience, resulting in the growth of knowledge. Thus, the Being of the World is apprehended, and by the advance of the sciences, is more and more truly comprehended, in virtual terms of a Personal Life. Is such humanizing, or anthropomorphizing, of the world rational?

It is a well-known fact of human history that the personification of natural things and forces has gone on, in all the past and to an almost unlimited extent, in a quite uncritical way. Indeed, this tendency to interpret the existence and the behavior of things in terms of man's experience with himself has been the intellectual spring from which the various streams of religious belief have taken their rise. Invisible spirits, constructed by human imagination, have been assumed in order to account for the self-like appearance and behavior of sensible things. In so-called primitive and in savage peoples this tendency is peculiarly lively and effective, because it furnishes a ready-made, satisfactory explanation of experiences which otherwise could not be explained at all. The character and results, for the development both of science and of religion, which such anthropomorphic tendencies have had in the past, will be further remarked upon when we come to examine the origin of religion in man's experience with himself and with the world of things. In this connection it is

sufficient to point out that, while these childlike imaginings of primitive and savage men, have resulted in much superstition and error, and have served to create a complete jumble of ideas as to distinctions between the natural and the so-called supernatural, they have never by any means completely obscured what modern men call the natural or mechanical and more purely scientific or practical view of the nature, uses, and laws, of material things. Long after man had discovered fire, he cut down a tree and warmed himself by using part of it as fuel, while out of another intrinsically similar part he made himself a god; he worshipped the same divinity which he used to roast his food withal. He poisoned his spear or arrow in order to kill his foe, just as he propitiated the serpent in order not to be killed himself; there was something divine in the poison although it was available for practical uses. And when he worshipped the all-glorious Sun as the greatest of heavenly divinities, he none the less knew that it was some sort of a material body moving in space and furnishing him with cherishing or withering heat and light.

It is customary to look on the attitude of the modern, instructed mind, which is assumed toward the problem of the Being of the World, as very different, both in science and in religion, from that of the primitive or savage man. And in truth it is vastly changed and much for the better. The philosophy of religion now regards this Being as a Rational Will, or Active Reason, who is also entitled to be worshipped and obeyed as perfect Ethical Spirit. In the conception of its Unity, it agrees with the conclusions of the physical and natural sciences, by which religion has been greatly aided in arriving at and defending this conception. By the same sciences it has been forced, as well as helped, through the contest which has gone on between the rival (*sic*) claims of the natural and supernatural, to regard the Divine Being, whom faith worships as God, as manifested by his immanence in the

World. Whether he may also be known, or believed in, as perfect Ethical Spirit, is a question which it lies outside of the province of general metaphysics to determine, or even to discuss. On the other hand, the natural and physical sciences have more and more demonstrated, what they have with ever-increasing confidence assumed,—namely, a unity in reality, a systematic ordering in terms of forms, forces, laws, and the principle of evolution, for the observed varieties and complexities of the particular things. Undoubtedly, these sciences have continually outstripped their definite proofs, on a basis of observed facts. To state the case somewhat figuratively: Science knows the Being of the World as perpetually unifying itself by processes which overcome, and abolish or harmonize the seeming contradictions. Therefore, science is more and more ceasing to be disturbed, or hustled out of its convictions, that further research and increased growth of knowledge will continue to perfect,—no matter how much it modifies in details,—this rational faith in the unity of the world. Now in all this, as a true and consistent theory of metaphysics shows, science and religion are at one, so far as their respective faiths and knowledge go.

The modern physical and natural sciences have developed a vastly complex, intricate, and often essentially mysterious mechanism, by which they interpret the Being and the behavior of this one world. Forces, undreamed of and unimaginable in the light of previously known facts, are now being discovered and made to manifest themselves to the senses, in however partial and limited ways. Formerly unattainable regions of space are now revealed through the telescope, spectroscope, and improved photography. Elements, so minute that the atoms of chemistry seem gigantic in comparison, are found to be in ceaseless motion with a swiftness that puts to shame the most of the planets. The mysterious changes of the ovum, when impregnated by the protozoon, are displayed on microscope slides, although the causes of these changes are

scarcely less mysterious than of yore. But the general tendency of the aims and the claims of the modern science of things is unmistakable. It would substitute a mechanical explanation, a description of the actual changes which go on in the mechanism, for any attempt at a metaphysical theory. A metaphysical theory, on the contrary, desires to know the real nature of the Being of the World in terms of universal human experience; and these terms are always and inevitably terms that represent wills, active in the realization of ideas. In a word, metaphysics interprets mechanism in terms of personal experience.

The perfect propriety and boundless benefits of the scientific point of view and the scientific method, are not now in dispute. And if they were, no one should be swifter and more valiant in their defence than the inquirer after a tenable system of metaphysics, as a theory of reality. Only it must be definitely understood in what essential respects, if any, this theory is modified by the valid claims of the physical and natural sciences, in so far as these are applicable to philosophy. Many metaphysical fancies and superstitions as to the precise self-like nature of things, and of their behavior, have indeed been either totally disproved, or much modified by modern science. The phenomena are now to be arranged and conceived of in causal relations and as subjects for measurement and calculation; they are no longer imagined, or believed in, as under the control of separable and invisible spiritual agencies. It is just as true as it formerly was, however, and as it always will be, that all things are known only as they are the objects, or the implicate, of human experience; and that this experience, being the experience of a Self, is statable, whether its objects be Things or Selves, only in terms of that which is self-like. So far, then, as the nature of that which, so to say, accounts for the mechanism and which works the mechanism is concerned, modern science is as essentially anthropomorphic, and its findings are as truly a species of personi-

fication, as were the fancies and superstitions of the primitive man.

Let us now return to one of our earlier points of standing. Children and child-like men, individuals and races, make great use of conscious, spiritual operations in their attempts to understand their own environment and to adjust themselves to its changes. With them, ideas are forces; or rather, with them, the will to realize certain conscious purposes accounts for the observed facts of the changing relations of things and of selves. This insight into the nature of other realities they cannot attain, until they have had experience of themselves as ideating forces, or as wills realizing their own purposes in others than themselves. The things about whose self-like constitution such minds feel most confidence, and which they know in most perfect and trustworthy manner as capable of being appealed to by motives that are comprehensible, are, of course, in childhood, their playmates; and in adult life, their fellow men. But to the human child, the dog, the horse, the pet lamb, is scarcely less completely self-like, because of its giving abundant signs of a self-like existence substantially like its own. As knowledge grows, whether such knowledge as is called ordinary and merely practical, or such as is scientific and precise, doubt arises in the case of many individuals and species of things. The man no longer sits astride a hobby-horse and imagines it to be controlled in its behavior by a purposeful will of its own; but he cannot easily deny a large measure of such control to the favorite animal which he rides to hunt or fondles affectionately in the stable. And if he begins to reflect on the general problem, he is at a loss to know just where to set limits to his anthropomorphizing. How much of this being of an ideating will shall be attributed to the still lower, and the lowest, of the animals; how much, in moods of poetic sympathy with nature, to the woods, the fields, and the flowers that bloom in his garden?

Now science, instead of solving this difficulty, only increases

and complicates it. For the mechanism which science discovers in all the animal- and plant-world, and even in the very constitution and behavior of the atoms, is so much more wonderful and seemingly purposeful—however doubtful we may be about the number and ordering of the so-called purposes, or the precise *locus* to which we are to ascribe them,—that the simple child-like way of attributing souls to certain choice things only, appears to be an act of undiscriminating favoritism. On the other hand, science knows scarcely any better just where to stop, or precisely how to limit its theory of reality as a system of self-like beings than does the child, or the unscientific man. The student of nature sees, what the ordinary observer cannot see; he sees amebas, and bacteria, and white-blood corpuscles, and ova, and cilia, and single cells or groups of cells, in all forms of living tissue, behaving in a more or less self-like way. Nor can he arrest his suspicions of something immanent in the reality which, in some faint measure at least, corresponds to his own conscious life, when he minutely observes the behavior of the different beings belonging to the world of plants. For, in the first place, at the lower limits of the two so-called kingdoms, it is difficult, or impossible for him to tell, to which of the two certain species should be assigned. And, second, many of those species, about the plant-like nature of which there is no doubt, show clearer evidences of a soulful existence than do many forms, and these by no means the lowest, of animal life.

Whatever determination may be shown on the part of biological science to assume the entire burden of difficulty in dealing with so obscure a problem, physics and chemistry cannot wholly escape their share. For the masses, atoms, and ions, which these sciences either observe or imagine, are also self-like existences. One of the most distinguished of American astronomers said in print some years ago, that all the planets in the solar system always behaved "*as though they knew*"—each one—"how they ought to behave under all the

circumstances, and taking into the account their actual relations to all the others."

It appears, then, that all things are known to men as *more or less self-like*, in so far as they are known to men at all. But are we for this reason obliged to say that every single thing, inorganic as well as organic, massive as well as individual, really is a consciously ideating will? By no means necessarily so. Much less are we obliged to consider every Thing as a self-conscious, self-determining being—a sort of completed or fully developed Self. And here it is proper to interpose suggestions which will be reconsidered as established truths in the following chapter. No human Self is really such a being, except through a process of becoming, or self-evolution. *To be* really a Self, the individual must, partly, by action of its own, and by developing that mysterious gift which ignorance calls a nature, *achieve* self-hood. Further is it an undoubted psychological fact that all human beings are not, and never become, to the same degree, really true and developed selves. At the beginning of their existence, human offspring are, as yet, in no definable meaning of the words, real selves. But human offspring may, and under all normal conditions they do, actually develop more or less of self-hood. If one chooses to tolerate the terms of the scholastic metaphysics, one may say that all human beings are at birth only "potentially," and not actually, true selves. This pronouncement of epistemology and metaphysics—that all things are known to man only as they are more or less self-like—ought to be exceedingly satisfactory to modern biologists. It comes in very handy when describing the anthropoid (or man-like) apes, or whatever other animal may be conjectured to have been the nearest of kin (or most self-like) in man's ancestral lines.

Such a theory of reality, when applied to so-called material things, is customarily met by the physical and natural sciences with several objections. Part of these objections are well

taken; and some of them cannot be answered. But then there are objections to every conceivable theory of the Being of the World, at large; and evidently the large general ground for objections lies in the fact that man, with all the advances of modern science and gathering together, as best man may, the united experiences of the race, knows so very little and so dubiously about the world in which he lives. When, then, the positive sciences object to such a metaphysics on grounds of agnosticism one should be ready at once to assent; no one does know precisely *how* self-like is the real being of any individual thing. The human knower must know all he knows at all, in terms of his self-conscious experience. Does this experience permit him truly to know those other realities which he knows as his "fellow men"? We cannot doubt this; for here doubt would not only stultify reason but would undermine and destroy all the foundations of ethical, social, and civic life. How far does the same form of mental representation touching the nature of real things, apply to the horse and the dog, to the bird and the bee, to the amoeba and the bacterium, to the lily or the palm, to the planet, the atom, or the ion? Ah! who shall tell us, whether "plain man" or expert biologist; or perhaps, poet, as well as either of the other two? At any rate, whatever any one tells of truth will be couched in essentially the same terms of self-like existence.

The more serious of the objections to such a metaphysics of things as recognizes in all of them certain signs of a being revealed to man's cognitive activities, in terms of ideating wills, are chiefly the following three: First, the objection to any metaphysics as being quite beyond the range of human experience; second, the objection that the descriptive history of the mechanism of things is a sufficient exposition and explanation of the reality; and, third, a certain covert form of objection, which consists in using mere conceptions, and even mere words, as though they were real causes, and so sufficient principles of explanation. The answer to these three

classes of objections, however, does not need to be conducted in three parts. It will be enough to show that the metaphysics of the natural and physical sciences themselves is obliged to express itself in terms which either have no real meaning at all, beyond that of being convenient abstractions, or else which, virtually admit, if they do not positively argue for, essentially the same theory of reality as that which we are advocating. And this must, of course, be done in an irenic and not polemical way. For such a method of discussing common interests is imperatively demanded by those relations of friendship and mutual assistance which have been shown to exist between science and philosophy. In this spirit the philosopher may say to the man of science: "Come and let us reason together; possibly we may help each other to understand more clearly what is the more ultimate significance of that interpretation of the Nature of Things which we both find ourselves compelled to give."

Let it be repeated, then, that no fault is to be found with the physical and natural sciences because they make the assumptions and use the language of common-sense, or of a "non-self-critical" experience, in describing the world of things. This is their privilege. And unless science aims to be also consciously and learnedly metaphysical, this modest reserve is its duty. Indeed, in this way, just as the dramatist, the novelist, the painter, the sculptor, or any form of artist, contributes most, when he practices his art without attempt to be conscious of its full value for a valid theory of art; so it is with the expert student of any species of real things in respect to his contributions to general metaphysics as a theory of reality.

There are two classes of conceptions which modern science constantly uses in solving its problems and in presenting the terms of the solution when reached. One of these is set forth in some such term as "nature," whether applied to individual things, to species of things, or to the total collection of species

considered as a series of dependently related species, in time, and under the principle of evolution. The other conception is that of "mechanism," the elements and relations of which may be measured, numbered, and so combined under quantitative formulas, into some kind of a system. Let us now inquire into the meaning for metaphysics, as a theory of reality, of both these classes of conceptions.

What does science really intend to say, when it speaks of the *nature* of any Thing; or when it applies the term Nature (often written with a capital) to the total of known or imagined natural things? It means to designate that concealed part of the explanation of observed changes which cannot be ascribed to external beings, or to relations among external beings. In a word, the *nature* of any Thing, or System of Things is *internal*. Speaking figuratively, it belongs to the very self-hood of the thing; or, if one may make use of a much misused phrase, it is the "thing-in-itself." Yet, in order even to seem to complete its full complement of causes, science is absolutely compelled to make use of this conception, which, from the point of view of science only, always remains blind, tautological, empty for theory, and practically absurd. Let this sweeping charge be examined in any case where the conception is used to explain the behavior of particular things. Let it be supposed, for example, that both physics and chemistry are asked to tell what is all they know about the thing which appears to the senses, as water. Chemistry will demonstrate that its constitution is $H_2 O$,—that is, approximately, 2000 atoms of hydrogen gas combined with 1000 atoms of oxygen under certain conditions (or relations affecting both) of temperature, pressure, etc. Physics will recite in detail the immensely valuable and extensively applicable qualities of the compound, under variations of many specific kinds and extending to an indefinite number of individual things and species of things. But suppose that both these sciences are pressed for more ultimate answers. "What, now," the chemist

is asked, "*really* is this so-called hydrogen gas; and what *really* is its twin sister in the transaction, the so-called oxygen gas?" "Why do these two unite in just such, and no other, proportions to form the compound water?" And, "why has this compound such astonishingly different properties from those of which there is the slightest trace in either of the two elements which compose it?" The man of science, in his effort to describe the nature of these two gases, may enumerate some of the many different proportions in which each one of them unites with many different kinds of atoms, under many different terms of temperature, pressure, etc. Or, especially if he is enthusiastically committed to the newest physics, he may refer to it for a fuller explanation of the nature of the atoms. Then we shall hear yet more wonderful stories of recent discoveries as to what ions and electrons can do within the atom; of radio-active properties rather than atomic forces; and of, as yet, wholly unproved conjectures as to the number and geometrical arrangement within the atoms, of the yet more ultimate elements of the atomic elements themselves. But after all is said, the mind returns to the original inquiry, and presses it with even greater insistence and force: Why do all these beings, which are either observed or assumed really to exist, behave, under so many varied and changeable relations, as they actually do behave? To this question there is only one answer possible at the last; and this answer is a confession of the limit of knowledge, a confession as to ignorance of so much of the real causes as, after all, *resides in the things themselves*. We may imagine, then, this conversation to take place. Question: "Why do the things—masses or elements of masses—behave, in changing relations of time and space toward each other, as they in fact do behave?" Answer: "Because it is their nature to." Question: "What do you mean by this nature which causes them so to behave?" Answer: "The sum-total of what they actually do, so far as I cannot account for it by reciting their relations to other

things." But shall we not call this a kind of perpetual "whipping of the devil around the stump" of invincible ignorance? And is it not an ignorance which we cannot overcome, or lessen, by driving him the faster as Nature herself increases the size of the stump?

If, now, the physicist is asked to explain completely the constitution and behavior of the compound water (shall we say, "in-itself" considered?), he would not have the slightest advantage over the chemist, when questioned in similar manner. It is impossible to explain the entire nature, or complex of properties, of any material substance by analyzing it into the elements of which it is composed; or to account for all that it can do by enumerating and measuring its changes under an endless variety of different outside forces and changing relations. *It*, too, has a *being-in-itself*; *it* has a *nature of its own*; and yet science can only describe that nature by telling the story of what *it* does, of how *it* behaves, under the action of outside forces and amidst changing external relations.

What is true of any element, or any compound, of material reality, is true of every element and of every compound. But the illustrations of the general truth are particularly pertinent and instructive when we consider the explanations which biological science gives of organic beings and their evolution. Here reference may be made to the very terms, species, genera, etc., as well as to all the phrases thought to be explanatory of the reasons for the connections of species, for the changes of species, and for the general history of specific forms (such as heredity, variation, evolution, etc.). Part of these explanations—the larger part, if theory seems best to walk on all fours in that way—must undoubtedly be attributed to more or less appreciable and measurable relations to an environment of inorganic beings, and of various other organic beings, other species, in the "struggle for existence" so-called. But the complete explanation cannot be found in this way. The individuals of each species have a *being-in-themselves*; and what is

discovered as common to them all, in respect of constitution, behavior, method of development, etc., science is obliged to lump together in the same blind way and call it the "nature of the species." When this nature is seen manifesting itself in ways that indicate a most marvellous intelligence somewhere, but an intelligence which cannot be localized in the individual's "stream of consciousness"; then science begins to talk about instinct, or to use in explanation the yet blinder and more misleading conception of "unconscious intellect."

All the recent history of the biological sciences shows, by perpetually recurrent and unmistakable signs, the same necessity. Outside of the Thing-itself you cannot wholly explain the existence, or the behavior, or the development, of any real Thing. *The Thing-itself must count in the explanation.* No wonder, then, that the science of biology has reacted against the extremes of a school which regarded the influences of environment as constituting a sufficient hypothesis for the evolution of species. This hypothesis concealed its own insufficiency under terms for the meaning of which there was little or nothing but a confession of complete ignorance. Thus it forced upon itself the necessity of looking within the living creature, instead of without upon the environment, for additional means of explanation. But here is a field of research which is, although less extended in space, even more complex in character and difficult to subject to direct observation. Here are countless millions of living cells, each one of which sustains manifold relations of action and reaction, of changing conditions, to other cells; but each one of which has a specific nature of its own. And if science tries to explain all these, as developing under externally determining causes, from the germinal cell of the impregnated ovum, it has not solved the problem in any different way. Indeed, its solution seems to contradict from the first the most plainly observed facts. For each of the cells appears to have a nature of its own. Its very life consists in its being, in large measure, self-determining. But

if, on the contrary, science manages to regard them all as simply the products of the parent cell, determined by environment within the body to such a form of development, then, surely, it has packed away into this parent cell the marvel of an infinitely complicated being-in-itself. Indeed, in this way, the *ovum* becomes, of all things directly observable in the world of things, possessed of a nature most rich and wonderful. It can, not only make itself so behave; but it can also make other beings which behave like itself.

What need to pursue this enigma further, so far as the term "nature," or any similar term, is applied to individual things? The meaning of that, whose meaning is to science wholly unclear, because properly left uncriticized, is clear—if not by any means absolutely so, at least relatively—when translated into terms of metaphysics. Every real Thing is known as self-determining according to certain ideas. This assumption of a self-determination in accordance with specific ideas is the nature of the Thing. No explanation is complete without this assumption. To deny the assumption is to stultify all claim to explain by leaving out one-half of that appeal to reality which is necessary for any explanation.

To show the limits and the insufficiency of all mechanical theories of nature, in the small or in the large, is now a comparatively easy task. For the discussion of the term nature, as applied in the more restricted meaning, has prepared the way to an understanding of the real significance of the terms used to set forth the conception of mechanism. Mechanical theories may, however, be divided into two quite distinctly different classes. Of these, one may be called the merely mechanical, or the theories which aim to describe appearances without explicit interpretation of the categories; and the other, those mechanical theories which are consciously and intentionally metaphysical, that is, which are theories of reality. The former class, so far as they remain faithful to their true character, have only a historical or descriptive value. They

narrate the changes which are observed in space and time; but they make no other attempt to explain these changes than that which is involved in their observed sequences in space and time. For example, in the cases assumed above, the chemist measures the quantity of the gases, the degrees of temperature, changes in space, the sequences in time; he records them all with faithful accuracy; and he then makes up as complete a descriptive history of the entire transaction as he possibly can. The physicist treats the observed masses, or the ions and electrons, the numbers and motions in space and sequences in time, in similar fashion. He permits himself to fancy the beautiful geometrical forms in which these invisible elements may be imagined to arrange themselves, although their minuteness and the speed of their movements must be admitted to transcend all the limits of human vision. But neither chemist nor physicist can properly talk of forces of gravity, or even of strains, pressures, etc., and much less of forces of attraction or repulsion, as implying affinities between the atoms, or of radio-active forces as driving the ions, etc., without passing quite beyond the sphere of a merely phenomenal mechanism into the mysterious realm of invisible, ontological entities and causes. So also with the authority in biology, as respects his method of dealing with the wonders of the impregnated ovum. He may observe under the microscope the changes which actually take place in this ovum, and in its successors in space and time; he may give the history of them all, either in technical language or on an endless series of microscopic slides. But he has no right to speak of heredity, or variation, or natural selection, *as though* these terms covered mysterious forces which were the true but invisible causes of the phenomena. For this is to do something more than, and different from, the work of merely describing the mechanism; it is to import into the mechanism something which the senses cannot discover or verify, something from the categories, something that is metaphysical in its very nature.

And, indeed,—to speak plainly,—there is not, and there cannot be any merely mechanical theory of any natural thing, or event in nature. One of the most universal, *a priori* unwar-rantable, and yet marvellous and marvellously effective meta-physical assumptions, is involved in every mechanical the-ory, even when reduced to its lowest terms by the attempt to exclude the least semblance of an ontological character. This particular assumption is the measurableness of all mate-rial things. The plain man takes the application of his ideas of the relations of magnitude and number, to the explora-tion and the practical uses of Things, as a matter of course. The man of science boasts of mathematics—geometry, cal-culus, etc.—as the indispensable right arm of his investiga-tions and discoveries; and he feels that the latter are placed upon sure ground only after they have been reduced to the terms of mathematics. Biology envies physics and chemistry for its superior privileges in this line; and all the psychological sci-ences strive, although forever in vain, to place themselves by the aid of mathematics in the ranks of the so-called “exact sciences.” More and more, also, does the development of the sciences in their application of the principles of mathematics to the mastery of Nature in the large and heroic way, evince and illustrate the supreme ontological truth: The concrete realties which constitute the comprehensive Whole, do actually obey, in their constitution and in their behavior, the rational principles, or categories of number and quantity. As affect-ing this fact, it makes no difference whether one takes the ex-treme and mistaken theory of Kant as to the purely *a priori* origin of these principles, or adopts the views of the most ex-treme empiricism. The fact is the important thing. The World, as known to the particular sciences, is more or less per-fectly constructed according to certain ideal principles of num-ber and of geometrical relations in space, and of measurable and numerical relations in time. “Pure mathematics” is derived from man’s experiences with the mathematical nature

of the real World; and it is rendered *pure* by a process of abstraction which disregards all the other categories that furnish conditions for the various existences and relations of this real World.

And now when we pass to the conception of Nature, as this conception is applied to all the real things in their known or imagined relations, we feel at liberty to take full account of all the categories in order to get at the metaphysical significance of this term. Indeed, we are compelled to do this. A merely descriptive history of the mechanism of Nature, or a theory of the Being of the World that is merely mechanical, will not account for the totality for which man has experience. Such a history, when converted into a theory, really explains nothing whatever. For if by a "merely mechanical theory" be meant a theory which is wholly devoid of metaphysical assumptions, no such theory can either be framed or stated. This Nature, which includes within Itself, all the particular things, with their varied natures and manifold, changing relations, must itself be possessed of all the categories. Only in this way can it be known; only so far as it is known in this way, can it be explained. And since we are now using this term to cover the entire system of things, with their observed or inferred unity, it follows that Nature must be conceived of as having intelligibility; that is to say, it must be self-explanatory. *The Being of the World must include within itself all that is necessary to account for human knowledge, that the World is, and what It really is.*

Limits of space forbid the illustration of the principle just laid down for all the forms of knowledge in detail; we must be satisfied to discuss briefly two or three of the more important ones. This will suffice for our purpose the better, because considerations closely akin to those which are now about to be offered, have already been indicated more than once.

In the first place, Nature must be endowed with categories of Quality; and these must be of such sort as to account for

the innumerable special qualities of the infinite number of things which are included in Nature. It has just been seen that the thinnest, most meagre, mechanical theory employs with confidence in its mastery of natural objects, and in its whole theory of the Universe, the ideas and ideals of mathematics. But quantity and number can never give to the mind any satisfactory explanation of the qualities of things. One might know thoroughly, and reflect through all eternity upon, 2000 parts of H , and 1000 parts of O , and certain conditions of temperature, pressure, etc., and never arrive at the most distant glimpse of the peculiar nature, as defined to experience by its qualities, of H_2O . And so it is with every real Thing. To enumerate most exactly the number of its constituents, and to make the most accurate and beautiful geometrical arrangement of these constituents, is never the equivalent of knowing the kinds of ways in which the reality compounded of these constituents will affect the mind through the senses. In most cases, indeed, these computations have no conceivable necessary relation to the most obvious and important qualities of things. And where they do seem to afford some quantitative formula which may lay claim to a law, we can always press our questions backward until ignorance permits no reply to be made to it in the name of science. Why $a + b + c$, rather than $x + y + z$, should have such a color, or such a smell, or such a taste, may be answered in terms of number, in one sphere of reality; but the problem, when seemingly solved in terms of quantity, will surely recur in a yet more obscure and unmanageable form, in terms of quality.

The ultimate explanation, therefore, of all the qualities of things must be found in the kind of a being that Nature is. The Being of the World is the supreme qualifier, the lord and master who controls, and distributes, and gives and takes away, the qualities which make the natures of the particular Things.

One of the most surprising and fruitful of the efforts of modern science to escape from the thralls of a doubtful or

worn-out metaphysics, has been the way it has dealt with the category of Force. This category is most distinctly the out-growth of personal experience, and most inseparably connected with a consciously feeling-full experience. It is no wonder, then, that those who would find satisfaction in a mechanical view of the world which should completely dispense with the categories, desire to drop the word entirely out of their scientific vocabulary. And, indeed, there are certain valid reasons for the desire. The very clinging of the need of a dead or decaying metaphysics to its roots is one of these reasons. Science properly desires not to take sides in obscure metaphysical disputes, especially by way of incorporating any one side into the language which it is required to use for scientific purposes. Besides this, the variety of conditions, as to relations of time and space, and as to the effects measurably accomplished, under which Nature's forces manifest themselves, makes it more useful to substitute certain terms which definitely incorporate into themselves some of these conditions and effects. Force is an exceedingly vague and general term. It may be used with seeming propriety, of the masses of the heavenly bodies, of the nervous centers, and of collections of souls, dead or alive, in present or in historical social relations. It is an advantage, which metaphysics need not be asked to pardon, to ignore the category of force, and to employ such terms as energy, work, foot-pounds, or other terms of dynamical import.

At the same time it must not be forgotten that all these terms, and all similar terms, have no explanatory value at all, as applied to individual things or to the World as a whole, without the assumption that the experience from which the conception of force is derived, tells to man the truth about the nature of Reality. Only as it is filled full of forces, that are ceaselessly acting and reacting, and that thus become the true causes of all motions and of all other forms of change, does Nature have any semblance of reality. On other terms,

the connections of ideas in the most fanciful of dreams would be more real than are the connections of things in a Nature robbed of its forces.¹

"If now we analyze more carefully this dynamical conception of the world which modern physical science has adopted, it seems to involve the following particulars: (1) The world of things is known as having some sort of unity that is referable to the conception of Force; (2) this unity comprises, however, a vast number of particular beings that must be regarded as in possession of, or as centres of, definite and measurable amounts of this force; (3) these particular beings,—vehicles of energy, or centres of force,—as they change their relations to one another in space, or their internal condition (the relations of the molecules, or atoms, or ions, that compose them), must be thought of as increasing or diminishing in the amounts of work they are doing; (4) the change in the amounts of work done by these particular beings is to be regarded as caused by the redistribution of the One Force of the world; (5) all changes of relations and conditions, which take place through this ceaseless redistribution of the World's Force, are in accordance with certain ideal limitations (that is to say, they are not haphazard, but are according to laws); and, finally, (6) thus does the World acquire a Unity which is both dynamical and ideal, because it consists of a vast number of beings that are doing work upon one another, but in some fashion that has respect to a set of regulations and, it may be, to some common goal or end."

The denial of any one of these six assumptions would appear to mar and make less effective, as an explanatory principle, the scientific conception of a living and forceful Nature. The truth cannot be concealed that certain elements of this

¹ The fuller treatment of this category, as in use by modern science, is to be found in Chapter X. "Force and Causation" (A Theory of Reality, pp. 253-293), from which the quotations introduced here are taken.

conception are as ideal in character, and as figurative in their form of expression, as are the conceptions of myth and poetry when dealing with the same facts of experience. But science claims a peculiar value for its conception of Nature because it is based solely upon observed facts. Let us, then, ask again the often-repeated question: What are the real facts of actual human experience with that system of things which is called Nature, or the Universe, or the World? All that the senses assure us, is simply this: "(1) Material things are, in fact, constantly changing both their external relations to one another in space and also the internal relations of their constituent parts; (2) these changes are measurable and comparable for purposes of theoretical or practical convenience." Or, the general facts of human experience with things may be expressed as follows: "Of a number of physical beings, *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*, etc., existing together in time, their simultaneous or successive changes are observed to conform to some formula, such as $x=A \dots Y$; or x varies as \sqrt{y} . The cause of this uniform mutually dependent behavior of *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*, etc., is thus declared to be found in their common possession of one (or one kind of) so-called 'energy';—namely, *Eg* or *Eh* (energy due to gravitation, or energy that is called heat). And, next, the principle, or formula, is spoken of as the law of that particular kind of energy (the formula, *L*, which is the rule obeyed by the peculiar kind of energy, *Eg* or *Eh*)."

"But, further, it is learned by experience that when the memorable changes in the internal condition or external relations of *A* are increased or diminished by a certain number of units of the standard; these corresponding changes increase or diminish in the internal condition or external relations of *B*, —provided that *A* and *B* are in the proper relations and are the two bodies exclusively to be considered. What is true of *A* and *B*, is also true of *A* and *C*, of *B* and *C*, and of *A* and *D*, etc.; and so on, until all the beings concerned (*A*, *B*, *C*, *D*,*N*) are considered in all of their possible relations. Hence

the warrant for that figure of speech which regards *E* as a gross amount of an entity called ‘energy,’ that may be redistributed continually amongst *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*, etc., by being transmitted, or passed over, from one to another.”

When, then, such clear thinkers as Tait and Clerk-Maxwell assert that “energy has been shown to have as much claim to objective reality as Matter has,” (Tait); and yet, “energy we know only as that which, in all natural phenomena, is continually passing from one portion of matter to another” (Clerk-Maxwell), we must consider them as dealing in convenient figures of speech. The impossibility of any such actual transaction, however, follows from the very nature of force; and no meaning valid for reality can be given to any of the expressions that follow this figure of speech without referring back to the original experience to which the genesis of the entire conception of force has been traced. Out of the same unwillingness to recognize the full significance of the ideal elements and implications which, of necessity, determine the scientific conception of Nature, comes the demand for explanation of changes as due to “pressure” and “strain,” and the refusal to recognize the possibility of *actio in distans*. “There is,” says Professor Challis, “no other kind of force than pressure by contact of one body with another.” “Forces acting through void space are inconceivable, nay absurd,” says Du Bois-Reymond. As though, forsooth, the very conception of force were not thoroughly interior and metaphysical, and its action from, or distribution over, a space of the one-thousand millionth of an inch as unrepresentable by any sense, as from or over a thousand million miles!

Similar strictures must be applied to all scientific conceptions connected with the “storing of energy,” or doctrines of “strains” between or within the atoms, or of the “energy of position.” These conceptions, too, conceal immensely valuable and convenient figures of speech; and when stated in terms of mathematical formulas they are the indispensable means

for enlarging and enriching our scientific conception of Nature as some sort of a totality which requires a real Unity of Force.¹ But the meaning of all this for a Theory of Reality, statable in terms of human experience, gleams through the celebrated dictum of Newton: "Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws." And what is true of this particular force is true of all natural forces. If they all, whether by their co-operation or by their conflict, and whether in a longer or a briefer time, and whether

¹"To illustrate by a single example: Certain compounds of Nitrogen, Hydrogen, and Chlorine (as $N H_2 Cl$. and $N H Cl_2$), are explosives; while perhaps the most astonishingly explosive of all compounds is that of Nitrogen and Chlorine $N Cl_3$. Now Nitrogen and Hydrogen get along comfortably enough together, and so do Chlorine and Hydrogen; as in the case of $N H_3$ or $H Cl$ and other compounds of Chlorine,—all of which are eminently stable and 'safe.' But the discovery of the explosive character of $N Cl_3$ was so dangerous an affair that it quite wrecked the health of the chemist who made it, through the state of constant anxiety in which he was kept by his investigation. Now we do not give any adequate explanation of the tremendous energy displayed by $N Cl_3$ when we merely speak of it as 'stored' either in the N or in the Cl; or when we declare it to have been put into either of them by effecting this combination as $N Cl_3$. The ultimate fact appears to be simply this: somehow the natures of N and of Cl are such that when they are for the time being united, they easily part company, and develop in the act of parting and reunion an enormous amount of energy. This idea, or rational explanation of the complex resultant of the nature of N, of the nature of Cl, and of the natures of both in their relations to each other, and to the other elements with which they unite on leaving each other, is concealed by chemical science under the figurative expression,—'chemical affinities.' But 'affinities' are never mere forces. 'Affinities' is a word that stands for *forces that have preferences*. Affinities are exercised by beings that have, belonging to them, immanent ideas in control of the forces; and their ideas dictate to the forces the terms on which they shall do their specific amounts and kinds of work. Without all this equipment of 'immanent ideas,' the behavior of things, chemically considered, cannot be understood or explained."

within a limited space or throughout infinite space, succeed in realizing the unity of particular beings, which we call the One World; then they must all be particular forms of the One Force, and the laws they follow must be conceived of as really the ideas and ideals controlling this One Force.

In a word, the moment that the physical and natural sciences transgress the limits of a simple attempt to tell the bare history of the phenomena they observe, they become metaphysical. They become this when they apply mathematical ideas to Nature, in the large. They become this more abundantly when they find all the forces capable of being considered as somehow constituting a Unity of Force. They become this yet more abundantly, when they regard this One Force as capable of accounting for the ceaseless production and destruction, and the ceaseless changes in the natures and relations, under laws, of the infinite number of particular beings in this One World.

We conclude, then, that all the language which the modern physical and natural sciences employ to express and to develop the conception of Nature, in the large way, amounts to endowing the One World-Force with manifold controlling ideas. Some of these ideas we seem to ourselves clearly to discern, others dimly, and still others we can only conjecture; while about the deeper lying ideals which this World-Force may be realizing, there may remain overshadowing doubt, or impenetrable darkness. And now let us gather together the elements of this conception of a Cosmos, or natural World-Order, and try to express it in terms of personal experience. Viewed in its ontological aspect, all the growth of man's scientific discoveries reveals the Being of the World (the "Nature" which philosophy sometimes calls the "World-Ground") as a Unity of Force, that is constantly distributing itself amongst the different beings of the world so as to bestow upon them a temporary *quasi*-independence, while always keeping them in dependent inter-relations, for the realization of its own

immanent ideas. But this is to make Nature pre-eminently Self-like; it is *the* Nature which serves as the Ground of all the world's self-like things.

The modern theory of Evolution, as it is introduced into every form of the sciences, both physical and psychological, and into the metaphysics, which they all both assume and support, does not lessen but greatly increases the strength of the evidence for such a theory of reality. Evolution, as a merely descriptive history, a purely mechanical theory of what may be conceived of as happenings in millions of æons of time past, has only the value of a logically consistent dream. But if it is to serve as an explanation of a real World, with its actual events and eventful and ceaseless changes, evolution must be both dynamical and teleological. That is, it must assume the co-operative working of vast and complicated forces, in boundless spaces and through infinite stretches of time, in accordance with immanent ideas, and for the actualizing of immanent ideals. To the consideration of the extent and value of the conceptions of plan and final purpose, etc.—the teleology—which the doctrine of evolution involves, we shall return again and again.

CHAPTER XI

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

THE process which consists in making distinctions, and which we have called "diremptive," does not stop when the Self is known by itself as apart from, and yet actively and passively related to, other selves and to things. In many of its aspects and relations, *this* Self is known as a thing like other things. It is not so much an embodied soul, as an en-souled body. But further distinctions inevitably take place which are interior to the complex nature of this thing-like Self. Some parts of the body—for example, parts of the limbs and trunk—are perceived by sight on the same terms as accompany the visual perception of all wholly external objects. At least, after a certain stage of mental development has been reached, considerable parts of the body may be lost without manifest impairment of the experiences essential to a Self. In rare cases, knowledge of any material thing through several of the most important of the senses has been from birth, or from early years, "quite shut out"; and yet a rich self-development has been achieved without their aid. In all cases, moreover, only certain parts of the bodily organism have any self-feeling localized in them; other parts are not known in any way by the individual knower as belonging to himself. This is pre-eminently true of just that portion of the organism—the central nervous system—which modern science knows to be most intimately and essentially related to all those conscious activities on which the very formation of self-hood depends.

It is, therefore, not only a matter of natural necessity but even of irresistible rational inference, that the "diremptive process" should end in somewhat sharply distinguishing between the body that is mine and my own true Self. To state the

truth in other terms: Certain experiences are inevitably and properly organized into a more refined conception of Self-hood such as expresses its true meaning and real nature;—while certain other experiences are regarded as more or less accidental and even entirely separable from the conception of Self-hood. It is a fact which belongs to the race's most ancient history and which is a matter of universal testimony, that men have conceived of the soul, or mind, as separable from its body, and even as able to continue its existence after the death of the body. Indeed, some of the chief difficulties with this doctrine which science and sound sense have to contend with, are found in the fact that primitive and unenlightened peoples cannot even tolerate the possibility of the soul's ceasing to exist at all.

Another preliminary consideration presents itself at this point. To this soul, or spirit, which may be regarded as disembodied, or at least as separable from its present organism and temporarily united with some other thing-like existence, the character of a substantial, or even a material entity, is readily given. The conception is hypostatized. To understand the term, "a soul," as a *mere* abstraction, and to attempt to cover all its experiences with the vague and empty words,—a "stream of consciousness"—is, indeed, for genuine scientific psychology, a complete failure and a patent folly. But to common-sense the same attempt is inconceivably absurd. It becomes, therefore, the most important task for a metaphysics which aims to construct a rational theory of reality on a basis of experience, to determine what kind of reality belongs to that part of the Self which is popularly called "mind," "spirit," or "soul."¹

As has already been intimated, neither the view which makes

¹ For the fuller discussion of this branch of metaphysics, see the author's *Philosophy of Mind* (Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1895) and various passages in "*Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*."

the mind an entity after the analogy of some material substance, nor that which resolves it into a mere abstraction, is true to the metaphysics of experience. There are two well-established truths which contradict both these views. These truths, considered both as a matter of inquiry and as systems of conclusions, are expressed by the words "dynamic" and "evolutionary." The mind, or soul, is known to itself, as every other reality is of necessity known, in terms of activity, as having form and being under law, and as subject to a process of development. Or to express the truth of experience in a more pronounced way: The Self, regarded from the interior point of view,—*i. e.*, in its real and essential nature, as mind, or soul—is a will that is realizing its own ideas in a course of self-development. Without this self-activity no real Self can exist; with its co-operation real Selfhood is achieved, more or less completely in time; for selfhood is not a ready-made gift of nature, but the resultant of a process, peculiar to itself, and which may properly be called a self-development.

When from the point of view assumed by psychological science the attempt is made to discover those forms of activity in which consists the essential nature of a Self, the first to appear is *self-consciousness*. But the awareness of one's being, and of being in such a state and in such relations to other beings, is no passive condition. The rather is it a peculiar expression of the will, with a content of feeling and ideation which is not only apprehended under terms of quality, quantity, and relation; but which is somehow *appropriated to the Self as its own experience*. What this self-appropriation, as experienced, actually is, can never be described in other terms than those which appeal to the same experience. To know what it really is to be self-conscious, one must actually have been repeatedly conscious of one's Self, as distinguished from other things and other selves. No mere logical description can make clear, apart from experience, the true nature of such an experience; and no logical juggling

with the abstract conception of self-consciousness can make other than it really is, the actual experience of being self-conscious. Finally, only by being self-conscious, as just that form of activity which it really is, can any being become a Self; and only as the characteristics of the higher forms of self-consciousness are more or less completely attained, can self-development be achieved.

But, strictly speaking, a single, complex activity, or state, of self-consciousness is only good for the knowledge that "I am"; and that "I am here-and-now" in such or such relations, and self-active in such or such particular ways. But reality requires some kind of continuity of existences. General metaphysics has already taught us that in order to be a real and self-identical *A*, the existence so designated must pass through a series of conditions or states which define its peculiar nature—such as *A₁*, *A₂*, *A₃*....*A..* This metaphysical truth applies to the Self in a very especial way; since its identity becomes in thought and imagination the type of all the self-sameness which is possessed by other selves and by self-like things. When, now, the ground is sought in experience, which affords to the Self this needed continuity, and which enables it to know that is indeed a real Self, it is found—although only partially—in the activity of memory. But the memory of a true Self is no mere repetition of resembling states in the so-called "stream of consciousness." Neither is it mere recollection; if by this be meant simply the recall into consciousness of ideas that serve for practical purposes as representatives of experience already had in past time. The memory of a true "mind" must be what has elsewhere (p. 90f.) been called "recognitive." Recognitive memory involves the knowledge that "I was," "then-and-there"; and the conviction that "I" who now remember was then the "I" who had the original experience. In a word, there is a confident appropriation of the two experiences, the original and the representative, to the same Subject, or Self.

But of all the countless thousands of experiences in past time, the active mind can bring into consciousness by cognitive memory only a small handful, grasped together as it were, at any one time. "One thing at a time," seems to be the sort of a rule under which it is placed when it strives to recall the past most clearly, completely, and intelligently. And whatever theories are entertained as to the indelible character of cognitive memory, on the one hand, or as to its dependence upon the integrity of the nervous areas and tracts of the central nervous system, on the other, the fact remains that the knowledge of one's being and doing as a Self, in the past, is exceedingly fitful and incomplete. In fact, it is true of the earlier years of this life, not only that I cannot remember, "I was a Self"; but it is also true that I was no real Self at that time. I was becoming a Self; and as in other similar matters of development, it is impossible to say just when this process of becoming was far enough along to justify a claim to have realized its end. When does the human child achieve a real self-hood? In most cases, perhaps in all, no observer can say; and science gives us no general rules which enable us to determine *a priori* all individual cases of development. A self-conscious existence, as established to itself by this kind of its own activity, must be symbolized in some such way as the following: $S_1 \dots S_5 \dots S_{50} \dots S_x \dots S_u$. Thus the reality of a Self, which is established solely by memory, whether of its own or of others,—parents, nurses, friends,—is that of a being which springs into existence for a moment, only to fall out of existence again for a much longer time. Such a view, however, destroys all the principle of continuity, as this principle is necessary to give any real identity or actual development, to the human mind.

It would seem, then, that something which abides must be interposed between the "I am," which self-consciousness can at any moment establish, and the "I was," which depends upon the fragmentary and fitful action of cognitive memory.

"I have meanwhile been"—expresses the knowledge which appears necessary to join these "moments" in the life of the Mind into such a compact whole as that they may amount to a knowledge of its real nature, actual development, and place in that Nature which is ascribed to the world as a whole. But how shall any one know that he, as an individual, has "meanwhile" existed—that is, throughout the time which has elapsed between all experiences which memory can recall? Self-consciousness cannot furnish this knowledge; memory cannot furnish it. Indeed, such is the very nature of memory that it could never complete even the picture of such an enduring mental existence. A memory of all memories, and so on to an infinity of states, which must be grasped together in one memory, would be needed for the fulfillment of such a demand as this. And, in truth, we only know our own existence, "all the meanwhile," in the same way in which we know the continued existence of all beings throughout longer or shorter times, and in different places as they are moved and located here and there. And this is by rational inference. Inasmuch, however, as we know ourselves with an immediacy and clearness which we cannot extend to other selves, and much less to other things, it seems even more absurd to suppose that the reality of the mind's life depends upon the memory of its individual experiences. The conviction which attaches itself to this sort of inference is intensified and confirmed by the growth of knowledge *about* ourselves. For it is found that numberless experiences, hitherto forgotten, are constantly being remembered; and some of these experiences, when remembered, are known as really occurring in the past time with all the strength of conviction which belongs to the most frequently repeated and well-assured memories. The testimony of others is added to that of our own mind; they can describe the signs which showed to them what was interior to ourselves, in terms which are at once recognized as true to the mind's actual life; and the same thing cannot be done for any other form of

life that is not of the same species. When a friend stirs up my slumbering memory, or clears up my disturbed memory, as to something which I thought, felt, or did, in the remote past, he furnishes me with an argument for my own existence in the meanwhile as the same mind, which is quite superior to any argument which men can give to each other to prove the continued existence of any self-same animal, or species, or inanimate thing. Moreover, I have constantly with me this resourceful major premise for all this kind of argument: "Is it likely that I, who can remember so clearly experiences which I confidentially attribute to my same Self, on this side and on that of forgotten experiences, really ceased to exist?" The instant I recall any of this "meanwhile," I identify myself as having been really existent in a certain moment of that same "meanwhile."

It is not strange, then, that the general problem of identity, of a certain kind of continuity for individual real existences, has raged about the Self, as a self-conscious, recognitively remembering, and rational Mind. The world of things may be illusion, may be called *Mâyâ*, in defiance of common-sense and of science. Man's confidence in any continuance of the spiritual principle of his existence after the death of the body may dissolve before scientific difficulties or religious doubts. The mind may strive to dispense with mere abstractions, and to gain a reputation for positive, scientific discrimination, by refusing to recognize itself, by analyzing all its own experience into disparate elements in a so-called "stream of consciousness." But if it continues to be self-conscious, and to remember, and to reason, it cannot deny some kind of reality and identity to itself. For in the last resort, that reality *is* the actual performance of these activities; and that identity *is* the matter-of-fact identification which takes place in every act of self-consciousness, of cognitive memory, and of rational inference.

Let, then, this important distinction be regarded as estab-

lished; it corresponds to the distinction which the most trustworthy knowledge of man compels him to make. The distinction is, in fact, actualized and more and more confirmed by the growth of all human knowledge. It has been shown that Things are known to man as "more or less self-like." Some of them are *more like*, and some of them are *less like*, what he knows himself really to be. Only in terms of self-likeness are they known, or knowable, to man at all. Of the higher species of animals, there are certain which are so amazingly like selves that we scarcely know where, in some respects, to draw the lines between the characteristics of their natures and those of our own. But there are many other kinds of things, to which, although they behave *as though* they were wills realizing immanent ideas, we do not dare to attribute any *separate* consciousness, so to say. Only in the human species is the fullness of self-hood found in actual existence. But man is a Self, whose very nature is known to himself as an organism with a mind, or soul; or as an ensouled organism. And it is only when he distinguishes between this organism, with its merely "self-like" existence and behavior, and the self-conscious and rational principle which is known as the Soul, or the Mind, that he comes to discern in its true and essential essence, the reality of his own selfhood. Others *are* more or less *self-like*; man *is* the true *Self*. But when the question is pressed: "In what does the reality of the Self consist?" or, "What is it really to be a Self?" no other answer can be given than that which faithfully and, as fully as possible, describes the Self in a dynamic and evolutionary way. This is, however, the only way in which any reality is known; the marks of its being are its varied forms of action under all sorts of relations. To be a self-conscious, remembering, reasoning Mind, with all the feelings which incite, guide, and accompany these activities, is to establish in the highest degree the claim to real Self-hood.

The important part which the peculiar feelings belonging

to the individual Self play in the constitution of its self-hood, cannot be overestimated. But this is only as they come under the rule of those essential activities of the mind which have just been described as creating and developing the reality of every true Self. *Mere* feelings, or feelings, as such, however tinged or saturated they may be with either pleasurable or painful sensations, are not enough for such a creation. Feelings must be recognized by self-consciousness, be remembered as belonging to the same subject, and projected backward and forward by activities of imagination and thought as involving the interests of this same subject, in order to be the *feelings* of a true Self. The painful or pleasurable emotions, the aspiring or depressing desires, the noble or ignoble sentiments, must be self-appropriated—consciously and actually so—in order to be a part of such a Self. It is, therefore, the fundamental and essential form of activity and development of the Mind, in which a true Self-hood is realized.

It is not intended, however, to deny that countless important elements and subtle influences, of an organic or of a seemingly psychic sort, of which the Self never becomes aware, enter into its disposition, and have much to do with deciding what-sort-of a Self each individual shall be. The sources of such influences science attributes to heredity, to disposition, to organic conditions, to the "sub-conscious," etc.; and all this is done either in the interests of a soul-less mechanism, or to conceal ignorance of the real causes. All this is indeed quite loyal to the purposes of psycho-physical science, so far as modesty and frankness prevail over and control it all. But these influences, this organic environment, these so-called sub-conscious processes, no matter how "self-like" they may appear in the eyes of the scientific mind, can never, of themselves, set such a mind into reality. It becomes real, only when it actually does those things in which its own real being essentially consists. All other beings, whether existent as germ-cells in parental bodies, or as cells which function as brain-cells within some particular

body, may determine disposition, cause sensations, arouse and support the lower forms of psychic existence; but unless there results the process of development in which the mind's life consists, no real Self can come into existence.

There are certain of the ideas and feelings which stand in a special relation of significance to the kind of a Self which the development of the mind's life secures to the human animal. These are those products of thought and imagination which are called "ideals," or "ideas of value"; and those sentiments, or forms of feeling, which attach themselves to these ideas, and which may be classified as ethical, æsthetical, and religious sentiments. Without these ideas and sentiments, a mind that had the highest development of self-consciousness, cognitive memory, and reasoning power,—if, indeed, such a mind could exist without these ideas and sentiments,—could scarcely be classed as a complete human Self. To this conclusion language lends a naïve but suggestive consent. A being, in human, organic form, who develops no ideas of duty or moral sentiments whatever, is called by the popular voice "inhuman"; and in scientific language such a being is called "defective," or even "a monster." Such beings are born with human bodies, but the minds connected with them never attain to a truly human self-hood. It is not customary to speak in so pronounced a manner of men who seem to be deficient in æsthetical and religious ideas and sentiments. But this may be only because this latter deficiency does not manifest itself in so startlingly horrid and dangerous ways as does the utter lack of moral quality in one having the semblance of a man.

The three leading forms of the ideal in human nature, together with the qualities which the experience of them seems to imply as existing in Nature in the large, are so intimately interwoven with one another that marked deficiency in any one of the three implies more or less of deficiency in the other two. All these ideas and sentiments have a sort of universal

and universally obligatory character which renders them compulsory for every human being who would attain the highest and most complete type of the self-hood of a man. But more upon these subjects belongs to the chapters of the Philosophy of the Ideal.

Important conclusions follow from the metaphysics of Mind, or doctrine as to "What it is really to be a Mind." Without development of mind, no true selfhood can come into existence. The human organism, when viewed by a true Self, would indeed appear to be self-like; but disconnected from a developing mind, it could never really attain to true self-hood. The essence of self-hood is just these self-constituting, self-appropriating, self-developing activities, in which the life of the mind consists.

First, then, stands the important inference that all Self-hood is a development. If "Nature" could confer self-hood upon any organic being, it certainly does not, in fact, act in this way. Indeed, we seem justified in saying that nature could not bestow all at once this incomparably estimable gift. At the first, the human organism, taken by itself, is perhaps no more self-like than is an amœba. Taken in connection with such earlier signs of sensation and idealism as its movements signify, it is not so self-like as the developed horse or dog. But as soon as mind appears, with its mysterious activities of self-consciousness, cognitive memory, and reasoning powers of the human order, the life of the true Self begins. But this life is not accomplished, and cannot be accomplished, without passing through the stages belonging to its natural evolution. It must have time to make its Self. Nor can this end be attained as the result of pressure of circumstances merely, or as the resultant solely of the character of the environment. The mind must take a hand in its own development. True selves cannot come into existence without *self-development*. A large measure of self-help is needed for the making of a real Self. For self-hood is that kind of a de-

velopment which is an achievement. Nature may determine the nature which things and the lower species of animals attain and transmit. But it is of the nature of mind to be more largely self-determined and, hence, to be self-made.

And, second: the true Self-hood which active Mind alone really is, becomes, according to this metaphysical doctrine, a matter of degrees. If the reality of self-hood is a development, under the conditions of space and time, and necessarily dependent upon the actual exercise and growth of the mind's active life,—an achievement, rather than a ready-made gift or endowment;—then, of course, different selves differ in the degrees of their reality. Even the same human being is not as much of a real Self at one time as at another, of his existence. Born, indeed, with what philosophy has called “a potentiality,” and what science refers to with equal vagueness as an “inherited nature,” the human baby is not yet a true Self; because it does not as yet have true mental life. It is not self-conscious; it is not a Self and has no Self to be conscious of. It has no true memory; for there is nothing for it to remember, nothing of its past experience which it can appropriate to the same subject in the past, which is the now remembering subject. It cannot connect the gaps between the “I am” and any “I was” with a reasoned conclusion, such as “I have meanwhile been”; because it has no knowledge of itself as now existing, no power of self-identification, and no reasoning with which to weave the chain of continuity, or causal connection, between the present and the past. But if a normal child of human kind, it will develope a normal self-hood; and this normal self-hood will possess the specific characteristics of the human mind, and also a more or less rich content of individual feeling, ideation, and deeds of will.

Somewhat startling conclusions follow from this metaphysical doctrine of the reality of a Mind. With every human being, there is a daily ebb and flow, and perchance a nightly complete cessation of the activities in which consists the reality

of a true self-hood. To think of that reality whose peerless value consists in being active as mind, as though it were a fitful and perishing existence, may seem at first an insult to the pride of manhood, or even inconceivably absurd. But thought must face the facts and base its conclusions upon facts. To-night you will sleep and dream, or you will sink into a dreamless sleep. If you were never to come back again to the mind's waking life of self-consciousness, recognitive memory, and rational thought, but were just to dream on forever, would you not have forever lost the larger and more precious part of your self? But suppose you were never to awake from a quite dreamless sleep; in what respect would the reality of your self-hood differ from nothing at all? Only one answer can be given; the purely negative concept of "the unconscious," and the largely negative concept of "the subconscious," whatever small value they may have for psycho-physical science, are, for defining the nature of Self-hood and asserting its reality, of absolutely no value at all.

Another truth of the greatest practical importance follows from the same conception of the Mind's reality. The causes which regulate, and the conditions which limit, the various degrees of selfhood, or personality in its highest form of manifestation, are indeed received without human willing, and are largely shrouded in human ignorance, as they come from the inexorable hand of Nature. The nature each man calls his own, so far as it depends upon inheritance, is not at all a matter of his choice. Neither can the individual in any measure modify the essential characteristics of the particular species of which he is a member; or of that larger Nature which is the producer and environment for all particular natures. But, as we have already said, it is the essential characteristic of the human mind—its specific potentiality—to develope more or less of those forms of self-activity which enable it within however narrow limits, freely and intelligently to determine its own character, and to select its own environment. Active *self-*

development characterizes the development of the true *Self*. Or to state the same truth in that language of common-sense which so often corrects or confutes the theories of philosophers: "Every man can make himself to be something of a man." Therefore, "Be a man, and ever more of a man," is no unmeaning exhortation, when viewed in the light of a consistent metaphysical theory as to the reality of the mind. In these activities of self-consciousness, recognitive memory, and rational inference, as they express the active aspect of mental life, lies the creative energy which must be evoked in order to secure this kind of reality. But the full significance of the fact is not grasped, or even suggested fairly, until we have considered the relation in which these activities stand toward the progressive realization of the ethical, æsthetical, and religious ideals.

Such a metaphysics of the mind, with its answer to the inquiry, "In what does the reality of the person, or true Self, consist?" places in a new light two problems which, of old, have been deemed most important by students of ethics and religion. These are the problems of Freedom and of Immortality. Indirectly, but none the less forcefully, does it urge upon the mind the problem of the essential Nature of that Being of the World, or World-Ground, which religion personifies and worships as God. It will be remembered that God, Freedom and Immortality, gave to the critical philosophy of Kant the three great problems, in the interest of the better solution of which he attempted to establish a sceptical theory of knowledge to be followed by confidence in a rational faith. But neither epistemology nor metaphysics, as we understand them, will allow us to accept the Kantian solution of these important problems. Their fuller discussion belongs, indeed, within those fields of reasoning and speculation which still await consideration. Only in the light of these facts and experiences, with which morality, art, and religion concern themselves, can the thought frame conceptions corresponding to these three important words. But the philosophy of knowl-

edge, and the theory of reality as applied to the mind, do furnish important new points of view from which to interpret the meaning of these problems. They also suggest, in no trivial way, the directions in which one may look for light to be thrown upon their solution.

And, first, human experience with the essential nature and kind of development which are realized by the mental life, shows us that the mind is, in fact, *self-determining*. At this point, however, a preliminary protest must be made against that use of the word "Will" which was much more current and well approved formerly than it has been of late. Will is no separate faculty, to be distinguished apart from, or in addition to, one or more other so-called faculties of the mind. From the psychologist's point of view the word is most correctly employed when it includes the entire active aspect of the conscious Self. For this reason we have not hesitated to say that while the experience of the individual may be described by telling what sort of feelings "I have" or "suffer from"; with what intellectual qualities I "am endowed," or "have cultivated"; each individual is justified, the rather, in declaring: "I am," essentially considered, a will. It follows from this that to speak of "*the will*" as being free, or not free, does not set forth in appropriate terms, the real problem. This problem is better expressed as follows: "In what respect, and to what extent, is the Mind—not as a self-like thing but as the true Self—actually self-determining?"

Whenever this problem of the mind's freedom is raised, as a pure question of metaphysics, there is a multitude of objectors who virtually refuse even to consider it; because, as they affirm, science has discovered all self-determination to be inconceivable and even absurd. Now, curiously enough, while there is a certain truth in this attitude toward the problem, what is generally understood to be the real finding of the physical and psychological sciences is the exact opposite of the fact implied in this attitude. Self-determination is indeed in-

conceivable, in that it cannot be wholly explained as caused by any force, being, or relation, exterior to the self which determines itself. On the other hand, however, every being, known to the physical and natural sciences—whether massive, molecular, or atomic, and whether inorganic, or organic, and plant or animal—is, of necessity, to some extent, self-determining. All scientific explanation assumes as a matter of course the self-determining nature of the particular beings, whose mutual relations and actions and reactions are to be explained. This does not mean that any of these beings behave themselves without paying regard to the other self-determining beings, which exist with themselves, within the same system. Quite the contrary from this. But it does mean that scientific explanation is always forced to leave a *residuum* of the unexplained; and this *residuum* it locates in the self-determining natures of the beings whose actions and developments it observes. *The determinations of science meet their inexorable limitations in the mystery of self-determination.* Why, for example, does the atom of oxygen behave as it actually does behave in the presence of the atom of hydrogen? Because it determines itself to behave in this way. Or, if your scientific feeling of pride is offended by this, you may change the words about and say: "Because its nature determines it so to behave." But you are only confessing your ignorance in other no less confusing terms. And this same atom has been determining itself, during millions of years, under an inconceivable variety of the most complicated situations, to be self-active in the way appropriate to its nature. Now it has been joined with hydrogen atoms in a drop of water; now it has left them and devoted itself to the formation of iron rust; again it has determined itself to be a part of the worm, on which has fed the fish, on which has fed a king. And so it has become part of the brain of some wise or—it is more likely—foolish, ruler of men. It is unnecessary, however, to go over this ground again.

It will at once be said that what science insists upon claim-

ing is this: Under similar conditions, all things determine themselves, or are determined by their natures, to behave in similar ways. That is to say, all things obey laws; over them all is the inexorable "reign of law." What this highly figurative language of physical science really means has already been made sufficiently clear. Things, as causes, in so far as their doings can be explained, seem to be controlled by immanent ideas. In saying this we do indeed double the mystery of the inexplicable self-determining Thing. Because, in the first place, unless some sort of consciousness be assumed as a guiding or controlling principle of the particular being, it is utterly impossible to conjecture what an idea "immanent" in it may be. And, in the second place, no one such idea could possibly account for the behavior of any particular thing all through the rapidly changing variety of circumstances, under which it is called upon to act. In fact, there is no actual event which comes under any one so-called law; there are no two events that are strictly similar—not to say, "identical," in the history of the World's development. If it is true that there must be important similarities in things, and essentially uniform ways of the behavior of things, or else there could be no order, and no real World; it is also true, that unless there could be ceaseless changes, new products and combinations in an endless series, and ever new variety in the forms of co-operation active within, and between, the numberless beings of this same World, there could be for It no real development. So variously and mysteriously self-determining are even unconscious, material Things.

But when science comes to consider conscious, living beings, especially the higher species of animals, it is forced to recognize a superior order and greatly enhanced degree of self-determination. In spite of all the efforts of the chemico-physical sciences, and of all the objections from every quarter, *these* beings cannot be explained without the admission that they are to some extent consciously self-determining. With them con-

sciousness counts as a force in determining their behavior and the changes of their relations. They are more self-like than are unconscious things; and they are correspondingly, in a different way and in a higher degree, self-determining. It is only matter of experienced fact to admit that their behavior is not so intelligible as viewed merely in the light of their external relations, and without taking into the account any of the conscious states with which they respond to these external relations. Two dogs of iron may be driven against each other so as to break each other in pieces; two angry, live dogs do not need any outside force to bring them into contact with each other. It is also matter of experienced fact, that living animals, as influenced by their conscious states, do not behave in the same uniform way as do unconscious and inorganic things. They are more freely self-determining. To say that, if we knew all about this internal mechanism, we should be able to predict with certainty how conscious wills would express themselves, and could then reduce to an exact science the behavior of the animals, is to say something, either not very wise or else very doubtful. As more is known about the workings of a conscious being by way of observation, or imagination, doubtless it is possible better to predict just what that conscious being is likely to do. In fact, all human life implies such opportunity for growth of knowledge about the lower animals and about men. But if science knew still more about the real nature of such beings, and especially about the highest type of such beings,—the self-active, self-developing Mind of man,—it would probably be the readiest to confess that complete scientific knowledge of this mystery is not possible for finite intellects. The impossibility is not due to lack of a knowledge of the mechanism—such knowledge as science can cultivate about all its objects of investigation; it is rather due to the real nature of this peculiar kind of Object, which is essentially mysterious and so must be assumed as being what it really is—an explanation of its own particular

doings, while being in its own hidden nature forever inexplicable and, therefore, unexplained.

Science, naturally and properly enough, does not like to accept this conclusion of an unavoidable limit to its extension; for it abhors the inexplicable, and constantly beats against the barrier of the unexplained. But, again we repeat, the essential experience of science is to explain in part only, and this by assuming, in fact, what is unexplained. Moreover, the more science knows of the real nature of particular beings, and of the Nature of the World at large, the more there is to know which belongs to the as yet mysterious, and if not essentially inexplicable, to what is at least thus far unexplained.

When, however, this interior force of consciousness, in its active form, reaches its highest expression in the human species, the most perfect conceivable type of a self-determining being is presented to thought. Conscious self-feelings prompt this being to forms of activity which will secure for the Self its coveted interests. Conscious self-knowledge, and knowledge of other selves and self-like things, guide these activities to their chosen ends. But above all, conscious self-determinations in the form of the deliberate choice of ideals regulate through long periods, and even during its entire career, the development of the life of the Self. To this self-determining being, for the progressive realization of these ideals, all the material furnished by Nature, whether in the form of inherited characteristics, or of limitations and opportunities of environment, may be made more or less subsidiary. And now, when science, physical or psychological, attempts to introduce within the *nature* of such a self-determining Self the conception of a rigid phenomenal mechanism, a chain of "other"-determining states, it throws no additional light on the metaphysical problem. The mechanical theory cannot even make a self-consistent history of the successive facts in that form of self-development, which is known as the life of a Mind.

Whatever else is necessary to establish the conception of

Freedom in a tenable and salutary way, belongs to ethics rather than to metaphysics.

And to ethics and religion belongs the discussion of the problem of the Immortality of the human Self, as Mind, when presented in any such form as to be of other than a purely speculative interest. Yet here also, metaphysics has something to say in preparation of the way. It was formerly held, chiefly in the supposed interests of theology, that some kind of natural inability to perish—a sort of *non-posse-mori*—must be established for the human Self. The reality of the Mind must, therefore, be conceived of as consisting in some kind of an indivisible substance, after the analogy of a material atom, or of the indestructibility of mass as attributed to Nature, in the large. But such a substantial deathlessness, if it could be demonstrated *a priori*, would be as useless and vulgar as it would be secure. The prevalent dynamic view of the “nature” of all material substances so-called has banished this dead and worthless conception of what it is really to be, from even the lowest classes of the least self-like of things. There is no substantial existence anywhere which corresponds to such a conception as this; and this conclusion is placed beyond a shadow of doubt, on the testimony with one voice of all the physical and natural sciences.

What it is to be real, as all developed human minds are in fact real; or in other words, what it is to have and develop the life of personality, of true Self-hood;—this we have just been discovering, although only in part. For man is an ethical, artistic, and religious, as really as a self-conscious, cognitively remembering and reasoning being. But even when kept as closely as possible confined to the relatively bare fields of metaphysical inquiry, the problem of Immortality, in the light of modern science, changes front. In its new form, it may be stated as follows: Is there rational ground for the belief, or hope, that these actual forms of activity in which the reality of the Mind now consists will be continued, after the bodily

organization, with which until death they are dependently connected, has ceased to exist?

To this question, a certain speculative but suggestive reply may be given in terms agreeable to the theory of reality already developed. It is too commonly supposed that change is inimical to the reality and permanence, as one real being among others, of any particular thing. But it has been shown that in fact every particular thing is constantly changing, both in respect of its internal conditions and states, and also in respect of its relations to other things. Its reality is not, then, inconsistent with change. But the reality of any particular being does require a certain consistency—the limits of which can never be set by *a priori* argument but must ever be learned from experience—with some idea or ideal. In other words, to continue really the same, the Thing must remain faithful to its Idea. But mere things do not consciously choose the ideas to which they must remain faithful; and the lower animals, so far as we know them, seem incapable of such a choice, especially if the idea is to take the form of a duty, a thing of beauty, or an object of worship and obedience as divine. The teleological influence, or force, which determines the lower animals to a consistent development, a persistence in the progressive realization of a type, does not spring consciously from themselves. It is wholly determined for them by the Nature whose offspring and wards they are. Undoubtedly, the same thing is largely true of human selves. They, too, are the offspring and the wards of the same Nature. The kind of being with which they are “naturally” endowed is at once more delicate, sensitive, and seemingly frail, than that of any other known existence. Self-consciousness is harder to develop and retain than is mere *quasi-animal* consciousness. Recognitive memory lapses under organic or functional disturbances of the central nervous system sooner than does the automatism of the unrecognized recall of habitual ideas. The higher reasoning powers come latest to their full exercise and

yield first to paresis or senile dementia. But on the other hand, this kind of reality in which the mind's life and development consists is signalized by Nature in several emphatic ways. To live such a life is to be the realest of all that is real. No other existence, while it lasts, is so real, to itself and to other existences, as the spirit's life, the life of the mind. Again, no other form of reality has the same value; no other is even comparable with it in value.

Without going too far just at present in the way of personifying that Being of the World which is known to the physical and natural sciences as Nature, it may safely be said, that the immortality of the human mind depends upon *Its Will*. Nature has somehow shown itself able to produce such a type of self-determining and rational beings. Nature has endowed them with the potentiality, and has entrusted them with the supreme task, of such a development. Nature has endowed them, above all others of its children, with the capacity for developing themselves according to more or less clearly and nobly conceived ideals. The same Nature which has developed the human organism, and which momently weaves its wonderful texture by driving through it the shuttles of life and death, will in the end dissolve this same organism. Will the life and development of the mind be annihilated at the same time? This depends upon the Will of the same Nature which has built the body, endowed the mind, connected the two in the unity we call a Self, developed them in this connection, and finally destroyed the body. We must, therefore, re-examine and enlarge our conception of Nature, to see, if perchance, we can discover its will in this regard.

There is one respect, however, in which not a few scientific objectors think they know enough about Nature's will with respect to man's hope of immortality, to decide the question by throwing it peremptorily out of court. It is Nature, they admit as a matter of course, which establishes and maintains that intimate connection of the organism with the mind's life,

on which the continuance of the human Self depends. This connection, it is claimed, is now so well known by modern science, as to make it impossible for the mind to go on existing after the organism has ceased existing. In reply, it must be admitted that the intimacy of this connection has been emphasized by our entire theory of knowledge, and by our view of metaphysics as a theory of reality. Only as an embodied mind, or an "ensouled" body, does the human Self exist and become acquainted with its fellow selves and with all self-like things. After the analogy of its experience with itself, as thus strangely compounded, it attributes mind-qualities or activities ("immanent" or conscious ideas) to all things; and on the other hand, it conceives of all the mind's qualities and activities as related to a world of material things. All this is indisputable fact of experience.

But the making of the fundamental distinctions between mind and body, and the recognition of the superiority of mind, as the real Self, over mindless organism, is also indisputable fact of experience. This, too, is an indication of the Will of Nature with regard to the nature and development of the mind's life. Moreover, this "diremptive process" results in separating the two parts of the one Self in such a way that the continued existence of the one no longer appears so absolutely essential to the existence of the other. Indeed, when analyzed from the purely scientific point of view, the connection between soul, or mind, and body, appears in no respect essentially different from that which may temporarily exist between any two or more kinds of reality. Stated in terms of pure mechanism, it has only the value of a very imperfect and extremely doubtful descriptive history. When such known changes, as, for example, the desire to use a certain book in my library and the resolve to rise from my chair and take it down, occur in consciousness, I know that they are followed by changes in the relations of material things which correspond to the desire and to its resulting deed of will. Of the thousands of interven-

ing links between those known facts which go on within the organism, there are some of which I am fairly sure on scientific grounds; but others are matters only of uncertain conjecture, and must remain utterly hidden from any available means of observation or experiment. When, then, the attempt is made to give a metaphysical, or ontological, interpretation of these occurrences, and thus deal with them as the result of real beings, influencing each other in a causal way; the reality of the conscious and self-determining mind, and the actuality of its control over the body, takes precedence of all else that is immediately and clearly known, or knowable, about the entire complex transaction.

Over the entire field of the dispute as to the possibility of human immortality, so far as physiological and psycho-physical science has anything to say, the history of the last fifty years sheds an instructive light. At one time it seemed as though such scientific researches were destined to destroy the hope of a continued existence for the mind apart from that organism which, with it, makes the constitution of a human Self. After the debate had ranged and raged over the field of experience, both parties seemed to be exhausted and willing to retire with the verdict of a battle drawn, and not to be scientifically decided in either way. But of late—we have no hesitation in saying—the doctrine which affirms a possible, and even a probable, separate existence for the mind after the death of the bodily organism, has been gaining ground in experience. It is true, on the one hand, that modern physiology is constantly discovering new and important relations between the constitution and functioning of the different parts of this organism and the tendencies and specific functions of the mental life. Not only the more obvious and bulky of the internal organs, but seemingly insignificant glands, the chemical condition of the blood, the presence of bacteria in unsuspected places, and a hundred different abnormal conditions of the tissues, determine the character of the conscious states.

.Secret irritations in remote places of the body may upset the brain's functioning, and lead to melancholia, mania, or other insane conditions. But, on the other hand, these changes in nutrition and organic structure appear to be, in man's case, essentially like the processes which go on in every form of living substance. The living cells behave with a complete indifference to the high service which they are to render by founding and guiding the self-conscious, self-determining, Mind in its unique course of development. Important organs may be lost, and from the theoretical point of view, they may be transportable from place to place, or from one human Self to another; but if the more primary conditions of organic life can be secured, the mind continues, with a seeming indifference, to exist essentially unimpaired. One's stomach may give one pain; one's liver may impart to consciousness a tinge of melancholy; one's heart may make one bold or timid; but none of these organs seem to have the power either to make, or to unmake, the reality of one's Self.

All this, we are told, may be true enough, outside of the central nervous system; and especially beyond and below the gray convoluted rind which constitutes the hemispheres of the human brain. But is not the relation between Mind and Brain such that the impairment and destruction of the latter necessitates the impairment and cessation of the other? Again it must be admitted that, as to an intimate connection between the functioning of this organ—or rather, collection of organs—and those activities in which the very reality of mental life consists, there can be no doubt. And from the scientific point of view, the connection, in order to be viewed as having any significance for reality, must be considered as a *causal* connection.

About the conclusions which follow from the facts, and which affect the hope of immortality as dependent upon the metaphysics of Mind, these two truths must be kept constantly in view. And, first, those unique activities in which the develop-

ment of the mental life essentially consists cannot possibly be conceived of as having an organic origin. For its life of sensation and motion the Self is obviously dependent upon the integrity of the organism; and since all the rest of the organism, so far as it affects consciousness, reports itself in, and is controlled from, the nervous centres, this life of sensation and motion is most immediately dependent upon the integrity and normal functioning of the brain. But the more unique and uniquely essential activities, such as the mind attains, do not seem to stand in the same relation of dependence. Without sight, one cannot know a visible world; without hearing, one cannot know the world of sound. But a Hellen Keller may attain a more highly developed mental life than the majority of human beings who have normal faculties of hearing and sight. The Self-hood of such a person is, indeed, restricted in important ways, as respects its knowledge of other selves and self-like things. But as a self-conscious and rational Mind, it may show an amazing independence of these restrictions. And, in no case, can we conceive of any such relations between self-consciousness, recognitive memory, rational inference, and the moral, æsthetical, and religious sentiments and ideals, as will permit us to regard the mental life as accounted for by any kind of functioning on the part of any kind of organism.

Second: modern cerebral physiology and surgery seem to be pointing the way toward a larger view of the relative independence of mind, of the hemispheres of the brain, and of an enlarged doctrine of the supremacy of mind over even these crowning structures of the central nervous system. If life can be kept going, the *developed* Mind, it would appear, can dispense with considerable portions of the brain substance, without surrender of those forms of activity in which its essential being is known to consist. Recently, there have been cases of cerebral surgery without anaesthetics, in which the self-conscious life has proceeded without interruption, while parts of these hemispheres, most important for sensation and

motion, have been largely excised. And when either disease or surgery makes the demand for a transference of function to other contiguous or corresponding areas of the substance of the hemispheres, no other form of stimulation and final control is so powerful as that of the self-conscious, self-determining mind.

In a word, the old theological doctrine, which less than a half-century ago seemed so likely to be totally discredited by the physiological and psycho-physical sciences, is now gathering new evidence to its support from the discoveries of these same sciences. One may elect to say, with more boldness than one could a generation ago, that the human brain is the *organ*, rather than the producer, or true cause, of man's mental and spiritual life. Metaphysics can indeed give no demonstration of the immortality of the Mind. But metaphysics does so expound its real nature as to show that the larger Nature, from whose womb it comes, and in whose bosom it reposes, has not revealed to modern science the impossibility of its being linked to a physical organism in a wholly separable way. Even science may soon come much more considerably than at present, to encourage the rational hope, in the individual, of achieving an immortal life.

CHAPTER XII

MATTER AND MIND: NATURE AND SPIRIT

IT is now time to bring together the metaphysical fragments of the preceding chapters, and once more attempt their union in one consistent theory of reality. We have hitherto discussed the problems offered by particular Things, and individual Selves, both as organic existences and as self-developing and self-determining Minds, with a view to answer the general question of metaphysics: What is it really to be? It has been shown that every existence has, on the one hand, a certain being-in-itself; and, on the other, that this being is an existence within a system of beings, no one of which can be known, or even conceived of, as independent of the others. The term, "being-in-itself," in anything like the Kantian sense, may indeed justly be subject to objections. Things, as beings-in-themselves ("things-in-themselves") cannot be spoken of as either postulated or conceivable. The very word "Thing" implies the correlate of cognitive activity. On the other hand, to claim that even those things which are best known, are dependent for their reality upon man's knowing them, is so shocking to common-sense, and so foreign to the findings of the psychology of perception, that the most extreme subjectivism cannot explain the term reality so as to give it consistency even in its own system of metaphysics.

But minds, as truly although not in the same way as things, take their part in the Being of the One World. And like things, although not on the same terms, minds have a certain nature, or real existence of their own; while they are, of course, dependent upon things for their existence and for the character of their development; and they are dependently related to each

other in the social system. No human mind, or spirit, is known to exist, except as in and through the system of so-called material existences; nor can such a mind, or spirit, attain or express its typical characteristics without intercourse with other human minds, or spirits. Out of the same Being of the World, and as a product of its evolution, has come man, as mind; and all the spiritual developments of the human race in history. These are facts; and metaphysics, as a theory of Reality, must somehow manage to take them all into its account. It cannot, on the one hand, leave out of its reckonings the chemico-physical theories, in their efforts to discover how all kinds of things are constituted, and under what conditions they have come to be as science now actually finds them to be. If the chemico-physical sciences attempt to cover with their doctrine of forces, laws, and measured relations of space and time, the living organism with which the mind appears as connected, this doctrine must be welcomed, so far as its truth can be substantiated. On the other hand, all the researches of these sciences make an increasing impression of inadequacy, when they attempt to frame themselves into a theory of the quite unique reality, which is constituted and developed by the peculiar forms of activity in which the existence of the mind is revealed to itself directly; and indirectly, to other minds. Such activities seem to transcend all that can properly be ascribed to any Thing, or collection of things.

How, then, shall Its Reality be conceived of, so as to make it appear capable, not only of evolving such a system of things and thing-like existences, as the World is actually known to be, but also of developing a race of beings which have such mental and spiritual characteristics as the human race is known to have gained and expressed during the course of human history. The World, as far as man knows it, or can know it, is One. What sort of a One World can make itself *one* in such a characteristic way?

In seeking for some satisfactory collective term, which shall

seem to express the whole essence of the World's true Being, one has a choice of the four examples, which stand at the head of this chapter. Thus one may begin with the conviction that the conception of "Matter" can be made so full of content as to serve for the needed explanatory principle. Then one will argue with one's self somewhat as follows: There are, indeed, individual human minds really in existence. But after sufficiently minimizing their capacities and emphasizing their limitations, one may conclude that the mysterious substrate of material things has within it the "promise and potency" of man's spiritual life, as well as of every other form of organic or inorganic existence. Thus Matter may be said to have made, or to have evolved, Mind. But when it is more clearly seen how much this conception of matter involves that is actually characteristic of mind, one may choose another of the several courses open to human thought: One may either regard mind as, so to say, unconscious or asleep, within matter (Mind is "immanent" in Matter); or else one may turn about the conclusion, and assert that it is mind which gives reality to matter and which accounts for all its evolutionary processes. In both of these cases, however, some collective term which is more comprehensive than either of the two, when they are brought into contrast or combined together, seems desirable. The word Nature offers itself as such a term. And now *Nature*, taken as a collective term, must include the essential characteristics of all things and of all human minds, if it is to afford the explanatory principle for both kinds of real beings. Things are, of course, natural evolutions, children of Nature, in the large. But so are human spirits as well. The difficult question then arises: Does the Spirit in Nature know Itself as Spirit? Is Nature to be conceived of as a self-conscious and rational Spirit; and, as such, the sufficient Ground of all spiritual life and development. Or, is it only potential Spirit, which comes to actuality in the particular spirits of individual men? In a word: Is Spirit, as a col-

lective term and applicable to the whole of Nature, an impossible or even absurd conception?

Let us now follow briefly along the path of these inquiries, in the order in which they have just been proposed. The word "Matter," in its collective use and as applied to all material existences, is confessedly a pure abstraction. There really are innumerable material existences, of an indefinite number of kinds, ceaselessly undergoing changes of relations, according to an indefinite number of so-called laws. But there is no such reality as Matter in general. Indeed, "it is proper to speak of the term matter, only as resulting from the second degree of abstractness, since it stands for a *grouping* of conceptions, each of which is derived from many individual acts of our experience with things."¹ Our inquiry, then, becomes: What characteristics of all material things are known to man, which are sufficient to explain the existence and development of human minds, in human history, as well as the evolution of things themselves? In a word: What really is this so-called matter; and what can it alone do? When we are told by a physicist like Sir William Thomson: "We cannot of course give a definition of matter which will satisfy the metaphysician," our reply is: "But this is the very kind of a definition which the mind insists upon; because it is seeking to find a conception which embodies metaphysics, as a theory of reality."

Now the most distinctive and important characteristic of all matter is its massiveness, or its quality of having mass; and from this, as secondary characteristics, inseparable from mass, are derived the qualities of solidity, inertia, momentum, weight, etc. But all changes in these secondary qualities do not affect, they rather assume, the continuity and unalterableness of mass. As formally constituted, any particular material body can be put out of existence; the characteristics of its energizing

¹ See the Chapter on "Matter" in the author's *Theory of Reality*, from which the quotations, unless otherwise specified, are taken.

may be profoundly changed; it may be rendered quite unrecognizable by the senses which were once familiar with it; or it may be made impossible of recognition by any of the senses. But its mass cannot be annihilated or diminished. What now is meant when it is said that all matter *has* mass? Plainly, it is meant at least to say that all material things are quantities which may be measured; and which must be considered as measurable, whether man can get at them to measure them, or not. But this is not all which is true of matter as having mass; for space and time, considered as empty of all matter, are also measurable, and the measurements to which they can be subjected are much more "pure" than any which can be applied to masses of matter. Besides, we do not content ourselves with saying that matter *is* mass,—that, and nothing more. The rather is it defined as "that which has" the mass.

If matter were simply massive, it would be dead; indeed, its mass could never be appreciated or measured. To get itself appreciated and to be measured, it must do something; and it must do something to our human minds, for we men, as minds, are the appreciators and measurers of matter, whether as "plain minds," in common-sense ways, or with all the mathematics and refined instrumentation of the modern physical sciences.

Therefore, as Thomson and Tait tell us: "Matter is that which can be perceived by the senses, or that which can be acted upon by, or can exert force." And now, if we change both the "ors" in this sentence to an "and," we learn that matter is known by us through the senses as being acted upon, and also as exerting force. Force, or energy, must somehow be imparted to mass, in order that matter may not be and remain a reality that counts for nothing—just dead, inert, and useless "stuff." Therefore, another distinguished physicist, Clerk-Maxwell, assures us in a sentence already quoted: "All we know about matter relates to the series of phenomena in which energy is transferred from one portion of matter to another,

till in some part of the series our bodies are affected, and we become conscious of sensation."

But it has already been made absolutely clear that the entire conception of force, or energy, as separable from things, or transmissible from one thing to another, is only a convenient figure of speech; and that to suppose that this figure of speech has its correlate in any actual transaction in the world of real things, is to suppose an absurdity. We are at once, then, compelled to agree with Du Bois-Reymond when he says: "Separately, Force and Matter do not exist"; or with another writer who declares: "Force is the dynamic aspect of existence, the correlate of Matter."

But to recognize mass and energy as the inherent and universal characteristics of so-called "Matter" does not as yet endow the latter with a sufficient outfit of capacities and powers to account for the existence and development of the entire world as composed of things and of self-conscious, rational minds. For in order to produce and develope particular things, and species of things, this "lump-sum" of mass and energy must distribute, and arrange, and rearrange itself, according to ideas and in obedience to laws. Plain traces of a striving after ideals would also seem to characterize some of the paths followed in this process of self-evolution. But over and over again, in discussing the metaphysics involved in the very nature of every particular thing, there has been discovered the necessity for recognizing mind, as a force, in a form to which we have given the vague phrasing of an "immanent idea." It now appears that matter, without the necessary equipment of immanent ideas, and of some sort of plan, concealed within it, or forced upon and dominating it from the outside, could no more build and develope a world of things and minds, than could some particular collection of molecules, or atoms, considered as mere dead matter, or lawless energy, construct any particular thing.

Mind and Matter must, therefore, somehow combine and

co-operate, in order to account for a collection of existences and developments similar to that which belongs to the system known to men in the growth of the particular sciences. "Matter" must be something more than is ordinarily understood by *mere matter*; it must be matter, including some, at least, of the potencies of what man knows himself to be as a mind, if it is to serve man as the one explanatory principle of all the existences which are made into some sort of a unity by this same principle. Need it be said again that this effective Principle must be somewhat more than a first Premiss, or logical principle; it must be an architectonic and developing Force?

The word matter, therefore, shall be abandoned; let us turn again to the word "Nature" as promising the suitable collective term for which we are seeking. And undoubtedly, if this word is made full enough of the right kind of content, it can cover a conception which will satisfy the mind as the basic truth in metaphysics.

There are several reasons why the word Nature seems to be a much better word than matter to serve as a collective term for all that is necessary to explain the existence and history of things, animals and men, as they are all known by man, in the unity of the One World. Among these reasons the following are prominent. In the first place; of the two terms, Nature is the more elastic and expansive. To deny the existence of the *immaterial*, of that which really is not matter, is usually the sign of a narrow and dangerous bigotry in the doctrine of the physico-chemical sciences. For there is life, and consciousness, and self-conscious mind, in the world; and these existences will always be regarded in the popular apprehension, as being non-material. With all their resources of microscope, and refined methods of chemical analysis, and of the detection of hitherto inappreciable physical operations, these sciences have never as yet succeeded in mastering the full explanation of the most insignificant living form, or even of a single living cell. The first conscious sensation still appears

to be an event in the world's history, as unappreciable and unstatable in terms of physics and chemistry, as it appeared when these same sciences had not attained any of their modern conquests over the field of matter: while to be really self-conscious and self-determining, as the developed mind of a man comes to be, is a triumph over the merely material, in the contrast with which, all the triumphs of the sciences of matter in their attempts to explain this mind, seem insignificant or absurd. At least, whatever certain individual enthusiasts among the physicists and chemists may claim for their discoveries, in the thoughts of the people and of the few who reflect, life, consciousness, and mind, cannot be covered by the term, Matter, when this term is properly employed.

But the same lack of elasticity, as it were, and of expansiveness, cannot be charged against the conception of Nature, when this is employed in the collective way. Indeed, most of those who would not think of calling consciousness and mind material entities, or even phenomena of the material order, vigorously resist any effort to take them out of the sphere of Nature. The *super-natural*, or *extra-natural* is at present in favor with no manner of science,—not even with those theologians who are more anxious to make their peace with the “scientists” than with the vice-gerents of Heaven. Of course, however, this genial and expansive use of the word as a sufficiently comprehensive and—shall we not say?—energetic term, only raises again the same old question: What kind of a Nature must this be which can develope, not only so many forms of conscious life, but also a race of self-conscious and self-determining spirits?

Another reason for the generally accepted preference of the word Nature as a collective term is undoubtedly to be found in the greatly superior appeal which it makes to the imagination. Many poets have always delighted to sing the praises of nature as the Giver of Life, the Inspirer, the Benefactor, and even the Author, of genius and of all gifted

minds; in imaginative literature, personified nature is the bountiful Source of the material goods which make men comfortable and happy. Comparatively few have followed Lucretius and celebrated in poetry the affinities and separations and, as it were, social quarrels and "makings-up-again" of the atoms, in a purely materialistic way. It is true that the trained student of physics or chemistry both observes and imagines processes in matter which are transcendently beautiful, mysterious, and worthy to excite admiration. It is no wonder that he is tempted to think, if matter can do this, why can it not do anything? Why can it not make itself conscious; make itself to feel and think; make itself to be a real Self, a self-conscious and self-determining mind? It certainly weaves a body for this mind; and this body is intimately connected with the development of the mental life. But the truth remains that even the influences of such an exciting character for the scientific as well as the poetical imagination do not easily overcome the objection which the human spirit itself opposes to being considered as a product of what science observes, describes and measures, as mere spiritless matter. When we say "Nature," however, we seem again to recover the rights belonging to poetical license. All the unfathomable mystery of life, of consciousness, and of self-conscious mind, can be concealed, and ever lovingly fostered, under the protection of this term. The imagination is delighted with, and at the same time baffled by, this limitless atmosphere of mystery. As to matter; why I may hold it in my hand, may strike it with my foot, and buy and sell it in the form of visible and tangible things, or may measure, weigh, and otherwise manipulate it in my laboratory. But as to Nature, all this is quite another affair.

There is a third reason for our preference of the word Nature as a collective, all-embracing, and all-interpreting term. It lends itself much better to the process of personification. And this is, indeed, the supreme and most conclusive of the

three reasons. Not only in a concealed and furtive way, in the terms of science, but in an avowed manner, in the terms of poetry, religion and philosophy, in order to be considered a satisfactory collective term explanatory of both things and men, Nature needs to be personified—made Self-like—in a more complete and final way. Religion has done this by personifying and deifying natural objects, and natural forces, of many varied kinds; but at last, in terms of monotheism, by creating the conception of an eternal and universal Spirit, God as Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer of the world. And early philosophy, like all poetry,¹ regarded Nature as the Mother both gracious and terrible, of all things and all men. "For," says Parmenides, "she rules over all painful birth and all begetting, driving the female to the embrace of the male, and the male to the embrace of the female."

It would appear, then, that human thought is on the whole reluctant to believe that man's spirit, and spiritual development, can have its origin in, or account rendered by, any principle which does not itself include the characteristics of Spirit in an essential and dynamic way. Since the word Nature does represent to thought and imagination a conception capable

¹ Büchner in his enthusiastic poetizing and personifying of Matter, proposes a song in its praise (see "Force and Matter," Eng. trans., p. 55):

"Ist dem nicht, was ihr Materie nennt,
Der Welt urkräftig Element,
Aus dem, was immer lebt und webt,
Empor zu Licht und Bewegung strebt?"

But the terms in which Goethe makes Faust address the Unknowable One, commend themselves much better both to poetry and to philosophy:

"Who dares express him?

The All-enfolder,
The All-upholder;
Enfolds, upholds He not
Thee, me, Himself?"

of such inclusion, it is held to be much preferable to the word matter. Consciousness, and self-conscious mind, if not all forms of life, demand the characteristics for their explanation, which man finds in himself as a self-conscious, self-determining mind, or spirit.

This naïve conclusion of the popular reflection, which finds expression in so much of poetry and in the elaborations of philosophy, we hold to be also scientifically true. In evidence of this truth we shall at present only call attention to the fact that the use of the word Nature, by both science and philosophy, actually makes it inclusive of Spirit; and this is really why reflection has chosen this word as the more genial, plastic, and suitable term.¹

As soon as the significance of the enlargement which is given to the conception of Nature, as a collective explanatory term, is duly recognized, the same distinctions have to be insisted upon anew. "The Absolute Whole divides itself again into two parts. These parts are not indeed separate and distinct halves of a total sphere; nor can they be kept asunder so as to remain independent of each other for their more complete significance and their more effective action. The rather are they two interdependent aspects of the same totality as seen from two equally necessary points of view. These points of view are the more internal and subjective and the more external and objective. Nature, regarded as an Absolute Whole (system of things and spirits, complete-in-itself) becomes two-fold; it is no longer simply nature as the common breeding-place of life, but as herself a Universal Life. Her being is no longer looked upon as the undifferentiated medium or soul in which all development takes place. She is herself the Ground—the inner principle of development. Nature is no longer just a system of things already formed, or considered

¹ This argument is stated more at length in Chap. XVII, "Nature and Spirit," in the author's Theory of Reality, from which the sentences in quotation are taken.

from the outside as a mere collection of data, arranged in a series, in unending time. She is an architectonic Force, formative and progressive according to ideas. Like the pure Being of the Greek philosopher, she is both Subject and objects,—Maker and things made." Or as Spinoza in more modern times would express the truth: Nature has become in some sort divided against herself; her total Being includes *natura naturata*, and *natura naturans*; a gross lot of created things that may be arranged and observed as in a natural system (a visible, tangible nature) and a creative Nature, or invisible, intangible and spirit-like power of evolving, in varied systematic ways, such visible and tangible things.

Thus has the metaphysics, both of philosophy and of science, recognized two groups of conceptions which must somehow be combined and made to work in harmony, if we are to have any collective term which will begin to hold the full content of the conception for which we are seeking. If Spirit, outside of and aloof from nature, will not serve for such a term; then Nature that has no spirit in it, must be deemed equally impotent. For Nature, even when regarded as an eternal but unspiritual Force, does in fact produce by her supremest efforts something spiritual, or rather an indefinite number of spirits; and these spiritual beings come to understand her, and to sympathize with her, and to supplement her in her work of evolving life and of driving man along his course in history. Nature cannot then, since to be this kind of a force is of the very essence of what man knows as spirit, be really and completely "unspiritual."

One of the more ardent and uncompromising of the advocates of the principles of scientific Naturalism¹ once declared: "For myself I am bound to say that the term 'Nature' covers the totality of that which is. The world of psychical phenomena appears to me as much a part of 'Nature' as the world of

¹ Professor Huxley, in his "Science and Christian Tradition Essays," p. 38f.

physical phenomena; and I am unable to perceive any justification for cutting the Universe into two halves, one natural and one super-natural." But such a statement as this, however it may seem to be an adequate refutation of certain theological views, neither expresses correctly nor suggests happily the answer to the problem of metaphysics as a theory of reality. Real spiritual beings exist (that "psychical phenomena" occur is an inadequate way of stating the data of the problem); these beings develope within the sphere for which the collective term Nature is proposed as a principle of explanation. Immediately the problem becomes not one of separating this sphere into two, as it were, independent halves; but of comprehending it in its totality so that it can seem to be a principle capable of performing all the work of creation and development attributed to it. And just as the lower conception of a matter, that seemed unable to live, and to be conscious, and to be mindful of itself, was transcended; so now it is necessary to transcend the conception of an unspiritual nature. For unless nature is conceived of as having the additional characteristics of spiritual being, it is as inadequate as the conception of matter was found to be, to serve as the one collective term for all that is real.

Let us, then, for the moment be content to say: Spirit must be immanent in Nature. To get from Nature to Spirit, it is necessary only to get more deeply into Nature. In other words, the needed principle is not to be found either in an unspiritual nature—falsely called, "scientific"; nor in the separation of the One Universe into the two halves of nature and spirit; but in recognizing the truth that Spirit is the real and essential Being of so-called Nature. In this truth both science and philosophy may agree.

The ultimate problem of metaphysics has now made a certain advance toward solution; but it has reached its most acute and difficult stage. The very essence of finite spirit is to be actually self-conscious and consciously self-determining. And

these spiritual exercises and achievements are possible only if the conclusion be accepted that they are immanent, or potential, in the Nature from which, and in which, all spirits have their being and their development. But how can such Spirit be actually immanent, as an effective principle, without being actually and actively exercised? In a word, how can Spirit, as a collective term be employed with reference to the work of Nature, unless the same Nature be understood to be essentially self-conscious and self-determining Spirit? To the question in this form only two answers are possible. Either we must say that the use of the word Spirit as a collective term is a mere abstraction, a carrying of the process of personification beyond the limit within which there can be any corresponding Reality; or else, we must accept the term in good faith, and regard it as setting the limit to all metaphysical conclusions. In the former case, all the work of human knowledge, whether ordinary, scientific, or philosophical, seems to have carried the race along lines of an experience with self-like things and an acquaintance with the inmost reality of humanity, only to end in agnosticism and stupefaction. In the latter case, the mind is brought face to face with the ultimate mystery of existence in the rational conviction, and reasoned conclusion, that the Being of the World is indeed self-conscious and self-determining Spirit; since it is truly apprehended by man after the analogy of his own self-conscious and self-determining spirit.

No sane thinker would claim that the use of this collective term, and the conception which corresponds to it,—the conception of Absolute Spirit—can be comprehended on all sides. On the contrary, it is itself the conception in which the ultimate mysteries of all being and of all human knowledge are included. As a principle of explanation it cannot, therefore, be made to take the place, or usurp the functions, of any—much less of all of the particular sciences. That it needs to be, and that it may be, successfully supported and expanded in a manner

helpful to thought, and comforting to the feelings, by considerations of fact and argument taken from other branches of philosophy, we shall show later on. But neither religious faith, nor cool, reflective thinking, can solve all mysteries. The particular sciences are even more impotent in the same spheres of explanatory endeavor. Indeed, their principal contributions to such problems only increase the difficulties and the complications attending any attempt at their solution. But this is because the more man knows of particular realities, the richer and more complex does the World which contains and produces them all, of necessity appear.

There is, however, one objection to any such theory of reality as that to which we have been, step by step, led forward, that requires a brief notice at this point. It has often been urged—although not so much of late—that the very conception of an Absolute Spirit, of the Being of the World as essentially self-conscious and self-determining, is internally contradictory and intrinsically absurd. Against this unqualified negation one might oppose the equally unqualified affirmation of Lotze: that *only* the Absolute or Infinite can be a self-conscious and self-determining Spirit, a real Person, in the truest meaning of the term. The more modest answer of psychology would seem to lie between, and to depend with much better assurance upon the valid experience of what it is really to be a Mind. The grasp of man's self-consciousness, and the sphere of man's self-determination, are in fact limited in space and time and content, in many ways. Nor can his mind imagine, or render into actual terms of consciousness, what a life would be like, in which all such limitations were wholly removed. But it does not appear that limitations, external to the Self and imposed from without, are essential to either self-consciousness or self-determination. On the contrary, the more varied, contentful, and rapid, are our activities which are classed under the terms, "sense-perception" or "self-consciousness," the more of minds, or spirits, do we seem to ourselves really to be. And

to hold that Absolute Spirit cannot be, because all its seeming self-determinations must really spring from its own depths instead of being actualized as limitations from without, would seem to merit the very charge of absurdity which the argument itself is constructed in order to enforce. We are at present contented, therefore, to affirm that the conception of the Being of the World, as Absolute Spirit, or self-conscious and self-determining Mind, is not to be thrown out of court, as contrary to reason, because it is not clearly representable in human imagination, or mathematically demonstrable, or capable of being subjected to the tests of empirical science. For it is a conception, the argument for which seems to harmonize with the nature of all human knowledge, and with the essential characteristics of all the objects of such knowledge. Were particular things, not *of* mind, how could they become known as actively they are known, *to* minds? And were the Nature in which all spiritual natures live and move and have their being, not as good as Personal Spirit; how could these finite spirits explain the fact that they themselves are constituted and developed, as they know themselves really to be?

CHAPTER XIII

ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY: ITS SPHERE AND PROBLEMS

IT is impossible to tell what human history would have been without the commanding influence of human moral, artistic, and religious ideals. It is safe to say that there would have been no *human* history at all. Indeed, it is these sentiments and ideals, rather than those ordinarily grouped under the physical and economic forces, which have chiefly characterized and controlled man's historical development; and to them the physical movements, whether peaceful or warlike, and the economical failures and successes of humanity, have been largely due. It is almost equally impossible to conjecture how the world of things would appear, and what would be the course in evolution of the physical and chemical sciences, if man were not possessed somehow of a moral, æsthetical, and religious nature. The World has never seemed to him devoid of mysterious and admirable forces, under the guidance of ideas which he could only dimly apprehend or, perhaps, could not even venture guesses about; but which stirred feeling, and stimulated ideas, of the beautiful and the sublime. The religious feelings of awe, worship, and desire for a knowledge which may safely lead to communion with invisible spirits, have universally been attached to the conception of Nature, as well as to many of the particular natural objects which seemed especially adapted to call them forth. Even modern science cannot talk of the grandeur, orderliness, mysterious power, and architectonic skill, of the things it observes and measures, or—even less—of the Universe, of which these things are parts and in whose life they share, without appealing to the same senti-

ments and ideals. In a word, things—their natures, modes of behavior, relations under the laws in a system—are scientifically known *to be real*, in such a way as evokes the confidence that, to some extent at least, they *correspond to* human ideals of an ethico-aesthetical or ethico-religious sort.

If now we recur to the point where the attempt was made to distinguish the main divisions of philosophy (see p. 30) it appears that one of these divisions was called "Philosophy of the Real," and another "Philosophy of the Ideal." We turn now to the more definite consideration of those problems which appropriately belong under the latter term.

Of the problems which may somewhat readily be distinguished as belonging to the Philosophy of the Ideal, there are three principal kinds. These give us the three divisions of (1) Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, (2) AÆsthetics, and (3) the Philosophy of Religion. Only in the latter case, however, do we find that the reflective thinking of mankind has evolved an Ideal of such a character that, its reality being assumed or proved, philosophy finds in it the ultimate Ground of all that is real, and the realization of all human ideals. Since this Idea is believed in, and worshipped, as God, the problem which it offers to reflective thinking may be called the problem of "The Absolute," or of the "Ideal-Real."

Our first concern in dealing with Ethics as a branch of philosophy is to know what territory it proposes to cover; and how it proposes to deal with the problems which it claims lie within this territory. And here at once some difficulty arises from the very nature of the subject. On the one hand, philosophy is supposed to deal with matters of theory—such as a theory of knowledge, or a theory of reality; and to make use of the methods of reflection and speculation. Only in this way, and then only as a matter of degrees, does it distinguish itself from the particular sciences which, as there has been repeated occasion to see, are all to a degree, metaphysical. But ethics—first, last and all the time—deals with what is practical, or

with doing in the form of human conduct. Only as thoughts, feelings, and ideas, are forms of doing, or matters of a practical sort, do they come within the sphere of ethics at all. Even the most abstract speculations of the schools of ethics, when examined, turn out to be for the most part wranglings over questions of psychological fact, rather than different essays in guarded and thorough reflective thinking. The tendency has, therefore, been on the one hand to exclude ethical problems from science because they deal so much with uncertain data of individual opinions and do not admit of scientific tests; and, on the other hand, to discredit moral philosophy as too abstract for paying so little attention to the same data, as matters of fact.

If the word "science" is to be confined to physical and chemical investigations, where mathematics and measurements and careful use of the external senses are so important, ethics certainly cannot be classed as one of the sciences. But the data for this study are data of fact; and ethics is pre-eminently a study of facts, if one may agree with Professor Wundt in saying: "The estimate of the value of facts is also itself a fact, and a fact which must not be overlooked when it is there to see." Ethics is also pre-eminently a psychological science; and it therefore requires the appreciation and interpretation of facts of the mental life, "as such"—that is, as facts of conscious, and self-conscious and self-determining mind. For this reason, to endeavor to convert it into an anthropological or sociological study, and so absorb it in the sciences which complicate and spread themselves under these terms, is quite to reverse the true order of procedure. For anthropology itself, and even to a greater extent, so-called sociology, have no claim to scientific standing except as they are compounds of psychology, ethics, and certain branches of history. The external signs of these forms of man's ethical evolution are discoverable by observation and history; the appreciation and interpretation of them must be given by psychology and ethics.

When now the question is raised, "What particular kind of mental facts, including facts which are estimates of the value of facts, does ethics attempt to reduce to scientific form?" the answer is not especially difficult. They are facts of human conduct. Conduct expresses itself, indeed, in a great variety of external ways, such as gesture, language, movements of the bodily organism, customs, institutions, laws, religious observances, and even scientific and philosophical theories. But these are all signs of the inner life of ideas, thoughts, motives, and deeds of will; and it is this inner life, primarily considered, which has true ethical quality.

Two important distinctions lie within the sphere, so far as it has already been defined, of that methodical and systematic study of certain facts of the inner life which may be called in a preliminary way, the science of ethics. The first of these is the distinction between facts which are taken as mere facts, and those facts which are estimates of the value of facts; it is in this latter class of facts that the very essence of the ethical is to be found. Psychology may look at all mental facts, just as mere facts, in the same way in which the chemical and physical sciences aim to deal with the facts falling within their respective spheres. But ethics cannot regard its facts solely in this fashion. The moment you take the ethical point of view, you must begin to speak of "good" and "bad"—meaning by this to set up some standard of value, to the measurement of which the facts in your judgment, must come. And let it be noticed that this standard cannot be the truth, or factuality, of the facts themselves. That is to say, the occurrences of the inner life, whether known by self-consciousness or by external signs, are adjudged to have some kind of worth, or worthlessness, according as they do, or do not, conform to some kind of a standard. They are facts of value, from the ethical point of view.

The second distinction which is required in order the better to define the sphere of ethics is the distinction between action

and conduct.¹ "It is not mere doing, whether of this or that sort, which gives to the student of ethics his peculiar problems. Conduct implies something more than action. Conduct implies the consciousness of an end that may be striven for; it implies the knowledge of means that are adapted to the end; it implies the power of choice with reference to both end and means. Conduct, in a word, is action rationally shaped; it is the doing of a Moral Self." This, however, does not narrow the sphere of ethics. We recall how Aristotle, in his attempt to define ethics as a kind of politics, affirms of the total function of man that it is "an activity of soul in accordance with reason, or not independently of reason" (Nic. Eth., I, vii, 14). Conduct, as being the action of a Moral Self, is not indeed a specific kind of action, set apart, as it were, for some definite species of external performances, certain compliances with custom, or refusals to comply, to the exclusion of other species of action. "In fact, the presence of these ethical estimates is to be discerned in every thing which man consciously and voluntarily does. Higher or lower degrees of these characteristics of all conduct are actually found as far back in history, and as low down in ethical or intellectual degradation, as we can follow the development of humanity. In his eating the adult human being, unless converted by hunger, or lost to shame, he returns to the action of a beast, does not merely *feed*. In his drinking he does not simply *swill* his drink. He raises the social cup, he pours out a libation to the gods; and the gods at any rate must be treated politely by the most shameless and gluttonous of cannibals. And when, as amongst the various Hindu castes in India, custom and morality and religion are so confused as to constitute a nearly complete enslavement of all the activities and interests of human life, the necessity and validity of this distinction between action and conduct are all the more to be emphasized."

¹ See the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*, p. 10 f., from which the following quotations are taken.

From these considerations are derived in part, but in part only, the reasons for emphasizing the presence of ideals in all ethical study. Certain proximate, but not final, ideals are of necessity involved in the very facts which have been called "estimates of the values of facts"; and which therefore comply with the characteristics distinguishing mere action from true conduct. In one form or another most writers on ethical subjects acknowledge the presence and power of these ideal influences. It is this recognition which has led some of them (Wundt) to define ethics as "the original science of norms"; and which has induced yet others (Mr. Spencer) to speak of ethics as dealing with the "doubly ideal." By the latter term it is meant that ethics should consider what would be "ideal conduct" (or conduct conforming to the idea which sets the standard) under "ideally constituted social conditions." But with this we cannot agree.

If now the data of ethics be approached with a view to collate and interpret them, and so to reduce them to something, at least resembling scientific form, the approach may be made from any one of several points of view. Inasmuch as these data are facts of different kinds of human conduct, rather than of the actions of the lower animals or of angelic beings under other than human physical and social conditions, they must be regarded as springing from the nature of man. The sources of ethics are to be found in the Self, regarded as self-conscious and self-determining; but also as influenced and determined by its relations to other selves and to self-like things. When studied from this point of view, ethics becomes a pre-eminently psychological investigation. But the same data may be classified as historical occurrences; and then it soon becomes apparent that this classification, in order to correspond to historical truth, must recognize the principle of development. By no means precisely the same kinds of conduct have been estimated in the same way by all human beings at any one time, or under all conditions, or in the different

ages of human history. Whether the ethical data are studied, as they are furnished by the individual, or by any particular group of individuals, or—so far as this is possible—by the race at large, ceaseless changes are seen to be taking place. Some deeds which were rated as virtues become rated as vices; and the vices of previous generations gain toleration, or even secure the approval as virtues, of succeeding generations. A deeper insight does, indeed, convince the student that these changes affect more the external signs than the character of the motives, the sentiments and ideals, from which the actions are judged to spring. But this conclusion, too, must be reached in accordance with the verdict of history.

In man's moral development, whether as individual or as racial, the same general truths prevail which characterize every form of human development. It is only by observation and reflection that the Moral Self comes to understand itself as moral or to discover the principles which underlie and regulate the relations in the midst of which its life and its developments take place. Right moral practice, understood as an intelligent and deliberate conformity to principles which appear reasonable to the conscious mind, is a relatively late affair. The more nearly instinctive and spontaneous following of obscure impulses, the acceptance of judgments either pronounced by recognized authorities or embodied in customs and institutions, belong to the earlier stages of ethical development. Beyond these stages, even after centuries of discussion of ethical problems by the advocates of the different schools of ethics, multitudes of men never attain. But in ethics, as in physics and in the natural sciences generally, certain principles do become, not only more clear as embodied in customs and institutions, and as taught by the recognized authorities; but they become more clearly comprehended as respects their nature and their grounds. Thus something of a logical character, something resembling a scientific system, is in a measure made possible for the student of ethics. In a word, the psychological study of the data in

their sources, and the historical study of the same data in their evolution, helped out by reasoning, result in a so-called "science of ethics."

Whether we consent to call this result from studying the facts of human conduct a "science," or not, we certainly cannot call it a science of *ethics*, the moment we lose sight of those distinctions in the making of which the peculiar sphere of the moral, as contrasted with the non-moral, is to be defined. The data of ethics are never less than the doings of a self-conscious and self-determining mind. It is true that all conduct, like all the existence of man and all that happens to man, is inseparably related to the bodily organism, both in the manner of its origin and also in the character of its expression. Of what would be conduct, good or bad, for a wholly disembodied spirit, no satisfactory mental representation can be framed. It is also true that the earlier and vaguer notions of personal life attribute to the Self many things which do not fall under the category of conduct as we have already defined it. Primitive and savage peoples often emphasize by punishment or reward a kind of unconscious and unintentional tribal responsibility. And theology has, in all the greater religions, consigned unborn or newly born infants, to perdition for the conscious vices of remote and even mythical ancestors. But if any appropriate sphere for a scientific ethics is to be discovered, it must recognize the difference between action and conduct as already defined.

Whether in treating of the sources, the doctrine of evolution, or the logical conclusions by way of establishing principles of ethics, another distinction is equally important. This distinction arises out of a difference in the "facts of estimate" given to the facts of conduct. If there were no such facts of estimate, and no such classification as is signified by the words "approved" or "disapproved," "right" or "wrong," "good" or "bad," "ought" and "ought-not"; then there would be no strictly ethical data to consider. Indeed, it is the attachment

of the facts of estimate to the facts of conduct which converts them into affairs of moral concernment. This second distinction directs the thought to a doctrine of sanctions as an indispensable part of moral philosophy.

This preliminary conception of the sphere of ethics may be completed by summarizing the preceding thoughts as follows: "Ethics results from the scientific study of human conduct—its sources, its development, its most general principles and its sanctions—as related to a standard." Its subject-matter is Conduct; its problems are such as the following: How do the different facts of estimate arise as having their sources in human nature? What kind of development do these forms of conduct go through, in the history of the individual and of the race? What principles may, with more or less consistency, be derived as governing this development? What is the origin, nature, and validity of these sanctions? And what is the nature of the standard to which the different kinds of conduct are brought, for the purpose of determining their worth?

It will appear at once that it is no easy task to tell just where philosophy must enter the field, and how far go hand in hand with science, in the discussion of ethical data. There is, indeed, no important ethical problem which does not very quickly transform itself into such a shape that its solution becomes largely a matter for metaphysical inquiry. Indeed, when examined to their foundations, they are all found to be firmly cemented to metaphysical problems. The one profoundly interesting question which reflective thinking puts to them all is with regard to their grounds in the real Being of the World. Facts, they are, and opinions about facts. They are facts which at first seem of the most mystical and changeful character; they are opinions that often appear most whimsical to the mind of a later age, and often most unaccountable even to the mind of the person entertaining them. Yet there is about these ethical data a certain group of characteristics which led

the Greek tragedian to speak of the “firmer laws” of right and wrong conduct as,

“Created not of man’s ephemeral mould,
They ne’er shall sink to slumber in oblivion,
A power of God is there, untouched by Time.”

And Aristotle, although he seems clearly to have recognized the difficulty of establishing ethics as a science, affirms: “There is no human function so constant as the activities in accordance with virtue; they seem to be more permanent than the sciences themselves.”

The following three questions, however, summarize fairly well the main problems which the data of ethics propose to reflective thinking in the form of moral philosophy: (1) What is the real nature of that being in whom the sources of morality are found? (2) What are the kinds of his conduct that have actually established themselves as conformable to the standard set by this nature in its actual relations to its environment? (3) What ground in the Being of the World can be assumed for the sanctions and the ideals of morality? In brief, the philosophy of conduct treats of the Moral Self, the Virtuous Life, and the Nature of the Right or morally Good; —and all with a view to fit its conclusions into a harmonious system of reflective thinking.

CHAPTER XIV

THE MORAL SELF

THE principal problem of psychological ethics may be summed up in some such manner as follows: What equipment for the moral life belongs to the subject of that life? In attempting to answer this problem that study of the phenomena which takes the point of view of biological evolution and therefore tries, under the principle of continuity, to make both a historical and a causal connection between man and the lower animals, is not without great value. But from the distinctively ethical point of view, man's moral nature must be regarded as an *endowment*. Whatever order his moral evolution may have followed; and however the influences of environment acted in establishing this order; ethics is chiefly concerned to know that it is, and what it is, which now renders man capable of responsible conduct. Even in raising such an inquiry, it is found necessary to distinguish between those factors, or forms of functioning, which are essentially ethical, and those which, however important as springs and guides of conduct, are not essential in order to a capacity for conduct at all. For example, anger, jealousy, fear, pride, and sympathy, together with the actions which grow out of them, are common to man with the lower animals. In man's case these emotions become distinguished as either good or bad from the ethical point of view. In man's case, too, they have an important influence in determining moral character. But they are not in themselves specific factors of man's moral equipment; they need to be associated with some other characteristics of feeling, judgment, and volition, in order to give them the uniquely moral significance which they have in the case of the human animal.

What, then, is it really to be a Moral Self? And what is the

significance of such a being in its influence upon our views as to the nature of the world which has evolved him? If we can answer these questions with any degree of fullness and confidence, we may hope—at least in some measure—to expand and confirm a tenable theory of reality. Thus the metaphysics of ethics may be made contributory to general metaphysics. Really to be a Self is, indeed, to be a self-conscious, rational, and self-determining Mind. But to be such a mind, would not, of itself, be the equivalent of a real Moral Selfhood. What more *is* necessary in order to constitute such a reality? Nature has answered this most primary demand by endowing man with a unique form of feeling.¹

"Into every genuinely human consciousness, into every subject of the truly human life, there enters at some time a form of emotional disturbance which is chronologically primary and essential to the very idea of ethics, as well as the unique possession of man. It is only when this feeling becomes attached to the idea of a certain action, that the action becomes conduct and the truly moral life begins. This statement must be received as applying in the strictest way to the development of moral consciousness in the individual; but it may be taken on grounds which, although largely speculative, are quite tenable, as applying to the development of morality in the race. It follows from the very nature of this feeling, as well as from the circumstances of its first origin in human consciousness, that all analysis ends with its recognition; neither the memory of the individual, nor any records kept by mankind, can recall and represent the occasions or the conditions of its origin in the race. As in similar cases, however, it is possible in this case to place on a firm basis of observed facts our views as to what takes place in the development of the individual, and to make out an acceptable argument as to what must have taken place

¹ For a detailed discussion of the "Feeling of Obligation," see Chapter V of the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*, from which the quotations are made.

in the history of the race." This feeling, which in its complicated and more highly developed form is known as the "feeling of obligation," we will call in its simpler and original form the "*feeling of the ought*" (and its opposite, *the feeling of the ought-not*). About it our contention is this: "*The feeling of the ought*" is primary, essential, unique; but the judgments as to what one ought are the result of environment, education, and reflection.

Within the consciousness of the human individual this feeling of the ought must arise and develop, or there can be no beginning and no growth of the Moral Self. The actuality in fact, and the dominating influence of this feeling, constitute the self-conscious and self-determining mind to be an ethical spirit. Its nature, which is essential to human moral nature, demands such a description as experience is able to give to it; but its nature is essentially such as to make its positive characteristics known only by the experience of just it and no other form of emotion or ideation. And, first, the feeling of the ought is not a mere pleasure-pain feeling; although it may be fused, or more loosely associated, with various kinds of pleasurable or painful feelings. Second: it is not a special form of emotion or desire, to be classed with the appetites, passions, or affections, such as hunger, or anger, fear, jealousy, love, or hate. But it is, third, a social feeling and apparently demands for its origin even, as it certainly demands for its guidance and development, the excitement of personal instruction and the experience of personal relations. It is also, fourth, a peculiar form of compulsion. To feel "I ought" is to become aware of some sort of bond which draws toward, or away from, some particular deed or course of conduct. But it would appear that in most, if not in all, of its earlier forms of manifestation, the reason Why—the explanation of the cause of the compulsion—is not made clear to the subject of this feeling. It is this mystery about the whole matter, this failure to comprehend why the mind feels compelled to do or not to do, with its accompani-

ment of sanctions which are obscure and hard to reckon with, that has bestowed its power upon *tabu* among primitive and savage peoples; and that has also induced religious minds to regard conscience as the "voice of God." To this must be added that the more sensitive the mind becomes to this kind of compulsion, the less regardful it becomes of the other forms of physical or psychical compulsion which endeavor to control conduct by an appeal to its sensitiveness to various kinds of pleasures and pains.

It is true that "when adult men say, 'I ought,' or other words equivalent to these, they are customarily expressing a complex attitude of mind toward a particular piece of conduct. Like every other attitude of mind, that which is thus expressed involves feeling, thought, and volition. And, indeed, one may emphasize either of these three aspects of the total situation by modifying one's expression. Thus one may emphasize the emotional factor by declaring: 'I feel' (more or less intensely and unswervingly) that I ought; or may lay stress upon the intellectual factor, the presence of judgment, by saying: 'I think' (more or less clearly, and with a consciousness of the reasons or grounds) that I ought; or even: 'I must,' indeed, and I shall, because I ought—in this way bringing into evidence the volitional impulse or mandate given to the will. But by separating in thought, what cannot be found wholly apart in the actual life of the Self, the conclusion is justified that this feeling of the ought is not to be identified with any other forms of human consciousness."

It is not difficult now to see how a great variety arises, not only in the actual forms of conduct which become accepted as customs, but also in those facts of estimate which by their attachment to the facts of action bring them within the sphere of the truly moral. For this obscure and mysterious "feeling of oughtness" is at first chiefly subject to conditions set by the physical and social environment. More precisely, at the first, it is chiefly prohibitory,—an enforcement by authority or by

the immediate connection with painful consequences, of the feeling I ought-not. Especially amongst savage and more nearly primitive peoples is it true that the feeling of obligation is primarily enforced, in the supposed interests of the family or tribe, so as to connect itself with refraining from doing something which the passions or self-interested promptings of the individual would lead him to do. "You must not this; you must not that,"—such is the command with which the community meets the cry of its individual members: "I want this, or I want that." Almost equally original and imperative is the demand to do that which it is painful or disagreeable to do. Thus customs, whether they are viewed as good or bad morally from the later historical, or higher and purer ethical points of view, become the approved laws for the Moral Self. That environment—and chiefly in the social form constituted by the prevalent customs—largely has the say as to what connections shall in fact be established between certain forms and types of conduct and this unique feeling of obligation, there can be no doubt. But this is a very different thing from saying that the customary is the moral; or that the development of the Moral Self is purely a matter determined by the physical and social environment.

Moreover, a process of reflection which has for its object to consider both the remoter consequences of conduct, and also the intrinsic nature of the inner life of thought, sentiment, and deeds of will, as itself subject to estimates of value from an ideal point of view, is all the while going on in the individual and in the race. Moral judgment, carrying with it the compulsion of the feeling of obligation, is constantly being passed upon the established customs themselves. Thus the Moral Self rises above the very influences which have co-operated to make it a Moral Self at the first. It was shaped by custom; but it now "breaks the cake of custom" and appeals in justification to something of a higher value which it finds within itself.

"The further exposition of the part which the feeling of obligation plays in the moral development of man requires that the working of other faculties in his equipment for the life of conduct should be taken into account. In part the origin, nature, and cultivation of ethical judgments must be discussed before we can understand the later forms of his consciousness of 'oughtness.' But two or three classes of familiar phenomena deserve at least a reference in this connection. First, it may readily be seen that vacillations and uncertainties of this form of ethical feeling are inevitable. These are not simply due to its obscuration and blunting by the so-called selfish emotions. Doubt about the rightfulness of the control of the feeling of obligation by the current rules of conduct is essential to a higher development of the individual and of the race. But such doubt inevitably leads to the disturbance of the feeling and to its possible detachment from its old associations. While this feeling trembles in the balance, as it were, between the old and the new point of attachment, an important influence is being exercised upon the entire attitude of the individual toward the conception of duty and toward the dutiful life. In large communities, and over continents occupied by different races and differing constitutions of existing society, periods of 'illumination' are always connected with unusual disturbances in morals and in the moral consciousness. This was true of the epoch when the Sophists became prominent in Greece, of the Renaissance in the Middle Ages, of the *Aufklärung* in Europe in the eighteenth century; it is true of to-day in connection with the modern discoveries of ethnology and with the application of the cruder views of biological evolution to the development of morality in the human race.

"And, second, the place of the feeling of obligation in the moral life explains, in part, how divergent views as to the nature and authority of so-called 'conscience' may arise. To speak of *a* conscience, or *the* conscience, is likely to induce misunderstanding of the most primary data of psychological

ethics. Moral consciousness man has; or, rather, he is essentially a moral consciousness. In this moral nature of his consciousness are found involved all of his so-called faculties, or powers, in so far as they have reference to the production and the criticism of conduct. No wonder, then, that those theorists who appeal solely to the feeling of obligation fail to convince others who take their appeal to the bar of an enlightened judgment. And just as little wonder that the latter, when they offend the feeling of obligation by their coolly intellectual judgments, run the risk of being described as essentially immoral in their standards of judgment. Thus fine feeling and sound judgment in matters of conduct may seem to be involved in a perpetual conflict.

"But, third, these same considerations show that this kind of conflicts in morals, with all the tragedy to which these words indubitably bear witness, is the fate of the individual and of the race,—the price that must be paid for all essential progress under existing social conditions toward the realization of the moral ideal. If moral judgment, based on grounds that lie outside itself and beyond the reach of mere feeling, is ever to be framed, then feeling and judgment must at times come into conflict. But since the rational man feels the obligation to be rational,—and, sometimes, as his supremest obligation,—therefore, the feeling of obligation is liable to be divided against itself. He who has not judged that he ought not to do that which he, nevertheless, still feels that he ought to do, has probably not yet passed beyond the earliest stages of moral development.

"And, finally, we are now prepared in a general way to give an opinion upon one of the contentions of the extreme evolutionary school of ethics. This school would make out that all which concerns the feeling of obligation is relative, is subject to evolution. In the case of individual man such a conclusion plainly is not true to the facts in the case. With the individual the most primary movings of an 'ought-consciousness' are not

modifications of the pleasure-pain feelings, or of any of those forms of emotional excitement which are so often improperly divided into egoistic and altruistic. On the other hand, the most primary forms of the quasi-ethical judgments are only propositions stating the fact of the arousal of this feeling; and the particular actions to which this feeling makes its earliest and firmest attachments are explicable by reference to influences of education and environment. In the later development of the Moral Self, the feeling of obligation becomes modified and changed in its associations by the changed character of the same influences, as these influences work upon all the passions and affections, and upon a system of increasingly intelligent judgments.

"Thus do man's moral convictions form themselves; and they always present the twofold aspect in which the feeling of obligation stands to his voluntary nature. They have a passive aspect; they are a consciousness of being *under law*. They have also an active aspect; they are an emotional excitement which constitutes a call to volition. The feeling of obligation is a feeling of being bound; for the 'ought' partakes in a measure of the nature of a 'must': it is also an impulsive feeling, and in its more intense forms comes very near to passing over from emotional impulse into an 'I will.'

"What is true in the small sphere is probably true in the large. What is true of the ought-consciousness of the individual is, so far as we can discover, true of the place which the feeling of obligation has always taken in the development of the moral life of the race."

No increase in the intensity, or refinement in the quality, of the feeling of obligation could ever result in the development of a Moral Self. Here, as in all the functions and interests of a completed self-hood, or maturing personality, it is the active intellect which develops. For this, its work in the sphere of the moral life, however, it does not appear that any additional or peculiar forms of intellectual activity are necessary. What

is necessary lies outside of the individual. It is his social environment, and the instructive and disciplinary experiences which necessarily arise out of the varied relations and causal reactions which come to the individual by way of intercourse with those of his own kind. In a word, given a self-conscious and self-determining mind, with all the powers of memory, imagination, and rational inference as to the secret and more remote consequences of actions; endow such a mind with the feeling of obligation; and place it under such social conditions as actually exist for the race in its historical development here upon the earth; and you then have supplied all that is necessary for the maturing of a Moral Self.

The earliest judgments, which have only an inchoate or *quasi-ethical* character, are easily accounted for in the following way: Under external influences, the most potent of which consists of the immediate and dominant personal authority, the feeling of oughtness becomes attached to certain kinds of action, as a form of either positive or negative compulsion—a feeling of the “ought-to-be-done,” or of the “ought-not-to-be-done.” This feeling is aroused, intensified, and reinforced by certain pains or pleasures, which are inflicted by the same external authority. The parent, the nurse, the older brother or sister, the community of playmates, or of teacher and school-mates, or the officer of the law in the block or upon the street-corner, establishes for the individual child the connection in experience between the germ of ethical emotion and the deed of will which results in the action. In its first stage, then, moral judgment is little or nothing more than an affirmation of this connection. This is right, and that is wrong, means only that the feeling of oughtness in the one case, and of its opposite in the other case, is in fact established by certain social, but purely external influences. But this important distinction between the moral judgment, even when in its most undeveloped form, and all judgments having relation to the connection of external events, is to be noted: The moral judgment establishes a connection of

an interior and unique sort between *my* feeling and *my* deed of will. And when this connection is reinforced by those other more complicated and distinctly social forms of ethical feeling which will be described later on, the evolution of moral selfhood is already well begun.

The undeveloped state of the moral judgment cannot last, no matter however secluded the individual may be, or how narrow the limits of his social environment. Doubt must arise as to the validity and the value of such judgment; and readjustment of the factors which enter into it, whether it has taken the affirmative or the negative form, must inevitably take place. No individual is so fortunately born and so carefully educated as to escape this shaking-up of his naïve and unintelligent, but feeling-full moral judgments. No child of the slums, however trained to judge himself bound in honor to commit crimes against the larger social order which encompasses and tries to restrain his own, can wholly avoid the challenge to reconsider his ideas and ideals of an ethical sort.

The sources of this compulsion to form new and different judgments as to conduct are chiefly of two kinds. One kind arises from within. The very individuality of every Self brings about a conflict between the judgments which have been dictated from without in conformity to the social customs and social ideals, and the judgments which are required in order to afford satisfaction to the individual Self. I have been told, I have been made to feel, that I ought to do this, and that I ought not to do that. But I have my own Self to look after; and as this Self develops, the demands which it makes for various kinds and amounts of satisfactions are greatly increased. I want to do what I have been made to feel I ought not to do; and I want not to do what I have been made to feel I ought to do. According as these impulses to action, by way of appetite, passion, desire, ambition, aspiration, when judged by the standard of an enlightened moral ideal, are either lower or higher than the forms of conduct prescribed and enforced by the

custom prevailing in his class, the individual may be determined to fall or to rise in the moral scale. In the one case he violates conscience, as mere unreasoned feeling, by determining to act contrary to his former moral judgments; and he may easily end by altering or suppressing the feeling, and by judging it to be morally right for him so to act. In the other case, he finds the satisfaction for what seems to him a higher form of feeling, by changing his former judgments in favor of these newer forms of experience. In either case, there has been an important development of the Moral Self. As we hear it properly said: "The man has come to judge and to act more for himself."

This inner temptation, or solicitation, to the development of moral selfhood by forming moral judgments of a more reflective and self-determined character, is further enforced by a growing experience with the social environment. It does not take the child long to discover that other people hold a great variety of views as to the right and the wrong of particular kinds of conduct. Of course, in certain essentials there seems to be too nearly general an agreement to make it worth while to question its validity. Or, if this might possibly be questioned on theoretical grounds merely,—a kind of reflection for which the individual is scarcely prepared at the stage of his intellectual development which is here supposed;—it is surely not wise in practical ways to depart from the common moral judgment. But where there is so much difference on practical matters as is obvious between parent and children, teacher and school-mate, officer of the law and thief, preacher and pew-holder, and between what one is on Sunday exhorted to do *because it is right*, and what one is tempted every week to judge is right, *because it is wanted* to be done; how shall the individual escape the necessity of revising and changing his moral judgments?

The enforcement of the need of moral development through a revision of moral judgments is itself strengthened in two

important ways. The first of these consists in bringing to consciousness other forms of feeling which are essentially related to, but are not identical with, the feeling of obligation. These are the feelings of approbation and of disapprobation, and the feelings of merit and demerit. These affective attitudes of the human consciousness toward conduct and toward character, when analyzed, appear more complex than the primitive and distinctively ethical feeling of obligation. From it they all differ in the following four, not unimportant ways.

And, first, there is a difference in the ethical feelings as respects their temporal relations to the deed of will. In imagination, at least, the feeling of obligation is fitly excited in view of a deed that is about to be done. This feeling looks forward to the future conduct; it arises on contemplation of conduct that is still to be. One of its most valuable services in assisting the growth of intelligent moral judgment is its power to call a halt to impulse before it passes over into deeds. "Hold up!" it cries, "let us consider whether this is really what ought to be done." The question what ought to have been done is more purely speculative; it requires an act of imagination in order to place the Self in moral judgment before the deed. But with the feelings of approbation and disapprobation, just the reverse is true as respects the temporal relation to the deed. These feelings look backward upon the deed as an already accomplished fact. They ask judgment to be pronounced in the light of the answer to the question: "How do you feel about it *now?*" And this involves complicated calculations as to the consequences, especially as they affect one's position of credit or esteem in society; and also one's feelings of self-esteem, or what we call moral shame or moral pride. From this, it follows, second, that the feeling of obligation constitutes a "motive" for the will—an impelling or deterrent force; while the feelings of approbation and disapprobation are of a more contemplative, deliberative, and abstract character. In order to allow them to be attached to what men call a "cool judg-

ment," or a "fair estimate," of any piece of conduct, or type of character, it is necessary to have the intellect informed as to a great variety of the antecedent conditions, and more hidden constituents, of the object upon which judgment is to be passed.

A third difference consists in the relations which the ethical feelings sustain to the experiences of pleasure and of pain. The feeling of obligation, when most intense and worthy of a high place in the scale of values, is often of a highly painful character. This is true of it whether it is found attached to a judgment which affirms the right, or to a judgment which affirms the wrong, of a particular piece of conduct. And while the pain occasioned by doing as one feels one ought may be very intense; the pleasure of doing as one ought is generally of a rather mild and non-compensatory value. It is as though nature would not have us bow to the authority of the sense of obligation on account of any hedonistic interest in our experience of it. But the case is not the same with the feelings of approbation and disapprobation. Feelings of approbation are distinctly pleasurable; and feelings of disapprobation are distinctly painful. In this connection we may notice one of the several fallacies which characterize all hedonistic theories. If all the pleasures of the approving consciences of all mankind were *qua*d pleasure, to be placed in the scales with the pains which all mankind have suffered both in doing the right and in disapproving the wrong, there can be little doubt which way the scales would turn. In a word, the sufferings of humanity far exceed its pleasures as *immediate* results or accompaniments of obedience to the moral law—of following the moral ideal. Seeking for pleasure affords no sufficient impulse, not to say intelligent guide, for the development of a Moral Self.

There is a fourth still more important difference between these two classes of feelings. The emotions with which men greet certain classes of conduct and certain types of character, *objectively regarded*, are very similar to certain non-moral emotions. What we have been speaking of as ethical

approbation or disapprobation is about as truly æsthetical. Thus the difference between the way in which men approve what they judge to be beautiful and what they judge to be morally right is not so much in the character of the feeling as in the nature of the objects. In the one case, it is a quality of being; in the other, a species of conduct. But conduct itself is an exhibition of certain qualities of personal life; and men are ready enough, are indeed readily enough compelled, to personify the qualities of impersonal things. So that the hero, who overcomes obstacles by the force of his personality, becomes admired for a sublimity which approaches that of the sea or the sky; and he is also approved as one possessed in large measure of what is morally good. Heroic goodness is particularly admirable from both the æsthetical and the ethical points of view. The qualities of heroism, whether in a good or in a bad cause, and whether in the interests of good or of bad intentions, cannot be considered as entirely *non-moral* in character.

The feelings of merit and demerit, with which moral judgments inevitably become complicated and by which they are enormously influenced, are still more complex and of a secondary and social character. The feeling of merit involves a feeling of desert and a vague feeling of right. In it are included at least the following factors: (1) A feeling of obligation to approve (I *ought* to be morally approbated by my fellows); (2) a feeling of right to assert a claim (I am entitled to some form of the good, which *ought to come* to me, because I have complied with this feeling of obligation); and (3) a vague feeling of another's duty as it were (thus, others *ought to treat* me "accordingly.") On the contrary, the feeling of demerit involves the opposite of each of these three factors. The pleasant satisfaction which the feeling of merit affords, when its right is satisfied, is closely related to the mild pleasure of a gratified pride; the dissatisfaction following the failure to be approbated by others, and "to be treated accordingly," is much

more than an equivalent in its power to occasion pain. Here, again, we meet with another anomaly which impedes the smooth running of every hedonistic system of morals. The path along which duty leads, as marked out by the ethical feelings, is much less strewn with roses than with thorns. He who thinks to pay himself for doing what he ought, in coin of the feeling of merit, will surely fail in the business. Indeed, one of the most curious of those anomalies with which ethical study is full, is encountered here. It is, as a rule, the meanest and least moral men who have the most lively satisfactions from the sense of their own merit, and who most intensely feel their right to a reward, for the occasional small, meritorious services they render their fellow men.

On the other hand, the purism which holds to such an independent standard for measuring the right and wrong of conduct, as the judgment of the individual who pays no regard to the social judgments which are incorporated in the customs, laws, and prevalent maxims, and who is uninfluenced by considerations of disapprobation from others, and by the feeling of deserving well of others, is maintaining a view of the nature of Moral Selfhood which neither accords with the data of moral life, as facts, nor with the most highly rational norm, or ideal of such a life. That these feelings of approbation and merit (and their opposites) are powerful social influences, no one can deny. Just as little, can the thoughtful student of man's moral evolution deny that the same feelings are, on the whole, conservative of the good, and promotive of the better, moral judgments to which they become attached. Moral selfhood can be developed only in society. Social and ethical unity, sufficient to constitute an environment not only favorable to, but even permissible of, such a development is secured by these emotional forces. And whenever the individual reaches a higher plane of the true moral life, by rising superior to the public standards, in obedience to the obligation or allurements of an inner ideal, he develops his own moral selfhood the better in

the form of a reasoned opposition to these standards. But if in rare cases he has, as it were, to stand alone, and voluntarily to relinquish the hope of human approbation and the right to claim merit for following the demands of his own moral consciousness, he still makes his appeal for sympathy and approval to a higher than the present human moral kinship. He has the approval of future generations, or of Nature as a Power that makes for righteousness, or of Heaven, with its "cloud of witnesses," or of God with whom to stand alone is reward enough. But this possession is a social good, which is somehow conceived of as justifying those judgments concerning the right and wrong of conduct which conform to a rational norm, an ultimate ideal.

The second class of experiences which enforce the call to moral development by a constant revision of moral judgments, looking to a growth in moral intelligence, is of a much more subtle and, indeed, partially inexplicable character. It has to do with what we may venture to call the "internalization" of the moral judgment. By this it is intended to speak of the turning of the judgment inward upon the Self; and thus, of the attribution of all forms of ethical feeling—obligation to and not-to, approbation and disapprobation, merit and demerit—to the conscious states of the mind, to the passions, desires, affections, intentions, and purposes, irrespective of the forms of action in which they culminate and which are known to others as their external signs. In this way moral judgment becomes immediate *self-judgment*. Without growth in the intelligent and accurate practice of self-judgment no real and high moral development can be reached.

It does not require a large amount of self-consciousness to discover that actions, in one's own case and in the case of other fellows, spring from impulses of an emotional character. Of many of the most primitive and important of these impulses, the individual is only dimly and very imperfectly aware. Indeed, the basis of personal life and personal development is

laid in reflexes of which consciousness takes little or no account. When such impulses appear in consciousness as motives or influences to action, their origin, nature, and significance may not be understood at all. The psycho-physical mechanism is taking care of all this for the Self, without informing the Self as to what it is about. And even those sensory-motor reflexes which have, as the word signifies, a conscious side to their origin, tend to take the form of unconscious habits in the sensory-motor organism; indeed, without this tendency on their part, the life of intelligence for the self-conscious mind could not be advanced. But there are other forms of emotional impulse whose very nature is such as to constitute disturbances, or affective conditions, within the conscious mind. They are those appetites, passions, desires, sentiments, intentions, or deliberated but feeling-full plans, which every Self is obliged to recognize as its very own. On account of their emotional character, or inherent tendency to compel conduct, they are lumped together as so-called "motives," under a common expressive but somewhat misleading category.

So far as conduct is a matter for external observation, and for testing by the application of the standard of what is customarily approved, either "good" or "bad" conduct may arise from a variety of different and even conflicting emotions. One man's motive to kill may be avarice, another's patriotism; still others may do the same deed from motives of hatred, sympathy, jealousy, or love. Doing a favor may be due either to thoughtless or to thoughtful kindness; to a sycophant's desire to curry favor in return, to the wish to save, or to the wish to corrupt. And so all the way through, in the case of all the so-called virtues. There is no deed so devilish in appearance that it may not spring from some motive which the moral judgment of the individual consecrates as right and meritorious; and none so seemingly angelic that it may not arise in the foulest sources of passion or prejudice.

It does not appear that children, unless expressly enjoined

and instructed, readily apply moral quality to the motives rather than to the deed. Even when diligently taught not to cherish "bad hearts," or to indulge secretly in "bad feelings," obedience to the injunction in any thorough way is altogether too mature an exercise for the childish intellect. In the earlier stages of moral development, the satisfaction of the impulse is the dominant consideration; its character, as a subject for moral judgment, and, indeed,—for so a certain school of ethical writers would have us suppose—as the only proper subject, of a truly moral judgment, is of little concern. If the savage or primitive man was, in this respect, no more and no less savage and immoral, than the average school-boy of the best Christian communities to-day, he troubled himself little about his "bad heart," or about the impurity and animal baseness of the motives underlying most of the conduct which conformed to the then prevalent social customs.

It cannot be denied, however, that at present a larger and the better portion of the race do hold, and do practice, the theory of morality which attaches the moral judgment to the self-conscious conditions of the mind. It is no longer the case that only *the action* is regarded as good or bad, *according to its conformity to custom*; *the Self* is regarded as good or bad, *according to the feelings* it indulges or cherishes. Sociologists who deny this, or treat lightly of it, overlook the most wonderful and inexplicable of all the data concerning man's moral development. It is not mere external facts, such as are essentially non-moral facts, but the facts of estimates, the "value-facts," which reveal the essential nature of man's moral selfhood.

How did this marvellous inward tendency of the moral judgment come about; and what were the influences which bore down on man to make him search himself, and find within himself, the true field for judgment as to the morally good and the morally bad? From the point of view of evolutionary ethics, no question can be proposed which is more difficult of

a satisfactory answer. Something undoubtedly—and, perhaps, very much—must be allowed to prolonged human experience with the effects of motives so-called. The more essential and primitive virtues of courage, patience, endurance, and tribal sympathy, as well as those of the domestic and friendly affections, counted most heavily in the earlier conditions of tribal and individual life and welfare. They, therefore, came to be approbated and deemed meritorious, as of-and-in-themselves considered. Their opposites came, under the same influences, to experience the results of the opposition which these conditions made necessary. In a word, the historical development of the virtues in accordance with the experimental testing of their benefits to the race is a partial explanation of the preference given to certain motives as compared with other motives, or inner states.

But by far the most important of those influences which suggest and enforce the “internalization” of moral judgments are of a religious character. From the earliest dawn of human history, and in those regions of twilight or nearly complete obscurity where detailed history is difficult or impossible, men have believed in invisible spiritual agencies, which they conceived to be both like themselves, and yet also superior to themselves. Upon their relations to these spirits they have thought themselves to be dependent, at least in some measure, for human woes or human welfare. These spirits take note of man’s actions, especially as his actions affect them or their favorites among men; and they treat man accordingly. But the gods, being somewhat super-human, know about men things which men do not know about each other. The relations of enmity or friendship in which the spirit of man stands to these invisible and super-human spirits are, of necessity, of a more internal and spiritual character. Who shall conceal the movements of his own inner Self from those mysterious beings who have so little difficulty in keeping their own thoughts, intentions, and movements concealed? For the gods

are very cunning, and know many things hidden from men. But as this cruder form of religious belief develops,—and this, largely in dependence upon the development of moral Selfhood in man,—the conception of an omniscient and perfect Ethical Spirit, who searches the heart and desires nothing less than purity of heart, becomes of all causes most potent for the “internalization” of the moral judgment.

The study of the social and religious forces which have evolved an elaborate doctrine of the virtues, and of the corresponding theories as to moral sanctions and moral ideals which this doctrine implies, throws a flood of light upon the nature and evolution of the Moral Self. And yet the evolutionary theory seems here, as elsewhere, to meet with the limitation of assumptions in which, as unexplained and perhaps inexplicable, its very explanations themselves lie concealed. The fact is this: The spirit of man has somehow come to recognize within itself intrinsic differences among its own self-conscious states. Some are higher, nobler, more worthy of approval and more meritorious than are others. To exercise them, and to be the kind of spirit in whom they control, is made compulsory by the distinctively ethical feeling of obligation.

“There are two important general assumptions to which one is brought by a study of the nature and development of moral judgment. First, man’s intelligence is rightfully regarded as obligating him to its own use in planning and guiding his own conduct. *Noblesse oblige*,—and not less the nobility of rationality than the nobility of rank or birth. Thus the thought is led around again to a position which is in neighborly contiguity with the position from which the discussion of the nature of ethical judgment took its departure: so-called ‘Conscience,’ as a matter of intellectual equipment for such judgment, is no whit different from so-called ordinary intelligence. But this ‘ordinary intelligence’ is human intelligence: it is man’s intellect, in its full use, culminating in judgment as to the right and wrong of conduct. Moreover, this use of

intelligence is itself either right or wrong—in the ethical meaning of the words: for this use is a species of conduct. And the moral feelings of obligation, of approbation and disapprobation, and of merit and demerit, have as much place, and as binding authority, in respect of this, as of any other species of conduct. If we generalize this fact which, like a silent postulate, permeates all our estimates of the nature and value of ethical judgments, and then bring our generalization into correspondence with that conclusion to which all our study of the nature of a Moral Self is pointing the way; we may anticipate the following conclusions: The intellectual processes are, of course, essential to the existence of moral Selfhood; the noblest use of them is characteristic of the Ideal Self; and such a use is morally obligatory, necessarily to be approbated by moral consciousness, and to be considered meritorious; for it is an essential part of the realization of the Ideal of a perfect Self existing in social relations with other selves.

“The second assumption involved in the doctrine of ethical judgment is this: Only through the exercise of intelligence does the so-called ‘motive’ pass over, as it were, into the choice and into the deed. It is not motive alone, or judgment alone, or deliberate choice alone, whether followed or not by a successful executive action, to which the qualification of moral goodness or badness should be attached. It is rather to the total Self in action—Feeling, Intellect, and Will—in a living unity. Motives must, indeed, be judged morally; but they must also be more or less willed, in order really to become motives. Judgments, too, are motived and subjects of volition. The highest expressions of will, the deliberate choices, are themselves the subject of both moral feeling and moral judgment. Good intentions alone do not constitute a perfect moral good; the conceived results are an integral part of the finished piece of conduct. Clear conception is an intellectual performance. A virtuous intellect is essential to a virtuous man.”

We are now in a position to understand the ethical develop-

ment of mankind in so far as it is due to the growth of intelligence in the race. This evolution follows the same laws as those which control man's total development of intelligence. In a certain somewhat loose way, three stages may be distinguished. In the earliest stage it is feeling largely, if not almost wholly, which determines the judgment; in this stage the judgment is scarcely more than a declaration of the fact of feeling. Children and childish men think little as to why they feel and therefore judge as they do; they know almost nothing of the influences which are operative upon their own minds. This is true whether these influences belong to the original constitution of human nature, or are themselves the results of the previous experiences of the race. In a word, amongst savages as amongst the children of civilized communities, judgments about the right and wrong of conduct arise in blind, instinctive feelings. If we could get very near to the so-called primitive man, we should undoubtedly find him yet more a creature and a subject of impulsive feeling. We should find him—if as yet man, however primitive—moved by selfish passions and emotions to do certain things which feelings of sympathy and sentiments of obligation and of ethical and æsthetical admiration and approbation were moving him not to do. We should find him in this strange conflict of feeling, this condition of schism between the higher and lower self; but the schism would not be comprehended; nor would the grounds be recognized on which the authority of the higher moral consciousness must be reposed. These grounds must be wrought out in experience; they must be discovered and proved by the growth of intelligence.

The second stage in the evolution of moral judgments is reached whenever experience of the effects of conduct has embodied itself in customs; or in the form of moral maxims, precepts, and regulations; or in the shape of something resembling a code of conduct defining what is to be esteemed right, what wrong, by the community. But even at this stage

the multitude of individuals in their private ethical judgments only echo and reiterate, as they for the most part unquestioningly accept, the generalizations reached in some form by the generations of their predecessors in the moral life. In this stage, whenever the attempt is made to give reasons for any particular judgment, such an attempt ends in a reference to the fact, as bare fact, of the conclusions already accepted by the majority. Thus most of the current reasoning on moral matters might be summarized in the one major premise for the standard ethical syllogism: It is right to follow the customs; doing right is doing as the ancients have done and as people generally do now.

But even this stage in the evolution of ethical judgment cannot come into existence, much less long continue to exist, without certain individuals at least making considerable advances into a third and higher stage. In this third stage, the science and philosophy of conduct become, to some extent, the interest and the attainment of the multitude of individuals of whom society consists.

The history of ethical evolution by no means, of course, warrants us in making a clean-cut separation between these different stages of man's ethical progress. Other factors and laws than those which are distinctly intellectual take part in this evolution. No community at any time can be regarded as stationary in either one of these three stages, to the exclusion of all examples of the other stages.

Amongst the lowest savages are found some who, more than others, think for themselves touching matters of conduct: amongst the most highly cultured ethically, the majority, for most of their ethical judgments, trust to unreasoned feeling or accept the conclusions handed down from preceding generations. And it is well that it is so. For thus the "cake of custom" is formed; only thus could enough of uniformity be secured to constitute a true and safe social environment such as is the necessary presupposition of any ethical life or ethical

development. But all the race—or at least, that portion of it which is undergoing a real moral evolution—is learning more and more how to make up its mind, on the ground of an enlarging experience and by the use of its improved powers of reasoning, regarding the right and wrong of conduct. A progress in ethical enlightenment is certainly taking place with this portion of mankind; but whether this portion, or the whole of mankind, is growing better in disposition and in moral purposes, in proportion to its increased enlightenment—why! this is another and distinctly broader and more difficult question.

It is not enough, however, to constitute a Moral Self that the ethical feelings should arise in consciousness and become self-appropriated; or that intelligence should discover what moral judgments correspond to the established customs in matters of conduct, or even to the intrinsic qualities of the different feelings, sentiments, purposes, and habits of the self-conscious mind. The development of moral selfhood, especially as it involves an improvement and rise in the scale of moral values, depends upon self-determination. And, indeed, self-determination has been either implied or expressly insisted upon in all that has thus far been said about the evolution of moral intelligence, both in the individual and in the race. To form intelligent and morally right judgments, there must be attention, discrimination, choice; the intellect is active in all this; the truly moral judgment is formed, not forced. Moreover, ethical judgment not only involves, but normally and necessarily issues in, acts of self-determination. Its predicate is the right or wrong of conduct; its issue is in doing something, even if this doing be only to suppress, or to indulge and cherish, some secret emotion or intention. The moral problem before the individual is: "Will you determine yourself in this way or in that; will you have this piece or that other piece of conduct to be your very own?" In order, then, to secure the development of *moral* selfhood, self-determination must become *moral* freedom. But this is not to say that the

human mind must attain any wholly new species of activity. If man were the mind that he is, without being also a Moral Self, nothing would have to be added to his so-called active powers, as such, in order to constitute him a morally free spirit. What would be necessary would be only (a truly momentous "only") to endow him with ethical feelings, and then to place him in social relations with others of his own kind. It is not ethics which creates for physics and biology and cerebral physiology, the mystery of self-determination. The mystery is there; and the fact of such self-determination is the limit which these sciences have to accept in all their explanations of every phenomenon with which the active human mind has anything to do. Moreover, as we have already shown, neither the theory of knowledge nor the metaphysics of man or of things can explain or confute this fact of the self-determining character of self-conscious mind. To be self-determining is really to be what it essentially is. The antinomies in the epistemological realm which are designed to disprove the reality of experience are mere logical abstractions, pale ghosts of a hypothetical nature which have no corresponding real existences. All real existences have natures which are more or less—however unconsciously—self-determining. And in this irresolvable, unanalyzable, and inexplicable mystery, the sciences which deal with things find, on the one hand, an inexhaustible store of fictitious explanations, and, on the other hand, an immovable limit to all truly scientific explanations.

Still further, it has been shown that the whole conception of a causal *nexus*, and of laws determining the relations of things within this causal *nexus*, itself arises from man's experience, as a consciously self-determining being with other beings which he cannot consciously determine. And there is not in all the history of human intellectual development a more unjustifiable exhibition of intellectual arrogance, than the claim that the doctrine of man's conscious self-determination has been, or indeed can be, disproved by the conclusions of the

physical and natural sciences. All that science knows, or ever can know, about reality and about the relations of really existent beings, whether unconscious but self-like things or self-conscious minds, is dependent upon its keeping faith with its own underlying assumptions.

It belongs, then, to the philosophy of conduct in dealing with the problem of moral freedom, to avail itself of what the theory of knowledge and the metaphysics of mind have already made clear. The problem is this: How does man, as a moral being endowed with ethical feelings and placed in social relations, develop and exhibit that kind and degree of self-determination which is necessary for a Moral Self? In weighing this problem the reasons for affirming the reality of self-determination are not only largely increased, but are also raised to a much higher stage of importance and significance. The metaphysical difficulties, and so-called scientific objections, are on the contrary in no respect essentially changed. From the theoretical point of view, then, the affirmative side of the problem of moral freedom has a great advantage. From the practical side, and as a matter of concernment for a rational view of human moral nature, and of the laws of moral life, the reasons for espousing this side are mandatory.

"The possession of any degree of moral freedom, and the development of its higher and more significant degrees, are dependent in all cases upon the possession and development of all the faculties which go to make up man's moral nature.¹ The problem of ethics is therefore not decided, it is not even properly stated, when only the facts that concern the purely voluntary aspects of consciousness are considered. Neither mere arbitrariness of will, nor machine-like and necessitated action of will, can constitute the basis of a truly moral freedom. For, indeed, the problem includes much more than this. Choices

¹ For a fuller treatment of the subject see the Chapter on "Moral Freedom" in the author's *Philosophy of Conduct*, from which the following quotations are taken.

to follow the ideal forms of that which is esteemed morally good cannot be made by a mere fiat of will, whether wholly unmotived or strictly determined; the presence in consciousness of such ideals and the conscious evaluation of them from the moral point of view is necessary to their choice. I cannot will to adhere to my feeling of obligation rather than yield to my passion or desire, unless I have such feeling of obligation; nor can I choose that course of conduct which I judge to be right, unless I am capable of a judgment which shall bring the conduct under the category of the right. And without the powerful influence from the feelings of moral approval and of merit (and their opposites) it cannot be contended that men would ever attain to a genuine moral freedom. It is in the neglect of these considerations that some of the antinomies which are forced into the problem of a so-called freedom of the will have their origin. ‘Freedom of the will’ is, as we have already had abundant reason to observe, a term which would better be abandoned by ethics. Moral freedom for the human Self;—What is it in fact, and essentially, in spite of its many degrees of intensity, so to say, and its different forms of manifestation?—this is the primary ethical question. And has moral freedom in fact such a character that, before the same moral consciousness which is its own severe and, when well cultivated, intelligent critic, we may justify the conclusion that the present social system has in it at least the seeds of rationality?

“Certain facts of indubitable experience exist, on the basis of which may be placed our conception of the nature of man’s choices, and of the part which they play in the moral life and moral development. But even these facts lose all their highest value and most of their significance, when we attempt to regard them as separable from the development of human life, in the individual and in the race.

“One word more of preliminary cautioning seems desirable. This has reference to the chief fallacy in discussing this problem which affects those metaphysically inclined. The fallacy

is that of mistaking conceptions for entities, functions for realities, relations for pre-existent and efficient causes. In a word, it is the fallacy of *hypostasizing*. For example, ‘Law’ never does anything, or accounts for anything,—no matter how imposing the capital with which one spells the word. ‘Necessity’ creates no real bond; and ‘Chance’ and ‘Contingency’—whether whispered with bated breath by the frightened worshipper of the great modern World-Machine, or boldly proclaimed by the avowed enemy of such a monstrosity—can no more injure the existing arrangement of things than the most inevitable ‘Fate’ can conserve this arrangement by preventing man’s interference with it all. Ghosts of abstractions, whether theological or scientific, whether redolent of the smell of the tombs in which they should have been buried ages ago, or emitting whiffs of the latest patent embalming fluid, can effect neither good nor harm outside of the mind of man. And when one is solemnly told that the Law of Causation forbids this or compels the other; that human self-determination would destroy the integrity of the physical Universe; or that the Conservation and Correlation of Energy does not admit of influences ‘passing over,’ etc., from the physical to the psychical realm; one may always demand a re-examination of the warrant in facts for such a sweeping use of ideas whose force is only that of the highest potency of logical generalization.

“What now are those facts of a well-nigh, if not quite universal human experience, from which flows the conception of a real moral freedom for man; and to which this conception must be referred in the effort to determine more critically its rational import? These facts may be divided between two related but not identical forms of consciousness. They may be called the consciousness of ability and the consciousness of imputability; or the consciousness of the Self as active and the consciousness of the Self as responsible. As these facts appear in the stream of the individual’s conscious life, and as they become data for the conception of man’s

moral freedom, they are expressed by such language as the following: 'I can' and 'I know that I can'; and because 'I ought to have' (or I ought not to have), I am worthy of approval (or of disapproval) and of merit (or of demerit). In the one case, the Self contemplates itself as in the presence of its own deed and affirms that the choice to do, or not to do, in spite of all external and internal influence, is, nevertheless, its very own. *I* make my choice; and the 'I' that chooses is not simply the being that was yesterday, or even a moment since; the rather is it the living, present, here-and-now-being of the Self. In the other case the Self contemplates its own deed as already done, and affirms that this deed which was chosen, together with a certain greater or less amount of the consequences following from the deed, belongs to itself; and in consequence, so does also the blame or praise, the punishment or the reward. *I* did this thing, for it was my choice; and my living, present Self doth reasonably assume as its own the moral predicaments of its own choosing. Such are the facts of human experience, when this experience reaches that stage of development which affords the clearest and most trustworthy data for a conception of moral freedom. But with inferior degrees the same experience manifests itself as an almost ceaseless accompaniment of, and a substantial factor in, the unfolding of the moral life."

Let us now examine somewhat more carefully these two classes of general facts belonging to man's ethical consciousness.

Nothing is more primitive or essential in the development of personal life than the consciousness of power. Without it, no Self can exist, whether from the point of view of its own self-consciousness or from the point of view of the outside observer. To convert this into a species of moral faculty it is only necessary that it should be recognized by the Self as an ability to choose one piece of conduct, or course of conduct, rather than another; and, among the different soliciting or conflicting motives to select one as preferred and adopted rather

than the others. By its possessor this ability is invariably recognized as belonging to the Self, as a species of self-activity; but also as an ability which has its limitations and its degrees, and which may be lost and regained, or irrecoverably lost. The complex truths of experience of this kind are expressed in such popular language as the following: "I know I can"; "I know I could have"; "I do not know whether I can"; "I fear I cannot"; or "I am sure I shall not be able," etc. This consciousness of ability to determine one's position toward one's external behavior, and toward one's emotional impulses and internal tendencies and solicitations to action, culminates in deliberate choice. In deliberate choice, where types of character and ideals of conduct come before the mind to solicit it for its voluntary adoption and allegiance, moral selfhood attains its highest possible form of self-realization. But where the choices are habitually subjugated by passions that blind the moral judgment, moral freedom may ebb so low that little of moral self-hood remains to hide behind the mask of being a man.

As to the consciousness of imputability and the immense influence which it has upon all human affairs in all manner of social conditions and relations, there can be no doubt. The phenomena of ethical pride and shame, of the claims made by the pure conscience and the remorseful consciousness to be self-rewarded or self-punished, show the workings of this influence in the life of the individual. The universal customs and the language of men with reference to each other's character and deeds, show the strength of the same influence in society at large. Is wrong done? The blame cannot be left mid-air, or assigned to beings conceived of as mere lifeless and unconscious things; it must be located in some at least *quasi-personal* being; it must be imputed to some Self. It is true that this fact of the imputability of conduct is obscured, or made ineffective and bizarre by crude theories as to the nature of the Self. It is also true that a certain solidarity of the race seems to assert itself in the form habitually taken by the conscious-

ness corresponding to the term. Members of the same family, tribe, nation, race, often seem compelled to feel a portion of the responsibility for deeds that are obviously done, *not* by themselves, but by a sort of corporation in which they are involved as members. In the development of moral judgments and moral ideals, however, the changes in the conceptions of personal life do not impair but rather strengthen the conclusion. Responsibility attaches reasonably to those beings only who have moral freedom; imputability implies moral discernment and ability to determine conduct and character for one's self. For the total complex fact is not simply the fact of conduct imputed and treated accordingly; it is rather the fact of conduct imputable and so *reasonably* treated accordingly. The "scape-goat" theory and practice are in a measure difficult to avoid; but to enlightened moral judgment they become unreasonable and even intolerable.

After what has already been said in various connections about the metaphysics of nature and of mind it is scarcely necessary to do more than briefly to mention the arguments which are customarily opposed to the reality of a development that implies moral freedom for the self-conscious and self-determining mind. Even in this late day some writers, indeed, continue to quote the dictum attributed to Spinoza which identifies man's consciousness of ability with his ignorance of the determining causes. Man is no more free than would be the arrow which became conscious of going toward the mark, but knew nothing of the science of strains, pressure from atmosphere, down-pull of gravity, etc. Such a bit of material would of necessity imagine itself free. But this abstraction of an arrow no more resembles a real self-conscious mind than did that other abstraction of an arrow which, according to the logic of the Greek Sophists, could not move at all! Neither Nature in the large, as modern science knows it, nor the nature of a self-conscious and self-determining mind, bear any resemblance to empty space and inert matter; to the

Void of Greek philosophy or to the purely *a priori* and logical System of Spinoza, with its barren "Affects" and statical Relations.

Scarcely less perverse and contrary to the facts of experience is the objection which would substitute for the rich content of a self-conscious and self-determining life a sort of rigid and foredoomed mechanism of psychoses, constructed after the analogy of a piece of physical machinery. A choice is then offered between this mechanical theory and the theory of purely unreasoned and incalculable arbitrariness. Such is not, however, the alternative; for neither of these theories expresses at all truly the actual life of the Moral Self. If, in fact, we are called on to explain the workings of the so-called faculties under the control of a causal nexus, we may as well say that the will governs intellect and controls feelings as that intellect guides, and feeling influences or determines, the will. Neither does it express the truth of experience simply to assert that motives influence the will according to the apparent or the real intensity of their motive force. On the contrary, motives are chosen on account of their excellence, or relation to an ideal, whenever they are brought into the focus of a truly moral consciousness. And in all truly moral transactions, it is the attitude of the Self, as self-determining, toward the emotional impulses, which decides the question of fact, whether the impulses shall become "motives" to action in the fullest meaning of the term.

Finally: No philosophy of conduct is possible which does not find room for the facts of experience, and for the theoretical construction of moral principles, that are implied in a valid conception of "Character." It is under the laws which control the formation of *character* that man gains such moral freedom as he has, and uses this freedom in the continuance and development of a truly moral life. But, on the other hand, the conception of character cannot itself be formed without taking into account those conscious experiences in which the

conception of moral freedom has its origin; and any such conception of character as contravenes and annuls the conception of freedom is itself unfit to command our intellectual allegiance and is injurious to the morals of mankind. What men call "character" is no entity, no self-existent principle, capable of playing an independent part in the dynamics of the moral life. The nature of any existence is merely the sum-total of those more uniform ways of behavior by which we are able, for purposes of knowledge, and the communication of knowledge, to distinguish it from other existences. But the *character* of a Self is a quite different affair from the *nature* of a Thing. For the character of a Self always includes the choices, and the results of the choices, in exercising which it has been self-determining. What ethics seeks is not some hidden statical core of reality which stands in the relation of a universal and omnipotent cause to each of the individual choices; the reality of the individual Moral Self is rather itself in a measure the constantly varying resultant of these choices. A man's character is not something external to himself which, as a finished product of the past or as an *extra-voluntary*, determining force, gives the entire reason why he chooses as he does choose. On a basis of inherited potentialities, and under a variety of influences from the total, constantly changing environment, and in a certain subjection to the principle of habit, *Every Self, nevertheless, progressively determines its own character.*

It will, of course, be seen that our view throws complete discredit on the empty boast of a so-called scientific Determinism. It is vain to say that if we only knew all the motives, both as coming from outside influences,—causes of the environment,—and also as due to the acquired character of the individual,—causes of habit; then we should be able to predict with a perfect certainty every new choice, whether as between motives or of different courses of conduct. The reply to this proposition is that the proposition itself is intrinsically absurd. No such knowledge can ever be conceived of as applying to a

true Moral Self. A true Moral Self, of its very nature, can never be supposed to be in the condition of a statical and wholly calculable kind of existence and habit of behavior. The very essence of moral development is such as to secure a lasting residuum of the unexplained and the scientifically inexplicable. Do we need again to point out how all the explanations of science end in the unexplained nature of things and of minds?

Those great principles which are true for the other main branches of philosophy are also true for the philosophy of conduct. These principles group themselves about two comprehensive conceptions which seem to us to be shaping the thought and the conduct of the present age. They are, of course, not new, either in their total complexion or in any of their more important factors; otherwise they could not be so comprehensive and influential as they are. But they are receiving new and enlarged meanings, and they are made to serve more extended and illuminating uses. These are the conception of Evolution, of the principle of becoming, and the conception of Self-hood, especially as having its roots in, and as reaching out into, social connections. It is enlarged and truer notions of Personality and of Development which are sought by the reflective thinking of the age.

When, then, such fulness of significance and range of influence are claimed for the conception of the Moral Self, it must not be imagined that any of the legitimate rights of the other conception, the conception of evolution, are invaded or denied. The history of morals, and the current opinions and practices of the time, as well as all the most profound and comprehensive of ethical principles, cannot be understood without giving due influence to both these conceptions. The Moral Self, in a process of Development toward the Social Ideal,—this complex of conceptions contains the whole domain of investigation for the student of ethics. What is the essential nature of the subject of conduct, the ethical being of man? It is moral selfhood, as it has already been described. But for every individual man, and

for the whole race of men, conduct is some sort of a career; it is subject to the principle of continuity; it is a matter of history, and of the growth from beginnings toward ends, in the ongoing of time; it is something which can neither be described nor even be conceived of, except as the individual is regarded in his physical, and especially in his social, environment. The principle of evolution applies, then, in ethics; but in no superficial or merely external way. The Moral Self is a life-growth, and so subject—although on its own special terms, as it were—to a continuous development.

The essential factors and prominent aspects of moral development may remain the same amidst a number of forms in which the Ideal assumes more definite outlines; and in spite of a great variety of concrete habits of action, under varying conditions and changes in the social environment. This Ideal may be the idea of a so-called moral law, or the idea of a perfected personality, or the idea of a Divine Will; or it may be some yet more inclusive form of a social constitution. With one good man the object which seems worthy of commanding him may be conceived of as an impersonal principle, an unselfish and unwavering obedience to which is recognized as summing up the entire obligation of man; with another, the conception of an infinitely worthy personal Being, in whose personal characteristics they may share who make the attainment of this ideal the object of their life-endeavor, may be substituted for the conception of an impersonal principle. With still another, the perfectibility by human efforts, of society seems to furnish the good, to strive for which with the strenuous life, is the whole duty of him who would attain the supreme moral Good.

Each of these, and all other forms of defining that ideal which is the perfect satisfaction and permanent source of inspiration for the development of moral selfhood, is quite likely to be marred by deficiencies, or to include subordinate elements which would better be left out. The possibility of a conclusive

speculative treatment of this Ideal will come before us for discussion later on. But we wish now to call attention to the truth that the very attempt to form any ideal of conduct in so comprehensive and loftly a fashion, and to place the ideal upon a basis of experience, while admitting the necessity for trusting the better sentiments and the artistic imagination, marks a high stage in the moral evolution of mankind.

The Moral Ideal is itself the subject of evolution,—necessarily so; for it is the mental construct of the Moral Self, and therefore dependent for its very excellence upon the stage of its own moral development which the constructive mind has reached. And moral development here includes all kinds of development; for they are all dependent in a measure upon man's own conduct; and man's conduct is the sphere of morality.

CHAPTER XV

THE MORALLY GOOD: ITS KINDS (THE VIRTUES) AND ITS UNITY

THE intimations which were brought forward at the close of the last chapter require to be further explained and defended. To accomplish this end, two lines of investigation need to be pursued. One of these consists in the study of the evolution of moral judgments as embodied in certain conceptions and principles which are esteemed to be of a more or less extended, if not quite universal, application. The other subjects these same conceptions and principles to a speculative process in which their real significance is made clear, and the basis in Reality on which they repose is disclosed. Only in this way can philosophy decide upon the place and value of moral ideals in the system of nature, or as essential "moments" in the Being of the World. For philosophy insists upon asking questions which the so-called science of ethics, whether pursued by the methods of descriptive history or from the evolutionary and explanatory points of view, cannot decide. Whence, in the last analysis come the sanctions and the ideals of man's unfolding moral life; and is not the Universe itself ethical to the core?

When we compare the development of moral judgments, as applied to forms of external conduct, with the development of moral judgment as applied to typical forms of the inner life, we note a marked difference in the results. There is far greater variety in customs, as judged from the ethical point of view, than in the motives, or conscious states of emotion, desire, and intention, out of which actions are supposed materially to spring. That the morally progressive part of the race has evolved a fairly consistent and notably uniform doctrine of

the virtues is a historical fact. And so far as the development can be traced backward, it is found that this doctrine, while placing greatly different degrees of emphasis upon the relative importance of particular virtues, has remained throughout essentially the same. No truly good man, no really bad man, would behave to-day in England or America as he would have behaved in ancient Egypt or Babylon. But the *character* of the good, or of the bad man, if it could reveal itself to the social moral consciousness as being what it really is, would be in many respects essentially the same to be approved or disapproved, in all places and all times. The Andaman Islanders, the native Australians, the Zulus, know a good man and commend him, when they understand him; and the Christian missionary recognizes in them the same virtues, however different the customary ways of expressing them, which he is striving to cultivate in himself.

This accepted practical doctrine of the virtuous life is, however, neither self-conscious nor scholastic. It is a practical attitude toward a rather indiscriminate lot of personal characteristics, rather than a rational appreciation of an idea which includes them all. It is an unreasoned view of many virtues (or their opposites), rather than a rational appreciation of the essential character of virtue. What is the "essence"—or real nature—of Virtue? is the question which we are about to raise.

It would doubtless facilitate inquiry if there were some universally accepted classification of the virtues. But there is none. The classification most favored by the advocates of a purely evolutionary and utilitarian theory of ethics—into egoistic and altruistic—is both inadequate and misleading. In searching for some germ of virtuous feeling, which nominally belongs to human nature, it is customary to find it in those emotional impulses which may be summarized under the name "Sympathy." Now it is true that men could not develope socially, and so could not develope morally,—or, for that matter, be moral at all,—without a large equipment of feelings which

may be grouped under this general term. And, indeed, most of the lower animals manifest similar forms of social impulses. There is, however, no one form of sympathy; there are many sympathies. There are as many as there are forms of feeling which are specific,—feelings of kinship, or “of the kind.” Anger, jealousy, fear, love, hate, pride, shame, ambition, esteem, etc.—may all be either egoistic or altruistic, according to the occasion which calls them forth, or the object toward which they are directed. It would even be not wholly improper to say that the same exercises of feeling are *both* egoistic and altruistic in the same individual, and at the same time. Of every Self it is inevitably true that a large part of *his* Self is a *social* Self. The *Ego* does not exist as separable, in idea or in action, wholly from every *Alter*. A man’s wife, children, friends, enemies, town, tribe, country, are “others”; but at the same time they are “*his own*.”

There are also certain sympathetic feelings, and altruistic actions flowing from such feelings, which are not only morally weak but positively immoral. While there are some of the virtues, such as courage, fidelity, and steadfastness, which are more fundamental and essential for the earlier moral development of the individual and the race, than is the virtue of so-called “benevolence.”

We must then return to the point of starting for our investigation into the essential nature of virtue, with these two convictions. There is rather an indefinite number of virtues (as so judged by the consent of the race); and they admit of various forms of classification; but the “virtuousness” which is common to them all has its essential quality made known, only when it can be discovered, what is the ideal standard with which they are to be compared.

For purposes of convenience chiefly, although also on account of the theoretical suggestions which will be found to be concealed in it, we adopt what we will call the “psychological” classification of the virtues. But the term must not be over-

pressed, and so misunderstood. This division recognizes three main classes of virtues: (1) virtues of the will; (2) virtues of the intellect; (3) virtues of feeling. But by this it is not meant to imply either that one can be virtuous in any other manner or degree with the use of one so-called faculty only; or that the essential characteristics of any particular virtue do not require the co-operation of all the so-called faculties. Indeed, a so-called "faculty-theory" of the mind cannot be held in any such way as to make their separate action possible, not to say virtuous. It is simple matter of fact, however, that some of those personal characteristics which the race has, with a practically uniform consent, regarded as morally approbated and meritorious, emphasize *self-control*; others emphasize qualities of *judgment*; still others emphasize the kindly *feelings*, or qualities of the heart, rather than of the intellect or will. This historical fact does something more than merely assist in the work of classifying the virtues. It plainly indicates what is the "essence" of virtue,—the *virtuousness* which makes virtuous all the virtues. And this is the problem which philosophy aims to solve.

The principal virtues of the Will, the virtues that emphasize self-control, are Courage, Temperance, and Constancy. "Courage is self-control in the presence of any form of temptation to fear; it is strength of purpose resisting the impulse to yield to cowardice. Temperance is self-control in the presence of every impulse to gratification of the appetites and desires; it is strength of purpose to resist the seductions of the pleasure-giving and pleasure-promising activities. Constancy is persistence in self-control in spite of resistance or obstacles to be overcome; it is strength of purpose triumphing over all impulses to turn aside from the chosen course of conduct, from the repeated if even laborious use of means to reach the desired end. The vices or faults opposed to these virtues are cowardice, licentiousness or profligacy, and fickleness or sloth." He who has these virtues in large measure is a man to be admired

from the ethical point of view as a man of "*good will*," in the more appropriate but restricted meaning of the term. For he is the man who has the will of a self-determining spirit; and be he Satan or Michael, *so far forth*, he both naturally and rationally calls for ethical and æsthetical admiration. Of such stuff are heroes made. It is such a brave, enduring, and loyal mind, whom savages admire and of whom the cultured poet sings:

“Languor is not in your heart,
Weakness is not in your word,
Weariness not on your brow.”

In all emergencies, in all stages and conditions of civilization, he is the man of the hour. And these are virtues, none the less fundamental and indispensable, if less openly and ferociously displayed, at the present time.

The principal virtues of the Judgment are Wisdom, Justice, and Trueness. In order that the term “virtues of the judgment” may be appropriately and usefully employed, these psychological truths which concern its nature must be kept in mind. Judging is no passive getting together of ideas, whether memory-images or products of phantasy, under the laws of association. Judging is a species of conduct. *I judge*; and therefore *I am*, in some sort, responsible for my judgment. Since the part which judgment takes in the virtuous life, is essential and integral, the truly good man must be a man of good judgment. When judgment applies to matters of conduct, either in deciding whether they should be, or should not be, from the moral point of view, or whether, having been, they should or should not be approbated and “rewarded accordingly”; then the word “*good*,” as applied to judgment, has something more than a merely logical significance.

Wisdom is opposed to that frivolity of which Humboldt said that it “undermines all morality and permits no deep thought or pure feeling to germinate; in a frivolous soul nothing can

emanate from principle, and sacrifice and self-conquest are out of the question." The most important respects in which that moral exercise of the judgment which is called the virtue of wisdom takes place are the following: (1) the estimate of ends, with a view to determine their relative worth; (2) the estimate of means, with a view to determine their relative effectiveness for the realization of ends; and (3) the appreciation of those limitations which belong to the natural and social environment of man. The supreme exhibition of the virtue of wisdom is, therefore, given when those ends are chosen which have the highest value as measured by the standard of the moral ideal; and when such means are adopted as are best worthy and most effective toward reaching these ideal ends, under the actual limitations, physical and social, of human life. From this virtue flow all the prudential virtues, but especially that most difficult form of wisdom for heroic and aspiring souls,—the virtue of Resignation when human wills come into collision with the Will of Nature in the large.

Of all human virtues, Justness is perhaps most difficult and at the same time highly prized by an enlightened moral consciousness as developed in social relations. The way that this ethical exercise of judgment spreads over every form of conduct under social conditions led Aristotle to distinguish a kind of "general justice" which included the essence of all virtuousness. Of justice so defined he says: "It is complete virtue, although not complete in an absolute sense, but in relation to one's neighbor." This "is not a part of virtue but the whole of virtue." Perfect justice, however, is not possible in a society composed of members of limited knowledge with respect to each others' character and deserts; and with both limited knowledge and power so far as the environment and the consequences of conduct are concerned. By this virtue, then, we can only understand the "voluntary judgment which apportions to men their due share of the goods and evils of life, *so far as this is dependent upon human conduct.*"

It has already been indicated that, as there is a higher wisdom, so there is a higher justness. This higher justness judges the customs and laws of society themselves and condemns or approves them in accordance with its own ideals. In its practice the good man can do no more than cherish the spirit of fairness and a high estimate of the worth of the individual man; inform himself as to the means by which the existing inequalities of conditions as related to deserts may best be improved; and fuse these elements of justness into judgment, whenever any of the many concrete questions come before the bar of his moral reason for adjustment. For as Plato long ago taught, the attempt to deal with life's labors and acquisitions in a way to correspond with an ideal, concerns "not the outward man but the inward, which is the true Self and concernment of a man" (*Republic*, 443).

Trueness, by which is to be understood something far more than mere truth-telling—the being true, in conduct and character—may be esteemed the one indispensable condition of all virtuousness, the core of all right and dutiful character. This virtue might be called "loyalty to reality," or fidelity, as well. Yet the extreme views of the relativity and evolutionary character of all the virtues have selected this one, with an uncommon delight, as proof obvious and positive of their contentions. For do not lies abound amongst all races that are low in the scale of civilization; and does it not require the experiences of a sort of mercantile profit to make truthfulness esteemed as a virtue at all? Now it is true that this virtue, on account of those physical and social conditions which prevail in all forms of civilization, and especially in the lower and lowest forms, is particularly difficult both of appreciation at its true value, and also of habitual practice. But this is not because truthfulness is not esteemed a virtue by men generally. Savages agree with Aristotle: "Falsehood is in-itself base and censurable; truth is noble and laudable."

"The liar is short-lived," says the Arabian proverb. "Lies,

though many, will be caught by Truth," is the rude Wolof's way of expressing the general experience. The natives of Afghanistan and of India may be nearly all liars; but "the career of falsehood is short"—so runs the maxim of the former; and truthfulness and courage are essential to the good man, according to the doctrine of the Rig Veda. Even the base Iago called the world "monstrous," in which "to be direct and honest is not safe." And in an age and country like our own, where deceit and lying, born of avarice, cowardice, and political ambition, are so wide-spreading; trueness, in the higher meaning of the word, is esteemed one of the most unqualified of the virtues. The conclusion which is justified by the philosophy of conduct, when guided by reflection upon the data of man's moral development, is this: He has most perfectly the virtue of trueness who most painstakingly and sincerely adjusts his judgment to the realities that have most of value in the relation to the supreme ends of the virtuous life. And this requires not only the refusal to be influenced by cowardice, greed, love of notoriety, and other vices which are prolific breeders of lies, but also a firm resistance of the judgment to the influences of thoughtlessness, dogmatism, and partisanship.

Those virtues which we have ventured to call Virtues of the Heart arise more spontaneously from the kindly feelings with which human nature is endowed, and which are as essentially natural and normal, and as indispensable even to the beginnings of human society, as are any of the most imperative of the self-seeking and self-protective appetites and passions. The shallow view, which at one time prevailed, that human nature is essentially selfish and that even the most altruistic of the feelings and kindly of actions are only more subtle and concealed forms of egoism, may now be dismissed without further comment. Many forms of sympathy are specific with man, as they are with all the higher species of animals. In man's case they have the human and rational qualifications and applica-

tions which belong to his entire life, whether regarded from within or from without. These virtues are, therefore, not lacking among savages and primitive men. Their characteristics in such cases are, however, derived from their limitations. "Primitive man," says Wundt (*Ethics*, I, p. 263f.), "can be sympathetic, helpful, even self-sacrificing, when his comrade is in danger: he is incapable of an action which will not benefit some one of his acquaintances, still more of conduct which does not aim to assist any individual whatever." The active well-wishing toward all men, with a consistent self-sacrifice in their behalf, "without regard to difference of class or race," is indeed the highest form of this virtue. But it is only under the influences of religion that mankind have in a measure risen to this moral judgment, and to a poor form of the practice recommended by such judgment. The *Bhagavad Gitā*, and certain writings of Buddhism, as well as of ancient philosophy, have indeed recognized and to some degree cultivated this universal feeling of brotherly kindness. But the writer just quoted is essentially true to the facts of history when he affirms (*Ethics*, I, p. 291): "Humanity in the highest sense was brought into the world by Christianity." And "humanity in this highest sense" is "the sacrifice of self for others without regard to difference of class or race."

Such, in brief, is the character of the man whom the moral verdict of the race agrees to call "good." A man of self-control—courageous, temperate, constant; a man in judgment, wise, just, and loyal to truth; a man of large sympathies, of a kind and unselfish heart. But these are many virtues; and wherein does their unity consist? This is the manifoldness of the moral life; in what does the essential distinction between the goodness of these attributes of it, and the badness of their opposites, make itself known and appreciated at its true worth? This search for an ethically unifying conception or principle is further complicated by such facts as the following: The very virtues seem to be called forth under diverse conditions;

so that at one time one of them, and at another time another of them, must be selected to afford the appropriate motive for the action which shall fit the circumstances in a morally appropriate way. Indeed, the most important and conspicuous of the virtues seem, of their very nature, driven into a conflict with one another. How shall a man be always courageous and just, and yet always pitiful and kind? How shall he be wise and at the same time wholly loyal to what is true? In this particular, concrete case, will it be more wise to be courageous and tell the truth, than to keep silence even when it is difficult not to recognize a certain degree of cowardice as a motive to silence? In actually being good, in the real life which aims at the ideal of virtuousness, the solution of such differences of solicitation and conflicts of equally honorable motives, is a ceaseless trial. But the teleology, or practical final purpose, of moral experience is not difficult to discover. It is in the trial, and in overcoming its difficulties, and in solving its problems, that moral culture essentially consists. The essence of being good, as a practical affair, consists in just this ceaseless striving to discover what particular virtue *is* called for, on each occasion; and in doing one's best to answer as promptly and fully as possible to the demand.

In saying this, however, we have only proclaimed the truth, that a self-conscious and self-determined effort to realize a certain ideal is the essence of subjective morality. We have only suggested a clue to, but have not fully answered, the problem: What principle gives unity to virtue? In what does the virtuousness of all the virtues essentially consist? In considering this problem further—both as a question and its answer—the constitution of the highest and most productive forms of unification must be borne in mind. They are not after the type of that hypothetical, unchanging and rigid atom, which a now vanished chemical science combined in order to build the less real but more serviceable unities of particular things. Neither are they logically consistent, complete, and

ready-made systems of elements. They are rather the resultants of many co-operating and conflicting forces, which act and react for the development of some form of life that aims at some kind of an ideal. They are growths, organisms; and the supreme example of a real unity is that achieved by the mind itself as a result of its own self-conscious and self-determining activity. A I make myself *one* Self by self-controlled thinking, feeling, and action according to a plan; so I make myself *one virtuous* Self by the persistent effort to conform thinking, feeling, and action, as species of conduct, to an ideal of conduct.

"There are two forms, closely allied but by no means identical, which have been taken by the customary attempts at unifying the particular virtues. Both of these are unsatisfactory in their method as well as in their result. One of them consists in selecting some single feature or aspect of conduct, and then identifying the virtuous or vicious quality of all conduct with the goodness or badness of this one feature or aspect. The other consists in selecting some one of the more important of the virtues, and then identifying with it the entire essential content of the virtuous life. Thus if one follows the trail of the first argument in one's search after the unity of virtue, one will discover the virtuousness of virtue to consist in either good external behavior, or in good motive, or in good intention. But if the second method of solving the problem be chosen, then it will be claimed that all the virtues are, in the last analysis and essentially considered, either wisdom, or justice, or benevolence, or some other one among them all. The first method of unifying the particular virtues results in a narrow and perverted notion of conduct, as conduct has already been described in accordance with the opinions and practices of mankind. The second method results in so modifying and expanding the conception of some one of the particular virtues as that it loses all its concrete and valuable particularity in a vague and shadowy generalization as to the nature of virtue. The result in both cases is similar to that obtained by treating in similar

method the allied phenomena of man's religious life. Thus in answer to the question, What is religion? one may locate its 'essence' in feeling, or dogma, or behavior; or one may attempt the answer by so manipulating some one religion as to include under it all 'true' religions and exclude all other religions on the ground of their being 'false.'"

The one essential characteristic of virtue cannot be found in the character of the external behavior; the science of ethics cannot bring about a unification of the virtues under the conception of conformity to the customs and rules adopted and practiced by society. The appeal which all men frequently make, and which the best men make most frequently and peremptorily, away from these customs and rules to something higher, more authoritative and more spiritual, shows that in fact the essential quality of morality is not, as Locke regarded it, the conformity of action to a rule. Neither is the word Motive, in any legitimate meaning, fitted to express all the characteristics essential to every form of virtue. In its proper significance, motive is any desire, impulse, or wish, which tends to induce a definite volition. Good motives, in the ethical meaning of the adjective, become then such impulses, desires, or wishes, as tend to induce the choice of good or virtuous action. But the extreme conclusion that the desire, or wish, to be perfectly virtuous is equivalent to being perfectly virtuous, is shocking to the moral judgment. Indeed, good motives that are not "backed up" and "put through" with a will that has courage and constancy are not infrequently characteristic of the most weak and morally unworthy personalities. And as Aristotle well said: "If the purpose is to be all it should be, both the calculation or the reasoning must be true, and the desire must be right" (*Nicom. Ethics*, VI, ii, 2).

In view of these imperfections of the other terms, the word Intention has been chosen to summarize the virtuous qualities which belong in common to all the particular virtues. And since this word may easily be made to include more or less of

consideration for the consequences of conduct, and of choice to realize in action the motives which are apprehended as morally worthy, good intention does indeed come nearer to suggesting that attitude toward life in which the virtuousness of the mind essentially consists. If under good intention it is meant to include the most perfect functioning of the Moral Self as self-controlled feeling, judging, and acting, in the interests of its Moral Ideal, good intention is clearly identical with the virtuousness of all the virtues. The man of perfectly good intentions would be so far as that particular man could be, the man of the perfect virtuous life. But this would only change titles without simplifying the subject. The forming of good intentions is, indeed, often the only way of virtue under the circumstances. There are, however, two rather important objections to this magnifying of words. In the first place, the virtues of the feelings, or so-called heart excellences, seem to lose some of their characteristic moral beauty and sweetness with a loss of spontaneity. Simple kindness, sympathy that is not too much strained through a close-webbed net of moral criticism, cannot be wholly lacking to the completely virtuous Self. And, on the other hand, some of the virtues of the will, especially the virtue of constancy, do not seem reducible to good intentions, even when this phrase is most liberally interpreted.

The effort to unify all the virtues by reducing them to one all-embracing or all-absorbing virtue, is even less successful from the point of view of the philosophy of conduct. As we have seen, Aristotle chose a kind of general justice for this purpose; but he did not press his doctrine to an extreme, and did not consider it as interfering with his theory that the real excellence of all the virtues consists in their lying in a mean between two extremes. Modern ethics has selected "benevolence" as the one essential and all-inclusive virtue. And joining itself to theology, ethics has tried to summarize all the virtues under such an expression as "The Law of Love and Love as a Law," etc. But the question recurs at once: Must

not this benevolence, or love, be wise, courageous, constant,—in order to have that “stability and substance” which, as Hegel declared, “constitute the key-note of character”? To this question no satisfactory answer is given, or can be given, without bringing in again a number of fundamental conceptions which do not fuse well with the conception of benevolence as the sole inclusive virtue. Lotze, for example, becomes hopelessly confused and unintelligible in his treatment of the whole subject. This usually clear thinker tells us that it is “not the effort after our own, but only that for the production of another’s felicity, which is ethically meritorious;—and, accordingly, that the idea of benevolence must give us the sole supreme principle of moral conduct.” To this vague sentence it is sufficient to reply that if by felicity be meant happiness rather than moral character, then the effort to procure it for others is by no means always “ethically meritorious”; but if felicity be used to include, and to exalt, the worth of moral character, then he who does not make an “effort after” it for himself, is the very opposite of “ethically meritorious.” Expand and explain our terms as we may, we cannot escape the truth: *The idea of rational measure is required as an added ethical qualification in connection with benevolence itself.* This “rational measure” is the key to the virtue of wisdom which Plato exalted to the place of supremacy: while in the ethical theory of the Old Japan, benevolence, justice, and wisdom all yield the crown to the consummate virtue of Fidelity.

In fine, the argument always seems to come circling round to the point of starting again. Benevolence is indeed an important and cardinal virtue; but it is only one of the virtues, and it must itself be supplemented and completed by the others, by constancy, wisdom, justness and trueness—if ethics is to depict in its perfection the Virtuous Life.

This circle in the argument, however, has its own most important suggestion to make. The suggestion is this: the student of the philosophy of conduct should concentrate his regard

upon the one conception corresponding to that unitary being about which the circle has been drawn. This is the being of the Moral Self. It is the conception of such a being in which we must find the true principle for the unification of all the virtues. The unity of the virtues corresponds to the unity of a personality, in active and varied relations with other persons. This is a unity of no mechanical or merely conceptual sort; it is neither like the unity of a piece of mechanism nor like the unity which the process of logical abstraction prepares in order to cover an entire species consisting of many individuals. One sheep is like another, although one may be white and another black, one with long wool and one with short. But wisdom is not like courage, temperance is not a species of kindness, and justness and trueness are not to be reduced to benevolence. This many-sided being called man is the virtuous or vicious one; his possible virtues and vices are as many as are the forms of his action that are subject to intelligent control. He is set in society as the encitement and environment of his moral development; and his social relations are as indefinite in number as they are variable in kind.

In all these varying relations, and on all these many sides, the Moral Self is seeking many different forms of good, and is trying to escape or bravely to endure many different forms of evil. In all this search and effort the individual man is only one of many, a unit in a larger social multiplicity, which is itself a sort of unit relatively to other higher unities. No one virtuous quality will suffice on all occasions, or for the satisfactory discharge of all the functions belonging to these differing relations; nor can any man, however wise, always tell which one of several virtues it is fitting to display.

“One unifying conception of great significance and power has, however, already been attained. All the discoverable virtues are partial harmonies, or single notes accordant with the Moral Ideal. And that ideal is a Self living the Virtuous Life in social relations with other selves. The effort to realize this

ideal furnishes to each one in a fragmentary way his bit of the principle of unification which, so far as it is adopted and applied, tends to bring his own inner life, at any rate, into the unity of a harmonious whole. The alleged unity of virtue thus becomes the fidelity of the one and total personality—the unitary being called a Moral Self—to the Moral Ideal. But this unity is subjective and lies in the nature of moral personality rather than in the nature of virtue—as though ‘Virtue’ could represent anything more than an abstraction from characteristic tendencies and conscious states of a self-conscious and self-determining person. For any further objective ground of unity we must look, not to the nature of virtue, but to the nature of the Universe in the midst of which the development of human morality takes place.”

There are two other aspects of human ethical experience which have become embodied in abstract terms that seem to give morality a kind of unitary, but impersonal character. These words are Duty and Law. Is not he the truly good man who always does his duty; and may not, therefore, the doing of duty be said to be the very essence of morality? Or, what more can perfect goodness require of the man who aspires to attain it, than a constant and unswerving obedience to the moral law? But on examining both these highly abstract conceptions we find ourselves taken again over the same ground of facts that are only realized, or conceivable as possible of realization, through the development of a self-conscious and self-determining Self. Separate from personal experiences, duty and law have, in Reality, no ethical meaning at all.

The significance of the word Duty is made clear by reference to these two sets of factors which are obvious and important in the development of the Moral Self: (1) that conduct is an obligation; and (2) that all obligation attaches itself of necessity to one person in varied social relations to other persons. Thus certain species of conduct, including the inner motives, intentions, and fixed purposes, since they are enforced by the

feeling of obligation, are regarded as dues, or debts, to others. It is right that they should be performed; and this rightness, as dictated and enforced by moral emotion, becomes the basis for a doctrine of duties and of rights. But there are duties many and diverse and difficult to discern; as many as there are other persons with whom the individual comes into social relations; as diverse as are these social relations; and as difficult as human temptations, human ignorance, or human limitations of means and opportunity can make them to be. The conception of duty, therefore, is an abstraction from that feeling of oughtness which accompanies all man's judgments and actions of an ethico-social character. When, then, Kant apostrophizes the conception: "Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name"; or Coleridge, Carlyle, and others who write about ethical subjects with appropriate emotional warmth, indulge themselves in similar figures of speech; it is really the perfectly dutiful person, if such could be found, whom they make the object of their admiration and their worship. As Kant himself elsewhere puts the truth in plain language: all men naturally ascribe a certain "dignity and sublimity to the person who fulfils all his duties." For the reality of such a life is glorified by the ideal to which it corresponds.

The manner in which the word Law becomes in matters of morality, converted into a sort of adorable fetish, is even more obvious. This use of the word is after the fashion so prevalent among the physical and natural sciences of the day. Having discovered, as they suppose, the unchanging natures and invariable modes of the behavior of things, and being able to give them an approximately accurate mathematical statement so far only as their quantitative relations are concerned, they proceed to personify and deify the formula. Obedience to the "laws of nature" seems to impart a dignity even to material substances which they could not have, if they were only considered as just naturally doing what they chose to do. But "laws of nature" are not entities, or compelling forces which

exist over and above, or outside of, real things. So entrancing does the conception of law become, and so shadowy and ineffective the conception of a consciously followed ideal, that the heart of science aches to reduce the Moral Self to a thing-like existence, under the reign of inexorable law. But this will not do. For in fact, *it is not the law that rules over the Self; it is the Self that makes its own law by following, or refusing to follow, the moral ideal.* And this ideal is not the bare keeping of an impersonal law. The good man is not the man who is "reigned over" from the outside. The good man is he who makes the ideal of a perfect Self, living in those relations with other selves which are fixed by his physical and social environment, the effectively controlling thing in all his conduct. And when the two laws—the vital impulses of appetite, passion, affection, desire, ambition, etc., and the mild but superior satisfactions of the idea—contend within him, his self-conscious, self-determining mind chooses the latter of the two.

How, then, shall this manner of speech be taken out of the realm of poetry and myth and given the garb of scientific truth? It seems to us that only one way is possible. The ideal of duty-doing, which is a mere abstraction until it is translated into terms of personal experience and personal character, is really the ideal of a Moral Self who is perfectly adjusted, by his own response to the feeling of obligation, to all other moral selves in the various social relations of human life. What, then, is the whole duty of man? It is the constant, courageous, wise, and loving devotion of one's powers to the realization of this Ideal. Positively expressed in terms of religion, the exhortation which sets before man his whole duty is this: "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Negatively expressed, and as contradicting all the impulses, endeavors, and ideals which lie in different directions, human ethical experience may be summed up in these closing words of Tourguéneff's "*Faust*":

" Not the fulfillment of cherished dreams and aspirations, however lofty they may be—the fulfillment of duty, that is what must be the care of man. Without laying on himself chains, the iron chains of duty, he cannot reach without a fall the end of his career. But in youth we think—the freer the better, the farther one will get. Youth may be excused for thinking so, but it is shameful to delude one's self when the stern face of truth has looked one in the eyes at last."

Closely connected with the conception of duty as an obligation upon impulse which is felt like "iron chains" is the conception of moral law in its origin and development. On this subject the analysis of moral consciousness confirms what an historical study of moral development suggests: only at a certain stage in his progress does man (the individual and—in a somewhat figurative way we may say—the race) find himself face to face with this legal conception of morality. It is indeed doubtful whether any distinct epoch in ethical evolution is to be discerned "when the *idea* of obligation held in the general consciousness has been taken by the obligatory *norm* of law." The rise and growth of the thought that the pursuit of the Virtuous Life may properly be conceived of as obedience to a universal code has been natural and yet manifold in character, and oftentimes subtle and chiefly concealed. Especially is this true of that exceedingly vague and intangible conception which undertakes to express itself in such phrases as "*a moral law*," or "*the Moral Law*." Laws, themselves impersonal, which are concrete enactments regulating the relations of persons, and which owe their origin to the action of persons, can be understood. Laws that have only the significance of the more or less regular observed modes of the behavior of impersonal things, are *prima facie* intelligible; even if we cannot understand their source. But what can be meant by *the Moral Law*, if all personality, all Selfhood, is to be left out of the account which ethics attempts to render of its origin, its validity, and the enforcement of its penalties?

In their effort to understand the origin and nature of such a mental construction as the conception of an impersonal moral law, writers on ethics are found shifting their points of view in the fashion against which warning has been already repeatedly uttered. That is to say, these writers take at one moment the subjective, or plainly personal point of view; and at the next moment they are found stationed at the more objective and tentatively impersonal point of view. We say "tentatively impersonal"; for no point of view from which to regard any ethical conception can possibly be more than apparently and momentarily (for the sake of the argument, as it were) separated from considerations that are realizable only in the conditions and social relations of moral and personal beings.

Subjectively regarded, the conception of Moral Law is the conscious apprehension of a definite rule or maxim, adapted to regulate conduct, which actually excites some person's feelings of obligation, approbation, and merit, and which actually offers a mandate to some person's will. Subjectively considered, also, the very formation of this conception implies a work of learning such rules or maxims from other persons; or of generalizing them for one's self by processes of observation. The primary data for the formation of such a law are the facts which have already been discovered by our analysis of man's moral consciousness; they are the "I think," "I feel," "I desire," "I plan," etc.,—all of them psychoses, which have reference to forms of good and bad conduct. Objectively regarded, however, the so-called moral laws are certain forms of conduct that have—by whatever historical processes and in accordance with whatever true or false traditions—become actually embodied in customs, maxims, statutes, or other institutions; they are the commonly accepted formulas which assume the right to regulate human behavior under a great variety of conditions and relations. But such *laws*, thus objectively and impersonally regarded, cannot be considered

as truly *moral* laws, without a return to the personal and subjective point of view. And here the simple and ultimate fact is that they appear before the individual consciousness as binding; they actually arouse the feeling of obligation, and offer a mandate, an imperative to the will. Their being at all, that is to say, consists in the recognition which they obtain in the minds of personal beings.

Moral laws imply, then, law-giving moral consciousness, which is their only actual and, indeed, only conceivable, source. So much of universality as they can attain is dependent upon those characteristics of moral consciousness which belong to human nature and are exercised *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*. So much of objectivity as they possess, of impersonality as they appear to have, is due to the conditions and nature of the various forms of social organization. But social organization is itself a product of morally constituted selves. In all such social organization the primary, universally present fact is found to be this: certain ways of behavior rather than others are actually recognized as binding upon human nature. As far back as one can go in human history, trusting in genuine historical sources, one finds society of some sort already organized upon substantially the same ethical basis as that now existing. The person makes the laws that take on the objective form of custom, maxim, common law, or written statutes; and the person responds to these objective forms with the feelings, thoughts, and volitions, which make them to be, in reality moral laws. The conception of an impersonal Law is, therefore, a pure fiction in ethics.

We may note, in closing this chapter, how the conceptions of Virtue, Duty, and Moral Law, stand related in the moral consciousness of mankind, in many interesting ways. *Virtue* is a generalization from particular virtues, or kinds of conduct to which, as due chiefly to moral reactions of the social environment, the feelings of obligation, approbation, and merit have become attached. *Duty* is a generalization from

concrete particular duties, each one of which implies the same feelings as connected with forms of conduct dependent upon our special relations with others (an "owness" of something to be done to some person). *Law* is a generalization of the maturer consciousness of the individual in his race development and more extended social environment. It is two-sided, and implies validity ("thatness") and content ("whatness");—an imperative which has reference to some external authority, although existing as a mandate within the human mind.

CHAPTER XVI

SCHOOLS OF ETHICS

THUS far our discussions have established the truth that the reality of morality is to be found in the actual life and development of moral beings in social relations. These beings are self-conscious and self-determining minds; but in order to become true moral selves, they must be something more. And this they are. For in fact man, as human and really man, everywhere and in all times of his history, has attributed both a practical and an ideal value to certain kinds of conduct. Nor has this preference been a matter simply of cool and unimpassioned judgment; it has been excited and enforced by certain distinctively ethical emotions. And when the question is asked: What are those inner qualities and the deeds flowing from them, which are estimated as having moral value and so obligatory, and as worthy of approval and so well-deserving? an answer is given with a fairly unanimous verdict from the race in its doctrine of the Virtuous Life. This doctrine reveals the truth that the essence of the virtuousness of the virtues consists in their conformity to a personal ideal. It is this Ideal which has value *in-itself* (or, so it appears at first sight); and as having such value it receives the sanctions of moral consciousness. The Moral Ideal, progressively realized in fact by the moral development of the race, is thus the explanatory conception discovered by philosophical reflection upon the data of ethics. *Moral Selfhood is a development from the self-conscious, self-determining effort to realize the Moral Ideal.*

But man as moral, and as realizing an ideal because he *is* moral, is still a child of nature. This nature which he is self-developing has been derived from that larger Nature which

begat, encompasses, and supports him. What, then, has man's moral nature to tell us with regard to this larger Nature? How can the sanctions which man appreciates and estimates to be of such worth, and the ideal which he deems himself obligated to follow, be grounded in the Being of the World?

Before we examine critically, the answers to this problem which have been attempted by the different schools of ethics, another obvious fact of man's ethical history must be called to mind. There has been a *universalizing* of moral judgments going on, as an important factor in the moral development of the race. The views held by savage and more primitive peoples as to the right and wrong of conduct and character are not so essentially different in the nature of the estimate, as in the range of their application. Even Aristotle thought there could be no talk of justice, or of friendly feeling, as obligatory on the part of masters toward their slaves; since "the slave is a living tool, and the tool is a lifeless slave." It was Christianity, with its conception of common citizenship in the heavenly kingdom, which first regarded the man as now "no longer a servant, but above a servant, a brother beloved."

Two classes of influences have been most important and effective in this process of expanding the limits within which the virtuous life is thought to be applicable, until no exceptions are to be allowed for any member of the human race. These influences are, first, the economic, political, and social forces which have given rise to their respective forms of organizations and institutions, into which many different individuals, families, ranks, and even races and nations, have been incorporated. Great mercantile and trading companies; great empires; great associations of an educational, or reforming, or actively religious character;—all these make constant and important contributions to the universalizing of moral principles. But the influences of philosophy and of religious doctrine have been no less important and effective.

Indeed, the moral ideals of the great philosophical and religious teachers of mankind, have furnished the mightiest moral uplifts to the human race. Philosophy has labored to commend morality to the collective reason of mankind. Its work has been the universalizing of moral principles through the practical necessity of establishing a rational connection between particular forms of conduct and these universal principles. But religion, while its moral doctrines have been on the whole much less rational and less fit to command the intelligent judgment of mankind, and while the moral practices of its organizations have often been of a low and even degraded type, has on the whole contributed powerfully in the same direction of an increased range to the application of moral ideals. Muhammadanism, for example, has bound all ranks and conditions of many races, under the bonds of one form of moral obligation, in an efficient kind of brotherhood. But above all, especially in its more modern form of doctrine and work, which is a return to the principles advocated by Jesus, Christianity is striving to bring about an extension of the same principles of life and conduct to the entire race of mankind.

This practical "universalizing" of moral principles has both supported, and in its turn been helped by, the different theories which have endeavored to solve the final problems of ethics. For according as the moral nature of humanity manifests itself, and testifies, as it were, to its own final purpose and goal, in this enlarged social way; so the necessity is made greater for some rational account of its own origin, sanctions, and ideals. From this necessity come the various schools of ethics. These schools, in spite of many minor divergences and differences in the combination of their more or less important factors, may, in principle, be reduced to three. We will call them: (1) Legalism in Ethics; (2) Utilitarianism in Ethics; (3) Idealism in Ethics.

As a final theory designed to account for the origin, sanc-

tions, and ideals, of man's moral life and moral development, legalism proposes the impersonal conception of Law. The theory may take one of two rather essentially different forms. The first of these uses the word in the same majestic but really unmeaning fashion which is so common with the shallower thinkers in the metaphysics of the physical sciences. The refutation of this form of legalism in ethics has already been indicated. Briefly reviewed, it may be stated somewhat as follows: All the facts of ethics, as we know them, are really subjective and personal. They are moments in the life of a self-conscious and self-determining Self, as limited by a certain physical environment, and socially related to other like-minded selves. But this form of legalism summarizes the external imponents, hypostasizes them under the inapplicable term Law, and offers this abstract conception as the real explanation of the whole experience. It amounts only to saying "that mankind, in its moral evolution, has somehow embodied in its social organizations certain ways of behavior, and types of character, which actually excite the feelings of obligation and approbation; and which, therefore, appear to have a right to command the will, with the majority of the individuals forming these social organizations." The criteria, sanctions, and ideals of conduct are in this way left, just where they ought to be left by all historical and descriptive ethics,—namely, in the conscious life of the multitude of individuals that respond to the stimulus of external condition with the appropriate ethical feelings and ideas. Nothing is learned in this way, however, as to how the source, the rational justification, the profounder significance or final purpose, of this experience of mankind, must be conceived of in relation to the Universe of which man is a part. All dynamic elements are lacking to such a metaphysics of morality. In the name of social laws, the theory deceives us with empty abstractions,—mere generalizations that neglect altogether the moral point of view.

"The case is somewhat different with the other form of Legalism in Ethics. This theory asserts that the moral law is revealed in human consciousness, and in such manner as to be independent of any form of historical or experimental proof. The Moral Law has thus the force—so the theory maintains—of an unquestioned rational principle; whose peculiarity, however, consists in this, that it does not simply offer a statement of truth which has demonstrable and universal certainty, but that it also makes upon the will a demand for obedience which is equally exempted from all questions of human scepticism. The moral law is, on account of the fact that its origin is purely in reason and without any admixture of empirical elements, both an *apodeictic* proposition and a categorical imperative."

That we cannot speak of any one all-inclusive and complete moral law, any proposition that shall summarize all the essential judgments of mankind with respect to ethical values and all the maxims esteemed right for realizing these values in a virtuous life, has already been demonstrated in sufficient detail. The very nature of ethical judgment, the plainly heterogeneous character of the moral code accepted by the best judges, the actual course of man's ethical evolution, show that this conception of an intuitive all-embracing moral principle, as set into the original constitution of human reason, or even as having evolved itself in the progressive formation of human reason, is a chimera. Even more unwarrantable have those attempts been found to be which disregard the personal influences and interests involved in all moral values; and which repeat the vain proposal to free the mind from its natural, necessary, and rational tendency, to consider all these values as rendered unthinkable and wholly without value as soon as they are treated from the point of view of impersonal laws and impersonal ends.

Our contention against the possibility of an *a priori* impersonal law as offering a solution of the more difficult prob-

lems of the philosophy of conduct may fitly be illustrated by a few words of criticism of Kant's attempt in this direction. In his profoundly philosophical mind the inevitable connection between ethics, on the one hand, and epistemology and metaphysics, on the other hand, is obvious and impressive from the very first. To found more securely the principles of conduct and the postulates and faiths of religion was his purpose from the beginning of his critical examination of human reason. Kant's criticism of so-called "pure reason," or man's cognitive faculties so far as they are native and constitutional, leaves these faculties embarrassed and thwarted wholly, whenever the attempt is made to extend knowledge beyond the confines of phenomena. Within these confines the same faculties operate to give to all kinds of experience, both constitutive and regulative forms that are themselves quite independent of experience. And when Kant comes to treat of the moral ideas, he demands for them, too, an origin that is not empirical, but wholly supersensuous; in this respect he remains true to the presuppositions of the Platonic ethics. But he is forced into the position where the very moral worth of every right action consists in its being done against resistance. Nothing but a bare law, unrelated to experience and arising in a world quite apart from the one which we know, is left of the essence of morality. This abstract formula, thus derived by a critique of man's moral consciousness and independently of all empirical data, is called by Kant the "Fundamental Law of the Pure Practical Reason." And it is stated by him, in the chief one of its slightly different forms, as follows: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation."

Further examination of this Law, to which Kant gives a perfectly unquestioned authority and an absolutely universal applicability, and which he conceives of as a mandate of reason entirely free from all considerations as to the consequences of conduct and as to the feelings with which men unavoidably

contemplate these consequences, shows that it is neither a *priori*, in any strict meaning of the term, nor properly speaking, impersonal. Indeed, whatever this law has which commends itself to the human feelings of obligation, or to the reasonable judgment of man, is dependent upon a vast and variable evolution of human experience; and all this experience consists of forms of intercourse between persons, and of readjustments in opinions and practices due to such intercourse. That is to say, all the validity which the so-called *a priori* and impersonal formula possesses comes from centuries of the use of human powers of reflection upon ethical and social phenomena.

There is much, however, in this lofty maintaining of the claims of universal reason to have somewhere hidden in its depths the eternal truths and unchanging principles of all morality, which excites the enthusiasm and commands the respect of the reflective mind. The most unchanging truths, we feel, are moral. The profoundest insights into the heart of Reality are born of the ethical nature. Man's kinship with the Infinite and the Eternal is most intimate and strong, only when he has arrived at the maturity of a moral self-consciousness. Things may be in an unceasing flux, and all the physical structures of human skill may crumble away. Even the elements may melt with fervent heat, and the heavens themselves be rolled up like a parchment scroll: but the obligations of duty can never be abated; the good of righteous living does not fade with time; the moral ideal loses none of its awful beauty or of its unconditioned value. Over and beyond the last fading vision of the things that minister to a sensuous good, there rises the spiritual vision of a good that is lasting and supreme. And in this Good, virtue is not the least but rather the most important factor; for it is the ideal which lures on and encourages and commands the moral development of mankind.

Thus the philosopher who is justly enamored of his own

rational construction has always felt and spoken regarding his Ideal of the morally Good. That profound stirring of feeling which Kant designates "respect for the law" is itself a fact; and so is also the movement of imagination and thought which accompanies the feeling. These facts are the experiences not to be doubted, of a moral nature that is—

"Formed to rise, reach at, if not grasp and gain
The good beyond him,—which attempt is growth."

It is the source, the significance, the value, the warrant, and the outcome, of the nature thus formed, and the relation which it sustains to the larger Nature, which offer to the philosophy of conduct its ultimate problems. These problems, which utilitarianism in ethics almost totally disregards, are not indeed solved by legalism in ethics; although the latter theory emphasizes and reinforces them as the former theory does not.

According to the Kantian form of legalism in ethics, the criteria, sanctions, and ideals of morality are placed by Nature in every human being, ready-made as it were, in the form of a perfectly intelligible and infallible, but impersonal mandate,—"a principle of universal legislation." According to Utilitarianism in its more modern and elaborate form, nature begets morality in a quite different and more roundabout and irresponsible way. The older form of Hedonism was frankly and consistently, even brutally, selfish; it made pleasure, as estimated by the subject of it, the sole test, justification, and final purpose, or end, of good conduct. The Stoicism which went to the length of scorning all kinds of pleasure, for pleasure's sake, and of seeming to cherish pain as a good in-itself, was the extreme answer to this Hedonistic extreme. Neither view could afford a satisfactory account of the data of ethics, the facts of man's moral experiences; and neither enabled the inquiring reason satisfactorily to connect the nature of the

human Moral Self with that larger Nature in which it must somehow find its explanation and its ground. The form of Hedonism prevalent in modern times has striven to guard against the objections, and to supply the deficiencies, of its predecessor, by introducing two important modifying conceptions. Of these, one is the conception of evolution; the other is the conception of qualitative differences, implying degrees of excellence, in the various pleasures and pains to which man's sensitive nature is subject.

Helped out by these two modifying conceptions, utilitarianism, with many minor modifications and divergences among its own most distinguished advocates, has agreed substantially in giving the following account of the origin, nature, and development of the Moral Self and of the customs and maxims accepted, as duly ethical, by a society of moral selves. First, we have to reckon with the obvious fact that the animal man, like all animal organisms, is sensitive to a great variety of influences. On account of the fact that he stands at the head of the evolution, hitherto accomplished, of animal species, he is the most sensitive of the many such beings of which we have knowledge. He is above all other things capable of reacting to his environment, both physical and social, with a countless variety of indefinite degrees of pleasures and of pains. To say that he craves pleasure and dislikes pain is a mere tautology. The attractiveness of pleasure, the repulsive power of pain, are essential and vital elements in the pleasure-pain experiences. But the way that man reacts—that is, his own behavior or conduct—determines in large measure the quality of his experiences, whether pleasurable or painful; and, as well, the intensities and varieties of both his pleasures and his pains. Nor is this relation of cause and effect limited to the individual acting; it extends usually, if not quite invariably, beyond the limits of his own self-hood and affects the pleasure-pains of other selves. These effects upon others, whether pleasurable or painful to them, may also be either pleasurable or

painful to the actor himself. For he, let us admit, has been already so far developed by nature, in the animal series, that he is superior to all the other animals, in his sensitiveness and multiform capacity for *sympathetic* pleasures and *sympathetic* pains.

What, now, inevitably results from this growing experience of the sensitive nature of man with the consequences of his conduct, as impressed upon him by nature, through the forces of his physical and social environment, in the form of egoistic or sympathetic pleasures and pains? To this question one of two answers may be given in the name of evolution; or both of the two answers may be combined. Some forms of bad conduct are destructive of the life, or the virility, of the individual and of society; and even of its power to propagate itself in a prolific way or to nourish itself and maintain the struggle for existence against opposing forces. The opposites of these forms of bad conduct will, of necessity survive and become preferred by men's consciousness through their enforced selection in the realm of so-called nature. Morally good conduct is, therefore, when viewed from this point of view, conduct which fits men to survive in their struggle for existence with natural forces and with other men in their social environment. Thus—in part at least—the morality which we have seen can belong only to the life and development of a self-conscious and self-determining Mind, existing in social relations with others of like mind, is explained as arising out of the unconscious and externally determined adaptations of the animal man to the conditions of his existence. Of course, as the human race multiplies and comes into more varied and close relations of an economic, political, intellectual, and social sort, what has been called the universalizing of moral principles is compelled more or less promptly to take place.

Does the same theory account also for the "internalizing" of moral judgments? This important fact in man's ethical history is by no means so easily explained by combining the

doctrine of evolution with the fundamental principle of utilitarianism. The human mind may be compelled by an inexorable nature to recognize, at first unconsciously and then with more or less of intelligence, that certain forms of conduct are preferable if success is to be attained in the struggle for existence; and this recognition would afterward cause it to attach a value to these forms because they are found *useful* for the purposes of this struggle. Mankind might even, by the extension of the sphere of sympathetic feeling, manage to cross part way over the bridge between the obvious fact that "all men want to be happy" and the moral obligation "to want all men to be happy"; although this is hard to admit. But it still remains to show that the essential quality of virtuousness is recognized by moral consciousness as its utility for the production of happiness; and yet further, to explain how it has come about that this consciousness estimates the internal qualities of the Self as having a moral excellence of their own, quite irrespective of the question whether they give pleasure to their possessor, and not wholly, or even chiefly, dependent upon their merely pleasure-pain consequences to his fellow-men.

In a word, when an answer is sought for the ultimate grounds of moral principles, the various considerations brought forward by the most subtle and complex forms of utilitarianism are far from satisfactory. The help which evolution gives to the explanation is only superficial. The principle of evolution can say, at most, only that somehow, because of an experience of their pleasure-producing power, certain activities of the Moral Self have come to be preferred; and that certain others are discredited, because of their lack of this power—so long as the principle of evolution remains strictly faithful to the principle of utilitarianism. But when the latter endeavors to help out the former, by turning its descriptive history into really explanatory science, it departs from its own essential point of view. Then, in fact, Utilitarianism in Ethics be-

comes something more than merely utilitarian. For *virtue* is given another kind of excellence, essentially different from its usefulness to the securing of pleasure and the avoiding of pain; and the "Moral Self" is seen to be something essentially higher than a sensitive and intellectually gifted animal. Thus the Nature which has produced such a natural being is called upon to show further reason to justify its ability for so noble a work, and for its interest in the realization of such an incomparable ideal.

Some of the more conclusive objections to every form of Utilitarianism in Ethics—that is to say, the theory which attempts to explain the criteria, sanctions, and ideals of the Moral Self as arising wholly from the relative utility of different forms of conduct to produce pleasure, or avoid pain—may be briefly summarized as follows: And, first, the psychology of man's pleasure-pains which is necessary to this theory is not true to the facts of experience. In speaking of pleasures and pains we are dealing, not with entities that can be externally measured or estimated, but only with subjective processes, the estimate of whose intensity and value is also a purely subjective affair. If *A* gets more pleasure (and therefore prefers it on hedonistic grounds) from swilling beer than from reading poetry or visiting the sick, or subscribing to the missionary cause, this is simply an indisputable fact; so far as the two persons are governing their conduct *merely* by pleasure-seeking, there is no difference in motive between the two. Nor is the moral character in general the chief determining factor in men's experiences of pleasure and pain. Until the painful struggles of life have worked out for the few souls who attain it, that consummate virtue of resignation, and its ensuing peace, the conditions of happiness, so far as they reside in the individual, are much more physiological and temperamental than ethical and spiritual. "Given freedom from disease, and a slain antelope, and there could be no merrier creature than a Bushman." Apart from the consolations of religion,

there is no small ground for the contention of Schopenhauer, that intellectual and moral refinements breed pains much faster than pleasures. But the whole utilitarian theory breaks down with the load of repairs which its upper story has to bear when the invention of John Stuart Mill is accepted and moved in; for this acute analyst of human moral consciousness detects and admits the fact that the self-conscious and self-determining mind *does make* distinctions between higher and lower pleasures, and between noble and ignoble pleasures; and that it does even prefer certain noble forms of suffering to certain ignoble forms of happiness. But the moment that this truth has been recognized, a new standard of estimates has been set up over the different pleasures and pains. *This new standard is a standard of moral values.*

Utilitarianism in Ethics is also disproved by its complete failure to make good its promise of affording some definite and scientific principle by which to estimate the relative values of different kinds of conduct and types of character. Its vague general statements about the quantity of pleasures and pains, happiness and misery, which flow from various ways of living and moral growth, are far enough from an exact science. For utilitarianism must be held, in its application, strictly accountable for an answer to these three questions: (1) *Whose* happiness furnishes the criterion, sanction, and rational ideal of morality? (2) *When* is this happiness to be conceived of as realizable, in order that it may afford the desired criterion, sanction, and ideal? (3) *What* is the nature of *the* happiness that stands in such an essential relation to morality? And it must answer these questions in such a way as (1) to furnish a criterion for distinguishing between the morally good and the morally bad, in behavior and in character; (2) to account for the sanctions on which the actual moral judgments of mankind rely in justifying the feelings of responsibility, and of moral approbation and disapprobation, together with the right and the duty of treatment appropriate

to the moral character; and (3) it must explain the nature and development of the moral ideal.

If now it be said that whatever form of pleasure or happiness (for the real issue of the argument is not changed by an interchange of these words) is preferred by the individual, taking his own life *only* into the account, precisely that, and no other form of pleasure or happiness ought to serve him as the criterion and the ideal of his own conduct; and that this preference is itself the sufficient justification of such conduct; this is as near as a strict doctrine of utilitarianism can come to giving a manageable rule of life. I know what gives me most happiness; and although I cannot calculate with much approach to scientific accuracy, the sum-total of my kind of preferred happiness during my whole life, I can come nearer to this than to the true answer for any other person,—much nearer, than for mankind in general. But to adopt such a criterion, such an ideal of the life to be preferred, is to go squarely athwart all the most cultivated feelings and judgments of the race with regard to the very nature and destiny of the Moral Self. It is, at best, to become in the opinion of mankind a calculating and, possibly, a refined voluptuary, but not a good man. All social development sets itself against the attempt to put into practice such a theory of the moral life;—and by no means least, the morally most perfect society. I must, then, take others into the account,—at least, some others—in adopting for myself, some principle to regulate conduct. I must, therefore, so govern my conduct as to secure the maximum of happiness for a portion of my fellows, without sacrificing unduly my own claims to happiness. Here again, however, I am at once met with the problem: Shall it be with those who prefer the things in which I find and anticipate most pleasure; or shall it also be, in part, with those who have other standards of pleasure? In case I am sensuous, must my moral union be with epicures and prostitutes; in case I am of intellectual or artistic tastes, with scholars and artists,

etc.? But in any case, utilitarianism requires that the Moral Self shall be controlled in all its moral purposes and relations by its ideas as to how to get, and to give, the most of its own particular, preferred kind of happiness. The world beyond may go its own way and utilize its conduct to the end of securing its own preferred kind of happiness.

No doubt a certain amount of this selfish sort of self-classifying in the pursuit of social enjoyment is generally held to be ethically justifiable. But we have undertaken to discover the essential characteristics of the virtuous life—in such form that the discovery shall explain and justify the feeling of obligation which Nature has fastened on the race, and the ideal of moral goodness which It has slowly, but now clearly, lifted above the horizon so as to make this ideal a matter of self-conscious appreciation and self-determining choice and endeavor, for the race.

The further expansion of the theory of utilitarianism, which the growth of moral consciousness in the race demands, results in a complete bursting of its bands. The man who thinks to be moral by associating himself in a calculating way with those of like mind and tastes with himself, as to how to get the most pleasure out of life, finds himself, as judged by the highest standards, far below the mark of the moral ideal. In the first place, he has no sufficient sanction for those heroic and self-sacrificing virtues which are particularly admired by the moral judgment of mankind. In the second place, his interests are narrow, and the virtuous deeds called out by them are lacking in breadth and depth. But—more fatal still to the theory—unless he is seeking by his conduct to promote the true and the highest happiness of others, as well as of himself, he is not really dutiful to the sanctions, or working toward the ideal, of morality at all. As we have already shown, however, the moment you scale your pleasures or happinesses so as to make some of them true and others false or deceptive, some intrinsically high and others base, you have abandoned

the utilitarian standard; but you have found the more excellent way. You have admitted that the values of a life which is struggling to attain the moral ideal, while relying upon the sanctions of moral consciousness to justify its reason in this struggle, are too excellent—or excellent in another way—to be expressed by such terms as denote only degrees of pleasure or happiness. You may change your word to welfare, if you choose. For it is not happiness, or pleasure, as such (*quoad* happiness) which imparts the sanction to the realization of virtue in this kind of a moral life; neither is it the maximum of happiness for all, in-itself considered, which constitutes its moral ideal. To be virtuous, even at the cost of suffering made inevitable by the physical and social environment and, so far as we can see, essential to the very process of moral development, *is* welfare for the Moral Self. Morality cannot be made the mere servant of happiness, not to say, its tool. Moral goodness, as a qualification of moral self-hood, has life and worth, incomparable, *in itself*.

When it extends its claims over all generations and tribes of human beings, and even beyond, into the invisible regions of hypothetical selves or future disembodied spirits, utilitarianism becomes yet more hopelessly bewildered in its argument. What sanction the religious devotee or patriotic martyr can establish in reason for his feeling of obligation to sacrifice himself in behalf of the future realization of a Divine Kingdom, or to help gain some centuries of a prosperous Commonwealth, from the obligation to seek happiness, if such an obligation exists at all as a moral affair, it is impossible to explain.

Finally, to return to an earlier point of view, utilitarianism does not help the theory of moral development to explain how morality arose out of the non-moral; how the obligation bravely and self-sacrificingly to face pain in the interests of an ethical ideal sprang from a natural craving for pleasure and a natural shrinking from pain. And here we come upon a point at which

the views of evolution and of utilitarianism seem to be not only divergent but even contradictory. Nowhere else is it so clear as in the moral sphere that the desired end cannot be realized, or even approached, except by paying the cost in immense suffering all along the way. Courage, temperance, constancy, wisdom, justice, fidelity, and kindness, are virtues quite inconceivable in a world free from temptations, suffering, loss. Indeed, such is the essential nature of the Moral Self that it cannot come into being at all except by way of a process which is one long-continued painful struggle.

The refusal to regard morality as having either its criterion, its sanctions, or its ideal, in happiness merely, has been so complete in the world's best literature that one scarcely need cite examples to show its truth. Dramatists, poets, biographers, and historians, who have taken the ethical point of view, as well as the surer insight of the highest class of modern novelists, have refused to depict or to estimate the values of human life in terms merely of pleasure and pain, of happiness and suffering. The necessary discipline of pain, and the moral worthiness of disregarding the purely hedonistic standard have so impressed the minds of the poets generally as to evoke many passages like that one often quoted from Browning's *Rabbi Ben Ezra*:

"Then welcome each rebuff that turns earth's smoothness rough,
Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go!
Be our joys three parts pain,
Strive, and hold cheap the strain;
Learn, nor account the pang; dare, never grudge the throe."

We cannot, therefore, accept the claim of Utilitarianism in Ethics that the criterion, the sanctions, and the rational end of conduct are all to be found wholly in the relation which conduct sustains to human happiness. Conduct is, in fact, a function productive of happiness or unhappiness; this is one truth of experience. But men call conduct good or bad,—

meaning by these terms to designate the characteristics of conduct in relation to another ideal standard than that of happiness. This is another truth of experience. These two truths cannot be united in the theory that conduct is to be considered, from the ethical point of view, *solely* as a function productive of happiness or unhappiness; that the rationality of the demand made upon moral consciousness for right conduct is based *solely* upon the value of its eudæmonistic tendency; and, finally, that the end at which moral self-culture aims is *solely* the end of attaining happiness.

To review the problem of conduct as it now comes before us for solution: We are seeking for some rational account for the origin and grounds of that quality of "rightness" which men attribute to some conduct in preference to other conduct. We are seeking not so much to explain the facts of particular preferences, but to discover a universal basis which our rational nature may approve for the fact of *this kind* of a preference. In the course of the search, the admission has been forced from the advocates of the hedonistic theory that men do not actually regard the preference of morally right conduct as identical with the choice of the course which seems to bring to the individual the maximum of mere happiness. The admission has also been forced that men do not regard themselves as obligated merely to seek happiness for themselves, nor do they claim the sanctions of conscience for seeking happiness, in the same way as for the effort to do right, and for the striving after the realization of the moral ideal. The admission has also been forced that in the practical reason of mankind, the ideal of happiness and the ideal of a Moral Self functioning perfectly so far as its own conduct is concerned, in social relations to other selves, are not absolutely identical ideals. What more is needed to constitute the admission that the criterion, the sanctions, and the ideal end of conduct, as regarded from the point of view of ethics, are not to be found in happiness alone?

It must be admitted, however, that the considerations which the modern theory of evolution has brought to bear upon the older forms of Hedonism are important; and that their admission into the theory produces certain improvements in the current forms of Utilitarianism in Ethics. So far as the theory of evolution is applied to the explanation of the changes that have gone on in the moral consciousness of the race toward different customs and practices, it throws a flood of light upon ethical phenomena. Undoubtedly, the experience both of the individual and of the race with the pleasurable or painful consequences of the current customs and practices is always changing—and often profoundly or even completely changing—the moral attitude of the community toward these customs and practices. The typical morality is uniformly, to a large extent, the construction of the physical and social forces that enter into the total evolution of human life; and hedonistic considerations are, of course, powerful amongst these forces. But they are by no means the whole of the forces which shape the moral evolution of mankind; and the history of this evolution itself shows that they are not. It is necessary again to remind ourselves of that fallacy to which the advocate of the theory of evolution in ethics is constantly tempted,—the fallacy, namely, of identifying a partial and defective history of moral development with a complete and satisfactory account of its underlying causes and its fundamental principles.

After making the necessary restrictions and explanations there are few real reasons left for the present close alliance between utilitarianism and evolutionary ethics. The just claims of both, as based upon facts of experience and upon fair conclusions from those facts, can be better admitted and incorporated into a satisfactory ethical theory, if this alliance is severed. Those complicated and distinctive forms of activity which make man a moral being cannot, strictly speaking, be explained as evolved from any less complex and more vaguely animal forms of functioning. His moral endowment being

once assumed, however, the various modifications which it undergoes are explicable—theoretically at least—in terms of the theory of evolution. On the other hand, the important part which man's susceptibility to an increasing variety of pleasures and pains plays in his ethical development cannot, of course, be denied; nor should it ever for a moment be lost sight of by the student of the philosophy of conduct.

Indeed, it is to these considerations, which admit the value of happiness and yet deny that happiness is the sole criterion, sanction, and ideal end of morality, that we must attribute the unsettled condition in which psychology and history leave the student of ethics. But utilitarianism offers no delivery from these painful dilemmas. On the contrary it widens the gulf, intensifies the strife, and perpetuates the schism, between the Sentient Self and the Moral Self. It tends to make a hopelessly divided manhood. For the same self-conscious and self-determining being cannot, under existing circumstances, pursue both happiness and fidelity to the moral ideal as its supreme end in life. No amount and no subtlety of intellect, when employed in calculating amounts, kinds, and ideal values of happiness merely, can so equip human nature as to fit it for, or conduct it toward, a rational and morally worthy end. We must look, then, to some other form of theory for help in the further solution of the most profound problems of ethics.

The answer which Idealism feels compelled to give to the ultimate problem of ethics is, therefore, unmistakable. It accepts all the truths to which legalism and utilitarianism make their appeal. The Kantian form of legalism is grandly right in holding that the moral ideal is bedded in human nature in such manner as to be its own criterion, and sanction; and that the worth of this ideal is absolute and not dependent upon the sensitiveness to pleasure-pains of the animal man, as shaped by his physical and social environment. But utilitarianism, joined with the theory of evolution, is

also right in connecting man's moral being and moral development in a causal way with the Being and Evolution of the Universe as known by man. The truths of both these theories must, therefore, be incorporated into the conception of this Universe as being ethical in its own nature and—so to say—"its own right." Unless man's moral ideals are really to have their ground, their sanction, and their final purpose, in the Being of the World, they are merely subjective, without rational ground, or sanction, and without sure promise of a satisfying end. That Nature, in which the physical sciences do not hesitate to find the self-like characteristics of order, of force directed toward appreciable and intelligible results, of obedience to so-called laws, and of other forms of rationality; that Nature, in which the biological sciences discover the sources, the selective and directive energies, the mysterious qualitative changes that result in the formation of species after species according to different types; that Nature, whose latest offspring is the human Self, with its self-conscious and self-determining mind;—that same Nature must stand sponsor for this same offspring's *moral* endowment and *moral* development. The criteria, sanctions, and ideal of ethics, must have their ultimate source and final warrant in the World-Ground.

It must be confessed that there is something mystical and not easily to be demonstrated by an offhand appeal to human experience in this belief of Idealism that the World is itself moral at the core. There are, indeed, many things done by Nature which are exceedingly trying to this faith—if faith it is to be called. In view of some of the most natural procedures one is tempted to call the "Mother" of men wholly non-moral, or most cruelly and persistently immoral, when judged by humanity's highest standard of what comports with its moral ideal. Even the devout and resigned religious believer is compelled to abjure the arrogance of a claim to justify all the divine procedure by admitting that "His ways are not as our ways." And yet the orthodox theological conception of God is, in im-

portant respects, singularly like the orthodox scientific conception of Nature.

We are not, however, just now engaged in trying to prove the perfect goodness of the Divine Being. Our present claim is one which calls for less of faith; and which admits of more of evidence from the particular sciences, as well as, especially, from the moral consciousness itself. The claim is simply this: The non-moral cannot produce from itself the truly moral life and moral development. A collection of beings, having unity enough to be called a World, or a System of Nature, or a Universe—what you will—that can develop a race of self-conscious and self-determining beings, who feel the sanctions, observe the criteria, and seek the ideal, of an ethically right social status, must have in itself the sufficient explanation of this unparalleled and glorious achievement.

The conclusion just drawn is, of course, speculative; but it is not *purely* speculative, if by “*purely*” be meant a speculation without basis in historical experience. The declaration of Matthew Arnold was not an exaggeration. He found proofs in history of a “Power-not-ourselves that makes for righteousness.” If the physical and biological sciences are allowed to use their own terminology, without being called too strictly to account for a liberal interpretation, they have no objection to speaking of the benevolence of Nature’s laws and of the wisdom with which she secures improved results by seemingly severe, but really on the whole kindly, methods of procedure. Now benevolence and wisdom are qualities of Selfhood in action, and not of impersonal laws or formulas. Physiology, medicine, and hygiene, are always declaiming about the rewards of virtuous living, not only or chiefly to the good man himself, but to his children, to his children’s children, and to his neighbor’s. Economists and moralists have no doubt that Nature, including above all the social manifestations, favors right conduct and, on the whole, “rewards accordingly” the conduct which is morally wrong. While there are no other

so powerful and convincing preachers of the doctrine that righteousness exalts nations, as those who know the history of nations; or those true statesmen who are trying honestly and intelligently to guide national affairs. The particular ways in which the Being of the World manifests its ethical preferences are, indeed, painfully slow, roundabout and hidden; but they seem, on the other hand, to be fairly well marked as to their intention and reasonably sure, if given time enough to work through to the end the forces which are executing its Will. The ancient Greeks, who were excelled by the Hebrews in the practical recognition of a God of righteousness as the Moral Ruler of man, themselves excelled all others of their own time in their reflective study of ethical principles. They admitted that "the mills of the gods" grind exceeding slow; but they knew that these mills grind exceeding small.

In computing the moral character of Nature, however, after having rejected the fallacies of both legalism and utilitarianism in ethics, it is obligatory of idealism not to commit the same fallacies again. Nature is not to be convicted of immorality, because she has not endowed man all at once with a perfectly infallible law by which to read on tables of the mind his own particular duties, on all possible occasions; nor again, because she has not given him a complete insight into her own ethical character and ethical ideals. In all her many aspects, Nature is far too large to be quickly and readily comprehended by the human mind. If there is much which is puzzling, and even seemingly self-contradictory about her moral character, this is no other kind of puzzle than those which arise whenever her ways are studied from whatever point of view. When we rejected the extravagant claims of the Kantian ethics, we surrendered our hope of finding anywhere an immediate intuition into the very depths of universal moral reason, as a ground for a confidence which admits no possibility of error, and which pays no tribute to a slow evolution of the criteria, sanctions, and ideals of morality.

There is much more danger to idealism, however, from a temptation to return to some of the subtler fallacies of hedonism or utilitarianism in ethics. Certainly Nature has not provided such an outfit or environment for either the individual or the race as to give it the maximum of conceivable happiness. Here again the Greeks were wise; for they declared "It is for toils that the gods sell all good things to men." Happiness, independent of conduct and character, would belong to a non-moral or positively immoral system of things and men. But the deeper truth lies in this discovery: Happiness, whether for the individual or for the race, cannot furnish the sole criteria, sanctions, and ideal, of moral life and moral development. What pledge of making morality to be that, which it essentially is not, could Nature give in order to establish in man's experience her own reputation for morality? If Nature has the higher regard for the good of *moral* selfhood, and of a society composed of selves who are striving for the realization of *this* good, rather than for the happiness of her children, she cannot conduct herself as though the moral criteria, sanctions, and ideals, were to be found in amounts merely of pleasures and pains. Otherwise, the moral philosopher might assume this bold attitude toward his Mother, and say: "I am holier than thou."

And, strangely enough, this is what virtually takes place in human experience. For so firmly fixed is the conviction that Nature *is* morally responsible for the way in which it treats man, as to control the thought and language of those who most stoutly refuse to credit all that is implied in the inference. Religion, in its highest form, recommends resignation to the will of God as accountable for the just and wise and loving distribution of the goods and evils of life. In its lowest forms, it is frankly dualistic; the evils of human life must be borne as coming from devils that reside in natural things and forces, and are hard to propitiate. But agnosticism and atheism are most inconsistent and illogical at this point. They affirm

in theory the totally impersonal and non-moral character of the system of things. And yet in practice, they are inclined to demand honorable and fair treatment from this impersonal and non-moral source.

More than by any other argument, however, is the interest of Nature in man's moral development manifested by the conditions and laws which it has fixed for the existence and welfare of society. Every example of right conduct is, by its very nature, subjective and individual. It is some person's conduct; and as conduct, it is an affair of conscious feeling, judgment, and volition, considered in relation to an ideal. This ideal, too, is subjective and individual. It is the product of that same individual's judging and imagining activity. But in society the Right appears also as objectified and universalized. For all men have, in order to constitute them moral and capable of living together under ethico-social relations, a certain constitutional equipment; and certain common relations, like those of the family, the tribe, or some more complex social organization, belong to men everywhere and at all times. Therefore, the conduct of the individual is never his own affair solely. It has constantly to measure itself by this more objective and generally accepted standard; and its ideal can never be achieved or even approached by those

“Who trimmed in forms and visages of duty,
Keep yet their hearts attending on themselves.”

“Moreover, these two ideals—both the individual and subjective, and the objective and universal—are never framed in any approach to a complete independence of each other; nor can they be kept apart in their application to the theoretical solution of the problems of conduct, or in their effect upon the feelings and deeds which correspond to moral ideals. Not infrequently the two seem struggling together; the one to enforce laws and rules, and to realize in the social organization

the conception of an eternal and absolute character for that which is esteemed right; the other to introduce exceptions and to break down existing laws and rules by an appeal to some superior interest or higher authority.

"It cannot be said, however, that the doubts and oppositions over the problems of conduct which characterize all human experience, and which especially characterize the epochs of rapid transition in customs and moral judgments, affect the fundamental Nature of the Right. Nor can it be asserted that the antagonism, or even the two-foldness, which seems especially to develope at these epochs, exists between the individual's ideal of his own self and the social ideal. For, in truth, the ultimate moral ideal is always necessarily social; it is invariably conceived of by every idealistic theory, which has any claim to critical consideration, as including the moral good of one and of the many, of the individual and of the social organization. What precisely this ideal good may be, and how it is going to harmonize in particular cases, or in the final result, the interests both of the individual and of society, no one may be able to describe *a priori*. Certainly, no theory which confounds all morality with the prudential virtues can frame a solution for the problems presented by the conflicting interests of the individual and society. But so far as one attends strictly to the *moral* ideal, the difficulties and antagonisms between the individual and society are of another order.

"These difficulties and antagonisms seem to emerge in something like the following way: On the one hand, it is plain that the more inclusive moral ideal is social; it is therefore adapted to control the particular ideal of the individuals composing society. But on the other hand, the social ideal itself is decidedly not the ideal of a social organization in which the customs, maxims, laws, and opinions, that are for the time being most popular and dominant, assert and enforce the right to control absolutely the individual in the pursuit of his own

moral ideal. Such an association would not correspond to the ideal of a society of truly *moral selves*. Indeed, the civil and ecclesiastical organizations which have—no matter with what pretence of a good conscience, or with what show of reasonable grounds—endeavored so to dictate moral ideas and laws to their individual members have usually turned out most mischievous and abominable tyrannies. The present day proposals which are more subtle and indirect, whether of the more pronouncedly imperialistic or socialistic order, to force conformity to some common social ideal, when the moral self is not intelligently committed to it as its *very own ideal*, will undoubtedly prove just as unfavorable to a real moral development. The two most prominent existing and contending types of social organization—imperialism and socialism—are both characteristically immoral and fatally destructive to genuine morality. For, the moment you conceive of your social organization as successfully framed after the pattern that commends itself to the ethical judgment, and that stirs moral feeling and the imagination in appreciation of its intrinsic excellence, you have rejected for the individual the *supreme authority* of the prevalent customs, maxims, laws, and opinions.

"An ethically ideal society is, therefore, such that it can be constituted only of ideally good persons living together in social relations. But the good person is the moral Self who self-consciously and voluntarily shapes his conduct in conformity to his own ideal of what a Self ought to be. He is indeed deferential to society; he conforms oftentimes to its customs and laws, and oftentimes remains silent in the presence of its maxims and opinions, although they do not represent satisfactorily the ideal which he has made his own. He is devoted to the best interests of society, as he understands these interests; for them he may wish to live, and on occasion be quite willing to die. But he can conscientiously do this, and so maintain in integrity his own moral selfhood, only in so far as his own moral reason will permit; and when the necessity arises, he

appeals to something within himself, or above himself and above all men, for the warrant to disregard and even to transgress the standard of morality which society has made objective and generally accepted. It is such men as this who have ever been the uplifters and saviors of social morality. They have been the truest expressions and supreme developments of social morality as constituted by Nature."

But it is under the influence of the sentiments and faiths of religion that this confidence in the correspondence, in character, between the World-Ground and the Ideal of morality has been strengthened and perfected. It is the religious consciousness which most unequivocally affirms the dictum of the philosopher Fichte: "The World-Order is in the last analysis a moral order." The cosmic processes which have combined to work out an evolution of moral ideals, as realized in the moral uplift of human society, must be processes essentially controlled by ethical considerations.

Undoubtedly, there are many human experiences which seem to conflict with the conclusion which we have just reached. Indeed, the conflict between the realities of human experience and the ideals constructed by human thought and imagination is the eternal conflict. According to the myths of the ancients and the theologies of modern times, this conflict was waged in invisible, supermundane regions before it began to be waged upon earth. The theoretical solution of the conflict, as respects its origin, its fullest significance, and its ultimate issue, is as satisfactorily treated as is compatible with the limitations of human knowledge, when it is shown how one may believe that the ultimate Source of both the reality and of the ideals which await realization is one and the same World-Ground. This World-Ground is a personal Will that is pledged and able to effect the progressive realization of the ideals which, too, owe their origin and historical development to It. In a word, the same Ethical Spirit who inspires the moral ideals of man, and who reveals its own Nature in their historical evolution,

will secure, and is securing, the realization of the same ideals by this process of evolution. If one may have a reasonable faith in this conclusion; then certainly, however severe the temporary conflict may be, and whether this conflict be raging within the soul of the individual or within the social organization, its final issue and fuller significance are secure. Well-founded optimism makes large demands on religious faith. Only when one is confident that there is indeed a Power in human history, which is over and throughout it all, and which effectively makes for righteousness, can one hopefully survey the long-existing disproportion between the actual conditions of humanity and humanity's own highest moral ideals.

CHAPTER XVII

ÆSTHETICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

THERE is a certain attitude of mind with which a selected class of objects is contemplated or reflected upon that resembles in important respects the moral consciousness, but is not identical with it. To this may be given the title of the “æsthetical consciousness.” And since it involves in no doubtful way the postulate of an ideal in more or less perfect control over the forms and relations of really existent beings, both Things and Selves, the nature and implicates of this kind of consciousness require treatment at the hands of philosophy. For here are subjective conditions and states which make a persisted and, on the whole, a gratefully accepted claim to tell to man the truth about the Nature of that Ultimate Reality in which all particular existences have their origin, explanation, and ground. The confidence of humanity that Nature, by its processes, recognizes and realizes æsthetical ideas, is as well-founded in the processes of human reason, as are the laws and principles of the chemico-physical sciences. In other words, the sentiments and judgments of the artistic development of the race may as truly teach us what the Being of the World really is, as the feelings and judgments of the race’s scientific development.

In any satisfactory study of the philosophy of the beautiful, whether in nature or in art, the foundations can be laid securely only by beginning with psychological analysis. We ask, then, first, this question: What, as a matter of experience, is the so-called æsthetical consciousness? The obvious preliminary answer to this question can be no other than the following: This form, like every other form of the experience of the self-

conscious and self-determining mind, must have all the essential elements of mental life and mental activity, blended in some particular manner. As sentiment, it is the feeling *of* the beautiful—the peculiar feeling inspired by objects that are judged beautiful (or its opposite). As judgment, it is a judgment *about* what is (or is not) beautiful. As realized in deeds of will, as practical, it is art, or the setting of the feeling and judgment of beauty into some *concrete object*. In saying this, however, nothing has been told as to the peculiar qualities of the kind of consciousness called æsthetical; but its psychological complexity has been recognized and emphasized.

In the analysis of moral consciousness it was found that all its earlier developments are chiefly characterized by vague and unreasoned, though by no means irrational, forms of feeling; and that the moral judgments of mankind in their undeveloped form are scarcely more than affirmations of certain states of ethical feeling. It was also found that the selection of objects to which these feelings attach themselves is largely—indeed, at first, almost, if not quite, exclusively—determined for the individual by his physical and social environment. In the sphere of the beautiful the dominance of feeling is even greater than in the sphere of conduct. And the conditions of human social evolution afford a ready explanation of why this is necessarily true. Departure from the generally accepted opinions and practices with reference to what is good or bad from the artistic point of view, can be tolerated with complacency by the community; or if their expression is going to bring discomfort to the individual, they may usually be easily concealed by the individual. The case is obviously not the same with regard to opinions and practices touching the good and bad of conduct. The difference is not, however, by any means absolute. For the suffering inflicted upon the individual who departs in any marked manner from the public taste in matters of dress or architecture, or furnishings, may be even more acute than are those of the man who violates some of the more

firmly established customs and maxims which are understood to be worthy to control the conduct of everybody. It is especially in matters of conduct themselves that the æsthetically correct and the morally right are often not distinguishable. Savages and half-civilized peoples enforce in cruelly rigorous fashion the feeling of obligation to conformity in matters which appear to us to be matters of mere taste. Communities which considered themselves highly civilized have tolerated and even approved of murder to avenge very slight breaches of etiquette in the treatment of an equal or a superior. While in the really most civilized countries of to-day, the laws are to a considerable extent devised so as to secure those forms of behavior which defer to the conventional notions of propriety, in affairs of social intercourse which are essentially quite as much æsthetical as they are ethical.

Three things should be noticed, however, about all this class of racial habits. First, the external form of conduct,—its propriety, or politeness—is no adventitious factor, but of the very essence of the conduct itself. Second, it is as conduct, and so as necessarily subject to moral feeling and judgment, that offences offered to æsthetical regulations are so sternly judged. And, third, after all, the sentiments and judgments of mankind as to the right and wrong of conduct are more firmly and definitively fixed than are their sentiments and judgments respecting what is, or is not, in good taste from the more purely æsthetical point of view. When we come to what has been called the internalization of moral judgment, we discover a more marked difference between the two. For faulty sentiment and misplaced judgment on matters of art have never been regarded as having the same relation to the quality of the Moral Self as the lack of the virtues of courage, constancy, justice, truth, and kindness. Yet, as will appear more clearly later on, the æsthetical and the moral development and perfection of human nature are most intimately related. Art cannot be indifferent to morality. Morality cannot perfect itself

in a complete indifference to artistic form. And the ideals of ethics and of aesthetics blend in the One Ideal-Real whom religious faith worships as God.

Beginning, then, with the emotional factors of æsthetical consciousness, we note first their pronounced pleasure-pain quality. This fact is scarcely expressed satisfactorily by saying that what is esteemed beautiful produces agreeable feelings; and what is esteemed not-beautiful, or positively ugly, affects men with feelings that are more or less disagreeable. The truth of ordinary experience is rather to be expressed as follows: What produces in men a certain kind of agreeable feeling, that they judge to be really beautiful; what fails to produce this agreeable feeling, but does not produce its opposite, that they consider æsthetically indifferent; and what produces in them the opposite disagreeable kind of feeling, that they judge to be ugly.

Further examination of the emotions awakened by objects which are classified in terms derived from æsthetical consciousness, shows them to share in the characteristics which are possessed in common by all human emotions; indeed, it might almost be said, by all animal forms of feeling. Æsthetical feelings have an obvious, and some of them have a strong, sensuous basis. They are bodily feelings—in part, but only in part. This sensuous basis is most pronounced in the case of those emotions with which the mind greets the sublime, the awful, the tragic, in nature; and the heroic, the mysterious, the tragic in human experience and human history. The physiological functions and psycho-physical factors called forth by the different kinds of beautiful objects, are also themselves characteristically different in kind. The poses and movements of the body and the corresponding muscular and skin sensations, the breathing, the action of the heart, the visceral stirrings, all contribute to modify the forms of emotion which, in general, may be grouped under the term “æsthetical.” And when the powerful influence of the principle of association—whether directly over

these feelings or indirectly through the varied grouping of the memories and ideas evoked—is fully taken into the account, then one cannot fail to conclude that the corresponding dynamic associations in the cerebral areas are the physical basis of the complex states of consciousness actually experienced. [More about the varieties of æsthetical emotion thus occasioned will be said further on.]

Æsthetical emotions are seldom a perfect blend of wholly agreeable or wholly disagreeable feelings. There are indeed objects which are entrancingly beautiful, which wrap the soul away from all semblance of anything to mar the pure bliss of æsthetical enjoyment. Religious intuition or faith produces such experiences; so do certain sights in nature,—as, for example, the Himalaya Mountains, or some poems, or musical compositions. But the latter, as well as all productions of human art, more rarely give an unmixed æsthetical enjoyment. The artistically uncultivated soul is usually made uneasy through some mixture of bodily discomfort, or ungratified desire, in the midst of its happiness at viewing the beautiful in nature or in art. And every one knows how dissatisfied is the artist—the more so the greater and truer artist he is—with his own art. Where æsthetical judgment is cultivated, while the pleasures in the beautiful are refined and increased, the sensitiveness to flaws and imperfections may also be so much heightened as to make a pure joy in beauty almost impossible. Thus most things, and most achievements of human character and human skill, when thoughtfully examined, awaken mixed feelings, partly pleasurable and partly tinged with pain. From the psychological point of view it is pertinent to ask: Why should not these feelings be subject to all the variations, degrees of intensity, and mixtures, which characterize human emotional states of every other kind?

The complex sentiments with which men respond to æsthetical impressions have, however, two classes of characters which distinguish them from all emotional disturbances of a merely

sensuously agreeable or sensuously disagreeable quality. A certain universality and a certain rationality are—however vaguely and dimly—evinced in the way in which men look upon each other's æsthetical states. The suggestion from this is that, while sensuous tastes, appetencies, and preferences of an emotional character, relate to what "in-fact-is"; genuinely æsthetical tastes, appetencies, and preferences belong, the rather, in some sort to the sphere of "that-which-ought-to-be." You, for example, may like olives and I may like them not; or the liking of us both may be the other way. In either case, it is a mere fact to be explained on physiological grounds, or on the grounds of association of ideas. One man may get more enjoyment out of rag-time music or the ordinary vaudeville song; while another may enjoy and approve, as a matter of rational preference, a sonata of Beethoven or the Erl-King of Schubert. This preference, too, must be explained, so far as explanation is possible at all, as a result partly of difference in constitutions and, partly, of difference in habitual associations. But whoever of the two approves of the higher and nobler form of art, cannot fail to look upon the other either with a feeling of pity or of contempt for his inferiority as judged by a standard which is rational, and which ought to be universally accepted by rational beings. So that the cultivation of æsthetical tastes is a matter of the improvement of the life of the spirit; and this profound truth even our public-school system is coming to recognize. The motto: "*De gustibus non disputandum*" is decidedly not true of æsthetical tastes. On the contrary, there are few other matters about which men think it more reasonable to argue than about the emotions and judgments with which things and deeds, beautiful or ugly, are to be admired and approbated, or the opposite: It is not fitting for man, being rational, even to gratify his appetites or natural desires without any regard for æsthetical considerations. And whoever is wholly lacking in feeling for beautiful objects is almost, or quite, as deficient in an essential quality of man-

hood as is he who wholly lacks moral or religious feeling. Indeed, all three forms of sentiment, while neither one is absolutely identical with the other, are in the experience and development of the individual and of the race, indissolubly united.

A second distinguishing characteristic of æsthetical sentiment is its peculiar objectivity. Of course, every feeling of the beautiful is somebody's feeling; it is an emotional disturbance occurring in the conscious life of some subject. As such, it testifies unequivocably to a certain susceptibility to states which have pleasure-pain qualities. But it is also a kind of sentiment which is aroused as an apparent appreciation, of a rational and quasi-obligatory sort, of the qualities inherent in the object which calls it forth. These qualities are appreciated, in the way of feeling, as having value, or worth, belonging to them. In this respect the relation of the object to the feeling subject—of nature and art to you and to me, when we call their products beautiful—differs in an important way from either the relations of sense-perception or of ethical appreciation. But it resembles the latter much more than the former. The orange, for example, is perceived to be in fact sweet, yellow, round, large, heavy, etc. That is, this thing affects the mind through stimulating the organs of sense in particular ways, and arousing in consciousness the complex resultant of present sensations, images of past sensory impressions, automatic organic or quasi-intellectual processes, etc. For the mind it is good or bad, has worth or is worthless, according to its uses. But this same object may at the same time arouse in consciousness certain feelings, to account for which, there is attributed to it either beauty or ugliness. This kind of impression, too, may in a measure depend upon changes in the subject's point of view; or in the utilitarian relations of the object as viewed from that point of view. Thus even a malignant tumor, or a loathsome reptile, may be beautiful as seen through the microscope of the student of clinical microscopy or of biology. And Rem-

brandt's so-called "School of Anatomy" is one of the most artistically impressive of the works of pictorial art. But the moment the object is contemplated from the unselfish and purely æsthetical point of view, as a thing of beauty simply, it is recognized as somehow having its value, or worth, "*in-itself.*" The expression of the subject's feeling toward it can be stated truthfully in no other way than to say: "*It is beautiful.*" We should no more tell the truth about the way it really appears to us, if we should say, "The whole and the only important fact is that I am affected thus and so, rather than that the flower or the star is actually existent," than if we should say: "All there is of this experience is that I—*A. B.*—feel agreeably or disagreeably impressed, without any reference to the qualities possessed by the object."

Nor is the relation which the feeling subject sustains to the beautiful object precisely like that involved in moral appreciation and admiration (or their opposites). There is the worthy or unworthy external object; and there is some condition, or performance, of a self-conscious and self-determining subject with reference to that object. If the condition, or the performance is subjective; the worthiness or unworthiness is also subjective. But no artist, on taking the purely æsthetical point of view, can reasonably regard his own product in a wholly subjective way. He may be proud or be ashamed of his achievement; this feeling, however, is not æsthetical, but personal, however true to the result of his endeavor the feeling may be. But if the artist has really made a beautiful thing, he has contributed to it an objective value,—a value which is now become quite independent of him. No matter who chiselled the statue, no matter who painted the picture, no matter who composed the symphony, no matter who wrote the poem; the one purely æsthetical question to be answered is this: "Is the object really beautiful, or not?"

These truths regarding the intrinsic nature of æsthetical sentiments have been boldly stated, at the risk of serious misunderstanding. There is, of course, no use in denying the fact

that environment, association, and education, are powerful in the development and control of these sentiments as they are in all human affairs. And that mere things, whether so-called natural or constructed by man, have no value, and no possibility of value "in-themselves," unless they share in that spiritual life which man knows himself to possess, and in the possession of which he has the criterion and the key to all questions of value;—Why! this is the very conclusion we are trying to prove.

On the other hand, the claim is justifiable that those feelings of humanity which have the characteristics of the æsthetical sentiments—namely, the characteristics of objectivity and universality—bear a creditable witness to the nature of Reality. They are not merely subjective states of the individual consciousness; mere matters-of-fact occurrence in a fortuitous succession, called the "stream of consciousness." They are so connected with man's rationality, so influential in determining his cognitive attitude toward the world, as to be the revealers of essential truths. And of the sentiment of beauty, in particular, it may be claimed that it is a rational feeling which has its correlate in the constitution of things; in that system of actual existences which we have so frequently summarized under the abstract general term, the "Being of the World."

Æsthetical consciousness is, however, a matter of more or less intelligent and deliberate judgment. But the precise form which æsthetical judgments take (it has already been said) rests even more upon a basis of unanalyzed feeling than is the case with the moral judgments. Ask the average man, for example, to explain why he considers this piece of conduct, or quality of spirit,—such as courage, justice, kindness—to be right, and its opposite wrong, and he will probably make shift to give you some kind of an answer. But ask the same man, why he considers this scene in nature, or this painting, or poem, or piece of music beautiful, and he is altogether likely to remain dumb or to prevaricate. In case he gives an honest

answer, he will probably defer to some one else's judgment; or he will recite some agreeable experience of his own with which the beautiful object has become associated in thought. These, however, are not answers to the question: "Why is *it*, the object, really beautiful?" The unexplained fact of judgment is accordingly left just where it was before the process of searching for its grounds began. *It* is beautiful means: It awakens agreeable æsthetical feeling *in me*; and it seems *to me* that it ought to awaken the same kind of feeling in other minds.

The nature of æsthetical judgment, and of the relations which such judgment sustains to æsthetical feeling, is made clearer by the fact of experience, that argument about the matter can only produce intellectual assent; but that argument cannot, of itself, produce a genuine æsthetical appreciation, whether in the form of sincere feeling or of intelligent and deliberate judgment. One mind can, indeed, point out to another the qualities of the beautiful object; and when these qualities are intuited or contemplated, they may excite the appropriate and genuine æsthetical feeling, and may thus become reasons for an intelligent and voluntary æsthetical judgment. But this is all that argument can do. The truth of these statements is enforced and illustrated by the methods which must be followed in order to gain or to impart a really æsthetical culture. The canons of the different arts may indeed be made matters of study. Perhaps they may be so laid down as to justify a claim on their part to constitute a sort of a science; and so far as they are science, they can, of course, be taught. These canons are, moreover, not simply rules for the production of art-objects; they are also rules for the appreciation of beautiful objects, whether natural or the products of the different arts. But learning these canons cannot make an artist; indeed, such learning has no tendency to make an artist. Even less does it, of itself, stir any mind to an appreciation of the beautiful in nature and in art. The most that such learning

can do is to point out how, and where, one should look to find the several characteristics of the objectively beautiful, when it is presented to the mind for its appreciative intuition or contemplation. Only the object, that is in-itself beautiful, can arouse and win for itself a genuine æsthetical appreciation.

In forming a judgment about matters of æsthetical concernment, but especially about the genuineness of the claims of any object to be considered really beautiful, the play of the imagination is confessedly the most important psychical factor. Beauty, both in nature and in art, appeals to the imagination. For its appreciation, in all its forms and in every kind of art, the imagination must be quickened; and for some kinds of the beautiful and some products of artistic skill, the work of the imagination must be greatly elevated and enlarged. This general statement is equally applicable to certain scientific facts, conceptions, and principles; they, too, require an awakening of the imagination, and a stretching of its wings beyond all that is common-place and ordinary, if the heights requisite for a true apperception and a dutiful appreciation are somehow to be reached. Indeed, the appreciations with which the discoveries and speculations of a large part of modern science are greeted, are much more æsthetical than they are logical or mere matter-of-fact. It is not the facts which so-called science knows that so much stir the spirit: it is, the rather, much more what science imagines and asks the learner to make real for himself by corresponding activities and stretches of imagination. All the appreciations of the vastness, the order, the mystery, the infinites, the infinitesimals, the achievements of the power and the skill, of so-called Nature, are æsthetical; and they, therefore, make boundless demands upon the imagination. If we were to take these æsthetical elements, and also the practical applications and contributions to the welfare of mankind, out of physics and chemistry, and out of the other allied physical and natural sciences, the remainder would scarcely contain salt enough to preserve itself in the open,

economic market of the world of human interests. For it is as an artist, and a lover of sublimity and of the other kinds of beauty, that the self-conscious and self-determining mind regards the Nature which constitutes its spiritual as well as physical environment.

There are these important differences, however, between the more purely scientific and the more purely æsthetical activities of the human imagination. And, first: in the case of the latter, the existence of the object at all is dependent upon the constructive activity of imagination. At any rate, for science as well as for ordinary knowledge, the Thing is there: it is not dependent for its existence upon the image-making capacity of the knower. For although this capacity is implied in every act of sense-perception; so silent, automatic, and relatively unobtrusive is its work, that the becoming of this thing to the knower as *his* object, seems in no respect to depend upon his constructive imagination. The amoeba, the diatom, the white blood-corpuscle, under the microscope, really is what any most unimaginative observer may see that it is. But with the "Thing of Beauty," the case is not so. The unimaginative person cannot see it as *such* a thing. The person who would see the object as beautiful must have aroused in himself, as subject, a species of sympathetic, constructive imagination. This is most patent in respect of all art-objects. They are, as beautiful, products of the artist's constructive imagination. If they are going to appear beautiful to another observer, this other observer must somehow reconstruct the object by a sympathetic activity of his own imagination. He must not simply observe; he must appreciate. From the point of view of knowledge simply—whether ordinary, or scientific—the thing remains unchanged; but from the point of view of art, the thing has been called into life again, made real, by a spiritual power which works in correspondence to the same kind of spiritual power which imparted to the object its quality of beauty at the first.

And, second, when this difference on the part of imagination in the two attitudes of the human mind, is carried over into the fields of science and of art, respectively, we arrive at a larger and more comprehensive distinction. Science aims, primarily, at the attainment of truth; art aims at the production of beauty. The ideals of science are realized, as estimated by its peculiar standard of values, according as the facts and the relations of the facts, are more accurately stated, on the basis of their being more comprehensively and minutely known. The ideals of art are realized, as estimated by its peculiar standard of values, according as there are more beautiful things in the world, and a more feeling-full appreciation and saner judgments of their worth as beautiful. Yet neither in science nor in art can truth and beauty be divorced. For the ideal of truth itself makes a powerful appeal to æsthetical feeling. And who can doubt that if the truth were more completely known, and faithfully applied to the art of living, by all men, there would be more of beauty, and of joy in beauty, among mankind? For who can doubt, on the other side, that if beauty were more appreciated, with an elevated and refined form of sentiment, and if the relations of life were regulated and estimated with a saner and more cultivated æsthetical judgment, men would know far more of that truth, which to know and practice sets men free.

From the more comprehensive philosophical point of view we are compelled to notice that all human development, whether in science, morals, or art, results in attributing more of spiritual character to Nature, considered as a system of existing and self-evolving things and selves? This conception of a universal Nature is itself chiefly the construction of human imagination,—placed on a basis of knowledge of facts and of principles generalized from the facts, but stimulated and guided by æsthetical ideals. Thus the mind of man recognizes the spirit of truth, the spirit of ethical aspiration and self-control, and the spirit of beauty, as all having their source and ground

in the Being of the One World. To speak in a more figurative way: This Being is conceived of,—although by methods which are indirect and devious, and according to ideals which are often shrouded in mystery—as having truth, morality, and beauty upon its own mind for a care; and before its own mind as a goal progressively to be realized. But such a conception is pre-eminently the work of the æsthetical imagination.

Some fragment, or shape, or concrete example, of the æsthetical ideal may be said to determine the intelligent and deliberate judgment which affirms or denies the qualities of beauty to any object; whether something in nature or some product of any one of the various arts. But the imagination which constructs the ideal does not directly reveal the reasons and grounds for the æsthetical judgment. How then are the rational explanations and defenses of particular judgments about matters of beauty to be discovered? In other words: How shall it be known, or even presented in plausible terms and in such a way as to carry a measure of conviction, that the object which gives æsthetical pleasure to an individual mind is really worthy to be called beautiful by everybody? This is a question which cannot be answered *a priori*; it cannot be even argued on purely logical grounds. Its answer requires an experimental and inductive examination, with a view to elicit and expose those judgments which have in fact been made, and which are most universal and enduring in the æsthetical history and æsthetical evolution of the race. An appeal must be made to the best æsthetical taste. Such an argument does not proceed from general principles defining what ought to be, and concluding what, as a matter of truth of fact, actually is; it proceeds, the rather, from what in fact has been and still is, judged to be true, and concludes with a summary of principles defining what ought to be. To say the same thing in another way: Logicians and philosophers cannot derive by reflective thinking those canons of beauty which artists and critics of art-objects ought to follow. Nature and artists make beautiful objects;

mankind, in fact, appreciate and approve of some of these as pre-eminently beautiful; reflective thinking seeks to discover what qualities nature and art actually give to these objects which are, in fact, judged to be beautiful. In order, therefore, for philosophy to assure itself as to what is the spirit of beauty, and as to what are the æsthetical ideals followed by nature and by art, it must consult the actual, concrete judgments of the race. These judgments of taste are expressed in two ways: first, in opinions as to what objects are beautiful; but more subtly and effectively, in the objects themselves.

If now we ask for a consensus of opinion as to what are the qualities of beautiful objects in general, or even as to what particular objects are judged to be beautiful, we are introduced to a wide and almost unmanageable diversity. Indeed, the diversity of opinions in this realm is even greater than in the case of questions relating to what is good, what not, in conduct and in character. As to some of the reasons why this is so, we have already remarked (see p. 367f.). Partly in the way of recalling these reasons, and partly in the way of expanding them, we ascribe the greater, seeming uncertainty of æsthetical judgments:—(1) to the great difference in the interests involved; (2) to the consequent difference in the stability of the forms of development; and also (3) to the essentially vague character of the æsthetical feeling which so powerfully influences or even determines the judgment.

In this connection the psychological truth must be recalled, that æsthetical judgments, in their very character as products of judging faculty (or intellectual processes) are subject to all the conditions which diversify, even to the point of contradiction, all the other kinds of human judgment. These conditions are chiefly the following four: The first of these is imitation; for although the really æsthetical attitude toward any object in nature or in art must be a self-conscious and not a merely imitative affair; still the direction of the judgment of the majority is undoubtedly often a mere matter of imitation.

Association and habit are other well-recognized factors in determining the æsthetical judgments of even the most unprejudiced and competent judges. And indeed, justly and reasonably so. For the qualities of beauty in the object cannot be dissociated from those qualities which appeal to other than the purely æsthetical interests of mankind. Most prominent among such associated interests are the moral and religious. But economic and various forms of social interests are also influential in determining men's judgments as to what is beautiful, what not. Above all the other justifiable causes for a somewhat wide divergence, and even conflict, of judgments in æsthetical affairs is education. Cultivated taste cannot, indeed, be produced by education alone; but given a constitution of spirit sensitive to æsthetical impressions, and education can develop such a taste.

The scepticism with respect to the essential nature or spirit of beauty, which results from the failure to find an agreement as to the qualities of beautiful objects by comparing the opinions of the multitude and of the various authorities, is much mitigated by continued inquiry as to the grounds of these opinions. For, in the first place, it is no one quality, or simple combination of few qualities, which in any particular case necessarily conveys the title to beauty, alike to each and to every beautiful thing. There may be several kinds of the beautiful. There may be a variety of features, or characters, so incompatible that they cannot be combined in any one object, but which if they can get themselves contemplated by the appreciative mind from the right point of view, will uniformly be regarded as beautiful. For example, there may be one kind of beauty which requires size in the object; and there may be another kind of beauty which can find expression only in that which is small, or even minute. There may be one kind of beauty which reveals itself best in a natural scene or artistic construction, that is characterized by extreme simplicity; there may be another kind of beauty which can reveal itself only

when clothed with the ornate. The material out of which the object is constructed may also have something quite important, or even determinative, to say as to what kind of expression to the spirit of beauty it shall be chosen to make. Thus in art, as in morals, we should discover a far greater consensus of opinion, as bearing on the universal and permanent laws of æsthetical judgment, and the corresponding canons of art, *if only* we could compel all men to take the same point of view. We should find in art, as in morality, that the fundamental agreements are really far more numerous and important than the seemingly irreconcilable differences, *if only* all the causes of misunderstanding could be removed. He who is seeking the truly sublime in the merely pretty, or the pretty in the sublime, may be disappointed, and indeed must be disappointed, at not finding it there. But he is not therefore, as a matter of course, justified in declaring any particular object ugly or lacking in the qualities of the spirit of beauty. Nor can he justify a quarrel with his fellow who is looking at the same object from a different but equally æsthetical point of view; or, who, perhaps, is not looking upon the object from a truly æsthetical point of view at all. Moreover, however high we place the value of the æsthetical in nature and in human life, it has no heaven-imparted right to pervert the truthful, or to dominate the moral, or even to disregard the economic and social interests of mankind. In general, the quickest and surest way to reconcile disputes about matters of æsthetical taste is to find out whether the disputants are thinking and talking about precisely the same thing.

The secret of the beautiful, the true and abiding spirit of beauty, however, is only to be discovered by reflection over the qualities of those objects which are intuitively felt and judged really to be beautiful. In this work of analysis, and of reflection upon the results of analysis, the art-object is likelier to tell us the truth than is any beautiful thing, or scene, in nature. This is not at all, of course, because art-objects are more beau-

tiful than are the constructions of the spirit of beauty which is in Nature. It is because man works to produce the beautiful in a self-conscious and self-determining way. In the sphere of the æsthetical, as in every other sphere, the Self knows itself more immediately and fully than it knows the Nature whose child the Self is. It is true that the highest geniuses in art, as in science, war, government, and philosophy, and perhaps even more than in any of the other fields of human achievement, do not fully comprehend their own inspirations or clearly picture the ideals they feel themselves somehow impelled to follow. But it is also true that the greater the real genius is, in all fields of human achievement, the better does he understand his subject and himself in relation to it. And no man knows, or can know, the secret workings of natural forces in their progressive realization of nature's ideals, with the same inwardness and penetrating spiritual appreciation with which he may know the forces working within himself. There are then three reasons, or three ways of stating essentially one reason, why the inquirer who is seeking to discover the essential spirit of beauty, must turn aside briefly to consider what kinds of art there are, and how the workers in these arts actually proceed in order to make beautiful things. For (1) the conscious mind may know what it intends to put into the beautiful object in order to make it seem beautiful; (2) the conscious mind may discover, in part at least, what it is in an art-object made by others which makes it seem beautiful; and thus (3) the conscious mind may reason from its more immediate experience with these objects to the more hidden secrets of the beautiful in nature, in a sort of analogical way.

It remains only to notice in this connection that factor in æsthetical consciousness which is called the Will, or the attitude of the *active* Self toward the beautiful object, in nature and in art. This is an attitude, primarily, of desire of possession,—not selfishly, or in order that it may minister to the passion, pride, or self-esteem of the individual, but because of

the intrinsic worth of the object itself. The beggar who is admitted without charge into the public park or museum may possess the statue, or the picture, much more truly and completely than the millionaire who can purchase it and shut it up within the walls of his own house. And to shut the people away from the beauties of the surrounding sky, or sea, or plain, or mountain range, or to deny them all possession of the loveliness of sunlight, and foliage, and flower, is a crime for which no economic advantages to the few can sufficiently atone. For this desire to possess the beautiful object, as itself intrinsically valuable and a benefit to the spirit, denies no equal right to anyone else; and, indeed, it wishes that the same desire of possession should be awakened and gratified in all mankind. The will-full attitude of the Self toward the beautiful object is also, in some sort, one of submission and devotion. Especially is this true of the sublimely beautiful in its effects upon the will. And, finally, the attitude of self-denial in view of the prospect of contributing something to enrich the store of the world's beauty has been a powerful motive with all the most masterful artists in the history of man's artistic development. In this respect the self-conscious and self-determining mind takes its stand toward the ideal of beauty in the same spirit in which it takes its stand toward all its other ideals. The ideal is intrinsically valuable; it has worth in-itself. And since it has this worth, it lays upon the human will an obligation to do something in order more fully to give the ideal a place in reality. Nor do we hesitate to announce a conclusion which we shall try still further to elucidate and defend: *In every beautiful object, Nature as a Reality of spiritual character and spiritual worth, reveals itself to human nature, and lays a sort of mandate upon the human will.*

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ARTS: THEIR CLASSIFICATION AND NATURE

THE proposal to appeal directly to those objects which are created and esteemed to be beautiful by the self-conscious and self-determining mind of man, in order to discover the spirit of beauty which they incorporate, assumes as a matter of course that these objects have certain characteristics in common. In material, size, form, color, method of addressing the senses and arousing æsthetical feeling and judgment through the character of their composition, beautiful things in nature differ indefinitely. In these respects, art-objects also are exceedingly varied. In some respects, however, both the creations of nature and those of art must be alike; otherwise, how could they all be called beautiful? This assumption of common characteristics is further strengthened by the following considerations: In the first place, all art-objects are the products of æsthetical feeling and imagination on the part of those who create them—*acting in a plan-ful way*. The artist, in no matter what kind of material or branch of the arts, must be moved and guided by the sentiment of beauty. There must also be something of the teleological in the idea which he wishes to embody in the material. Plan is particularly conspicuous in some kinds of art,—especially so in landscape-gardening, architecture, and sculpture. Even in music the comparative absence of it in the latest music is a distinct disadvantage to its genuine æsthetical quality. In his Critique of Judgment—the work in which Kant developed his æsthetical and theological opinions in a somewhat artificial conjunction—his ruling idea is the teleological. Beauty in the object implies some sort of plan.

Again, since all art-objects are beautiful and are intended by their maker to appeal to æsthetical feeling and imagination in

other minds, they must all have something common to their respective plans, in order to make this appeal. The stirring of feeling, the activity of the creative image-making faculty, in response to the beauty of the art-object, may be of a special character in each individual case. But it is, nevertheless, a kind of response common to humanity. Generic characteristics must belong to the things that can excite mental attitudes common to the race. Only qualities common to all that is beautiful in the object, could appeal to mental attitudes that are common to all subjects, who observe and appreciate the object. *There must be something in the one object which corresponds to the unity of the one self-conscious, appreciative human mind.*

And, finally, we note that, in order to become objective, the artistic sentiment and imagination must take concrete form in some kind of material. The material may be either so substantial and enduring as stone, or bronze, or steel; or it may be so unsubstantial and fleeting as tones and words. But successions and combinations of tones and words must have qualities in common with the shapes and relations of things made of stone, or bronze, or steel, if they are all alike to awaken æsthetical feeling and control æsthetical judgment. And, we are only repeating from a somewhat changed point of view, what has already been referred to before, when we call attention to the significance of this important fact: It is intuition and contemplation in the presence of the beautiful object, rather than reasoning about it, which begets the genuinely æsthetical appreciation of its beauty.

Any attempt to discover the most logical Classification of the Arts, is met by somewhat of the same difficulties as those which everywhere obstruct similar inquiries. In the case of the arts, however, they have come quite conclusively, to classify themselves. This they have done by a process of development, which, on the one hand, has defined the appropriate spheres and pointed out the proper limits of each one; and which has, on the other hand, enabled certain of them to co-operate with,

or to supplement, each other in a more intelligent and effective way. Here reference might be made to the history of the development of dancing, music, poetry, and the drama; or of painting, sculpture, and architecture.

But we are not now interested in the arts from the historical or the practical points of view; we are studying the art-object reflectively, with a view to learn what it can tell us about its own essential qualities that may help to discover the more hidden secrets of the spirit of beauty. Any principle of classification which will best assist the mind in this search, will be most satisfactory for the present purpose. Such a principle is found in the character of the Material employed by the different arts for the construction of the object which is to arouse appreciative æsthetical feeling and command an approving æsthetical judgment. Since all art must express itself in some kind of material, the kind of art, as expression (both in manner and degree) depends chiefly upon the kind of material. And the quality of the material which chiefly determines its relation to the artistic idea and plan, is its *plasticity*, or mouldableness. As an affair of physics, different materials can be handled, and shaped, and made expressive of ideas, in a planful way, only in accordance with, and in obedience to, their different physical properties and physical relations. As an affair of æsthetics, these same different materials, on account of their different physical properties and relations, can be made expressive of the sentiments and ideals of beauty, in a planful way; but only in different degrees and various forms. Some things will receive and embody certain aspects of the spirit of beauty as other things will not. Some materials will express the spirit of beauty in a rich, revealing way, as other materials cannot. The more plastic the matter, the more perfectly can the spirit mould it to an expression of the spirit's ideal.

Beginning, then, with those kinds of art which, on account of a lack of plasticity in the material stand lowest, we ask of Landscape-Gardening, what qualities and ideals of beauty it

intends to express. But at once two considerations come to the fore which elevate this art from other points of view, above the standing assigned to it in the classification which has been adopted. For since landscape-gardening deals with natural objects, its very material, before art has shaped it, has those qualities of beauty which are vaguely summed up in the word "likeness" (*Lebendigkeit*). In this art, nature puts living things at the disposal of the self-conscious and self-determining mind, for its arrangement in aesthetical forms. Moreover, in certain cases it is possible to approach by art those conditions of magnitude which nature employs to stir man to the appreciation of the beautiful which is also sublime.

In general, however, and especially under the conditions of modern civilization, the æsthetical feelings and ideas which can be expressed by this form of art are limited by the character of the material. There are two groups of qualities and relations, which two markedly different styles of landscape-gardening are fitted to express. And although these styles have, each one, their advocates, who sometimes even refuse to see any beauty in each other's work, we must, as philosophically inclined, admit the claims of both. One of these styles gives emphasis to the expression of the ideally orderly and harmonious; but the other prefers to emphasize the ideally free, and graceful because free. Close to the borders of each runs the risk of over-stepping the limits and so of losing the coveted æsthetical effect. Too much attempt at ordering things, too obvious an effort to bring all into relations of exact proportion and into a forced agreement or balance of parts, runs the risk of exciting feelings of distaste for artificiality and pettiness. But neither can an excessive freedom, whether of self-propagation, or of self-nourishment, or room for growth, be allowed to natural objects if they are to be combined in the art of landscape-gardening. However much the mind may rejoice for a time in the unchecked wildness of the tropical forest, this revel of nature cannot be imitated precisely in human art. The

landscape-garden may, indeed, leave some spots to "run wild" in a relative way; and yet the complete license of nature can never be profitably imitated, without restrictions, in a cultivated portion of ground. Art, moreover, gives preference to some natural products rather than to others; it must protect its selections against their natural enemies. Here the human art must make nature realize its own ideal, according to the scale and under the conditions which inevitably belong to all landscape-gardening, even better than would nature if left wholly to herself. Therefore, art selects some trees and shrubs and flowers, rather than others; it selects some branches of each to survive rather than others. In the minute and highly specialized form of this art in Japan, for example, it directs the manner of growth of each branch, and determines the individual twigs and even the leaves that shall be allowed to develop upon each twig.

There would seem then to be some resemblance between the qualities of this kind of art-objects and the different virtues. They not infrequently appear to come into a kind of conflict; and then a choice must be made as to how best to compromise the claims of each without violating the spirit of the ideal. Order and harmony, freedom and luxuriance of growth,—all are beautiful, as embodied in the object of art; somewhat as courage and wisdom, justice and kindness, must be incorporated into the moral texture of the Self. From each of these leading *motifs* may be derived a considerable number of subordinate rules such as control the orderly arrangement of spaces; the due proportion, or balance, or contrast, of shapes and magnitudes; the harmony and proper amounts and relations of the coloring of the natural objects, etc. On the other hand, a certain license, disregard of conventions, and even appearance of freakishness, if it does not go to excess and if it manages to reveal the signs of a subtle but no less real regard for æsthetical effects, is by no means without a beauty of its very own.

The conditions which the character of the material with respect to its plasticity impose upon the spirit of beauty in the art of Architecture are markedly different from those which prevail in landscape-gardening. They are also, on account of the very nature and final purpose of this art, complicated with other physical, economic, and social conditions. For men do not build houses for themselves, any more than they make canoes or bows and war-clubs, solely or chiefly to express and gratify the sentiment of beauty. In understanding where the art of architecture begins to control the merely utilitarian considerations of the builder, analysis must consider the problem of architecture. What is the principal, practical question, the solution of which man has before him when he builds a structure which he wishes to have give æsthetical enjoyment? He *must* build, for safety and for comfort. He instinctively or deliberately imparts to what he builds some expression of appreciation for beauty. Building becomes architecture when the structure is made not only to be safe and serviceable, but to have such an appearance as to express and excite æsthetical sentiment.

From the utilitarian point of view, the one essential thing about all buildings, under whatever conditions of climate and for whatever social purpose, and relatively independent of economical considerations, is the roof. When primitive man crawls out of his cave, or descends from his tree, he proceeds to make for himself some shelter for his head against the sunshine and the storm. And now the logic of physics leads by a direct and inescapable route to the main principle which governs the art of architecture. The steps of this logic may be recited briefly in the following way: Every roof is a load and the force of gravitation is unceasingly bearing it down toward the ground; to resist this force, the load of the roof must somehow be supported; the way in which the load of the roof is supported, and the subordinate but important purposes served by the supports, whether to screen the inmates against weather,

or to conceal domestic procedures, or to guard the contents from thieves, etc., chiefly determines the whole form of the structure; and, accordingly, the different styles of architecture and the rules of their practice with respect to æsthetical details, depend in the last analysis upon the character of the roof as a load and upon the way in which this load is supported. Since—and especially in all the more permanent and strong structures—the supports are themselves a load, the foundations of the building, and the arrangement upwards and sidewise, of the supporting sides, become a dominant architectural problem, as well as a problem in sound and safe building.

A building is something to be seen, if it is to produce an æsthetical effect. It appeals to the mind through the eye, and not through the ear, as do music and poetry. If it is to produce the maximum æsthetical effect, it must be capable of being æsthetically appreciated as a whole; and this requires that at least one, and if possible two of its sides, should be seen in their entirety at the same time. But here we must remember that seeing an object in its entirety "at the same time" is not a mathematical, much less a physically instantaneous affair. To use an appropriate figure of speech: the eye must be able to "sweep over" the whole structure, back and forth if need be, and to appreciate the main features of the different parts so as to make a synthesis of them in their respective places and mutual relations. This first total impression must be completed by the roving vision within the limits of the time necessary for the synthetic activity of the imagination. Too short, or too long, mars the beauty of the first total impression. In great and elaborate objects constructed by this form of art, contemplative study is both necessary and possible, in a peculiar way. For the building stands there—the same day after day, and perhaps age after age. Each survey of it, however, is a particular and fleeting achievement of some self-conscious mind; it cannot, therefore, be beautiful to such a mind unless it complies with the unchanging conditions of its visual activi-

ties when in use from the æsthetical point of view. For this reason there are certain physiological and psycho-physical conditions, with their allied forms of æsthetical feeling, for a lack of the knowledge of which or because the physical and economical conditions imposed upon them make it impossible to comply with what they do know to be demanded, architects are constantly making grave æsthetical blunders. It would be foreign to our purpose to enter upon details here; for we are striving to discover only the main features which the spirit of beauty impresses upon its objects, alike in every one of the arts. Some few general considerations will, however, contribute to the success of our search. Among such considerations are the following: (1) The foundations of the building should appear; and they should appear to be what, from the builder's point of view, they really must be—foundations, firm and strong. No building made with human hands should seem to grow out of the ground, like a merely natural structure. Hence the architectural device of employing different materials, and larger sizes of similar materials, for the foundations; or of marking them off by a water-table, or other signs. (2) So, too, wherever it is possible, the roof should be seen as a load; and if it is the case of a massive structure, the roof should appear as being the great load that it really is. But above all, every part of this load should not only *be* sufficiently supported, but it should *seem to be* sufficiently supported. To say, as did my friend, the engineer, of a certain church, that he "never could understand why the roof did not fall" is to condemn the structure from the artistic as well as from the physical point of view. (3) The perception and appreciation of the form, arrangement, and significance of the various visible parts, should be made obvious and an achievement to be gained without difficult and disagreeable psycho-physical impressions. The eyes move freely together over the fields that may be covered along both the horizontal and the vertical axes; but they do not take kindly to the task of working together in oblique

directions. Repetitions of forms that are integral parts of the structure, or of different species of ornamentation, must therefore occur, in the main, in series up and down, or right and left, if they are to be synthesized into an agreeable and appreciative æsthetical impression. One corollary from this rule is illustrated by the case of the modern sky-scraper which must be seen, if seen as a whole at all, from the opposite of a narrow street. Only by grouping its many stories, under a few general features of the façade, can its inherent tendency to a painful ugliness of monotony, be in a measure avoided. But if this is done, a touch of sublimity—somewhat artificial and unlike the sublimity of nature or of the moral hero, it is true—may be imparted to such a structure.

In what has already been said about the art of architecture, it has been made plain how the spiritual qualities of strength, planful ordering and harmony, or the triumph of mind over what appears as dead matter to give it expressive form, dominates the structure of the object. The object is made beautiful just so far as it expresses these qualities by moulding the stuff given to the artist's hand. In a more impressive way the same truth is taught, when it is considered how the main, different styles of architecture seize upon, and emphasize by the forms of expression which they contrive, the different main kinds of beauty, as these will be named for recognition in the following chapter. For example, there is the beauty of sublimity, which requires size and especially height in the structure, as in the Gothic cathedral; here the load of the roof visibly towers aloft, but is amply supported on the outside by buttresses, and within by pillars that are clusters of supporting partners in the difficult achievement, and which spread out under the roof their uplifted hands with many fingers, as though the task were accomplished easily and with a kind of aërial joy. But there is also the beauty which is chiefly characterized by symmetry and proportion. In this style of architecture the Greeks excelled; and nothing since has been done to equal them; for all

that has since been done has been copied or borrowed from them. In this style, the roof is frankly displayed at the front as a load which rests upon the architrave; and then beneath this is the row of pillars which appear quite competent and quietly secure in their task of supporting the architrave. Justness of proportion, simplicity and symmetry,—all the rational qualities of the calm and philosophic mind—are expressed and cultivated by these art objects. The ornamentation is confined to those lines of the building where it can be most easily seen; it is significant of the purpose of the structure; it is kept under a control which corresponds with the life and intent of the whole. But the kinds of beauty which are especially distinguished by the qualities of grace, or by a certain wild and luxuriant outburst of the vital forces that strive to find expression in moulding to their uses even the materials most lacking in a natural plasticity, have also their appropriate style of architecture. Such is the Moorish architecture; but, perhaps, above all, the palaces and tombs of the Muhammadan conquerors of Northern India. It might seem that marble and other harder stones were not appropriate for carving into a tracery of leaves, and into fruits and flowers; but to one in the right mood, which is neither the strictly religious, nor the strictly practical, nor the strictly rational, but rather the dreamy and luxuriating, there is nothing in the world to surpass the Taj Mahal, and other structures of this sort. As to that kind of beauty which may be called the pretty or the merely handsome; it, too, may be realized in architecture, if the building is characterized by simplicity and reserve, by a study of good form in the outlines, and by an absence of all attempt to put on beauty from without; especially when the resulting structure is associated with the sober business of trade or manufacture, or with the feelings of comfort and home-likeness.

The relations of architecture to sculpture and the allied arts are both historical and natural. In Greek art, where both of these arts reached so high a degree of development, archi-

tecture and sculpture were employed together for the expression of a common ideal, the latter serving—as in the notable example of the frieze of the Parthenon—as an expressive decoration for the former. Such a union of these two arts, in service, is still a desirable means of enhancing the æsthetical effect; but chiefly, or only, in the case of large public buildings—such as Halls of Justice, Legislation, Commerce, Education, and Museums of Industry and Art—where more definite ideas control the beautifying of the structure.

From the point of view which we have chosen to assume, Sculpture stands higher than architecture; although the former is properly subservient to the latter. It uses the same materials, such as wood, metal, stone; but the limitations of size, and the greater freedom from economic and social requirements, enable the sculptor to represent more purely and effectively the triumph of the spirit over the material in giving to it the beauty of form. Especially is this true when the ideas and sentiments of the spirit find their supreme visible expression in the varying attitudes and relations of the human form. In order, therefore, to reach its highest development as an artistic medium for the expression of the beauty of form, sculpture must have an independent life and growth. This independence it secured in a considerable measure in ancient Assyria and Egypt, and in India, where it was and still is employed to express religious ideas; but above all others, among the Greeks. The beginnings of the two developments—the one in union with structures which have economic and social uses, and the other which seeks rather for the free expression of ideas and feelings in independence of such uses—go back to savage and primitive man. He carves decorative forms upon his utensils; and he also satisfies his artistic desires, generally in connection with religious interests, by making detached effigies of more or less realistic or mythical and imaginative animal and human beings.

Of all the arts, sculpture stands at the head as moulding its

material into expressions of the beauty of pure form. Now it is *life* which gives form. This is true even of all inanimate objects which have beauty of form; they appear to us *as though* shaped in beauty by an indwelling life. Lifelikeness, then, must be the pre-eminent characteristic of all the beauty of sculptured form. The shapes of all things that have life are modified, either slowly or swiftly, so as to express the nature of the forces in whose possession and active co-operation the life itself consists. In the case of our own self-conscious and self-determining mind, we know that the most precious and potent of these forces are our own thoughts, sentiments, and purposes. The life which belongs to others of our own species, with its thoughts, sentiments, and purposes, we have no other so sure, visible means of appreciating as that which consists in changes of their external form. We infer the same thing to be true of the lower animals. By the very essential terms of our knowledge, we imagine the same thing to be also true of all self-like beings; and all things in nature are more or less self-like; and looked at from the right point of view, they almost, if not quite, all have a marvellous beauty of form.

All the resources of modern physiology and psychology might be invoked to describe and emphasize the strength and subtlety of those relations which exist between the various kinds and intensities of the mental states and the changes in the muscular system, which so largely control the human form. The most complete skill in the plastic arts can imitate all these changes with more or less commendable success. But, in general, the truer province of the art of sculpture is with such of those ideas and sentiments of the human mind as are most important and most universal. The trifling and ephemeral conceptions and feelings are apt to prove tiresome when given the importance and permanency of an expression in stone, metal, wood, or other material available for this art. Thus sculpture surpasses painting in the expression of those qualities of gravity, repose, strength, and grace, which the indwelling life imparts

to the forms life assumes, and especially to the human form; while expressive but painful attitudes, sculptured yawns or smiles, and even sculptured flowers, come nearer to the perilous limits where the beautiful is separated from the ugly by the character of the contrasted feelings which the two call forth. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that all these sentiments and thoughts belong to human life; that the pitiful and the comic are not to be excluded from the field of the arts; and that almost any human experience may be looked upon so as to excite genuine æsthetical, as well as genuine ethical, sentiments and ideas.

It appears, then, that those qualities of the object which are imparted by this peculiar form of art, are essentially the same as the qualities which have already been recognized as characterizing the spiritual content of the lower forms of art. But in sculpture, the superior mouldableness of the material in its relation to the artistic object admits of a much more varied and rich content than in landscape-gardening and architecture. More ideas and sentiments, of the sort which command æsthetical appreciation, can be given expression under the conditions which limit this art; it is, *therefore*, superior from the point of view assumed in our inquiry after the spirit of beauty. In a word, more of the qualities of a beautiful spirit, of a life corresponding to a spiritual ideal, can be embodied in the statue, or group of statues, or other sculptured forms, than in a landscape-garden or in a building devoid of sculpture. It would help the inquiry, did space permit, to discuss again the old problem offered by the sculptured Laocoön, and his sons, struggling in vain with the monstrous serpents. It would appear that its claim to beauty lies partly in the æsthetical as well as moral interest which man naturally takes in all contests that put the will to a test for courage and endurance; but more especially, when the story is known, in the æsthetical as well as moral admiration for the self-sacrificing heroism of the father in behalf of his two sons.

What has already been said about sculpture in the more strict meaning of the word applies, although in a less obvious and important way, to all kinds of the plastic art, whatever the material employed.

Painting and the pictorial arts, in their effort to give a varied and rich spiritual content to the objects they construct, have certain further advantages over the plastic arts, which are due to the increased plasticity of the material. This material is, of course, some kind of colored pigment or wash laid upon a background of paper, canvas, mortar, or even wood, metal, and stone. The pictorial arts are intimately allied, both in their nature and in their historical development, with the arts of architecture and of sculpture. The superior power of expression which painting has, as compared with sculpture, is due chiefly to two important particulars. It can express a greater variety of human ideas and feelings, a fuller experience of the human spirit in all its relations; because it can depict, or suggest, man's relations to nature, with its smaller or larger expanses of sky, sea, and landscape. And it can also depict, or suggest, many men in the complicated situations of actual history, or of artistic imagination. Thus the thoughts and sentiments with which nature itself seems full, and which reveal the spiritual content of things as they appeal to man's æsthetical consciousness, are presented in a powerful and large-minded way. Even the naturally sublime can be made to appeal to the eye by a painting as it cannot by either architecture or sculptured form. The spirit of man can commune with the spirit of things, through the medium of pictorial art. Thus, too, those common interests, common thoughts and sentiments, and common movements, which involve many men, can be put before the human mind in the artistic way.

The second of the two important causes of the superiority of painting is the increased lifelikeness and warmth of feeling which the use of color imparts. Sculpture must rely chiefly on form, and is therefore naturally cold, and with a certain

suggestion of a lack of life; or even a suggestion of death. But form, both in things and in man, has color; and color is in no case independent of a suggestion of the character of the indwelling life. In natural objects it is not superficial, not laid on from without; the rather does it shine through from within, and its changes as the relations between indwelling life and the life of the sunlight are modified, are a revelation of the character of that play in which the spirit is constantly taking part. Combining these two advantages, painting can set humanity forth, as a bit of nature warm with its own peculiar life, in a natural or social environment that is colored by the character of its own life,—a contesting and contrasting, or a sympathetic abode for man. All the experiences of the human spirit, in an environment whose nature is adaptive, appreciative, sympathetic, can thus be represented by the different resources of the pictorial arts. All the phases of external nature, which are suggestive of an indwelling spirit that resembles the human spirit—only grander, more subtle, mysterious and alluring—can be represented by the same arts. The limitations which the character of the materials employed impose upon the æsthetical sentiments and ideas of both artist and beholder are, nevertheless, fixed and obvious. The same thing is true of the temptations to conventional degeneracy, to mere imitation, to an undue exaltation of the trivial and the petty; or on the other hand, to a slovenly disregard of form and of effects which can be reached only by a patient devotion to ideals. But perhaps above all, painting suffers from the temptation to become a minister to the love of luxury and to lust.

The question of how far art ought to be merely or chiefly imitative,—or, to put the problem in more acceptable terms, “true to nature,”—and how far chiefly creative and suggestive of something higher than the concrete realizations of artistic ideals which purely natural objects afford, comes to the front in painting. Here the nature of the material has less to say about what the physical limitations of the artistic imagination

shall, of necessity, be. There are, therefore, schools of painting—realistic or idealistic, minutely accurate or romantic and suggestive—to a much larger extent than is possible in the arts of landscape-gardening, architecture, and sculpture. But the maxims, "true to life" and "faithful to reality," afford no definitive solution to such a problem until we have raised and answered the questions: To what kind of life and reality must art be true? Whether attention be given to the actual qualities of things and selves, or to the forms of expression which these qualities assume, no superficial survey will suffice to say:—What that is alive and real is also really beautiful? Only reflective thinking can answer this question. As has already been shown, reflection must indeed be placed upon a basis of actual experience in which the historical witness of the arts, as recorded in the objects approved by the developing æsthetical sentiment and judgments of mankind, has made itself known. And, as we rise higher in the scale of the arts, we seem more clearly to gather the meaning of this historical witness. It is the ideals of that spiritual life, which the self-conscious and self-determining mind knows to be its own, and when in its *right mind*, considers to be of supreme value; the same ideals which the mind attributes to the possession and expression of Nature, in the objects of her construction,—it is these ideals in which the essence of the beautiful is to be sought and found.

It is not so much a marked advance as a great and sudden change that is encountered when the art of Music is considered with reference to the plasticity of the material which it employs. In music the material of æsthetical expression is sound-waves which cause conscious tones of varying intensity, tonal quality, and pitch. These sound-waves are themselves first moulded by the vibrations of some form of a tube, or string, or hollow box subject to percussion; or by the human organs of speech. The psycho-physical relations in which the stimuli stand to the sensations received mainly by the ear are such as to render sounds by far the most plastic and easily

varied and effective media for the arts in expressing and appealing to the æsthetical nature of man. The superiority of music over the arts already considered consists chiefly in these two respects: First, the nature of its material is such that it can present the art-object in an actual time-series. Thus a single musical composition may be made to appeal to the many changes of interests, and moods, with their varying values, which occur in the actual spiritual life. This life in man is itself a succession in time. As a succession in time, it is always changing; and, in this succession, it is sometimes joyful and sometimes sad; sometimes struggling with temptation or penitent over temptations yielded to, and sometimes triumphant and heroic; sometimes transported by love and sometimes by resentment; sometimes anguished by pain, grief, and disappointment; but often also uplifted by aspiration, longing, and tender sympathy. The plastic and pictorial arts can only obscurely and imperfectly remind the soul of these changes of its own experience in time. Nature, since she is subject to similar changes which are suggestive of the different moods and varying states of the human spirit, also lives her life, in time. Therefore, in this one respect at least, music represents man's environment for æsthetical appreciation, far better than do the plastic and pictorial arts. For the ear of man is, in a special manner, the organ of time; and through its use of this organ, art can either lead or keep pace with consciousness which is always a succession of states in time.

But the second and allied reason for the superiority of music is even more important. Above all other arts, music expresses and arouses the emotions, *as such*. The mastery of the emotions by this form of art is chiefly due to these three characteristics:—(1) Music appeals to and expresses all the kinds and shades of human feeling with emphasis and power. Are the emotions grave and solemn and compelling to the soul which cannot escape quickly from their grasp; and so cannot resume its light-hearted and quick-stepping way of receiving

the incidents of life? Musicians use a style, a tempo, and a weight and pitch of harmonious or somewhat dissonant chords, which shall speak a language truer to this feeling than any succession of articulate words. But if the heart feels like dancing, and the will can scarcely control the muscles from executing what the heart feels; then, too, there is a style, and tempo, and weight and pitch of musical sounds, adapted to this mood of the mind's life. With our modern instruments, especially by the full orchestra, or the grand organ, or the military band, and in only less degree by the pianoforte, the feeling for the sublime can be stimulated and lifted to a height scarcely below the power of all but the most sublime scenes in nature, and quite above what any of the plastic or pictorial arts can easily reach. Indeed, there is little doubt that a thorough psycho-physical analysis of the bodily conditions for the feeling of the sublime, would show that they are most easily brought about by immensities of sound.

(2) The superior control of music over the emotions depends also upon the fact that its appeal is made to such of them as are most fundamental and universal, and in a simple, direct way. It is not the feeling *peculiar* to "poor me," but the feeling, of whatever sort, which I share in common with the race, to which the art of music makes its most legitimate and therefore successful appeal. In a word, it is *human* feeling; it is the emotion which is universal and common to mankind. The private experience in so far as it is associated with particular ideas and unusual emotions is not so much the proper field of musical expression. The composer, indeed, may be moved to expression, and guided in his expression, by what is born of, and intimately associated with, his own private and even very peculiar experiences. But if his composition is to be a beautiful object, it must stir and guide similar feeling in the listener, irrespective of personal differences in associations, that are due to equally private and peculiar experiences. It is ministry to joy, to sorrow, to love, to resentment, to aspiration and long-

ing, to struggle for achievement and to peace secured or forfeited but to be regained—all that is common and universal in human emotion—within which lies the true beauty of the musician's art. And like every other true artist, the great musical composer imparts the qualities of his own spirit to the plastic material furnished by the invisible and intangible air-waves,—not selfishly as though their greatest worth were to win pity or applause for himself, but the rather to express, to satisfy, and to cultivate the profoundest and most universal emotions of humanity. From this point of view it appears how just and natural is the alliance between music and religion; and, as well, between music and all the more important civic and social ideals of the race. We are also reminded of the fact that mere admiration for technical skill,—for the high *C* or even the high *F* of the soprano, or for the graceful bowing or rapid trilling of the virtuoso,—however natural or proper it may be, is a totally different thing from a true appreciation for the beauty of the art-object in music.

(3) The other two characteristics of music lead to a third which in some sort summarizes them both. This is the freedom of music as an art. This superior freedom is indeed largely due to the superior plasticity of its material. But the character of the material is not the whole cause. The freedom of musical art is also due to what the art is chiefly trying to express. This, as we have seen, is chiefly those emotions of the self-conscious spirit, which occur in a succession of time, and which constitute the important values of the life of the spirit. That it should rejoice, hope, aspire, achieve and feel triumphant; but equally also that it should suffer, struggle, know disappointment and loss, and win peace by effort;—these are the supremely valuable experiences of the self-conscious and self-determining mind. To have these experiences is to lead the spiritually *beautiful* life. It is the kind of life to which that Nature, whose personification as an expression of immanent spirit, we are more and more convinced, is a legitimate work

of the thought and imagination of man, has consigned every individual as a member of the race; has, indeed, consigned the entire race. This Nature is all "groaning and travailing together" in its search for redemption. Above all the plastic and pictorial arts, music is free to express and to appeal to æsthetical sentiments and ideas, because these sentiments are so fundamental and universal, while the attached ideas are so vague and vast and unrestricted in meaning.

The various qualities of the art-objects, as we have seen them to appear in the construction of the other arts,—such as strength and suggestions of courage and heroic effort, order and proportion, freedom and grace—are all qualities which contribute to the determination as a thing of beauty of the musical composition. But the very nature of the life which the musical composition is adapted to express with a power, simplicity, and freedom, excelling any other art, puts it under certain limitations. Music can be made, to a considerable degree, imitative of natural sounds, or descriptive of physical and social situations and relations. It had its origin largely in the imitation of nature; for nature herself appeals in varied and marvellously effective ways through the ear to man's æsthetical consciousness. There is the roaring, moaning, sighing, and murmuring of wind and sea, the sweet and peaceful soughing of the grains and grasses, the thunderous sound following the lightning flash or the falling of the avalanche; as well as the songs of birds, the chirping of the cicadas and other insects, and many other utterances of a natural kind. And there are musical qualities in all these sounds; none of them are mere noises. The best music is, however, although ministering, not didactic; and when music attempts to use the methods of poetry and of the dramatic art, whether by itself or in combination with these modes of æsthetical expression (opera, oratorio, song), it inevitably loses something of its own peculiar power. It may gain, however, a partial equivalent in other ways.

The bond which has always connected poetry and dancing with music is twofold. They are all rhythmic in their nature; they all keep time, and they all express, though in different ways, to a considerable extent, the same emotions.

Poetry, although in some particulars inferior to each of the other arts, surpasses them all in its power to express and arouse æsthetical sentiments in combination with definite æsthetical ideas. It is, therefore, man's supreme form for giving voice to his particular feelings and more definite judgments respecting the beautiful in nature and in human life. Nor is it difficult to see why this is so. And the reasons, when discovered, carry us a long way into the very heart of the life of beauty.

Poetry shares with music the advantage of using sound as its highly plastic or mouldable material. But it surpasses music in its power of definite expression; because, although it is inferior in the ability to stir a quick and passionate response by way of emotion, its material of sound-waves is moulded into the form of human language or articulate speech. Language is the supremely *human* form for the expression both of feelings and of ideas. The experiences of the self-conscious and self-determining mind of man are both known and communicated in language as by no other medium. If one could not talk to one's self, could not put into expression in words the experiences of one's own which no other knows, it is doubtful whether these experiences could ever take, even for one's self, the values of truth, beauty, or morality. The spirit of the race has made human language; but the language made by the race for the individual is no dispensable factor in the creation of the individual's æsthetical ideas and sentiments; as well as in determining the character and limitations of his knowledge and of his morals. That the communication of the higher and more definite forms of sentiment and ideation require language, needs no argument.

The supremacy of language as the human mode of expression appears more clearly from such considerations as follow:

(1) A careful comparison of human language with all the various and subtle ways of communication employed by the lower animals, shows that in every important particular man's articulate speech embodies all the peculiar excellences of his entire nature, as a being of thought, feeling, and will. Especially in this connection should it be noticed, how all the various intensities and shades of human feeling shape the emphasis, the arrangement, the rhythm, as well as the conceptual content, of the uttered word. Emotion of any sort, instinctively and inevitably affects articulate speech. So true is this, that prose can scarcely become impassioned and remain mere prose. So true is this that familiarity makes men more sensitive to the delicate shadings of accent and emphasis which feeling imparts—and no less when the speaker is striving to suppress or conceal the feeling—than to the meaning of the words as interpreted by common usage or by lexicographic authority.

(2) Language is also capable of almost limitless development as the experience of the race requires it for its growing science, art and philosophy. It is doubtful whether the very character of the material will allow real growth of the art of architecture and sculpture, beyond what ancient and mediæval times left to the world centuries ago; and whether painting can be made any more beautiful, or developed in quite new directions, to excel the work of the greatest of the old masters. Music, too, can make combinations of sounds, by grace of modern instrumentation, that were unheard in former days; but will it give birth to musicians surpassing the art of Beethoven, Schubert, or Mozart? We may not, indeed, have poets of greater artistic genius or talent, in the centuries to come than those which have sung in past centuries. In general, the arts are not capable of the same unlimited development which belongs to the particular sciences. But if the form of beauty which poetry takes does not make increase, it will not be because its medium of expression has reached the limits of its possible development.

By its very nature, then, poetry is fitted to express and to arouse every form and shade of æsthetical sentiments and ideas as no other art can. It can speak, not simply of love as a fundamental and universal emotion, but of all the particular forms and phases of love; it can depict all the imaginable features of attractiveness and loveliness belonging to the beloved object. It can deal in the same way with the human emotions of grief, anger, longing, aspiration, resignation, and every other experience of the spirit's life in its present physical and social environment. And it can set this life into a sympathetic environment, both physical and social, with more of definiteness and warmth of coloring than is possible for the kindred art of painting. And while painting can only suggest those spiritual qualities of Nature which the appreciative eye discerns in her various scenes and moods, poetry can utter their voice with an unmistakable distinctness.

Since it also, like music, moves in time, poetry can give æsthetical expression and value to all the changing incidents of human life, in the actual order of their occurrence. Thus it can move with an even step along with the human spirit in its walk through the pathway of life. Hence its supreme lifelikeness —a congeries, or rather, artistic grouping of qualities brought about by the creative imagination, which we have found to afford one of the most important tests of the beauty of every art-object. Indeed, it would not be an unpardonable exaggeration to say that the truly best poetry *is* the expressed life of the spirit of beauty in the spirit of man. To all these excellences, which are chiefly due to the character of its medium, poetry owes its supremacy as a uniquely human form of art. It is the medium of man, of living man, for the active and definite expression of his spiritual experiences, as no other medium can express them, on their æsthetical and æsthetically appreciative side.

The æsthetical effect of poetry is further greatly increased by the variety and strength of the associated ideas and feelings

which its use of language enables it definitely and deliberately to elicit. The artist in other fields of art cannot surely reckon upon the character of those associations which his object, when produced, is likely to call forth in the individual. In the art of music particularly, he does not wisely aim to control too strictly the associated ideas; he is satisfied if he can produce those kinds of fundamental and universal emotion which correspond to his theme and to its treatment. But the poet must always have a more definite aim. Even if it is the feeling of mystery, in the most vague and general way, which the composer wishes to express and to stimulate; he cannot talk nonsense; he cannot use words that have no definite meaning, or suggestions of definite associations, to any human soul. The failure to have any clear meaning, with its customary disregard of all form, is the chief degradation and destruction of much of our modern music and poetry. But, then, it too is characteristic of much of our modern life.

Similar conclusions of a practical sort are reached when we consider that he who wishes the ministrations of this form of art can find them to fit every one of his peculiar experiences, and all of the associated feelings and ideas with which these experiences are now accompanied or are remembered as having been accompanied in past time. One cannot actually see again the Himalayas, the Jotunheim Mountains, or the Alps, by reading imaginative descriptions of mountains; but one can read some poem which expresses the beauty of that sublimity which belongs to them all. One cannot actually see again the Taj Mahal by moonlight, when looking upon the page of a printed book; but one may stimulate similar states of imagination and feeling with pictures and associations, moulded into the right artistic form by some master of the poetical art.

An analysis of those formal qualities which are thought to give beauty to the object in poetical art shows them to be essentially the same as those common to all the other arts. Strength, proportion, freedom and grace, luxuriousness or sim-

plicity of the noble sort, characterize the form of the truly great products of the poets in every age and clime. But no more in poetry, than in the other arts, or than in human life when considered from the ethical point of view, can all these characteristics be realized in any one form of language at one and the same time. Thus different poems, like different buildings, pieces of sculpture, paintings, or musical compositions, are beautiful in different ways. For as we are about to discover, there are different and measurably incompatible kinds of beauty, to which different typical forms of our æsthetical consciousness respond; although the spirit of beauty is one and the same. But like the human spirit, and—as we believe—like the Spirit of Nature—this unity is not sameness, or monotony, or identity without change. It is, the rather, just this wealth of variety which is realized in every spiritual life and development—although it is all under the control of an Ideal. What has been said about all the other arts shows us that, when considered from the purely æsthetical point of view, the supreme kind of art is found in the form of the Drama. For this, at its best, gives us the whole Self, as self-conscious and self-determining mind, in the complex environment of nature and human society, thinking, feeling, and in action; but as represented to itself, for self-appreciation, in the most effective æsthetical form. And as Aristotle long ago said, it is Tragedy, which is the supreme and morally purifying form of the drama. But this very power of the dramatic representation of human life to express and set forth this life in its totality, makes the drama, when æsthetically bad, the most disturbing and disgusting of all the failures of an attempt at art; and makes it, when morally unworthy, the worst possible corrupter of the public taste and the public morals. Infinitely worse, both from the ethical and the psychological points of view, than bad architecture, bad sculpture, bad painting, or bad music, is the æsthetically ugly and morally unscrupulous stage.

CHAPTER XIX

THE SPIRIT OF BEAUTY

THE enormous differences which exist among the different objects esteemed beautiful, whether in nature or in art, and which are partly due to differences in material and partly to economic and utilitarian considerations, compel us, in our search for the spirit of beauty, to return to a more careful analysis of æsthetical experience. The different forms of admiration which men give to these objects correspond to the different kinds of beauty which the objects present. The fact of universal experience is that the human spirit is moved in notably different ways while contemplating these objects. From this follows the postulate or metaphysical assumption which is the ultimate aim of our inquiry. It may be stated in a preliminary way as follows: The varied movements of the human spirit correspond in some rational sort to the spiritual qualities actually belonging to the real objects. That there are kinds of beauty in reality is the explanation for the corresponding kinds of man's æsthetical consciousness. But since the latter are matters of fact that admit of investigation by more or less sure scientific methods, while the former are inferences or faiths of reflective thinking about which the mind may easily have its doubts, the philosophy of beauty begins with the matters of fact.

The notably different states of consciousness that fall under the common category of the æsthetical, seem to depend chiefly upon the following three factors: (1) The feelings awakened, especially with respect to their sensuous qualities, and their varying intensities, and magnitudes or massiveness (seizure of, and spreading over, all the bodily organs); (2) The imagina-

tion and intellect in their joint work of picturing and thinking, which the intuition of the object both stimulates and requires; and (3) the character and number of the associations that are awakened, and that in general group themselves very differently according to the nature of the object which imagination and thought present to the mind. From all these points of view—to illustrate—we may contrast our æsthetical attitude, when divested of all personal fears or other non-æsthetical *motifs*, in the presence of a storm at sea and when looking upon a lovely orchid; or when viewing an eruption of Vesuvius and when examining one of the tiny vases buried by its ashes so long ago.

Without claiming perfection, or even freedom from all objectionable features, for this classification, we will recognize as sufficient for our purpose, five markedly different kinds of the beautiful to which the æsthetical nature of man responds in five markedly different ways. The psychological differences in the attitudes of the Self toward these kinds of beauty have already been explained as chiefly due to differences in the blending of the three factors of sensuous feeling, active imagination or creative thought, and sympathetic association of ideas. These five kinds are (1) the Sublime; (2) the Graceful; (3) the Orderly, or Harmonious; (4) the Unrestrained, and so Luxurious or Wild; and (5) the Pretty, or Handsome.

The feelings excited by what men consider sublimely beautiful have, of necessity, a certain sensuous intensity, but more especially a massiveness and wide-spreading sensuous character. In extreme, but typical cases, the heart seems enlarged; the breathing deepens; the head wants to uplift itself; the whole body seems to expand. In general, there is an emotional condition which announces an increase of the release of stored energy, a sense of being extraordinarily alive. But in such cases, there is also a sequent, if not accompanying feeling of being overstrained, overpowered; as of being too weak and small adequately to appreciate the sublimity of the object.

Imagination and intellect are correspondingly stimulated to a condition of excited activity in the effort worthily to fill out the picture, or the conception, which is the real object toward which the mind is, by the external stimuli, pointed the way. For in the sublimely beautiful, more than in any other kind of beauty, there is always something far more than what is merely presented to the senses. Meantime, also, a rush of associated impressions or clearer ideas adds further intensity and expressiveness to the entire mental and emotional condition. Enlargement and uplift are thus communicated to the spirit.

In his treatment of the sublimely beautiful, the philosopher Kant recognized two species of the emotion which corresponded to two classes of characteristics in the object. These were the mathematically sublime and the dynamically sublime. The immensities of time and space, when the imagination is excited to the effort to picture them by some concrete representation of them—for example, the sky as viewed in Egypt or made known by astronomy, the æons of actual history, or those more extended æons borrowed from infinite time by the modern theory of evolution—excite the sentiments and ideas of this kind of beauty. But above all, this effect is produced by the attempt to conceive of God under such terms as the Infinite or the Absolute. This species of the “mathematical sublime” is contemplated and appreciated with less of physical agitation and strain than is the dynamically sublime. Great exhibitions of any form of energy excite human admiration, whether—as for the most part—made by natural forces or by collective bodies of men. The resistless movement of the railroad train, the ponderous and powerful machinery of the modern steamship, as well as the thunder storm, the volcanic explosion, the earthquake, when separated from the images of the destruction they wreak, excite us in similar manner. *Pretty*, they certainly are not; but the sublime stands above the pretty in spiritual impressiveness and charm.

These Kantian divisions, however, do not properly cover the entire field of the sublime. Kant himself recognized the truth that respect for the moral law was a form of emotion which had a place under both of the two categories, the ethical and the aesthetical. His attitude toward his own conception of this law was one which demanded for its expression the warmth of coloring imparted by the sentiment of the sublimely beautiful. And, indeed, the morally sublime is the supremely worthy example under the general species. It is this which accounts for, and justifies, the fact that there is a certain unmistakable kinship between the feelings with which men view Niagara or the sky over the Arabian Desert, and those with which they think of Martin Luther at the Diet of Worms, or of David Livingstone dead upon his knees in Africa. In the heroism of man's spirit, when it triumphs over temptation and weakness, nature gives us the supreme concrete expression of the morally sublime. "God," said Hegel, "is a spirit and it is only in man that the medium through which the divine element passes has a conscious spirit that actively realizes itself." As to the sublime in the products of art he further declares that "God is operative neither more nor less than in the phenomena of nature; but the divine element, as it makes itself known in the work of art, has attained, as being generated out of mind, an adequate thoroughfare for its existence."

Doubtless it would not be consistent with the same principle of division to make a special class of the sublimity of the mysterious. But it may be noted as an important and suggestive truth, that the sublime is always mysterious or unexplained, in large part. That which man seems to himself wholly to comprehend, no longer appears worthy of admiration on account of its sublimity. For the man of science who is petty and devoted chiefly to the observation and description of details of fact, without a superior interest in the hidden causes and undiscovered laws, nothing either in nature or in art is likely to appear sublime. But to him who constantly bears in mind the

magnitude and the mystery of Nature, the sentiments and ideas appropriate to the sublimely beautiful are never far away.

In the beauty which is chiefly characterized by Grace, the conception of motion is always either obviously prominent, or really dominant, although in a concealed way. This kind of beauty, therefore, either suggests or actually illustrates that easy and joyful movement along lines of least resistance, which is significant of abounding life. Thus we feel ourselves entitled to speak of the graceful lines, or shapes, of objects which, like buildings and statues, cannot move. They suggest, however, such easy and joyful movement as is brought to pass by the indwelling forces of life. Graceful melodies and poetical compositions characterized by this kind of beauty do actually move; they change in the succession of time, and in rhythmic fashion, the positions of their elements in pitch or, also in the articulate word with its burden of feeling and idea. The contrasted kind of beauty is suggestive of vigor and strength, which overcomes with endurance and perhaps with pain, the obstacles to movement of any kind which are embedded in the environment of human life and in the structure of every material organism. For if we must "get there" somehow, and cannot do it by easy and joyful movements; then we must turn angles and take, not the curved line of beauty but the even more beautiful line (if the truth of life be clearly understood) of consecrated toil. Besides, in works of art which depict the rugged and scarred aspects of nature, or the rude physical surroundings as moulded by the common man for himself, or the human form bent and ploughed and feruled by contention with physical forces, there is an expression of, and an appeal to, another side of the spiritual life which has a beauty of its own. The statues of Praxiteles and the peasants of Millet are both beautiful—each in their own way. The highest example of this kind of beauty is the human form, either in such pose as indicates a fullness of physical well-

being, or in such action as suggests cultivated and kindly feeling as its motive. The risk in the art which strives to depict the perfection of this kind of beauty is that of making *mere* gracefulness, as a matter of pride in its possessor and of sensuous longing, the minister to luxury, effeminacy, and even lust. In this respect nature sets to art an example, by refraining from so debasing its ideal. Just to be beautiful in this way is not, of itself, a worthy æsthetical ideal for a self-conscious and self-determining mind.

Certain objects, or groupings of objects, or series of occurrences, which cannot fitly be called either sublime or graceful, excite æsthetical feeling because of the symmetrical character of the composition, or sequence, of their parts. This kind of beauty is that which we have classified as the beauty of the Orderly or Harmonious. All compositions, whether products of nature or of art, when regarded as *compositions*, must possess more or less of this kind of beauty. Under this ideal influence the mind regards the various beautiful landscapes as scenes, whether their parts are selected and synthesized by the eye's looking out upon nature, or by the artist who is always alert in his search for materials for a true picture. In carving a statue, in constructing a building, in composing a piece of music or a poem, there must be regard had to order, proportion, balance, harmony, and other similar qualities. Those musical compositions, for example, which make upon the lover of music the impression that the tremendous and complex sounds called forth might just as well be arranged in any other than their actual order, can scarcely expect to endure in the æsthetical admiration of future generations when placed beside the classical masters of this divine art.

This species of æsthetical feeling is excited by the perception or mental representation of proportion, balance of parts, and similar forms of the expression given to one ideal, in control over numerous elements. The imagination seizes with a pleasure which is more than merely sensuous, and which has

the qualities belonging to all genuine æsthetical appreciation, upon the unity which a plan brings to numerous factors of varying sizes and kinds. Coupled with this, however, there is undoubtedly a sensuous element. For the effect of combinations of the dissimilar, and repetitions of the similar, is to make more easy and successful the grasp of imagination and thought. When arranged under the rules which are followed for the construction of beautiful objects of this species, details do not need to be slowly and painfully mastered, as details, in order to appreciate their beauty in combination. They have this beauty, indeed, not altogether or chiefly in themselves; but as growing out of the relations in which they are made to stand to one another as parts of an orderly, planful, and harmonious whole. The secret of our appreciation for this kind of beauty is thus revealed. Like all the æsthetical feeling which critics bestow upon the *form* of the object, it is not *mere* and *dead* form—as though any such thing could be; it is the life that shapes and shines through the form which is greeted and recognized as worthy of admiration and respect. The object reveals the triumph of reason and rational will over unorganized material; and the self-conscious and self-determining mind of man recognizes at this triumph with a kind of sympathetic joy. Therefore, this kind of the beautiful, too, is an appeal made by the spiritual characteristics of the object to the kindred spirit of the subject of æsthetical sentiment and judgment.

It is easy to understand, then, what are the risks of failure and revulsion which lie in the path of this particular kind of art-work. They are chiefly the risks of a wearisome monotony, or a relatively spiritless compliance with conventional rules for the too precise ordering of artistic achievement. In nature, indeed, life follows law; and all varieties of beautiful forms yield secret or manifest obedience to gravity, sunshine, and various kinds of physical and chemical energies. In its most hidden working this life which shapes things, while not dis-

obedient to "the heavenly vision," does not attempt to loose itself from the bonds of earth. But in nature, to the eye which penetrates her secrets and is clarified by pure feeling, rather than suffused with morbid sentimentality, there is no monotonous conformity to form for form's sake. There is, the rather, infinite variety given to the formal expression of every species of life. In using the word life here, we do not wish to confine it to its proper biological use. For the statement is as true of crystals as it is of animals, of gems as it is of flowers. But no natural objects are more strictly and definitely ordered than is the shaping of crystals and of gems; but each kind has its own beauty, and even the individuals of each may reveal some particular kind of charm. While, as to the larger combinations of natural objects, the scenes arranged by Nature when uninterfered with by man, there is no such thing as an ugly or disagreeable monotony.

The human mind, however, finds relief from those aspects and experiences which breed the oppressive sense of excessive sameness or conventionality, in breaking loose as it falsely imagines—from law and in realizing its own inherent rights in the joy of the wild. So it is with human æsthetical experience; and with the objects which minister to this experience. For there is a beauty of the Luxuriant and the Wild. And the feeling for this kind of the beautiful is that which naturally and fitly belongs to a varied and superabounding life. In order to arouse this feeling, the object, whether in nature or in art, must suggest enough and to spare of indwelling spiritual energy. In its larger and more impressive natural exhibitions, this species—the luxuriant and wildly beautiful—has certain features akin to those of the sublime. But there is a lack of that confidence in the supremacy of reason, and that respect for the law-abiding, which belongs to the beauty of sublimity. The rugged and desolate mountain side, the earthquake shock, the volcanic eruption, may seem to the mind of the observer to have title to either one of these kinds of beauty, according

to his point of view. But a mixture of terror and even of repulsion is likely in the one case, to take the place of feelings of awe and even of worshipful reverence in the other. The Titans, godlike in strength, and rejoicing in its exercise, but without a godlike pity or reserve, are made responsible by untaught imagination, for the grandly wild: Divine Reason, in control of boundless might, is suggested by reflective thinking, as the author of the awfully sublime.

The æsthetical feeling aroused by this kind of beauty is at its purest and best in the presence of such natural objects as tropical forests or gardens; and in such objects of art as those buildings, carvings, paintings, poems, where form and color seem to have escaped from all the restraints of convention, and to have "run wild" without, however, overstepping too far the limits of their vital forces and due relations in the effort to throw off all external constraint. In furniture, dress, and daily occupations and companionships, the mind which is sensitive to æsthetical interests and considerations, apart from all craving for the unlawful indulgence of appetite and lust, takes a real and legitimate satisfaction in occasional breaks with the slavery of routine, the monotony of convention. In the development of art, too, the epoch-making masters and schools have generally been characterized by a revolt against the existing regulations and dicta of the critics. What is called order, and is therefore ordered for compliance with by every beauty-loving spirit, has come to seem oppressive and even irrational and ugly—at least in part. Then, the indwelling life breaks beyond the bounds of the ordinary; it roves and revels in its newly found freedom.

It is at once evident that the last two kinds of beauty, and the corresponding æsthetical attitudes toward their objects, are complementary, if not contradictory. In true art, as in nature considered from the æsthetical point of view, they are complementary rather than essentially contradictory. Work should be followed by play; the expenditure of the vital

energies should not be always ordered along the same monotonous lines. This is the truth of physiology. And the resulting æsthetical truth is, that the full and complete life of the spirit requires both of these two kinds of expression. In general, life should be carefully ordered and therefore engaged in the repetition of the same energies. It should be directed by intelligent will toward the arrangement and repetition of the component factors of its work. But at times, it should have the more unrestrained joy of throwing off—what may become a burden and a source of ugliness and inefficiency—the conscious compliance with conventional rules for being merely alive and for doing nothing but work. That there is æsthetical as well as ethical risk connected with the appreciation of this kind of beauty, scarcely needs argument. As the excess of order tends to the restriction of development and the slavery of convention in art and in life; so does the excessive love of the beauty of the luxuriant and the wild tend toward offensive savagism and immoral indecency. The Bohemian has its place in the spirit of beauty; but its habitual devotee is sure to lose most of the genuinely æsthetical elements of life and art in the froth and mire of selfishness and sensuousness.

There are many things, both in nature and in art, which do not seem to fall easily under any of the four kinds of the beautiful whose dominating characteristics have already been described. Yet, if we deny all beauty to them, we greatly diminish the scope and the content of human æsthetical experience. We have called this kind of beauty, that of the Pretty, or the Handsome. That these terms designate an inferior class of objects and a correspondingly lowered response to them in the form of genuinely æsthetical sentiments and judgments, there seems to be no doubt. But one should not be disposed habitually to use these words with a half-concealed contempt. For pretty things and handsome animals and human beings play an important part in ministering to the joy and cultivation of human life, on its æsthetical side. Nature is full of them, is,

indeed, largely made up of them. Most of the objects produced in all kinds of art, if they can make any claim to beauty at all, would have to be assigned to this fifth and lowest class. They are not sublime, or especially graceful; neither are they patterned after ideals of harmony or of the luxuriant and the wild. But they may give a certain unselfish pleasure. The uninstructed lover of nature is interested in this way, in almost all natural objects; the common people appreciate, though not with really good taste or cultivated judgment, such objects when produced by the various kinds of artisanship. Many of them have more or less of beauty, or of the semblance of beauty in them. But of what kind is their beauty? Let us call it: "just the being pretty or handsome."

The beauty of prettiness stands, as respects the sentiments and the activities which it calls forth, at the other extreme from the beauty of the sublime. In this kind of beauty, the object must be brought near the eye, if it have visible shape; and a certain minuteness of attention must be given to the delicacy and skill involved in its structure. The massive feelings of awe, and that sort of *quasi-moral* respect, which characterize the sublime are wanting in all such cases. And if the mere prettiness of the object is too conspicuous, or is secured at the expense of the other qualifications necessary to every beautiful object, it may even excite some slight feeling of that contempt to which weakness invariably tempts the vigorous mind. Since the object does not appear as a species of conduct, the modifying feelings of compassion, or pity, or even sympathy, are not likely to be aroused. The popular airs, and songs, and even the popular poems, where they are not positively vulgar or immoral, belong for the most part to this class. Amongst so-called civilized peoples, they have not the seriousness, simplicity, and instinctive beauty which belongs to almost all the art-objects of savage peoples. What lover of genuine beauty does not feel compelled to confess that the pottery of these peoples, the decorations of their utensils and

clothing, their songs, etc., are æsthetically far superior to much which finds favor in the modern department store or upon the modern vaudeville stage?

That the relatively unimportant natural structures have a beauty of their own, needs no proof for one who has habitually studied them with a trained eye and an appreciative mind. No surfaces decorated in patterns of many colors and geometrical shapes by human skill surpass the wings of the most insignificant beetle; no lace-work from any convent or factory equals in delicacy the web of the common spider or the thread spun by the silk-worm. The blades of grasses and of grains, and the sand or soil men tread under foot, are constructed with a wonderful regard for variety in unity, for proportion and order, but with freedom to evolve an infinite number of differences in details. In that sympathy with nature which is so highly characteristic of Japanese art, worm-eaten surfaces, crooked and gnarled branches, grotesquely shaped stones and minerals, are esteemed to possess in more abundant measure the characteristics which the human spirit should appreciate as beautiful and worshipful when wrought into her products by the Spirit of Nature. All this æsthetical sentiment is confirmatory of the view for which we have been contending. *Any object in order to be considered beautiful, must appear to the human mind as revealing some traits kindred with itself, of an ideally worthy spiritual life.* The same thing is true, although—confessedly—in inferior degrees, of all those objects of art which can establish an acceptable claim to the beauty of prettiness, of the *petite*, because they exhibit the result of painstaking human skill. The beauty by which they are characterized is indeed of a “delicate, diminutive, or inferior kind”; but it possesses, although in diminished degree, some of essentially the same characteristics as those which belong to the other and higher types of beauty. These objects have in them a pinch of the same salt, a *modicum* of the same universal life.

There is no other department of philosophy in which the

conclusions of reflective thinking have so little of the compelling quality which investigation by scientific methods imparts as in the Department of so-called *Æsthetics*. The philosophy of the beautiful ends in a sort of rational faith rather than in a system of reasoned conclusions. This fact is due, in an unavoidable way, to the very nature of the objects studied; and to the affective or emotional results which such objects produce within the self-conscious and self-determining mind of man. These emotional and intellectual effects, as they appear in consciousness, however, are facts of no transitory and restricted importance. They are continuous, abiding, and universal, throughout the history of the human race. It is possible to trace—not, indeed, to their first sources but to relatively simple forms—the development of the particular arts and of the subdivisions of these arts. But all the various attempts which have been made to account by a theory of evolution for the essential psychical elements and persistent types of man's æsthetical consciousness are wholly artificial and unsatisfactory.

The nature of the savage, or of the mythical primitive man (so far as anything is known about primitive man), in respect of these elements and aspects, has always been the same as our own in this day of so largely misplaced æsthetical pride and self-conceit. For in truth, human nature is as essentially æsthetical as it is essentially moral and religious. Man has, therefore, always recognized beauty as something worthy of appreciation and of artistic striving. Still further, while there always has been, is now, and probably—it is to be hoped, certainly—will be, wide differences of opinion and practice, in æsthetics as in ethics and in religion; essentially the same vital and spiritual characteristics which he has thought to recognize in certain objects have always moved him to admiring appreciation and to artistic endeavor. The important philosophical, or metaphysical, truth is this: The race has the faith that Beauty is objective. Or, to say the same thing, in other language: The æsthetical ideals which the human mind appre-

ciates and even worships are confidently believed to be followed in the very structure of real Things. In a large way, Nature, or the Being of the World, expresses and appreciates man's Ideal of Beauty.

It is, of course, true that by no means every thing in the world of nature is considered by every observer to possess the characteristics of beauty. Material things, in general, do not appear to man to be under the same obligation to be beautiful as that under which conscious selves appear, to be moral. Some things, indeed, seem to most people to be positively ugly, or even repulsively so; while most natural objects are to the multitude of those who use them, at best indifferent as respects any claim to the special characteristics of beauty. Are not toads, and snakes, and dead branches, and dry leaves after the autumn-colors have faded, either distasteful or quite lacking in positive charm? That depends upon the individual's point of view and limited associations. Philosophy, most assuredly, cannot solve the problem of the ugly in Nature, if it sets out with the assumption that Nature, in order to be altogether beautiful, ought to fashion every object from her hand so as to afford to everybody a measure of sensuous enjoyment; or that she ought so to restrict her forces as never to do damage to the economic or sanitary interests of any individual or community of individuals. But such, in fact, is not the World's way of being either beautiful or beneficent. And there is abundant reason to think that, if it were her way, Nature could not produce, or elicit and develope, in man the appreciation and expression of the really noblest and most worthy of æsthetical ideals. Granted, that the human mind cannot perfectly solve in any way the seeming presence of so much in the production of nature that offends its æsthetical sentiments. Neither science nor philosophy can solve any of the problems offered by the Universe at large, in a perfectly satisfactory way. The more, however, is known of natural laws, the more natural objects and natural processes are studied with judgment and insight;

the more of a real and grand, as well as of a delicate and exquisite beauty is revealed in the Being of the World. And finally, the mind seems warranted in believing that there is nothing made or done by Nature which, however indifferent or ugly it may appear from some points of view, may not claim to be considered positively beautiful, with some one of the various kinds of beauty, from other points of view. That natural forces, at the same time and in the same objects or processes, should be both sublime and pretty, both obviously orderly and almost oppressively luxuriant and wild, would be as really impossible for the human spirit to appreciate, as it is apparently impossible for Nature to perform.

As we observe the World on the largest scale, and reflect more profoundly upon our observations, from the æsthetical point of view, we learn the lesson which science habitually teaches:—that we are dealing with a vast, and in many respects incomprehensible system. In this system what appears to men as bad and ugly, from the point of view of their sensitive natures or of their economical interests, is generally an essential part of the sublimity, grandeur, harmony, and super-abounding life, which belong to the Totality of the Being of the World. The Spirit of Beauty, in the larger meanings and uses of the beautiful, is possessed by that Reality, whose essential characteristics are revealed, not to science alone, but also to the moral, artistic, and religious nature of humanity. This æsthetical postulate, or article of faith, is based upon what seem to be facts of experience. *Every beautiful object, whatever be the kind of beauty which it especially emphasizes and represents, is beautiful because it suggests in a concrete way some one or more of the characteristics of an ideal spiritual Life.*

This postulate, or article of faith, may be proved—so far as the word proof is applicable to the subject—by all that has thus far been said as to the nature of æsthetical consciousness, of the characteristics of beautiful objects, and of the kinds of beauty, as presented in nature and in the arts. Some

of these reasons may properly now be restated and summarized under the following four heads: (1) All the forms of art, so far as the plasticity of the material they employ and the economic conditions and utilitarian uses of their product will permit, do represent and express some form of an ideal spiritual Life. According to the particular form of the spiritual ideal which they succeed in following is the kind of aesthetical sentiment and approving judgment which they call forth. Art concretely embodies the Spirit of Beauty so as to appeal to the spirit in man which appreciates the beautiful. (2) This theory explains why Tragedy is the highest form of art. The tragic idea, and the appeal to its appropriate sentiments, whether set forth in sculpture, painting, music, poetry, or prose dramatic literature, is found in almost all the greater and more highly appreciated products of art. The verdict of the world's best artistic judgment runs this way. Struggle against difficulties, scorning of pain, self-sacrificing affection, the often baffled but final triumph of justice, human penitence and pity, and Divine pity and grace, find their expression through the tragic in art. But these are all ideas and sentiments which fall under the most heroic spiritual activities and which correspond to the supreme and profoundly satisfying ideals of spiritual Life. (3) The persistent and rational determination of mankind not to regard its aesthetical sentiments and judgments as purely subjective, but to ground them in Reality, cannot be disregarded. This determination is both cause and result of the belief that all the forms and kinds of beauty have their ground and ultimate explanation in a Universal Spiritual Life. (4) The World, when regarded from the aesthetical, as from every other point of view, is seen to be undergoing a process of development. It is, at least in many respects, and so far as its processes are open to human research, coming to be more and more beautiful; and therefore more and more satisfactory to man's aesthetical ideals. This evolution itself is of all conceivable natural things or proc-

esses, the most awfully and mysteriously sublime. It is a development characterized by order and harmony and grace, and by exquisite workmanship in details; but it is also characterized by rigor, severity, and luxuriant wildness in parts. It has the marks of a spiritual process, of a vast march onward that is compelled, and shaped or more gently urged, by the Power of an indwelling Spiritual Life.

The treatment given by philosophy to the ideals of humanity is not satisfied without making the attempt somehow in Reality to unify them all. We do not anticipate unduly this attempt when we call attention at this point to the intimate relation between man's æsthetical and his moral ideals and development. It has already been said that the two cannot be identified. To accomplish this identification would impoverish human nature and would weaken and degrade man's conception of the Being of the World. But the intimacy of the relation may be made clear by the following, among other considerations. There is, both in theory and in practice, an intimate and fairly constant relation between man's æsthetical and his moral development. This truth is evinced by the following among other classes of facts. Reference has already (p. 366f.) been made to the fact, that there are sentiments and judgments, approving or condemning, which men universally express toward certain forms of conduct, but which may be, with about equal propriety, considered from the æsthetical point of view. The existence and the behavior of things may be beautiful, or indifferent as regards beauty, or positively ugly. But unless things are more completely personified and endowed with moral feelings and with some apprehension of moral ideals than science permits, neither their nature nor their behavior can be judged as coming under ethical categories. For Things are self-like; but they are not such Selves as are self-conscious and self-determining minds. On the contrary, the nature and the behavior of men fall, of necessity, under both classes of categories. Men may be both moral or

immoral, and also beautiful or ugly. Heroic deeds of human courage, fidelity, endurance of pain and of loss in the pursuit of noble ideals, are the subject-matter of the most effective forms of the poetic and dramatic arts. Examples of this are the master-pieces of literature, such as the Antigone of Sophocles, the Book of Job, the Inferno of Dante, the King Lear of Shakespeare, the Paradise Lost of Milton, the Faust of Goethe. In all these, and in all similar cases, however, the characters of the drama and the treatment given to them by the artist are spontaneously and inevitably passed upon from the point of view which regards their fidelity to moral ideals. The deeds depicted in this form of art may excite a salutary revolt and disgust, or feelings of penitence, pity, and sympathy, which are neither exclusively ethical nor exclusively æsthetical; but which are both, and about equally.

This mingling of ethical and æsthetical experience bears witness to the truth that immorality, if it is brought before the mind in such form that its true moral character is discerned, is also distasteful to the æsthetical consciousness, when the latter is placed in its own purer and higher points of view. But the general fact is particularly obvious as respects certain vices, like cowardice, meanness, cruelty, unfaithfulness, and other similar departures from the ideal of a noble manhood. If it is objected that much in the plastic and pictorial arts, and especially in literature (above all, in drama, poetry, and the novel), which is undoubtedly beautiful, is also, as undoubtedly, either positively immoral or of immoral tendency, the objection must be admitted to be true in fact. But it misses the true point of the argument. It is true of religion, too, that much irrational belief, degrading superstition, and cruel and immoral practice, have grown out of the most profound, permanent and universal religious impulses and ideas. In both classes of intimate relations between the æsthetical and the other controlling ideals, the seeming discrepancies and contradictions depend chiefly upon mistaken

points of view. The courage of the murderer, *quoad* courage, is virtuous; the beauty which nature or art gives to forms and relations that excite and minister to deeds of violence or lust, is beautiful indeed. But change the motive as discerned in the one case, and the attitude of either artist or observer toward the object; then the whole transaction changes its real æsthetical character and value. In order to remain beautiful, the nude in the plastic and pictorial arts, or the lifelikeness and charm of the drama, the poem, or the novel, must not appear to lend itself to the ministry of lust. The moment the bounds of either form of obligation are overstepped (and these bounds are different in different communities, at different times, and under changing social conditions; and are often matters for honest differences of opinion), the product becomes both ugly and immoral when viewed in the clearer light of the æsthetically and ethically perfect Ideal.

That men who are great in art are by no means always conspicuous for virtue is a fact which offers no objection to our theory. The psychological unity of the individual Self, and the spiritual unity of the race, are indeed such that neither the individual nor society can develope æsthetically or morally with an exclusive regard to either one of these supreme interests. But if the question be raised as to how either one may be temporarily subjected to a deliberate disregard of the other, the answer is to be found in the weakness and limitations of human nature. How can a human soul unite such diverse qualities as an exquisite and sure appreciation of what is beautiful, in many of the qualities and kinds of real beauty, with dullness of intellect or hardness of heart toward important moral interests? It is just this kind of unifying of discordant and contrary sentiments, judgments and practices, which every self-conscious and self-determining mind does actually effect. And while, on the one hand, the so-called "artistic temperament" must often be charged with much of this vain struggle to make a harmonious totality out of a character and a life

that is swerved from the ideal of spiritual perfection by excessive devotion to some one of its component ideals; it must also be remembered that not a few of the greatest artists and lovers of beauty have, like Plato and the supreme Leader of men toward the religious ideal, recognized both beauty and righteousness as not interchangeable but related forms of that which is ideally Good.

The intimate relation which exists between the ideals of beauty and the ideals of religion will appear more clearly in subsequent chapters. It will then be discovered that some of the most productive sources of religious experience arise in the æsthetical sentiments and ideas. This is most conspicuously true of the feeling of the sublime. Indeed, when combined with the allied or identical feelings for the mysterious and incomprehensible, it is found that man's attitude toward the sublimely beautiful is perhaps the chief source of his nobler religious experiences and of his higher religious developments. But the sentiments and beliefs of religion are, in only less degree, called out by the artistic harmony, freedom of super-abounding life, and technical skill, with which the Spirit that is in Nature produces its objects and brings them before the appreciative spirit of man. These qualities of Divinity religion recognizes, in its earlier developments, in the form of nature-worship; just as the more definitively ethical qualities of Divinity are recognized in the form of ancestor-worship.

The part which the influence of æsthetical ideals plays in the development of the individual and of society cannot safely be neglected; it can scarcely be overestimated. As said Professor Everett (*Poetry, Comedy, and Duty*, p. 43f.): "There are few who would not recognize the fact that the dying out of the sense of beauty from any life is a real loss. There are few who do not realize that the enjoyment of beauty is one of the normal functions of the soul and that it cannot fail without disturbing the integrity of the life." The love of the beautiful, not as affording sensuous gratification to the

individual but as having a real and universal worth, and a certain worshipful attitude toward beauty, when properly cultivated, make man morally better by bringing him nearer to the ideal of a perfect spiritual life. This truth applies even to manners and morals of the so-called practical sort. The true gentleman must be something of an artist in matters of conduct. The purer happiness and the higher usefulness of any life depends in no small degree upon the genuine æsthetical culture which it receives. And all so-called "liberal culture" should make provision for stirring and directing an appreciation of the beautiful in nature and in art.

But for reflective thinking and for philosophical system, this is the supremely important truth which follows upon a study of man's æsthetical experience and æsthetical development. The appreciation and interpretation of the World,—its Nature, as science would say, its real Being, as the uncouth language of metaphysics might express its problem,—and also of the meaning and goal of human life, cannot be gained in the highest degree, without æsthetical cultivation. That Nature, as man's environment and man's Mother and foster-mother, *is* really beautiful, and has made her child to appreciate and judge the worth of beauty, is by no means the most insignificant of the several voices which bear virtues to the Spirit that reveals itself as immanent and controlling in the system of selves and of things.

CHAPTER XX

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: ITS ORIGIN IN EXPERIENCE

THAT man should become a religious being is made necessary both by his constitution and by his physical and social environment. His spiritual nature, whether it was received at the beginning as an endowment or was achieved by many thousands of years of struggle upward, demands the satisfactions of religion on the emotional and practical as well as on the more purely intellectual side. The essential and supreme thing about Selfhood is the development of a self-conscious and self-determining mind. This mind seeks and finds, and still again seeks and finds, more and more seemingly valid explanations of its own nature and of that larger Nature in whose lap it is born and at whose bosom it is nourished and cherished. But as self-conscious and self-determining, it feels the pressure and recognizes the obligations of ethical and æsthetical impulses, sentiments, and ideals. Thus man's rational being—in the larger and fuller meaning of the word "rational"—requires him, not only to regard the Being of the World as a system of self-like beings, standing in more or less intelligible relations to himself and to one another, but also to endow this Being with some greater measure, however hidden and mysterious in places, of those spiritual qualities which he feels himself compelled to appreciate, to admire, and to imitate. In a word, man gives to Nature a Spirit, after the pattern of, and yet superior to, the spirit which he consciously recognizes himself to be. Thus the fundamental belief of religion is made inevitable.

Why should not, then, his attitude toward this Universal Spirit be one of fear mingled with desire for friendly communion? Why should it not include the sense of mystery tem-

pered by the longing to know; the appreciation for the morally sublime and the sublimely beautiful held in reserve or disturbed by the doubt of ignorance; the emotions of filial affection, trust, and obedience, darkened, delayed, and thwarted, but finally triumphing over the obstacles of unreason and temptation to wrong-doing? Such is the religious attitude of the human spirit toward the Being of the World. Therefore, to call it natural is not to do it dishonor; it is, the rather, to do honor to the Spirit, which is immanent in Nature as well as in the spirit of man.

When speaking of "the religious consciousness," however, it must not be expected to find, on analyzing it, any wholly new factors or forms of conscious activity, to which attention has not already been directed. Religion is not like a mansard roof added, in compliance with a new architectural taste or custom, to an old-fashioned building of a quite different architectural style. As long as man has been a speaking, moral, and social being, so long has he been also a religious being. He has been all these—if, waiving all ill supported conjectures, we plant ourselves firmly on the facts of human history, so far as these facts are discoverable—so long as he has been a true Self, a real man. It is human, then, to be religious; and, on the contrary, it is as truly to lack something important in the human constitution, not to be religious, as it is to have no development of the conscious ethical and æsthetical experience. To show the origin of religious experience, it will therefore only be necessary to point out how all the various allied departments of human nature (if one may be pardoned so mechanical a term) contribute to that complex experience which constitutes the religious attitude toward the Being of the World. It will then follow as a matter of course that this experience requires its special and highly important place in any attempt at systematic philosophy.¹

¹ The discussions of the following three chapters, and all the quotations not otherwise credited, are taken from the author's

"But what is religion? and By what marks are we to recognize the experience connoted by this term? Some brief and yet more precise determination of the sphere of historical and psychological research within which the investigation of the phenomena proceeds is surely needed at this point. For on the one hand, there is risk of framing too loose and indefinite a conception of the term religion, and so perhaps of identifying its sphere with the entire group of ethical and æsthetical beliefs, emotions, and ideas; or with the content of thought and opinion belonging to philosophy itself. While, on the other hand, a danger awaits the inquiry, from confining the examination to certain favored examples or types of religion, or from prematurely dividing religions into the lower and the higher; or into the wholly true and the wholly false. This last form of restricting the subject may amount in the end to something quite different from distinguishing between truth and half-truth, or between truth and falsehood, in any particular religion. It may discourage the attempt to trace the development of the religious consciousness of humanity from lower to higher stages in the rationality of its conceptions and in the purity of its sentiments. And surely the use of the psychological and historical method will not permit, except in a modified way, the acceptance of Eucken's declaration that 'he who concerns himself about religion's content of truth need not inquire into its darksome beginnings nor trace its tedious climbings upward, but may at once transport himself to its height. Since here the problem of its truth first attains a full clearness, and here first gains a compelling power.'"

In its lowest terms and considered as universal with the race, that product of the self-conscious and self-determining mind of man which is called Religion, in its effort to interpret the phenomena so as to satisfy certain rational impulses and demands, as well as to afford a rational basis for life,

Philosophy of Religion, 2 vols. (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905).

shows essentially the same results of the activities of the human intellect as those which are shown in all other forms of allied human development. It may be summarized as follows: "Religion is the belief in invisible superhuman powers (or a Power) which are (is) conceived of after the analogy of the human spirit; on which (whom) man regards himself as dependent for his well-being, and to which (whom) he is, at least in some sense responsible for his conduct; together with the feelings and practices which naturally follow from such a belief."

It has already been proved that all the physical and natural sciences recognize the more or less self-like character of the nature and behavior of the things with which they undertake to deal in their several special ways. Moreover, if these sciences recognize the real meaning of their more ulterior conclusions in the form of species, laws, principles, and a course of development of a plan-full character toward some sort of goal; then they, of necessity, virtually assume the immanence of Mind in the system of Things. Indeed, the whole work of the particular sciences is a work of interpreting the phenomena in terms which have meaning only for self-conscious and self-determining beings, such as human beings have somehow come to be.

But back of all this work of science lies the fundamental and—so far as it is possible to conceive of the subject at all—the unchangeable nature of the human mind as evinced by the so-called categories, and by the principles of mental procedure as pure logic and pure mathematics reveal those principles in terms of these sciences. The very nature of all knowledge, of knowledge as such, is a species of personifying. It is an attribution to Things of activities and relations, the complete nature and significance of which are known only in terms of the conscious recognition of the experience of the Self. All knowing is interpretation; and all interpretation must come down at the last upon the bed-rock laid by Nature in the

nature of the interpreter. The interpreter is the self-conscious and self-determining mind of man. The postulate, then, which saves all this work of interpretation, which is called "science," from the yawning gulf of scepticism, is the assumption that the faith of reason in itself is grounded in a rational Universe. The rationality of Reality becomes in this way, at the same time the postulate, and also the more and more intelligently conceived and irrevocably fixed conclusion, of all human knowledge; because it is both discovered by a critical theory of cognition and also demonstrated by all the scientific progress of all the particular sciences.

Such a view explains the remarkable parity which history shows between the religious and the scientific development of the race. Religion *is* not science, whatever one may choose to contend about the possibility of a science of religion. Neither is science, or scientific development alone, sufficient to originate or develope the religious experience. Indeed, this experience comes more largely and surely out of the ethical and æsthetical sentiments, beliefs, and ideals, as they are operative and co-operative in human society. Here also,—and, perhaps, here as nowhere else—great reformers and geniuses have given to the race the supremely important uplift to its spiritual life in the religious domain. But both religious belief and scientific acquisition have had this important thing in common; they have both tended more and more toward confidence in the essential Unity of the World, in the Oneness of the Source of the Inspiration, and of the Order, of all things and all selves, in spite of many seeming discrepancies, gaps, faults in the process, and even contradictions.

Many of the same influences have operated upon both science and religion to compel them to their respective forms of faith regarding this conception of "unity" as applied to the Being of the World. But especially true has it been in the most recent times that the particular sciences have forced this conception upon religion in a somewhat startlingly new form.

The invisible and superhuman agency in which religion believes, be it one in complete harmony with Itself or be it divided between two or more different, if not contentious sources, has a much bigger and more complex sphere to fill and to control than ever before. The philosophy of religion is therefore compelled to conceive of its Object in a far grander and more inclusive and magnanimous way. But on the other hand, since it is the religious consciousness in which all the various ethical and aesthetical, and so the social and practical, demands of the human spirit mingle and culminate; religion has the right to expect of the particular sciences their support for a spiritual interpretation of the universe. Only by a harmony between the principles of science and the faiths of religion can the one nature of man be most fully expressed and satisfied. Only in this way can the Oneness of the Universal Nature, whose child man is, be most satisfactorily expressed and completely understood.

The various lower species of religion, such as spiritism in the form of Shamanism or in any of its other varied forms; or such as all the different polytheisms; or such as the higher species of Nature-worship, when it has partially escaped the degradation of spiritism and polytheism; or as Ancestor-worship in its ethically nobler beliefs and practices;—these are all doomed by the very nature of the intellectual progress of the race to give way before a spiritual Monotheism. That the Divine Being of the world must be conceived of, worshipped, and obeyed, as One, is as inevitable as is the growing certainty of the spiritual unity of the race; and of the Unity in Reality of all things and selves in this world. Neither of these assumed unities can as yet be said to be a demonstrated truth, after the pattern of mathematics and the more exact of the empirical sciences. Perhaps, from the very nature of the case, neither of them, as they enter into the faith of religion and into the kindred faith of science, ever will receive a demonstration of the kind which Kant called *apodeictic*;

and which certain kinds of agnosticism require as a basis for knowledge. But the conviction that they are true is gaining evidence from the growth of every kind of human knowledge.

It is, however, in the sentiments, conceptions, and ideals of æsthetical, but above all, of ethical consciousness (in the large meaning of the word ethical) that a spiritual Monism finds both its source, and its guarantee, as well as its motives for practical efficiency. For it is an historical fact that all the greater religions, and especially among them all, the Christian religion, have come to regard the world-system of things and selves, when considered from the point of view of reflective thinking, as the manifestation of One perfect, indwelling Ethical Spirit.

How this conclusion of the more highly developed religious experience of the race has come about, it is not our purpose at present to examine. Indeed, the examination belongs to the study of comparative religion, in its historical processes, rather than to systematic philosophy. But a brief survey of the experience, in which the beliefs, sentiments and practical activities of religion have their origin and justification is necessary to lay the psychological basis for any valid philosophy of religion.

Beginning with that which is most obscure and lowest, but not least powerful, we note certain impulsive and more purely emotional sources of religious experience. These obscure impulses and feelings do not afford conscious reasons or intellectual justifications for religious belief; but they operate none the less powerfully for all that. In this respect they are not unlike all the more basic and definitely psycho-physical functions of the Self, both as an organism and as a conscious mind. Of late, the phenomena of religious experience, when studied from the biological and economic points of view, have been thought to show in a marked degree the influence of the "instinct of self-preservation," so-called. This motive, so far as it exists at all and is effective in human religious experi-

ence, is almost as complex and ill-defined an affair as is Schopenhauer's "will to live." But both terms—"the instinct of preservation" and "the will to live"—may, conveniently enough and with considerable propriety, be used to cover a group of subtle and powerful psychical influences which compel man to the beliefs and practices of religion. The desire and the experienced need of protecting and cherishing the interests of a complex life is much greater and more intense in the case of man than in that of any of the lower animals. And as man more and more realizes his true Self, and so feels in an enlarged manner the natural impulse to protect it, and to employ "the will to live" in the interests of the higher life, these impulses blossom into the more intelligent and self-conscious form of a search for, and an increased evaluation of, the religious as well as the ethical and æsthetical ideals. Thus religion springs and develops perennially out of the desire of man to "better himself." It is this "sense of unrest, the ceaseless longing for something else" (and better) "which is the general source of all desires and wishes," and "also the source of all endeavor and all progress," in which some writers find the most primary and powerful impulse to religion. It was a suggestive saying of Humboldt: "All religion rests on a need of the soul; we hope, we dread, because we wish." And the insatiable nature of human cravings, when once the mind and will of man have been roused to effort at attaining a full satisfaction for themselves, is undoubtedly an exhaustless source of the religious life. There is, without doubt, quite truth enough in the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann to make it sure that *such* cravings can never be satisfied simply by improving the economic resources and utilitarian conditions of the race.

No candid student of the phenomena of religious experience is now ready to accept as wholly true the ancient saying (attributed to Petronius): "Fear first made the gods." But the emotion of fear is, especially in the earlier and wider forms

of man's evolution of religion, an effective impulse. No other being has so many justifiable fears as has man; for no other has such a variety of interests which he knows to be subject momently to dangers from many sources. For the savage or unscientific man, the sources of most of these fears are largely unknown or wholly mysterious; for all men, they are either difficult of their own control, or even beyond all possibility of human control. Being unseen, they are of necessity attributed to spiritual agencies; for even when it is poisonous serpents, or violent winds, or tidal waves and volcanic eruptions, it is the spirit which is in the visible phenomena that accomplishes the harm. For the same reason, attacks from zymotic diseases, or those due to mal-nutrition, especially if they assume a pestilential form, are most naturally ascribed to gods who are, for some wholly unknown or half-suspected reason, angry with men. With these dreaded invisible and spiritual agencies, therefore, man must keep on good terms, if he would live happily or even live at all.

But as said Spinoza: "There is no hope without fear, as there is no fear without hope." And if the gods or devils can be propitiated, then hope may take the place of fear. What is more significant and promising, however, on the side of hope, is the fact that genuine social feelings of the kindlier type may reasonably be cherished as between the invisible super-human spirits and the spirit of man. In very ancient times, and in many widely separated countries, these kindly social feelings between gods and men have been expressed and cultivated by the communal feast, and in other ways. In these social feelings Pfleiderer finds the most potent emotional factors of Aryan religion. Many of the most ancient of the Vedic hymns express these feelings in no doubtful manner. In Japan to-day the deified ancestor is bound religiously to his living descendants by bonds of sentiment that are distinguished chiefly by reverence and affection rather than fear. The dreaded cobra in India, the rattlesnake among certain

tribes of the Redskins, the hideous idol among the Mexicans, and the ragged and dirty puppet among the Christians of Southern Europe, may represent that side of the divine being which awakens the kindlier domestic and social emotions.

Of the more intellectual of the impulses in which religion finds the psychological causes of its origin and development, the chief is that curiosity to know, which is associated so inseparably with the feeling of dependence. We certainly cannot attribute man's chief interest in religion, as von Hartmann does, to a "disinterested observation of the heavenly phenomena and of their relations to earthly conditions." Yet something is to be said in favor of those writers who oppose to the derivation of religion from feeling alone, the counter statement that intellectual curiosity, with its accompaniment of naïve and instinctive metaphysics, is the very core and spring of man's personality, so far as his religious life is concerned. "In all stages of civilization," says one of these writers, "among all races of mankind, religious emotions are always aroused by the same inward impulse, the necessity for discerning a cause or author for every phenomenon or event." To place the intellectual before the emotional in this way may be a reversal of the order of nature; but on the other hand, without the influence of intellectual curiosity and the spontaneous and naïve positing of realities to act as causes in accounting for the changes in the phenomena experienced, not even the lowest form of religion known as a vague and unreflecting Spiritism could ever have arisen. Two considerations should be borne in mind in order to a better understanding of this subject. The human mind is to itself a mysterious being living in the midst of a mysterious environment. It is dependent for the realization of its interests upon the character of its reactions to this environment. In order to react aright it must know both itself and its environment. There is therefore every reason in man's dependence upon nature to stimulate his curiosity respecting its invisible and superhuman agencies. In the case of

primitive or savage man this reason is greatly exaggerated by the fact that he has little or no conception of nature such as modern science cherishes, as an orderly system of interacting causes under the principles of continuity and uniformity. All the more reason, then, why he should believe in the causal action of the invisible and superhuman, and should seek to discover and interpret to his profit the modes of their operation.

"It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the intellectual curiosity of even the savage or primitive man is limited to those events which he has reason most to hope for or to dread. A belief in creator gods, and the mixture of cosmogonic myths and theories with religious beliefs and stories of the invisible powers or supernal deities, are found very low down, if not universally existent, in the religions of mankind.

"All these impulsive and emotional sources of religion, when considered as co-operative, and even when supplemented by any number of similar sources, will not suffice to account for the *nature* of the object of religious belief; nor, indeed, do they tell us *why* any such object is *in fact* posited by the mind of man. Impulses and emotional disturbances do not of themselves furnish the ideas of the religious experience; much less do they create the ideals of the higher forms of this experience. Such stimuli can only incite and prompt imagination and thought to do this work of creation. In a word, it is reason that must construct the Object of religious faith; and this act of construction must be based upon, and supported constantly by, the faith of reason in its power to reach Reality. We turn, therefore, to the study of the religious consciousness of man as rational and free,—as the experience of a self-conscious and self-determining mind."

The confessedly vague terms, rational and rationality, with so much of freedom, and of the intellectual and emotional attitudes toward scientific, moral, and æsthetical ideals, as they properly include, have already been defined with sufficient

detail and clearness for our present purpose. In respect of those sources of religion which have already been recognized, man differs in no essential respect, but only in variety and degree, from the lower animals. The fundamental and permanent difference has relation to the Object of his religious belief. The complex and lofty conception which becomes the goal and determines the course of man's religious experience cannot by any possibility get itself constructed within the consciousness of the lower animals. The reason for the failure of any species of the lower animals to be religious, as all men are religious, is then chiefly their lack of those rational activities which are necessary in order to make objective the grounds of the religious impulses and emotions. Only a *human* intellect and imagination could frame the conception of real but *super-human* spirits; only a human conscience could locate the moral quality of conduct in relations of obligation and approbation (or their opposites) to these spirits; only human aesthetical and ethical sentiments and ideals, keeping pace with the growth of intellect and imagination, could develop that ideal of a perfect Ethical Spirit which is the culminating product of man's religious progress. In a word, only a Self, such as the human being is, but the lower animal is not, could achieve the religious attitude toward an infinite and absolute and morally perfect Other Self. This attitude, when made rational, is the crowning achievement of humanity under the Divine Self-Revelation.

The metaphysical postulate which underlies and makes valid all man's rational activities is the *reality of the object*, in the cognitive judgment about which these activities terminate. This is as true in the sphere of religious experience as it is in all forms of complex human experience. As Kant points out, the *nervus probandi* of all the so-called arguments for the Being of God is the "ontological argument." But this is equally true of all kinds of argument, without distinction in the subjects about which the proof is sought and assumed to

be found. The major premise, or assumption based upon the faith of human reason in itself, which underlies and supports all the conclusions with regard to the nature, the doings, and the relations of both things and selves, may therefore be stated in some such way as the following: "What is so connected with our experience of reality as that it is essential to explain this experience satisfactorily, is itself believed to be real." This assumption of man's "ontological consciousness," of his metaphysics whether naïve or scientific, is the bed-rock which underlies all the pathways along which the human mind makes its excursions into the Being of the World.

The false opinions, mistakes, and superstitions, which so cloud and pervert the judgments of savage and primitive man, and which linger on to the restriction and distorting of the religious creeds, institutions, and practices of the most enlightened nations, are not essentially—that is, logically or metaphysically—different from the same workings of ontological consciousness in all other spheres. Religion has no monopoly of prejudice, error, and practical folly. The pathway along which the most exact sciences have moved to higher stages of evolution is strewn with the same kind of mental débris and wreckage. It is largely by correcting their mistakes that both religion and science rise to higher stages of knowledge and successful endeavor. Nor are the spirit in which, and the motives from which, they undertake their different tasks, altogether different.

This procedure of the ontological consciousness in religion is perfectly natural; instead of being irrational, it is of the very essence of reason itself. It is precisely similar to the procedure of science in every form of its vast productivity and wonderful development, down to the present time. The invisible superhuman spirits are as necessary to the savage, in order to explain his experience, as the invisible atoms, or radioactive molecules, are necessary to explain the experience of the modern chemist or physicist. Who shall say with an entire

confidence, as yet, that the one assumption is not as rational as the other? Or, better: May not both ways of looking at Reality be sometime subsumed under some larger conception of the World's Unity?

"It appears, then, that religious belief, for its form and development, and indeed for its very existence, can never be rendered independent of metaphysics. All religious experience implies an irresistible conviction of a commerce with Reality; it cannot arise without either a naïve and instinctive, or a disciplined and systematic exercise of the ontological consciousness. The cultivation of the so-called ontological consciousness has, therefore, an important influence on the religious evolution of humanity. In fact, the rational culture of any race, or epoch, has invariably been marked by schools of religious philosophy and of theology; and these schools have profoundly influenced the religions of the time;—first of all, through the thoughtful few of the existing generation, and then through the large multitude of the less thoughtful and of the succeeding generations. In India, every important school of metaphysical philosophy was early represented; and every school has left its traces on the religious beliefs and practices of the people of India down to the present time. Everywhere, though not to the same extent, the influence of the great metaphysical thinkers of the race has continued over the religious beliefs, sentiments, and practices of the succeeding ages, in a most powerful way. The metaphysical speculations of the Eleatics and of the Sceptics influenced the religions of the Greek world; Plato and Aristotle powerfully moulded the religious experience of the Middle Ages.

"In vain are men exhorted to be satisfied with saying the same prayers and singing the same sacred songs; they continue to divide and subdivide their religions on ontological grounds. The importance of subtle and minute metaphysical distinctions in religious opinion is, indeed, often overestimated; the failure to recognize what is common to all, and to exercise charity with

respect to differences of belief, has doubtless resulted in much loss to the religious life as an essentially spiritual and practical affair. But the history of man's religious development confirms what the psychology of the religious experience enables us the better to understand;—namely, that the Object of religious faith and worship must ever be regarded as something about whose real Being man must unceasingly strive to know. A proposed belief in *mere phenomena* as divine, has about it characteristics so disturbing, that even its temporary holding tends to provoke the laughter with which our mind greets the discovery that the ghost which has awakened its fears is only, after all, existent in its own eye. It is never, then, any particular system of metaphysics which is the most dangerous opponent of religious faith. It is, the rather, the denial of all possible trustworthiness in religion to man's ontological consciousness. The fundamental error of dogmatic or sceptical agnosticism, we have seen to be the assumption that the so-called categories, or constitutional forms of human cognition, are inescapable limitations, if not the fruitful sources of illusion, for all human attempts at a knowledge of Reality. Thus the grand result of the cosmic processes which terminate in man is a being whose crowning glory is to be the discoverer, critic, and self-convicted dupe, of his own rational nature. In a word, the claim to be rational stands self-condemned, as inherently self-contradictory and irrational.

“This belief in reality, as it extends to the peculiarly religious forms of belief, and has its genesis—so the theory of knowledge has taught us—in the experience of a self-active will opposed by, and in commerce with, other wills, cannot of itself give form or rational content to the conception of the Object of religious faith. It is the activity of man's imagination and intellect which accomplishes this. It is by the combination of these so-called faculties of the mind that the objects of all forms of religious belief and worship are more definitely shaped.”

As in all kinds of human experience which are influenced by ideals, so above all in religion, the function of Imagination is of primary and pre-eminent importance. This is true even when there is included under the term both the lighter and more illogical play of fancy, and also the more serious logical work of the creative imagination, as the latter is controlled by a stricter regard for the undoubted facts of experience and for the confessed limitations of human understanding. Indeed, no fixed line can be drawn between the two;—whether regard is had chiefly to distinctions in the mental activity involved, or to distinctions in the characteristics of the products resulting.

In the same stages of civilization, therefore, we find the grotesque and grawsome divinities of unrestrained fancy and the “creator gods,” or “heavenly powers,” whose mental representation requires the higher and more strenuous activities of imagination, existing side by side in the popular belief. The former are, indeed, the more popular and more sought after in the daily life of the average man. This is not so much because the worshippers are deficient in intellectual power to know better, as because the lesser divinities are of more utilitarian value and more intimate and constant concern. To know what devil or protecting deity can inflict or cure small-pox, or can help one kill his enemy or succeed in adultery and theft, is more immediately important than to know what kind of a god created the heavens and the earth. In the civilization of ancient Greece, where both intellect and imagination attained the power to achieve much which has never been surpassed, an almost aesthetically perfect mythology existed cotemporaneously with an elaborate religious philosophy. Plato regards the gods of mythology as creatures of imagination; and Aristotle thinks that most of the state religion is myth, due to anthropomorphic representations and justified only by political motives. But neither Plato, nor Aristotle, nor any modern thinker, can cultivate either sci-

ence, or philosophy, or religion, without trusting to the power of human imagination in its claim to represent the realities immediately known or indirectly implicated in human cognitive experience. If the self-conscious and self-determining mind were not endowed with creative imagination it could neither picture the Being of the World as science conceives of It, nor construct the image of God as monotheistic religion believes in Him.

It has been customary in certain quarters to speak of pure imagination with a certain tone of contempt; and, on the contrary, to praise the purity of freedom from imagination, of the intellectual processes of modern science. No such purity, however, can possibly exist in the functions of either of these two allied and co-operative forms of man's cognitive faculty. The creative imagination, which is the highest and most important activity of the human mind in representing to itself the truths of reality, becomes relatively pure, only when it is freed from the limitations of concrete facts and particular examples, in order to depict general types or universal laws and principles. It is to the attaining of such freedom that the highest efforts of science are chiefly directed. But in attaining this kind of purity, the imagination stands in constant and special need of those intellectual processes which first secure a collection of accurately observed facts; and then require the exercise of caution and sanity and skill in the experimental testing of facts and in their logical arrangement and concatenation. Representation demands the purification of its products by thought; in order that either knowledge or a rational belief may be attained by the mind. For, on the one hand, the real world is not a heterogeneous assemblage or unordered series of occurrences and existences, to be taken note of as *mere* facts; it is the rather, a construction in which ideas, and ideals, of law, order, and harmony, take a conspicuous part. It requires, therefore, the creative imagination of the observer, in order to apprehend and reconstruct it as it really is. But, on

the other hand, this creative activity of imagination must freely and joyfully limit itself by intelligence touching the real beings, and natural occurrences and relations, of this same world.

This relation of mutual assistance between imagination and thought is as true for religion as it is for science. Indeed, religion stands in special need of a process of separation and purification for the work which it calls upon the creative imagination to perform; and the chief reasons for this need are the following two: Its primary beliefs are essentially of the *in-visible*, the *non-sensible*, the somehow *super-human*, the Self that is *other* than myself. Moreover, the practical and emotional interests to which the work of the religious imagination is committed are so immediate and pressing as the more easily to override the considerations upon which the scientific development of man lays such peculiar emphasis. Superstitious beliefs, born of unworthy and irrational hopes and fears and desires, have never been confined to religion. But, in religion, on account of its very nature, they have been most potent and difficult to modify or to remove. Hence, the necessity, but also the embarrassment and the delicacy, of the task of improving the work of imagination in the construction of an Object of religious belief which shall worthily fit in with the system of human experience, rationally regarded and, as far as possible, scientifically explained.

“An essential part, therefore, of the thought-factor in man’s religious life and development, consists in the application, to the Object of faith, of the psychological laws which control the explanation of all classes of experience. It scarcely need be said again that these laws always apply in the religious domain, in close and inseparable union with the beliefs of ontological consciousness. Experience must be explained—whether religious or otherwise—in accordance with the conceptions and laws of ‘efficient cause’ and of ‘final purpose.’ For man knows himself as a will, self-determining in his pur-

pose to realize ends; and he has no other way of constituting the being, or explaining the behavior, of the world of existences outside himself, except that offered by the analogy of this knowledge of himself. Efficient causes, behaving according to ideas of order and consistency in the realization of ends, must be invoked to explain the world anthropomorphically (and such is man's only way of explanation), whether they are located in big things, or in little atoms, in mere things, or in men, or in the gods. All kinds of real beings, that seem to afford help in the explanation, are necessarily thought of, if thought of at all, under the conceptions and terms furnished by the same psychological laws.

"It is, however, the business of intellect to criticize the process of anthropomorphizing, to prune it unceasingly and unsparingly, and to force it without fear or favor, constantly to readjust itself to the growing experience of the race. This is not best done, either by relinquishing all hope of knowledge of Reality, that it is and what it is, or by giving free rein to fancy in religion, under the false and fatal impression that science and religion may remain at peace with each other while retaining, not merely different but even conflicting and contradictory, views of the one world. This world is man's world; and the self-conscious and self-determining mind of man cannot remain in conflict with itself, whether as respects its intellectual or its practical interests. This same mind, therefore, acting as a creative imagination and as an intellect that seeks, under the psychological laws which all attempts to extend the sphere of human knowledge must perforce obey, to understand the grounds of its own experience;—this same mind constructs the Object of religious belief and worship.

"But the uplift of higher forms of feeling than those which have already been examined must be recognized, and their influence and value to convey the truth about the Being of the World must be duly estimated, before it is possible to ac-

count for the important religious truth that this Object finally attains the shape of an ethical and æsthetical Ideal. For it is in fact these higher forms of feeling under whose impulse and guidance man comes to believe in and to worship One perfect Ethical Spirit as the true and Alone God.

"At this point we must of course refer back to our analysis of the ethical and æsthetical sentiments and judgments, and to our estimate of their value in contributing to the race's stock of knowledge respecting the constitution and meaning of the system of things and selves; and also to the history of the race's religious experience, which shows how the Ideal of religion, to which reference has just been made, has actually been achieved by a process of development."

Beginning with æsthetical sentiments, we note how the feeling for the sublime, and its natural accompaniment of a sense of awe, mystery, admiration and the "painfully-pleasurable sense" of helplessness and dependence, is one of the most fruitful sources of religious belief and worship. This is, indeed, primarily the logic of feeling; but it is the logic of thought as well. The grandeur of beauty in Nature suggests and seems to prove to the appreciative spirit of man, a grandly beautiful Spirit as immanent in, and manifesting itself through, natural existences, forces, forms, and relations. All the other forms of æsthetical feeling, which are awakened by different kinds of beauty, may also be awakened and cultivated in the interests of religion. They are all, moreover, capable of almost unlimited development. For, in the language of Kant, we seem here to be dealing with a spiritual faculty, "which surpasses every standard of sense." And in this field the creative imagination feels justified in stretching its efforts beyond all the limitations which the more prosaic, mechanical, and matter-of-fact observations of natural structures and processes impose. Yet here again there is a certain parity between the conception awakened in the religious consciousness

and those with which the chemico-physical sciences are familiar enough. The common ground of their meeting is in the æsthetical nature of man.

The moral sentiments and judgments are even more powerful in their influence over religious belief, and over the mental attitudes and practices with reference to the invisible, super-human agency, in which the essence of man's religious experience is to be found. In the broader, but more appropriate meaning of both terms, it is not true that the ethical and the religious have ever been divorced. Both negatively and positively, the lowest forms of religious faith and practice to which the history of the race bears witness, have invariably had something—and, indeed, much—to say as to what is proper in conduct and in character. Not all *tabu* has a definitely moral significance. But in the case of primitive and savage man, the line between "better-not," because you are likely to be hurt, and "must-not," because you "ought-not," is never very strictly drawn. In general, religious ceremonial incorporates both these forms of the *tabu*. The same moral significance attaches itself to what has been called the religious act of "expropriation"—or the devotion to the gods of something which has value for the offerer. On the positive side, all religions enforce with the moral feeling of obligation, as well as with the inferior motive of fear, the various forms of gift, prayer, sacrament, rites and religious austerities.

When the Divine Being is conceived of as a sort of moral unity, whether in the impersonal form of the Hindu Atman or World-Soul, or in the yet more impersonal and vague form of the earliest Buddhistic conception of Karma, or as God, the Absolute Ethical Spirit, perfectly good, just, and holy; then all morality—and not some particular species of conduct merely—comes to be viewed as obedience to the Divine will. The height of the ethico-religious consciousness is reached when wrong-doing in general is regarded as a breach of the right relations between man and God; and when right-doing

is regarded as the acceptable service of God, with fidelity and ethical love as its supreme motive. Thus there comes about such a fusion of the springs of morality and religion, that the whole life of conduct flows forth, strong, pure, and spontaneous, as from one divinely inexhaustible source. With religion God is now conceived of, and thought about, as an essentially perfect Ethical Spirit. The world then becomes regarded as a theatre for the manifestation of the divine purposes toward God's spiritual creation.

Most fundamental and important of all the forms of man's religious experience is the attitude which the human Self, as self-determining, assumes to the invisible and super-human Other Self; or to say the same thing in more familiar terms, the attitude of man's will toward the Object of his religious faith. The conditions and limitations of "moral freedom" in the religious sphere do not, indeed, differ essentially from those which have already been pointed out (p. 303f.) as belonging to the entire life of man in his present physical and social development. Freedom such as this is no attribute to be located definitively and exclusively in some one so-called faculty of *Will*. It is the achievement of the active, self-determining Self, involving the motives which originate in all its higher sentiments and aspirations, as well as in its lower impulses; and engaging all the various forms of its mental functioning. Were man not active in thinking, imagining, and feeling, he would not be free; but then neither would he be religious. Especially is the fact to be insisted upon in this connection that moral freedom is no ready-made attribute, or absolute and unconditional endowment of human nature. It is a matter of indefinite variety of degrees; and it is always a subject of development. It is, however, in the adjusting of himself, by a more or less deliberate choice, to the Object of religious belief that man's freedom makes the culminating manifestation of its essential excellence and likeness to this Object. In its highest form, such an act is properly to be

described as a voluntary adjustment of the finite spirit to that Infinite Spirit, whom faith calls God.

The importance of the relation which the development of human freedom in the religious sphere sustains to the value-judgments can scarcely be overestimated. On the one hand, in the formation of these value-judgments man exercises his volition by deciding what shall have value, as judged to be of superior or supreme worth. For the judgment itself is not by any means a passive affair; it is, the rather, itself an activity involving the self-determining mind—a voluntary commitment of the Self to a mental attitude of preference. But on the other hand, the character of the value-judgment thus preferred, itself reacts to assist or to hinder the development of a higher condition of freedom. Choices of the more spiritual values, when often repeated in the religious consciousness, set the will free from the influence of the morally inferior impressions and solicitations. In the lower stages of man's religious life we note this competition between different kinds of good;—between the sensuous valuables to which the will is compelled by appetite, passion and desire, and the spiritual values which religion, in its higher stages of the activity of intellect and imagination, presents as rivals to these sensuous impressions. And the man is called to choose between the two. This choice it is which seems to religion as a choice between the flesh and the spirit; or between the world and God; or between human favor and the divine approval; or, finally, between a widening separation from the source of all spiritual life and its voluntary acceptance as the indwelling and welcomed source of the true and highest life.

In this way the exercise of moral freedom in the life of religion emphasizes the self-determining attitude of the human being toward the Divine Being. And the kind of self-control which the highest development of religion demands is the ability of the human will to respond to the Divine Will. Where this Being is regarded only as a motley and conflicting

host of invisible superhuman powers, there is, of course, no freedom to worship a God who is conceived of as perfect Ethical Spirit and to serve his cause with fidelity and ethical love. Where the conception of the Object of religious faith is thus split up, as it were, and involves so heterogeneous and contending elements, the allegiance of head and heart and life cannot freely go forth toward this object. The possibility of the highest kind of freedom in religion depends, then, upon the possibility of attaining and justifying a truly spiritual Ideal which shall harmonize all the interests of both the intellect and the æsthetical and ethical sentiments. But this possibility itself can be effectively realized only in the form of a choice. Only that form of religious belief, therefore, whose conception of God is that of an Ideal which satisfies the religious needs, and which calls forth and fixes upon itself the most profound and influential choices of the human soul, can fully develope the potentiality of freedom that lies hidden in the soul's depths.

There are two extreme views which stand equally opposed to the true view of the relation in which the freedom of man stands to the genesis and development of his religious experience. One of them exaggerates the independence and creative activity of the finite will. The practical conclusion may then follow that man has no need of divine help, and even that "all religious ideals and systems are childish illusion, utterly incompatible with right reason and rational ethics." On the contrary, the other extreme view so relates the finite will to the Absolute Will, the human being to the Divine Being, that the former realizes the good of religion only by being merged and utterly lost in the latter. Man is then no longer a rational and free Self when he attains the end of religion; man is swallowed up in God. The problem of the relation of man's nature, as self-conscious and self-determining mind, to the Infinite Spirit whom religion believes to be manifested in that Nature whose child man surely is, affords, indeed, the most

insolvable of all puzzles to the philosophy of religion. But it is certain that neither of these extreme views opens up the prospect of its solution in a way to correspond with the facts, or to answer the demand for satisfaction of the religious experience and the religious evolution of the race.

It has been customary to discredit the conclusions, both those more naïve and those more elaborate and reflective, of the religious experience, by pointing out that it all ends in "a man-made God." This impeachment must certainly be allowed to be true. But if there has been any general conclusion established by the entire course of our reflective thinking, it is this: the world as man knows it is, of necessity, in the same meaning of the term, "a man-made world." But then this same world made man to know itself in this way; how else could a "world-made man" know the world than as a "man-made world"? The origin and development of all the religions of the human race is characterized by this confidence that the invisible spirits which are objects of faith, although superhuman, are rightly to be conceived of as bearing the image of the human. So then, religious philosophy, when complained of for making God in the image of man, feels itself justified in replying that, in truth, this is because man has been made by God in the image of God. Here is without doubt, for both science and religion, a circle in the argument from which there is no possible escape. The trustworthiness of this circular argument, which begins with the faith of reason in itself and ends with an ever-increasing, because an increasingly rational faith, is the path which man is compelled to take in all his progress toward the superior heights of knowledge. This making of man in the divine image is a development, a process in history. Man makes God in man's image; because God has made man in the divine image. Man, as he becomes more fully man, more of a rational and free personality, more worthily and truly conceives of God; but this is because God is himself making man more and more like God.

A detailed study of the ways in which this process of the religious development of the race is going on would require a careful survey of all human history. For history shows that this development has always been most intimately related with every other form of man's development. Man's economic, industrial, political, scientific, moral, and artistic, progress has everywhere and at all times been interdependently related to his religious progress. Nor have there been lacking numerous important interactions between religious beliefs and practices and the physical environment. Especially has philosophy, or the products of reflective thinking, most powerfully affected the forms given to the Object of religious faith; and this result has very naturally been most marked in the higher and purer forms of this faith. The more profoundly man thinks, and the nobler his sentiments, the more reasonable and inspiring must be the conception to which this Object corresponds.

We see, then, that religion is no adventitious and insignificant affair in the life and the development, of either the individual or the race. It springs perennially from the entire nature of the man. It is ministered to by the entire Nature which constitutes his environment. In its historical evolution, it is intimately related to every other human interest; and it furnishes powerful reactions upon them all.

CHAPTER XXI

THE WORLD-GROUND AS ABSOLUTE PERSON

THE varied conceptions of those invisible superhuman spirits which have been at different times the objects of men's religious faith may be subjected to historical examination. The developments which these conceptions have undergone, and the form which the one conception has taken that represents the highest achievement of reflective thinking upon the basis of religious experience, may be studied in the same way. This historical research is the work of comparative religion. It results in showing how two groups of factors have been chiefly influential in bringing about the present state of religion in the world. There are, first, the factors which have made for the unifying of the Object of religious faith, as the essential unity of the World, when viewed both from the scientific and from the social points of standing, has become better established. Some kind of a Unitary Being must, then, be substituted for the many invisible, superhuman beings believed in by savage or primitive man. One Alone God displaces in the faith of mankind, the gods many and of varied, if not conflicting interests. And, second, the changing conceptions of the nature and laws of the development of personal life have most profoundly influenced the very structure of the Object whom religion believes in and worships. In the higher forms of constructive religious thinking,—especially in the theology of modern Christianity,—the Object of religious faith is God as personal and perfect Ethical Spirit.

The data of man's religious consciousness, when presented in their sources by comparative psychology and in their development by comparative history, propose to philosophy its most

profoundly difficult and practically important problems. These are the problems of God as personal and ethically perfect Spirit; and the problem of the relations in which man, as personal and finite and ethically imperfect spirit, stands to God. Thrown into the form of questions, these problems may be stated somewhat as follows: How shall the Being of the World be so conceived of, as at the same time to comply with all that is known by the particular sciences, physical and psychological or moral, and also to satisfy the demands of religious experience? And again, how shall the relations of man, both individual and social, to this Being of the World be so conceived of as to conserve and secure, in accordance with the truths of fact, man's own social integrity and practical interests? These two problems are interdependently related. The attempt at a brief and confessedly fragmentary but critical discussion of them will be made in the following two chapters.

Thus far a number of vague and somewhat uncouth terms have been employed to embody for the time being the factors which have been selected in order to form the most comprehensive and reasonable conception of that Reality which is manifested in all the phenomena of nature and of human life. Among such terms have been "The Being of the World," "The World-Ground," or "Nature in the large," "The Universe," etc. As long as these metaphysical terms served only the interests of a generalization made for, and confined to, the purposes of the natural and physical sciences, the attitude of mind and life assumed toward them appeared to be of little practical importance. Indifferentism in the form of Syncretism, Scepticism, and Agnosticism, in the metaphysical sphere make comparatively little practical difference with the growth and usefulness for human betterment of these sciences. But the moment the border is crossed into the philosophy of the ideal, into the metaphysics of values, the case remains by no means the same. Whether morality, art, and religion, are really grounded in, and of interest to, the Being of the World, makes

a great deal of difference with man's interest in morality, art, and religion; and as well, with his practice in all these fields of aspiration and endeavor. Especially is this true of religion. For the relation which is sustained by the way in which the race conceives of God to the entire development of the race, and especially to the solution of the problem proposed to philosophy by the religious experience of the race, is an indissoluble and essentially unchanging relation. Sincere and thorough indifferentism, or scepticism, or agnosticism on the part of men generally,—were either of these possible—would at once effect the negation of the religious ideal; it would in time destroy the religious experience of mankind.

It is of primary importance in subjecting the postulate of religious faith to a critical examination, that there should be some agreement as to the kind of evidence which this postulate can rightfully be expected to offer. On this subject there are two views standing at opposite extremes, both of which must be rejected. The claim of the individual religious devotee to have an indubitable "vision of God"—whether more purely subjective or seemingly objective, and whether psychology pronounces the experience to be only half-illusion, or pure hallucination—cannot be offered to reflective thinking as conclusive evidence for the conception which religion holds as to the Being of the World. In its more rational form the claim to have an intuitive knowledge of God becomes the theory affirming what is known as a "God-consciousness" in all men. If by this it is meant that man has the power to make an immediate seizure, so to say, of the Object of religious faith, as we envisage the Self in self-consciousness or the something not-self in sense-perception, then the claim is psychologically indefensible. There is important truth, however, touching the origin and nature of the fundamental conception of all religion, in the evidence which is customarily offered by the advocates of this view. What we do really find in the religious consciousness of the race is a spontaneous interpretation of

experience both internal and external, both of things and of selves, as due to other spiritual existences;—with its accompaniment of confidence in the ontological value of the interpretation. This process is indeed the ever-developing source of the knowledge of God.

"By an easy and almost inevitable transition the claim to have an intuitive knowledge of the reality and attributes of Divine Being passes over into the claim to have demonstrative, or what Kant called apodeictic, proof on these matters. It has for centuries been the ideal of philosophy and theology, by a process of reasoning which shall start from an absolutely indisputable major premise, and which shall proceed by equally indisputable steps, to establish deductively the conclusion that God is, and—at least in some degree, as to what God is. The author of the critical philosophy, on the contrary, supposed himself to have demonstrated once for all the illogical character of all the existing proofs of the reality of God; and to have shown in an *a priori* way that the very nature of man's cognitive faculty makes any real knowledge of God impossible. But like other *demonstrations* which were to settle for all time the limits of metaphysics as ontology, this one has been quite persistently disputed both by those who believe—as Kant himself did—in God, and also by those who are either agnostic or sceptical toward the conception."

Between the extreme of confidence in either an immediate intuition or an unanswerable demonstration of the reality of the Object of religious faith and the extreme of agnosticism or despair, the grounds of this faith lie hidden or exposed in the experience of the race. The one inexhaustible source of evidences for the true conception of God is *the experience of the race*. But this experience must be considered in its totality and as subject to development. We may say with Schultz then: "To be certain of the existence of God means, fundamentally considered, to recognize as necessary the religious view of the World." This belief has been in the world of men

for untold centuries; it has already undergone a significant process of development. We are, therefore, not seeking a new vision or an hitherto undiscovered demonstration of the order expected from the genius in so-called *pure mathematics*; we are, the rather, trying to give a rational interpretation to the thoughts and beliefs of the ages, in the form of a Postulate touching the Being of the World. Or in other words, we are raising in a critical but sympathetic way the inquiry whether the *World-Ground may reasonably be conceived of as personal, and as perfect Ethical Spirit.*

In answering this inquiry it is by no means necessary to take an entirely new start. For, indeed, all our previous investigations have furnished more or less of material contributory to the desired answer. It will therefore facilitate further inquiry if we summarize briefly some of the more important points derived from them all. The conclusion from our attempt at a philosophical theory of knowledge need not be referred to again in this connection; since it has reference to all degrees and kinds of knowledge, quite irrespective of the nature of the subjects about which man vaguely aspires or definitely attempts to know. Here, science is as completely bound by limitations as is religious faith.

Recognizing the limitations, and at the same time holding to the faith of reason in itself so long as it is a reasonable faith, the following inferences of a general character may now be taken over into the field of religion. First: All the particular sciences, in their dealing with the specific kinds and relations of real objects, find themselves compelled to assume a certain inherent nature as belonging to these objects, and to the elements of which they are composed. On further examination, this *nature* appears to stand for a characteristic group of habitual actions or tendencies under the control of ideas. But to admit this is virtually to say that all things, and all elements of things, are known to science, and only known, when they are conceived of as more or less self-like.

It may be a startling, but it is a justifiable, way of stating the metaphysical assumption which underlies all human knowledge of physical objects to say that, in order to be known by the person, man, things must be themselves, in reality, possessed of certain personal attributes. Or, in a yet more general way: The laws and forms and tendencies, which control the forces of action and reaction, are strictly analogous to ideas regulating a so-called will. And while the phenomena are manifestations, or appearances (as, indeed, the very word signifies); the will and the ideas manifested are invisible, and of a *quasi-spiritual* quality.

But, second: As the intricate and complex phenomena are more and better comprehended and systematized by the growth of knowledge, especially in terms of modern science, the tendency becomes stronger and more compelling to regard all the seemingly separate kinds of force as variations, or different forms, of one Force; and, in like manner, to consider all the forms, and specific varieties, and varying relations, and interdependent developments, as constituting one System,—a Nature, or Universe, that is somehow one day to be understood as a Unitary Being, in conformity to some supreme idea, or Ideal. That science is far indeed from knowing the world perfectly in this way, and further still from comprehending the Idea which the world's evolution is realizing, must, of course, be admitted without question. Science is, in truth, far enough from knowing any simplest, and seemingly most valueless Thing, or the many ideas which the thing may be following and expressing, in any complete way. There is that which baffles research, in the clod as well as in the star, in the single living cell as well as in the spirit of the artistic or religious genius. In spite of this, however, we must do the best we can; and to all appearances, we are making some substantial gains in our knowldge of what sort of a One World this is, in the midst of which the human race is evolving. But the one Force which science desires to substitute for many

varied and conflicting forces, and the Unitary Being, with its onward march toward the completer realization of some Ideal, serve to bring together all things, and all their transactions, under a conception yet more distinctly that of an invisible and *quasi-spiritual* reality. *The Reality*, the Being of the World, to the faith in which science invites us, is essentially non-sensuous, intellectual, and Self-like, in a far grander way than are the individual self-like things composing the physical system.

Third: It is only, however, when man knows himself that he gets the more imperative impulse, and the fuller insight, toward the knowledge of those characteristics which are essential to the attainment of reality in its realest and supremely valuable form. *His own Self*, man may come to apprehend, in a more immediate and certain way, as not simply self-like when known by another, but as a very true and real Self. The reality of such a self-hood is constituted by the activities of the self-conscious and self-determining mind, the spirit that is in man. Here again,—and in some respects, especially here,—there are many limitations to be acknowledged; there is much extension and correction of hypotheses to be desired; there are many puzzling problems to be solved, and many invincible mysteries to be confessed. And always it must be remembered that this kind of self-realization is a matter of degrees, and a subject of development. At the same time, its reality is not to be questioned; it is no subject for scepticism or agnosticism; and its value cannot be made lower than that which belongs to the standard by which all other values are tested and, as values, estimated and explained.

Such a world as this, then,—a system of self-like things, environing and partially but not wholly, controlling a race of beings that have somehow developed self-conscious and self-determining minds—is *The World* as man knows the world really to be. All its phenomena are necessarily akin to himself; for they are all manifestations of an invisible, and spir-

itual Reality, the highest approach to whose characteristics he recognizes as found in the reality he knows himself to be. Thus far the physical and psychological sciences seem compelled to go toward the personification of the World-Ground, while maintaining their own peculiar points of view.

We cannot, however, rest argument here if we are to afford full satisfaction to human interests, both intellectual and practical, in our conception of the so-called World-Ground, as the Reality whose nature all the phenomena are manifesting in an increasing way. We must, the rather, fourth, receive to our confidence for all which they are worth, the testimony of human ideals. That these ideals, both the moral and the artistic, have powerfully influenced the development of the race in history, there can be no doubt. But this influence has been largely due to the fact that men have believed their ideals to have verity; and also due to the authority which is thus imparted to ideal conceptions of the real Being of the World. Neither the obligations of duty, nor the allurements of beauty, have ever been believed to be wholly subjective. And no theory of evolution has ever explained, or ever can explain, how the moral can arise out of a Nature that is wholly non-moral; or how the æsthetical can emerge from a material Universe that has itself no appreciation of beauty. It is true, as has been admitted in treating of the philosophy of morals and the philosophy of the beautiful, that variations and uncertainties cloud human experience with both these classes of the ideal; and that the conceptions which come to rule for the time being in both, are subject to a continued process of development. It is even more profoundly true that the ideals, if any, which the Being of the World is following in its moral and æsthetical education of the race (if one may be allowed to speak in this way) still remain—and probably, always will remain—much shrouded in impenetrable mystery. None the less, however, the race, and most firmly the best of the race, maintains its confidence in the faith that its own ethical and æsthetical

ideals have their Ground in Reality. But to maintain this confidence is to give to Reality a more distinctly personal character. It is to construct a conception of the World-Ground, on the basis of the belief that It manifests itself *to us*, as a spirit *in us* and akin to what is best and highest of our own.

Now religion, as an individual and practical belief, fastens upon all these indications which point out the real nature of the world; and to satisfy its demands, it proceeds to all the lengths necessary in the process of personification. In its crude, unscientific, and unphilosophical form, and with a spirit divided in its impulses and attractions between the morally and aesthetically good and the morally and aesthetically evil, it creates many invisible and superhuman spirits, of varied and conflicting kinds. But the philosophy of religion aims, here as everywhere, at unity and harmony. It asks: "May we not, in accordance with all we know of the phenomena, conceive of the World-Ground as Absolute Person; may we not even conceive of the World-Ground as the perfection of moral and aesthetical Personal Life?"

On the very threshold of an attempt to examine this problem the inquirer is met by certain *a priori* denials of the possibility of uniting the proposed terms in any one conception. Personality and absoluteness, or infinity, are promptly alleged to be incompatible terms. Equally incompatible are, it is said, all properly personal characterizations—such as self-consciousness, reason, and all moral attributes—with the absoluteness of the World-Ground. The harsher contradictions and graver difficulties which have been introduced into the conception of God as Infinite and Absolute Person are, at least in part removed, when the following three considerations are borne in mind.

"And, first: To identify the Infinite or the Absolute with the unknowable or the unrelated is absurd. To know is to relate, and all knowing is, in respect of one group of its most essential elements or factors, relating activity. Thinking is

relating, and although thinking is not the whole of knowing, knowledge and growth of knowledge are impossible without thought. Moreover, all human knowing is finite; man's knowledge of the infinite and absolute is a very finite and relative kind of knowledge. But to speak of this knowledge as impossible, because the knowing mind is finite; or of absolute knowledge as a contradiction in terms, because knowledge is, essentially considered, relating;—this is so to mistake the very nature of mental life as to render the objection nugatory and ridiculous. This strange psychological fallacy, although it so frequently entraps writers to whom credit must be given for ordinary acquaintance with mental phenomena, scarcely deserves other treatment than a reference to the most elementary psychological principles. Man's cognitive capacity is not to be compared with the capacity of some material vessel; the content of the mind is not to be likened to the contents of a wooden measure." As to The Infinite, the Unknowable, or The Absolute, the Unrelated, we are indeed warranted in affirming: "Such a metaphysical idol we can never, of course, know, for it is cunningly devised after the pattern of what knowledge is not" (Schurman, Belief in God, p. 117).

"But, secondly, the words infinite and absolute as applied to any reality cannot be used with a negative significance *merely*. Absolutely negative conceptions are not conceptions at all. Thinking and imagining cannot be wholly negative performances. Words that have no positive meaning are no true words; they are not in any respect signs or symbols of mental acts. Pre-eminently true is all this of an idea so infinitely rich in content as that arrived at by thought, when, reflecting upon the significance for Reality of man's total experience, it frames the ultimate explanation of it all in terms of infinite and absolute self-conscious and self-determining mind. In arguing about the possibility of an Infinite Personality this rule, which forbids laying all the emphasis on the negation, must always be rigidly observed. Personal qualifications do

not necessarily lose their characteristic personal quality, when it is affirmed that certain particular limitations, under which we are accustomed to experience them, must be thought of as removed. No removal of the limit destroys, as a matter of course, the essential nature of the qualification itself."

Yet, again,—to express essentially the same cautionary truth in another way—the words infinite and absolute as applied to any subject of human thinking, must always be taken with an adjectival signification; they are predicates defining the character, as respects its limits, of some positive factors of a given conception. The Infinite, The Absolute,—these and all similar phrases, when left wholly undefined—are barren abstractions; they are, too often, only meaningless sound. The negative and sceptical conclusions, which it is attempted to embody in this way, are controverted by all the tendencies of the modern sciences—physical as well as mental. All these sciences, in their most comprehensive conclusions and highest speculative flights, point toward the conception of a Unity of Reality, a Subject (or *Träger*) for the phenomena. The Oneness of all beings that are real, we have called the Being of the World, or the World-Ground. But, as has already been seen, we cannot rest in this abstraction. What really is this Being which has the manifold qualities and performs the varied operations? This Subject of all the predicates, we desire more positively to know—meantime we call it absolute because, itself unconditioned, It is the Ground of all conditions. We call it infinite because, itself unlimited from without, or Self-limited, It sets the limits for all finite and dependent existences.

In speaking, then, of God as infinite and absolute person, or Self, it is not meant simply to deny that the limitations which belong to all finite and dependent things and selves apply to him; it is also meant positively to affirm the confidence that certain predicates and attributes of Personal Life reach their perfection, and are harmoniously united, in the

self-conscious and rational Divine Will. It follows from this that the conceptions of infinity and absoluteness apply to the different predicates and attributes of a person, in quite different ways. Thus a personal God can be spoken of as *infinite*, in any precise meaning of the term, only as respects those aspects or activities of personal life to which conceptions of quantity and measure can be intelligibly applied. His infiniteness of power, for example, becomes his omnipotence; his infiniteness of knowledge his omniscience; his complete freedom from control by the limiting conditions of forces that act in space becomes his omnipresence, etc. To such moral attributes, however, as wisdom, justice, goodness, and ethical love, the negating aspect of the conception of infinity does not apply, except in a figurative way which by being mistaken, may become misleading. It is at once more appropriate, intelligible, and safe, to speak of the *perfection* of God as respects these moral attributes. For the very conception of measure and quantity, strictly understood, has nothing to do with moral dispositions or attributes, as such, but only with the corresponding number of objects toward which these activities are exercised. An infinitely wise person, for example, is one whose wisdom is perfect in all relations with all other beings; but this perfection of wisdom cannot be exercised unless the same person is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good.

By calling God *absolute* it is meant, on the one hand, to deny that he, in respect of his Being or any of its manifestations, is dependent on any other than his own self-conscious, rational will. No others, no finite things or selves belonging to the world of which man has experience, constitute the original ground and reason of the divine limitations, whether of power, knowledge, wisdom, or love. He is in his essential nature *absolved*, *absolute*, as respects dependence upon others. But positively considered, his absoluteness is such that He is the One on whom all beings, both things and selves, are dependent.

In his self-conscious and rational Will, finite existences and events have their Ground. Outside, or beyond the control of, this self-conscious and rational Will, no real uniting principle for the cosmic existences, forces, and events, can anywhere be found.

In brief, by speaking of God as infinite and absolute the philosophy of religion means to affirm that there are no limitations to the self-conscious rational will of God which can arise elsewhere than in this same self-conscious rational Will. God is dependent on no other being for such limitations as He chooses to observe. God wills his own limitations. And he would not be infinite, or absolute, or morally perfect, if he did not. Will that is not self-controlled, or limited by the reason or purposes known to itself, is neither rational nor morally perfect will. On the other hand, all finite and dependent beings and events do have the only satisfactory explanation of their existence and their natures—that they are at all, and what they are—in the Infinite and Absolute One; and this infinite and absolute Being is the Object presented to religious faith as its ideal.

The objections to conceiving of the World-Ground as an infinite and absolute person, in order to fit such conception to be the satisfying Object of religious faith, arise chiefly on two grounds. They are either predominatingly metaphysical or—perhaps it would be more accurate to say, psychological; or else they are ethical. The metaphysical objections revive the claim that *self-conscious* personal being cannot be infinite and absolute; the ethical objections interpose cautions and fears connected with the integrity and values of the moral and religious life. The former may be removed by a profounder metaphysics, based upon a truer psychological analysis; the latter may be reassured by pointing the way to a more philosophically satisfying and practically useful kind of faith.

In considering critically the first class of objections our

thought is brought back to the point from which our argument set forth. It can now be made clear that these objections derive their power to confuse and deter the mind, largely through their misuse of the ambiguous terms "infinite" and "absolute." That a self-conscious and self-determining mind cannot also be conceived of as infinite and absolute, turns out by no means the self-evident proposition which it has been assumed to be. Indeed, certain indications appear which point in the opposite direction. Even our human finite and dependent self-consciousness does not have its most essential characteristics properly described by such terms as finite and dependent; much less by such meaningless terms as *not*-infinite or *not*-absolute. In other words, there is nothing in the essential nature of self-consciousness, even as we know it in ourselves, to show that the range of its grasp, either as respects the number of its objects or its speed in time, determines the possibility of its very existence. On the contrary, the more perfect our self-consciousness becomes, the more manifold are the objects which it clearly displays within the grasp of the one activity of apprehending the Self. Human self-consciousness is indeed a development; and at its highest degree, whether as respects the multitude of its objects, or their relations to each other and to the Self, is undoubtedly a meagre, a limited affair. It is always dependent upon conditions over which we ourselves have little or no control, either direct or indirect. But in it is the very type and the supreme example of clear, certain, and ontologically valid knowledge. The amount of the small approaches which the human mind can make in the direction of becoming the Infinite and Absolute Mind, is tested by the increase, and not by the decrease, of the region covered by the individual's self-conscious life. The richer and more comprehensive the individual's self-consciousness becomes, the more do the limitations of his finiteness recede. The more the Self immediately and certainly knows

of itself, the more it is capable of knowing about other selves and things. Thus by increasing the limits of self-consciousness, rather than by relapsing toward the unconscious and therefore the unknowable, does the self-conscious and self-determining mind of man become a larger and a clearer "mirror of the world." For example, in cases of intimate friendship between human beings one person may come to know another person with a suddenness, clearness, and certainty of intuition, which converts the ordinarily slow, obscure, and uncertain inferences that serve us men for knowing, or rather guessing at, the thoughts of others, into the semblance of a satisfactory and genuine self-consciousness. And great minds, who observe with a loving sympathy the transactions and laws of the physical world, rise at times to experiences which seem to approach, if they do not fully attain, the likeness of an intuitive envisagement of Nature's deeds and of the meaning of those deeds. In general, the more of objects and relations the human mind can take up into its apperceptive and self-conscious experience, the more freed from its customary limitations this finite and dependent mind becomes. In a word: *The perfecting of self-consciousness tends to raise the mind toward a more boundless and approximately absolute knowledge.*

But it is urged that self-consciousness, since it involves the distinction of subject and object, and implies the setting of the Self over against the non-self, is essentially an affair of limitations and of dependent relations to some other than the Self. That self-consciousness is, for all human selves, thus limited and dependent, may be admitted as often as the objector will. Why need keep on repeating that, of course, this is so? But when this human limitation, in fact, is converted into an essential characteristic of self-being as such, the argument violates every truth with which the study of the phenomena seems to make us familiar. And the use of the words infinite and absolute reaches the height of their misuse; the

object of self-consciousness becomes endowed with a sort of mystical negating and limiting power. In this way the quite absurd conclusion is arrived at that my Self when object, in some sort hedges in and confines the activity of the same self when acting as the knowing subject. According to this view, the more the extension of the object is increased, the more the activity and reality of the subject should be diminished. Now the fact of experience is just the contrary. In the growth of a Self, the subject becomes more real according as it is able to unite in the grasp of its conscious life a greater number of objects,—whether these, its objects, are its own states or are so-called external objects. For, in the cognitive act the relation of subject and object is not, essentially considered, one in which the two limit each other; it is, the rather, a relation whose essence is a living commerce of realities. In the knowledge of self-consciousness the relation is a commerce between different aspects of one and the same reality.

It is, therefore, the perfection of the self-consciousness of God which makes it possible to say of Him that he is infinite and absolute. It is this very conception of the World-Ground as self-conscious and self-determining mind, or Spirit, which enables the finite mind to transcend the inscription on the shrine of Athene-Isis at Sais: "I am all that was, and all that is, and all that shall be; and my vail hath no mortal raised." But this affirmation of the infinite and absolute character of the self-conscious personal Being of the Object of religious faith is not simply an attempt to gather under the obscuring folds of a loose and purely figurative conception a lot of ill-sorted particulars that can in no way be realized together. On the contrary, it gives us an all-comprehending and vital principle for the explanation and interpretation of the system of actual things and selves, such as can be won by reflective thinking in no other form. It permits the mind to conceive the divine knowledge as having that perfect immediacy, comprehensiveness, certainty, value for truth, of which man's

faint, limited and meagre self-consciousness is, nevertheless, the highest type of his actual or possible experience. It also encourages the mind to regard all finite beings and events as essentially and constantly dependent upon the self-conscious and rational Will of God. Thus all these beings and events become objects of the divine self-consciousness. Science, in fact, takes its conception of "Nature" or the "Universe," in substantially the same unlimited way. Out of *It*, all things come; in *It*, all things are included. But we have already seen (pp. 261-267) that, in order to do this, science itself must recognize the truth that Spirit is the essence of Nature; and that the uniting force of the Universe is a Will guided by Ideas.

The ethical recoil from certain conclusions, to leap to which is easy, and which almost seem required by logical consistency if the standpoint of a personal Absolute is to be maintained, deserves sympathetic and patient consideration. No one, however, of the metaphysical predicates or moral attributes of personal being is to be understood in a perfectly unlimited or absolute way. No one of them is a solitary affair. Of necessity they limit each other; and both in their nature and in their manifestation they are mutually dependent. Personality is not a merely unrelated aggregate of independent activities. And instead of its perfection requiring or permitting the unrestricted increase of any one of its essential activities, the case is quite the contrary. No finite Self makes progress toward an escape from its natural limitations by letting its psychic forces loose from the control of wise thoughts and morally good motives. Neither can wisdom and goodness grow in any human Self while the real core of selfhood, the control of will, is being corrupted or diminished. The very constitution of personality is such that its different attributes are mutually dependent, reciprocally limited. And the nicer and more harmonious the adjustment becomes, in which wisdom and goodness guide power, and power greatens under their control,

and for the execution of their ends, the nearer does personality approach toward the type of the infinite and the absolute. Or,—to cease from so abstract a manner of speaking—growth toward the perfection of personality can be attained only as the forms of personal activity, not merely become greater in amount, but also more harmoniously active in the unity of the one personal life.

On applying these considerations to the Divine Being the conclusion is not made more obscure, nor does it lie farther away. Because God is essentially personal, a self-conscious and rational Will, the different predicates and attributes under which the human mind must conceive of Him are *self-limiting* and *self-consistent*. This is to say that they limit each other according to that conception of perfect personality which is realized in God alone. But the ground of this limitation is in no respect, when essentially considered, outside of, or independent of, God himself. God's infinite power is not blind and brutish force, extended beyond all limit whatsoever in a purely quantitative way. God's infinite power is always limited by his perfect wisdom. Even the purely natural sciences, when forming their conclusions without any recognized influence from moral or religious ideals, admit natural forces into the account only as regulated by natural laws. Neither is the divine omniscience an ability to know, or mentally to represent as real and true, what is not real or what is irrational. God's knowledge is limited by the laws of reason; but in the case of the omniscient One, these so-called laws are only the essential forms of his own independent rational life. That is real, to which this infinite and absolute Will imparts itself according to these rational forms.

But, in even a special way, it is to be said that the moral attributes of God are *self-consistent* limitations of certain of the metaphysical attributes. If the divine justice or goodness is to be considered as perfect, then these moral attributes must constantly and completely qualify the divine omnipotence.

And to say that God cannot do wrong, when one is satisfied that his righteousness is perfect, is not to limit the divine power or to render it any the less worthy to be called omnipotence. In all the discussion evoked by the attempt to apply such terms as infinite and absolute to God, it is the unifying nature of his Personality—perfectly self-dependent and self-consistent—which affords both the theoretical and the practical solution of the same problems, if these problems are to be solved at all. How can God be infinite and absolute, and at the same time personal? To this inquiry one may answer: Just because he *is* personal. How shall self-consistency be introduced into this complex of metaphysical predicates and moral attributes with which man's religious feeling and philosophical thinking have filled out the conception of the Object of religious faith? By more and more expanding this same conception as that of a perfect, and therefore infinite and absolute Person.

The growth of that ideal of the World-Ground which is represented by the conception of God as infinite and absolute Person, has its roots deep down in religious feeling and also in philosophical reflection. The impression made upon the mind of man by his total environment is one of mystery, majesty, and illimitable force, in space and in time. What is greater than all his eye can see, or his hand touch, or his intellect measure and comprehend, but the invisible Cause of it all? In these vague feelings religion and art find a common impulse; and later on, if not at once, philosophy as well. But science and philosophy aim not simply to feel, but also to comprehend, this mysterious, majestic, and infinitely extended Being of the World. And by their studies of IT, through centuries of time, they arrive at the conviction of its real unity. It is itself real, and it is the source or Ground of all particular realities; It gives laws and life to all the forms and relations of finite realities. Such is the *reasoned conviction* which comes to enforce these feelings of mystery,

majesty, and limitless power and extent, in space and in time, that are called forth by man's experience with the cosmic existences, forces, and processes.

And now the inquiry arises and presses for an answer: In what terms shall the mind best express its grasp upon the Object of this reasoned conviction? That it is a perfectly comprehensible, not to say a perfectly comprehended, conception, cannot of course be maintained. The most dogmatic theology, or self-confident philosophy, or boastful science, would scarcely venture to affirm as much as this. With different meanings and yet in substantial unison, they must all confess: "There was the door to which I found no key." Inasmuch as no finite thing, however mean, and no casual event, however trifling, offers itself to man's mind in a way to ensure a complete comprehension, one may be the more ready to hasten the admission with regard to the problem of the Universe itself: "It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than hell, what canst thou know?" This attitude of reflection is everywhere met in the history of human reflective thinking; it is the inevitable and logical result of contemplating the problems offered by the religious conception of God as infinite and absolute; it is found alike in pantheistic theosophy and in Christian mysticism. Hence it is that *Pistis Sophia*, a book whose very title is significant of the determination to resolve faith into an esoteric theory of the Divine Being, raises the question: "How is it that the first mystery hath twelve mysteries, whereas that Ineffable hath but one mystery?" And the Upanishads, whose discovery, says Professor Hopkins, (*The Religions of India*, p. 224), is a "relativity of divinity," abound in passages declaring the incomprehensible character of God. Scarcely less true is this of the biblical writings. But men, declares a modern Hindu writer, "for the practical purposes of their existence, need to *get* God and not merely to *have a knowledge of him*."

Neither this, nor any other rational view, however, regard-

ing the incomprehensible nature of God as infinite and absolute, is the equivalent of the doctrine that the tenet itself is *inconceivable* in the meaning in which this word is so frequently employed. The infiniteness of God cannot, indeed, be conceived by repeated and cumulative activities of the mind in a time-series; or by pushing imagination, as it were, to transcend at a bound the limitations of spatial perception or of the numerical expressions for sums in energetics. But the relief from such futile attempts is by no means to be found in a sluggish repose of intellect, or in so-called faith in a Reality which is inconceivable, because such faith implies the effort to grasp together in a single ideal mutually exclusive or self-contradictory ideas. An irrational faith is no worthy substitute for an irrational thought.

The valid conclusion of our discussion is, the rather, that we may—nay, must—believe in God and think of God, in terms of self-conscious and rational, that is Personal Life. And this we may do without fear that the course of our believing and thinking will be compelled to terminate, either against an impassable wall at the end of a blind alley, or in a bottomless and darksome bog, where shadows of abstractions allure the mind onward to increasing dangers, but can never lead it into a region of light and safety. The conception of God as infinite and absolute is, indeed, an ideal which can never be exhaustively explored, or fully compassed by the finite mind. But just as modern science, while it is learning more and more the limitations which beset its utmost efforts to expound its own fundamental conceptions and postulates, nevertheless understands these conceptions better and better, and continually validates these postulates more satisfactorily; so may it be with the philosophy of religion. From similar efforts, when directed toward the Object of religious faith, the reflective thinking of mankind can never be frightened away, whether by agnostic fears or by awe in the presence of incomprehensible mysteries. This conception of God justifies, while

it does not destroy but the rather enhances, the profoundest æsthetical and religious feeling. And it is at the same time so increasingly satisfactory to the reason, as the reason is employed in the growth of science and in the speculations of philosophy, as to entitle its conclusions to the position of an accepted theory of Reality, as the postulated World-Ground.

CHAPTER XXII

GOD AS ETHICAL SPIRIT

THE metaphysics of the physical and natural sciences not infrequently assumes to treat of all phenomena as belonging to a *self-explanatory*, *self-contained*, and *self-maintaining* system. This is equivalent to saying that all operative causes and actual relations which make the phenomena better understood by our minds must be either found, or reasonably postulated to be found, within the system itself. To admit the breaking-in upon Nature, in the large meaning of the word, of that which is *super-natural* or *extra-natural*, is not a form of explanation which science can tolerate. Now the postulate which reflective thinking upon the phenomena of religious experience aims to establish, has much of this same merit in a yet higher degree. So far as certain metaphysical predicates are concerned, the conception of the World-Ground as Absolute Person needs no supplementing by way of attributes that do not essentially belong to itself. For example: Omnipotence, omnipresence, eternity, omniscience, and unity; these are essential to the very conception of Absolute Person. But plainly, with the possible exception of omniscience, there is no more mystery or confusion about all this way of thinking of the *self-sufficiency* of the World, when it is assumed in terms of the philosophy of religion than when the same thing is taken for granted as a basis for the positive sciences. And even with regard to omniscience, it is by no means clear how all the particular sciences taken together are going to explain a *System*, which is orderly, law-abiding, and framed after the pattern of ideas, without assuming the control of an all-embracing mind as its immanent reason,

That God may have these metaphysical predicates logically applied to him follows from the very conception of God. It is desirable, however, that they should be defined in such manner—so far as this is possible—as to harmonize with one another and with those moral attributes which religious faith attributes to its Object, for the more complete satisfaction of human ethical and æsthetical sentiments and ideals. When conceived of in this way, omnipotence has both its negative and its positive aspect. Conceived of as power, God is infinite and absolute. There is no conceivable limit to his power other than that which he puts upon it; and for its possession and exercise he is dependent upon no other and is bounded by no other. But as thought of in a positive way, religion acknowledges the Omnipotent One as the source of all actual and possible forces; as the inexhaustible fountain of all the cosmic manifestations of energy, and the spring from which come all the so-called human powers of psycho-physical and mental activity. In the practical life of religion, this view excites and supports the feelings and the conduct on the part of man which are appropriate to his immediate and constant dependence upon God. To religious faith it supplies the motive and the assurance for filial piety, trust, and hope. To the unbeliever it may become a chastening and morally corrective thought. For the will of God is sweet or bitter to the taste, according to the way in which it is taken.

The doctrine of the divine omnipresence, negatively taken, denies that the Divine Being is subject to the spatial attributes and spatial relations which limit the presence and the power of all finite beings, both things and selves. It also denies that God is to be conceived of as over against the World, in a *quasi-spatial* and temporal way. Positively taken, omnipresence predicates the power and co-conscious being of God, here and now, without distinctions of space and time. To religious thought and feeling He is the One:—

"Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."

For the philosophy of religion this view maintains the belief in the universal immanence of the Divine power, knowledge, and goodness; and it also sustains the argument which looks to his self-conscious and self-determining Will as the ground and explanation of all spatial relations and spatial distinctions. Thus for religious faith and the conduct founded upon it, there is no existence, and no place, and no event that can be freed from all the fullness of the presence of God.

The predicate of eternity, both negatively and positively taken, does much the same thing for our human conception of God as related to the category of time,¹ which the predicate of omnipresence does for the conception of God and for the category of space. The conception of eternity, however, must by no means be confused with the wholly negative and self-contradictory theological phrase of an "eternal now." Limitations of time, as man experiences them, where all his activities of body and mind take place, feebly, fitfully, and confined with the narrow lines of a temporal series, do not apply, either in fact or in idea, to the Absolute Person. But the positive conception of eternity cannot, of course, be attained by any manner or measure of the addition together of portions of time. So far as the efforts of the human mind are able at all to apprehend what it cannot comprehend, the results of these efforts may perhaps best be stated in something like the following way: "The world's absolute and universal time is the actual succession of states in the all-comprehending Life of God. If then one is willing to substitute for the abstract, mathematical symbol of infinity (∞) the conception of the life of

¹ For a discussion of the metaphysics of the conception of "Time," see Chapter VIII in the author's Theory of Reality (Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1899).

an absolute person, one may validate both the popular and the scientific assumption of an absolute time in which all the events of the world are ever taking place. This conception is that of a series which must indeed be conceived of time-wise, but which involves the denial of a beginning or end to itself; a series that, for every *now*, or ∞ , reaches both backward and forward to ∞n . *The transcendent reality of time is thus conceived of as the all-comprehending Life of an Absolute Person.*"

Most important, however, for religious faith is the metaphysical predicate of omniscience, when attributed to the Object of faith. Indeed, omniscience seems to imply and include all the other metaphysical predicates, while it is a sort of preliminary necessity, as it were, to the perfection of the moral attributes. In all religions, the gods, or invisible and super-human spirits, have been supposed to know more than men. The concentration of knowledge in one Divine Being is therefore assumed and naïvely expressed for all kinds of monotheism, in these sentences from the Koran: "With him are the keys of the unseen. None knows them save He; but He knows what is on the land and in the sea; and there falls not a leaf, save that He knows it; nor a grain in the darkness of the earth; nor aught that is dry, save that this is in his perspicuous book." Those limitations of content, clearness, and accuracy, to which all finite experience is subjected, and which can never be removed for the minds of men, do not apply to the infinite and absolute knowledge of God. And for the positive conception of the Divine omniscience we are at liberty to employ the highest possible, and even conceivable type of human knowledge, as a help to the imagination. All his knowledge, which extends to all objects and all events, has the immediateness, clearness, certainty, and fullness of content, of which we have only a faint and imperfect type in our most highly developed self-consciousness. Thus the religious man knows that nothing which he thinks, or feels, or plans,

is hidden from God; and also that for this thinking, feeling, and planning he is absolutely and momently dependent upon the immanent power of God.

The ethical, psychological, and metaphysical objections which may be urged against this view of the *method* of the Divine omniscience, as a species of *co-consciousness*, whether they can be satisfactorily answered or not, do not impair the value, for purposes of the practical life, of the postulate itself. Somehow, God knows it all. But, in our judgment, these objections do not weigh at all heavily against this doctrine of the type of that knowledge which is to be thought of as infinite and absolute. Indeed, the objection, when made on moral grounds, that in this way God becomes, as it were, the self-conscious and planful author of error and sin, has really no significance at all in this connection. For it is not the cognitive relation, the relation of knowledge, in which one person's thought and planning stands to another person's thought and planning, that immediately affects the freedom of either. It is, the rather, the relation in which one otherwise self-determining will stands to another will. I may not only predict without doubt how another will choose, but even know without uncertainty how he is choosing; but if I choose that this other do the choosing, he may be as free in his choosing as though I had no knowledge of him at all. Nor from the psychological point of view does it seem as though *self-consciousness* and another's *co-consciousness* were in any respect, of necessity, mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they may be regarded as different aspects of one undivided experience, even in the case of human relations. Indeed, other-consciousness and self-consciousness grow together; and especially is this the case with human spirits that are most akin and most intimate. For the pious soul, no other thought is more welcome, and brings more of comfort and strength, than the thought of the immanent presence of the omniscient spirit, with and in itself. The metaphysical difficulty which arises

to obscure all discussion as to how God can know the future, if it is not relieved by the conception of the Divine self-consciousness as extending to all existences, all relations, and all events, is at any rate—it seems to us—not increased by this conception. Certainly, the human mind cannot worthily represent to itself the omniscience of God, as extending over all future time, after the species of a shrewd guess or a conclusion arrived at as the terminal of a careful mathematical calculation. But when in any way the completeness of the conception of the metaphysical predicate of omniscience, as applied to the Object of religious faith, is sacrificed, in the supposed interests of man's moral freedom, the cause of this same freedom receives much more harm than assistance. God *is* omniscient; and the future is in his hands, because he knows it and he has power over it. Thus much belongs to Him as Absolute Person; and if he is also perfect Ethical Spirit, his knowledge is not inconsistent with his wisdom and justice; neither will his power be abused for the impairment of either of these moral qualities in man.

The unity, or one-ness, of God is not an affair of mathematical quantity. As Absolute Person he is, with a metaphysical or ontological certainty, the Alone God. There is and can be, no other than He. But positively regarded, this unity is that which must be conceived of by the human mind in terms of the highest type of conceivable unity. This is the unity of a self-conscious and self-determining mind. That the Object of religious faith is, in reality, such a unity—why, this is the conclusion which we have been enabled to reach by the entire course of our previous argument.

The nature of the *argument*—so far as it can be called argument at all—changes when we come to consider the reasons which have led mankind in history, to the attribution of moral perfection to the Object of religious faith. The belief in God as holy, or perfect Ethical Spirit, is indeed a postulate which reposes upon the highest developments of religious

experience. But the reasoning by which it is supported is plainly of a circular character. This circular course is chiefly due to the fact that the human mind is somehow compelled to "get around" the presence of an undeniably monstrous amount of what seems to it like real evil in that system of things and selves which constitutes man's physical and social environment. To state the case of this peculiar *circulus in arguendo* somewhat bluntly, When the question is asked: "How do you solve the problem of evil?" the reply of religion is somewhat like this: "By faith in a perfectly good and just, or holy God." But when the question is turned about: "How do you reach and justify this faith?" the inquirer is apt to be told, virtually, that it is "because this faith either solves, or greatly relieves, the painful pressure of the problem of evil."

Now neither on experiential nor on philosophical grounds can a solution of the problem of evil be given in a manner to satisfy both the intellect and the ethical and æsthetical sentiments of the race. The fact that much of what seems to our minds unnecessary pain and waste, intellectual blindness, and moral failure and degradation, is provided for, as it were, in the very constitution of things and of selves, cannot be successfully disputed. On the other hand, as the larger view of the profounder significance and more nearly ultimate tendencies of the cosmic system, in its relation to human interests, is gained; certain principles are being slowly won from experience which greatly soften our judgment as to the Being of the World, in regard to its indifference to pain and waste and sin. Biological science points out: (1) how the very constitution of all animal life, including man's, is such as to limit the endurance of suffering; (2) how provision is made for much enjoyment and for the easement of pain, in all animal life; and (3) how the animals, the lower races of men, and the children of the more sensitive races, really suffer much less than the hyperæsthetic observer imagines that they do. Much more

impressive, however, is the evidence afforded by the biological theory of evolution; this theory is more clearly showing that much, if not all, of this vast amount of pain and waste eventually results in the uplift of life toward higher stages of the realization of its own ideals.

But above all do we esteem it necessary to a just and fair estimate of the problem of evil, that the points of view peculiar to moral and æsthetical sentiments, judgments, and ideals, should be steadfastly maintained. From these points of view, as we have already seen while standing in them, the Being of the World does not appear to be aiming at any short cut to procuring a complete and temporary satisfaction for the appetites, passions, and desires of all those sensitive natures which It enfolds, and nourishes or destroys, within its own Nature. If, then, the so-called "instrumental theory" is applied to the problem, and it is maintained that somehow the pain and waste involved in the struggle for existence, and indeed in existence itself on any terms, are the indispensable means for the development of life under existing, and even under any reasonably conceivable conditions; then the confidence of the religious consciousness may claim in some large way to have the voice of science on its side. And the disciplinary value for the higher end of moral and artistic, as well as, chiefly, religious, culture adds great weight to the argument for a so-called theodicy.

When, however, the side of the problem which considers the amounts, the causes, and the results, of so-called "moral evil," is approached, the course of reasoning and argument is by no means so easy or so clearly marked out. That pain is a necessary instrument to the development, and even to the existence, of all finite spiritual life, has been held to be true by writers on morals from time immemorial. "When a difficulty falls upon you," says an ancient author, "remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has matched you with a rough young man." But it is "that you may become an Olympic con-

queror." "Without pain," says a modern writer, "it does not seem that the life of the spirit could arise from the physical life." In accordance with this view, the developmental theory of man's ethical and aesthetical progress undertakes to show how moral failure and obliquity, and even moral disease and death, in overwhelming numbers of the race, have served as means to the spiritual uplift of humanity. The essential value of struggle with temptation, and of experience with the results of yielding to temptation, may also be estimated in a way greatly to reinforce the claim that *much* sinning is an indispensable prerequisite to *some* holiness.

A vast amount of pain there is, however, which does not appear to serve the ministrations of a higher good, whether of happiness or of moral purity. It is just this inevitable and overwhelming amount of suffering and struggle for bare existence which has prevented most of the race from reaching the higher and more valuable forms of intellectual, social, artistic, and even of ethical and religious satisfaction. Besides this, the distribution of suffering, and its consequent temptations to wrong-doing, is so apparently unjust as to constitute in itself one of the darkest aspects of the problem of evil. Even if this difficulty be lessened or diverted by any theory of future rewards and punishments,—whether in the vague, indefinite form of Karma, or the more definite form of Christian orthodoxy—the theory of itself cannot be established satisfactorily except in dependence upon that faith in the Divine ethical perfection, which it is itself expressly designed to support. Here again, then, we encounter the same vicious (?) circle in the argument. There is truth, therefore, in the assertion of Eucken that the "medicinal theory," as applied to the problem of evil, makes of the whole subject a yet more insoluble riddle.

The difficulties of the problem of evil are all accentuated and complicated when the problem takes the form of a Theodicy, or an attempt to justify completely, *to* man, the ways

of God *with* man. For while the pantheistic and pessimistic theories of the World's origin and development allow of ascribing its load of evils to the irrationality of a wholly blind Will, or to the unconscious striving of an immanently teleological but impersonal Will; monotheistic religion—and especially Christianity—must consider the reasons for the existence and prevalence of evil to be found in God as the Creator, Preserver, and moral Ruler of the universe. In God, then, must the solution of the problem of evil be found, if it is to be found at all. Plato saw this; and his treatment of the difficult subject in the "Republic" (book X) is in all essential respects a theistic, and even a Christian theodicy.

But, second, the very attempt at any such solution of the problem of evil as religion proposes implies the firm belief, if not the demonstrated truth, that the world as known to man, is a *moral* system. Indeed, all arguments, both *pro* and *con*, and the very effort either to erect or to destroy a tenable theodicy, agree upon the postulate that the Being of the World is a subject for moral judgments. Were it not so, the natural forces, processes, laws, etc., of the world, could give no evidence either for or against its own moral attributes. He who does not believe in some kind of an ethical nature as belonging to the World-Ground, can neither be resigned to the Divine Will and live piously, nor "curse God and die,"—while at the same time maintaining the slightest claim to rational consistency.

Hence, third, the necessity of considering the problem in a large way, and in its totality. This totality concerns the system of all known or knowable things and selves, if regarded in some way independent and connected, but only, of course, very imperfectly understood, and even as yet very partially discovered. This totality also embraces the boundless stretches of the world's time, not only backward but also into its prospective future. The problem of evil is not the problem of a day, or of a century, or of a thousand years.

The so-called "argument from ignorance," illogical and unscientific as it usually is, does not seem to be wholly out of place in dealing with the problem of evil in this large and universal way. Indeed, the particular sciences make no small use of a similar method of reasoning, although in a concealed and half-hearted manner. They always espouse the cause of order and law, against the evidence which seems to be in favor of a temporary and local reign (?) of chaos and old night. Nature, when summoned before the bar of human reason and accused of the crimes of disorder and law-breaking, is invariably given by her devoted disciples the benefit of the doubt. Her lawyers plead her cause very lustily, and yet by no means always in strictly logical form, before her defamers. But why should man, who does not hesitate to break the laws of Nature and suffer the consequences in the way of physical disease and death, curse the same Nature for instituting and enforcing these laws, even as against his desires and cherished interests, and in spite of his ignorance? Is it any more reasonable to curse Nature and so die in mind and spirit at her cruel and tyrannical feet, than to curse God and die at the foot of his throne? On the contrary, the religious postulate of the perfection of the Ethical Spirit which it devoutly ascribes to the World-Ground is more faithful and loyal to its Object, and scarcely less consistent and conclusive in its logic, than is the corresponding scientific assumption. Religion clings to its faith in the perfect justice and goodness of God; it magnifies the evidence in the favor of this faith, and it minimizes or wholly disregards the evidence which is against this faith. This it does, chiefly for the very same two reasons which so powerfully influence the particular sciences: (1) The evidence for faith is constantly accumulating in the development of man's religious experience—and that most, in the highest and best experience; (2) the faith itself is so satisfying to the intellectual and sentimental interests of religion,

and so helpful for the strengthening and uplift of the life of endurance, duty and achievement.

The lower forms of religion have little or no difficulty with the problem of evil. According to their beliefs, there are some good gods, indeed; but there are even more devils and bad gods. Why should there not be? And why should not man's experience of both good and evil, as due to the influences of invisible spirits, be divided in accordance with the facts of the life of each individual, between the two? But the development of reflective thinking and of moral sentiment and judgment inevitably enforces some species of ethical and philosophical Dualism. Both, mobs or groups, of spirits become organized socially; and the two must then be placed in some sort of a struggle for equality, or one must be subordinated to the other. Thus the resulting dualistic solution of the problem of evil assumes one of two principal forms. Either the two kinds of invisible spiritual agencies continue to exist after the analogy of a human social organization; or else each of them becomes hypostasized in some *one* divine being. There is Ahura-Mazda, King of Light; and there is Ahriman, King of Darkness—wholly good God and wholly bad Devil. Enormous as are the difficulties which any logical and consistent system of Monism finds with the problem of evil; Dualism is always and absolutely unable to endure the strain of the uprising and uplifting reflection and religious experience of the race. *The conception of God must, then, be modified so as to make Him his own justification, of his own ways, to those who consent to take the attitude of filial piety toward Him.* This altered conception is not that, simply, of a World-Ground which may be received by the intellect as an Absolute Person; it must appeal to heart and goodwill, as well to the intellect, in the form of a postulate which affirms the perfection of the Object of faith as Ethical Spirit.

For the individual believer the problem of evil is now

solved by his changed estimate of the values of the different goods, and by his faith that the changed attitude in which he stands toward God secures for him the supreme and all-inclusive good. This attitude is a voluntary, ethical, and spiritual union with the object of his faith. Indeed, all the higher religions make this good, which in the estimate of a mind that can see truly, outweighs all the evils of life, to consist in some sort of communion with the divine beings. Even the lower forms of religion show intimations of the same confidence. In Greece, to dwell with the gods on Olympus was the highest wish of good fortune for the believer after his death. The supreme desire of the old-Vedic *rishis* was to be united with Agni, Veruna, or Indra. And when the impersonal principle Brahma is elevated above the gods, even the gods themselves are only gateways to the soul that longs to be absorbed in the higher good of a union with Brahma. But above all does the Christian faith convert the bearing of all suffering for the individual Self into a loving and cheerful submission to the will of God; and the triumph over all moral evil, however much self-sacrifice it may involve, into a loving divine service. Thus there is something of the fine Stoicism about it, with which the crippled slave philosopher, Epictetus, referred to the divine dealing with him: "What about my leg being lamed, then?" "Slave! do you really find fault with the world on account of one bit of a leg? Will you not give that up to the Universe? Will you not let it go? Will you not gladly surrender it to the Giver?" But there is also something yet finer in the way that religious faith answers, for the individual believer, the dark problem of evil. As seen from its highest point of view, the minutest details of the life of the pious man are under the merciful and loving care of a Heavenly Father: and suffering is only a filling-up of the measure which has been poured so full already by all the true sons of God.

Thus, also for a humanity that has the fullness of the true faith, God is so conceived of as to be his own Theodicy. But the

question recurs as to the basis in fact upon which this faith is reposed; and as to the rationality of the faith itself, when taken in that large way which is necessary in order even partially, to compass the problem of the *World's* suffering and moral failure. To this question there are these three considerations to be advanced. First, and now most important of all, the appearance and growth of religious experience itself is of immense value in support of the claim that God is indeed perfect Ethical Spirit. The experience is a fact. It is one of those facts of an abiding and rising confidence in the reality of human ideals, which constitute the most significant and influential factors in human history. The grand conceptions of a perfectly good God, and of his Kingdom, are with the race. Whence did they come? To tabulate, to estimate and to criticise, the empirical sources, does not suffice to account for the conceptions themselves. The experience claims to be *about*, or *of*, the World-Ground; its ultimate sources must be sought and found, if found at all, in the reality of the World-Ground. If the World-Ground can be conceived of as producing so comforting and lofty an illusion, then it is surely capable—given time enough—of vindicating its own character and of proving that the faith is not an illusion, but, the rather, an insight into the Reality corresponding to its own Ideal. Such testimony from religious experience, and especially from the highest religious consciousness, is not indeed a demonstration; but it is of essentially the same nature as all of the complex argument by which we are compelled to establish the rationality of man's faith in God. Only this particular experience is still *in the making*, as it were: and the problem, to the better solution of which it promises its contribution, is so deep, and high, and vast in extent, and so dark, that a few centuries can scarcely be expected to contribute a complete empirical solution. Have all the countless records of the countless biological ages served as yet fully to answer the problems of biological evolution?

In saying this we touch upon the second of the more important suggested considerations. The nearest which human reason can come to any theoretical solution of the problem of evil must be found in a doctrine of *Becoming*,—in a theory of the development of the world within which man's total experience lies. Such a theory must be founded upon facts; and the facts upon which it is founded, if it is to have any value beyond that of a pleasant dream or a fanciful hypothesis, must be facts of the world's actual history. Among these facts, however, and by no means of least account in determining the character of the world's evolution, are those which pertain to the religious and moral history of mankind. Christianity's doctrine of this development regards it all as somehow falling under the divinely ordered scheme of redemption; it is the history of the coming in its perfection of the Kingdom of God.

It must not be forgotten, however, that Christianity—like Brāmanism, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism, in this respect—does not offer itself as an *immediate* and *direct* cure for all the evils of the world. Neither does it promise any indirect but final cure in this life for all those experiences which are esteemed evil by man, and which are really evil from the point of view of his sentient nature and desire for happiness. Salvation offers primarily a cure for man's sinful attitude toward God, and for *its* evil nature and consequences.

The reasonableness and hopefulness of this offer is supported by two tenets of faith, in which all the greater religions have a share, but which Christianity has perfected in their more elaborate and logically consistent form. These are the doctrine of the Future Life and the related doctrine of the Social Ideal. In general the religions which have, partly through other considerations, arrived at the belief in immortality, have felt the need of this belief in order to maintain any satisfactory view of the problem of evil. "Thus," says D'Alviella, "most peoples have sought in doctrines of a future

life the means of repairing the evils and injustices of the present." It is Christianity, however, which by its unfolding of a belief of Judaism in a social redemption of the righteous and the faithful, has offered for the solution of the problem of evil a faith in the progressive and finally triumphant Kingdom of God.

It should be noticed, finally, that for the faith of religion, much of the evil of the world can scarcely be said to be evil at all. Religion itself is, indeed, born in humanity through the travail of desire to get rid of the evil—both the evil without and the evil within. As the development of religion proceeds, the moral purification and spiritual insight that lead to communion with God, and to a union with Him which we might almost say, is "for better or for worse," become the things of highest worth to the religious mind. This longing for deliverance then develops that despair of self-deliverance, or of other deliverance at the hand of man, which is, on its other side, the longing for redemption. The great and final function of religion is the ministry to this yearning. To this, subjective religion holds out the hope of vanquishing the evil. The evil of suffering is to be overcome by piously bearing it as an expression of God's will under the conditions of living assigned to the individual; and by doing what can wisely be done to remove it from others, by use of means that accord with the divine righteousness. The evil of sin is to be vanquished by availing one's self of the divine help, and by helping others to escape; in a word, by conforming to the conditions set by God's good Will for the establishment, growth, and final triumph, of his Kingdom among men.

Let us, therefore, be content at present to put the solution of the problem of evil which religion offers, in hypothetical and negative form. Unless the historical evolution of the human race, as a part of the World-All, may be believed to be directed toward, and to be secure in, the final triumph of that all-inclusive Good, which all the other great religions dimly

foreshadow, and which Christianity denominates "Eternal Life in the Kingdom of God," there is no possible solution to be discovered or even imagined for this dark problem. The summation of what is called "earthly good," were it possible, as it is not, that it should be attained for the race under the fixed conditions of its earthly environment, would not abolish the conflict between good and evil, and the resulting schism in man's soul. The hope of an ideal good, that is spiritual and collective, is held out by religion. *The faith in the securing of this good as the fixed purpose of God, through a process of development, is religion's solution of the problem of evil.* Confirmations, that find a certain broadening basis in our experience of the world, are accumulating in the storehouses of the particular sciences. And although the evidence is far from being theoretically complete, its general nature is similar to that upon which repose the most important postulates of man's intellectual and practical life and development.

The difficulty which thought and imagination have in harmonizing the different moral attributes when in action, in an ideal way, is much greater in the case of a so-called Infinite and Absolute Person than in the case of any finite person. Concessions must be made to unavoidable ignorance, if any human being under the actual conditions of his physical and social environment, with the best of intentions and the most zealous care, fails of perfect justice. Perfection of wisdom in the choice of ends and means is, of course, impossible for any finite being. In human society the salutary purpose to punish wrong-doing and to avenge the wronged and the oppressed is unavoidably doomed to contend with the honorable impulse to pity and to forgive the wrong-doer. Indeed, it is by no means infrequently true that the better the man, the more severe and bitter his inner conflict between opposing virtuous inclinations; and the greater the chances of a decision that can only be followed with a species of moral self-disapprobation and regret. Thus, the picture of moral imperfection in its

struggle toward an unapproachable moral ideal, can easily be understood and appreciated, because it is matter of actual experience. But how shall the mind of men present to thought or imagination the perfection of these contending moral attributes in one person and in every motive and act of that person? This is indeed a problem impossible for the finite mind definitely to solve.

What has already been said, however, as to the essential nature of the virtues, as conceived of and known and practiced by man, and of the moral ideal, affords some light upon this difficult problem. Moral conduct, essentially considered, implies just such a variety of mental attitudes toward other moral beings in a rational correspondence with their character and with their social relations to us and to one another. Nor is there any one virtue which, on account of its inherent pre-eminence, is entitled to overshadow—much less to overwhelm—all the other virtues. The perfection of moral personality would, therefore, require a steadfast and omnipotent Good-Will, guided by omniscience, absolutely free from the limiting conditions of space and time, and so present and operative in every event and everywhere. But it could not be expected—indeed, it would seem to imply an absence of perfection—that, to the ignorant and imperfectly informed observer, all the deeds of such a Good-Will should appear equally just and equally kind, or equally brave and equally prudent, and perfectly loyal to truth, etc.;—under all the varying circumstances and conditions of the evolution of the human race in this its corner of the Universe. Above all must it be remembered that the Divine Ideal, whether conceived of in terms suggested by man's moral and æsthetical experience or not, is by no means so simple an affair as to be entirely comprehensible by finite intelligences.

For a reason, then, which seems essential to the very constitution of the moral ideal of perfection, its progressive realization will offer many insoluble puzzles to those most

sympathetically inclined toward a full faith in its existence and supremacy. While for the doubter and the critic no convincing argument to support such a faith can possibly be supplied. When, then—as so constantly happens,—the question arises and weighs heavily upon the heart of man: “Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?” religious faith will answer “Yes”; but those who have not that faith will still remain in doubt or will give a negative answer. For it is only by the completed process of self-realization that the perfection of Ethical Spirit can *demonstrate* itself to the human mind. To complete such a process is the province of the ages.

The attribute of “holiness” as applied to the Divine Being is rather a ceremonial, priestly, or theological, than a distinctly ethical conception. Neither in its nature, origin or development, is it the precise equivalent of the perfect justice and goodness of God. In the lower forms of religion, this conception has little or no moral quality whatever. It arises in the vague feeling that the gods appreciate some kind of, at least physical purification; and, therefore, that the worshipper is more likely to obtain their favor if he undergoes some kind of a purifying ceremony. To appear somewhat “cleaned up” gives one a better chance of propitiating the invisible spirits who influence the weal and woe of mankind. Even in the greater religions, including Judaism and Christianity itself, holiness is rarely made wholly synonymous with the perfection of moral purity. Nor can it be denied that certain of the more modern, and still existent ideas connected with this term, are inconsistent with, rather than contributory to, the faith of religion in a God who is perfect Ethical Spirit. This inconsistency may take either one of two extremes. It may substitute more or less completely the conceptions which are cultivated by an excessive regard for the ceremonial and the dogmatic in the religious life, in the room of those ideals which are most valuable from the points of view held by moral sentiment and ethical judgments. Thus the Object of re-

ligious faith is made to be a *holy* Being by his own superior regard for Himself in respect of the way in which he is approached by the worshipper; or else on account of his interest in being accurately comprehended, and conceived of with a logical consistency. Holiness in man, as a requisite for the divine favor, then becomes a process of purifying the life with appropriate ceremonial observances or with instruction in so-called "sound doctrine."

But the developments of the conception of holiness as applied to God have had an even yet more baleful influence as contributing to another extreme of belief and practice. This influence has induced theology to make of God a Being who must be conceived of as embodying ethical attributes in a way to repel and confuse the most cultivated and choicest moral sentiments; and to contradict the most "well-convicted" moral judgments of mankind. Such an unfortunate result may be achieved either by over-emphasizing the divine retributive justice at the expense of wisdom, pity, and mercy; or else by exalting these milder attributes in such manner as to rob justice of its moral fibre and so to make impossible any satisfactory theodicy.

When, however, the conception of holiness is itself purified and made clear of its quite too customary ethical and æsthetical imperfections, it becomes harmonious with a faith in the moral perfection of God. A perfectly holy God then becomes a perfectly good God;—that is, the Ideal of personal, moral perfection. Then, too, the motive of subjective religion for the finite spirit becomes the exhortation: "Be ye holy even as I am holy"; or—more simply and appealingly said: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect." And the goal of the religious life, as the chief good of humanity, becomes the attainment of a perfect moral union with the Divine Being.

The ethical and artistic efforts of man to improve his conception of Deity constitute the most important and interesting

feature of the history of his evolution. The architectonic of the gods, however, has been a matter of slow development. Even now it is far enough from perfection;—whether one take, for one's point of observation, the ethical, the æsthetical, or the more purely practical, position. The gods of ancient Egypt, for example, were conceived of with a most excessive naturalism; and as subject to all manner of degrading limitations and lack of perfection. They suffer from hunger, thirst, old age, disease, fear, and sorrow. They perspire, have headaches and bleeding at the nose. Their limbs shake; their teeth chatter; they shriek and howl with pain; they are not immune as against either snakes or fire. Even the great gods of the Egyptian pantheon cannot perfect themselves by throwing off these depressing natural burdens. But as man's ideal of personality and of personal relations, as viewed from æsthetical and ethical points of view, has improved, he has more and more idealized the objects of his religious belief and worship. In the other greater world-religions, but pre-eminently in the best efforts of reflective thought to interpret the experience which Christianity has brought into the world, the result has been the framing of a conception of an Absolute Person, who shall stand in the Unity of his Being for the realization of all of humanity's ideals.

There must be, however, a complete union of the "metaphysical predicates" and the "moral attributes" in order to fill out the conception of the perfection of the Divine Being. This union can be effected—whether in thought or in actuality—only as it exists in the unity of a personal life. In answer to the demand for such a unity, religious faith attempts to blend all these predicates and attributes in the one Ideal of eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient, Goodness personified. In a word, its Object is conceived of as perfect Ethical Spirit. But in the mixed, scientific, philosophical, and religious development of man there has been a constant tendency for two lines of reasoning upon the data of experi-

ence to fall apart; and so to prevent or to impair the perfection of this ideal. To state the case in a somewhat extreme way: The God of science and philosophy, and the popular God, have often been at war with each other. Philosophy, in fidelity to the data furnished by the positive sciences, has evolved the conception of an Absolute or World-Ground. In this conception the attributes of eternity, power, absoluteness as respects limitations of time and space, have been the factors which have claimed the pre-eminence. Thus the philosopher's God, even if he ceases to be a barren abstraction and gains the title of "Supreme Being," or the "Power which the Universe manifests," is not so personified as to come near to man, to touch his heart, and to influence his life profoundly on its ethical and spiritual side. But, on the other hand, the more popular conceptions so anthropomorphize God as to dissatisfy, if not to shock and revolt, the more permanent demands of the scientific and rational interpretation of human experience in its highest, most dignified, and noblest developments.

Now neither of these lines of human development, or of the conceptions for which they stand, can be safely discredited or left out of our total account. The "philosopher's God" cannot be dismissed from consideration with an outcry against its metaphysical origin and abstract characteristics. It is a constantly recurrent and permanent force in the evolution of the religious life of humanity. It represents the highest flights of human reason in the attempt to reach the lofty altitude where the atmosphere is so free from the mists of ignorance, and the dust of superstition and passion, that the purged eye may look into the very face of the Infinite One. Nor is this true of the mystical speculations of India or of later Greece alone. It is also true of the Fourth Gospel, of some of the Epistles ascribed to Paul, and of other passages in the New Testament. And the history of the first four centuries of Christianity shows how, on a basis laid in part by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, the Christian view rose to a conception of

God, not only as the Father and Redeemer of men and the author of the forms and qualities of things, but as the very Being, Substance, and Reason, of the world of things and souls. "The cosmogony of Origen was a theodicy": and Augustine's "City of God" is a treatise on cosmology. The Christian conception of the Object of faith can no more be made in the future to return to the alleged simplicity and freedom from metaphysics of early Christianity than the existing cosmos can be forced back into the mythical egg from which it was brought forth.

On the other hand, the God who dwells ever near the popular heart, even in the lower forms of religious development; he who sits by the fireside and guards the hearth, who presides over the boundaries of the fields, and is the guardian angel of each new-born child; he who makes the clouds his messengers and rides upon the wings of the wind; he who springs to life before us in every fountain and whirls by the frightened mariner in every storm;—*He*, even *He*, represents a conception that cannot be denied its correlate in reality. The homely, domestic divinity, the God of the child and of the lowly in intellect and in life, He is no less a reality than is the philosopher's God. But we must reiterate the supreme triumph of man's religious development: There is only One God; and He is the Alone God.

As the development of the race has gone forward, the greater religions, and especially the more thoughtful forms of Christian teaching, have presented in a more harmonious union the different factors of the conception which appeal to the various interests of humanity. Thus God is more perfectly known, because known as perfect Ethical Spirit, as well as the Infinite and Absolute One. But this union is disturbed, rather than assisted, when there arise within the same religion two conceptions of God,—one esoteric and one popular; and when two sets of doctrines as to the divine relations to the world of things and selves are evolved. In its efforts to perfect the concep-

tion of Divine Being, Christian dogma has centered its attention chiefly upon the Fatherhood of God and the sonship of man;—that is, upon the relations of God to man in those conditions of weakness, suffering, and temptation, which are inseparable from existence in the world. This fact has made this religion of inestimable practical value for the comfort and uplift of mankind. But when even these truths are so distorted as to obscure, or even to contradict the ideals of Divine Being which have been evolved by the reflective use of human reason, in its highest forms of functioning; then religion ceases to represent the perfection of God in the most effective way. As a consequence, science and philosophy become arrayed against the popular religion; and the latter is sternly called upon in the name of reason to improve and elevate its most fundamental conceptions. For the Reality corresponding to all man's supremest Ideals must be found by religion in the perfection of the Object of its faith. In the same source must also be found the pledge of the progressive realization of these ideals. The same confidence is expressed by poetic insight:—

"All we have willed, or hoped, or dreamed of good shall exist;
Not its semblance but itself."

From the highest point of view reached by religious experience when reflectively treated, all the ideals of humanity appear, for their origin, ground, and guaranty, to converge in one Ideal-Real. This Being of the World science calls by various titles,—such as Nature (*natura naturans*), or the one Force, of which all the varied forms of energy are species or examples; and places it under the "reign of law," in a course of evolution. By further reflective thought, philosophy arrives at the conclusion that the essential characteristics of this same Being of the World can only be expressed, or even conceived of, in terms of self-conscious and rational Personal Life. But religion has needs that science and philosophy, apart from the further reflective treatment which the latter can give to

religious experience, taken in the large, are quite unable to satisfy. Through thousands of years of groping, and yet at times led rapidly forward by great religious teachers or by more popular movements, humanity has employed its profoundest thinking and loftiest imagination to construct a satisfactory ideal for religious faith. In this, its Object, religion finds something much more than science and philosophy can furnish as respects the ability to meet the moral, æsthetical, and practical needs of human nature. For to the religious consciousness the Object of its faith appears as One like man, an ethical spirit,—but immeasurably, and as yet incomprehensibly superior to man, a *perfect Ethical Spirit*.

The objections to this conception of the Object of religious belief and adoration, which arise on various empirical grounds, still persist,—if in vanishing degree. Neither man's physical environment, nor his moral and spiritual constitution, nor his social relations as thus far evolved, nor his demands for a speculative harmony and unity in his great postulate, *completely* correspond to his belief in the divine perfection. Faith is troubled, baffled, forced into conflict with a part of its own experience, on this account. But faith persists; and on the whole, as it seems to us, it can scarcely be denied that both science and philosophy are in the way of more firmly justifying its confidence as having a sure ground in reality;—but more particularly, as commanding it for its practical efficiency in sustaining the life of conduct under the conditions inflexibly set by man's present environment. Not all the apparent limitations to the ethical perfections are removed as the world-order is becoming somewhat better known. In fact, this knowledge is compelling many important modifications of what so-called "ethical perfection" actually is. But the philosophy of religion welcomes all these discoveries; for it considers them as self-limitations; and it is ready with a nobler, more rational, and morally more effective, conception of that absolute Person, who in wisdom, love, and holiness, thus limits

Himself. Nor will the popular religious belief and practice, in the long run, suffer in this way: for, to make the ideals of humanity more rational and uplifting can never turn out otherwise than an important service to humanity. The principle concerned may be stated in the following way: *Absolute Will could not be Good-Will, were it not limited by a self-imposed deference and devotion to ethical and spiritual ideals.*

And finally, a study of actual religious experience shows—whether we pursue this study as the experience manifests itself in the most illustrious individual examples or in the larger way in the history of the race,—that it is itself the most convincing argument for its own faith. The most valuable practical conclusions are made sure for the individual who has embraced the faith, and who is living according to the life which it requires. These conclusions seem also to be vindicating, while perpetually correcting and improving themselves, as the uplift of religion, in the fuller extent and perfection of its operation, moulds the social constitution and social relations of mankind.

CHAPTER XXIII

GOD AND THE WORLD

WHAT has sometimes been called the ultimate and most difficult problem of philosophy may be expressed in the form of this question: "How shall the mind conceive of those relations that are most fundamental and permanent, between God and the World?" Indeed, the very use of the word *relations* in such a connection is accustomed to arouse a violent protest in some minds. Nor is the protest wholly without reason; and this reason may be introduced in the following way: For although the discussions of the later chapters have had a bearing upon this problem, without further explanations they may all seem only to have made it more difficult and confused. We began by making a distinction between the world, considered as a vast collection of individual existences (of which the human race is a part) that are observed to be mutually interdependent and reciprocally related among themselves, and the "Being of the World"—an abstract conception—considered as First Cause, or Ground, of this same system of related individual beings. The particular sciences are seeking to discover what relations exist amongst the individual beings in time and in space. In their search they arrive at the conception of a Nature in which the individual beings are all included and which will serve as a term to designate them all. Then philosophy, in the form of metaphysics, insists that this Nature shall be conceived of, as it were, ontologically,—that is, as a Unity of Reality. It further proceeds, taking counsel with the various aspects of human experience, to endow this Being of the World with a variety of personal characteristics. And, finally, religion, ad-

vancing beyond where the philosophy of ethics and æsthetics ventures to go, makes out of this Being the Object of its faith and worship, by conceiving of it in terms of perfect Ethical Spirit. What, then, can be meant by speaking of God *and* the World, other than to inquire how the One Reality, in one of its aspects, stands related to Itself, as considered in another of its aspects? Still further: How can the term "relation" be properly used in any such inquiry? The three principal ways of responding to these questions are atheism, pantheism, and theism.

As to the use of the word relation, or its equivalent in some form, it is surely unnecessary to traverse again the ground already so thoroughly covered. *Relation* is the one universal category; for to think is to relate. And no opinion on any subject of human thought can be expressed, whether affirmatively or negatively, whether completely agnostic or rigidly dogmatic, without virtually confessing the validity for human thinking and human judgment of this category. Even to place two nouns in connection by the word "and" is to propose a problem in relations. The mind does not escape from the necessity of thinking in terms of relation, whatever the value, and however negative that value, which it attaches to the two conceptions, "God *and* the World."

We wish to divest the term Atheism from all traces of opprobrium, either ethical or theological. In its twentieth-century form it is customarily either agnosticism or materialism. These latter terms also we are not inclined to use in the way of an *argumentum ad hominem*. If the former of the two (agnosticism) is intended simply to deny that demonstrative or scientific proof, giving ground for a comprehensive conception of God when conceived of as Absolute Person and perfect Ethical Spirit, has been as yet furnished; then there is really little more to be said than what has been said already. It remains only to recommend a further review of the considerations already advanced for the validity and the value of

tenets that are virtually, but in large measure unconsciously, held by all the particular sciences; and that are expanded and confirmed in the form of a rational postulate by the moral, artistic, and religious experience of the human race in its historical evolution. In the case of any mind to which all this does not seem to afford sufficient evidence for an intellectual assent to, and a practical confidence in, the postulate of religion, there is little more of importance to be said.

If the attitude toward the problem of "God and the World" which is charged with materialism means simply to assert a well-founded confidence in that view of so-called Nature which the physical and natural sciences have already attained, we are far enough from having any quarrel with it, so far as it goes. But it has already been shown that the qualities of spiritual life are invariably met with in all material existences, and in all physical forces and relations. Without some measure of an indwelling spirit, no individual Thing can really exist or actually perform any service by way of influencing other things; or by co-operating with them in the architec-tonic of the one world. *A fortiori*, then, the conception of Nature in the large is, essentially considered, just nothing but an inert and inoperative *omnium-gatherum*, unless there is recognition made of an indwelling, self-ordering, teleological Will and Mind.

The essential truth which the theistic position attempts to embody in its statement of the fundamental and permanent relations between God and the world, is that of the Divine Immanence. As opposed to this truth, there have been, and still are, certain theological tenets which are as essentially non-theistic in their conception of these relations as are any avowedly atheistic tenets. This fact Professor Flint has expressed (Agnosticism, p. 423) in the following somewhat startling fashion: "The two forms of agnosticism which directly refer to God and religion are the theistic and the anti-theistic, the religious and the anti-religious." This so-called

"theistic agnosticism" robs the actual world of any momently vital relation with the Divine Being by separating him from the actual and present system of things and selves. He *is*, indeed; but he is set apart. The real world was in the beginning made by Him; but he endowed it once for all with all the outfit necessary for it to run on forever, or at least until it shall have run down. Having imparted to it this self-dependent and self-included existence, the Creator left his creation to the unchecked dominion of its own forces, under its own laws. God and the World were, then, once in reality related; but all the present-day relations of the individual man are exhausted within the sphere of his intercourse with finite things and finite selves.

This extreme of complete separation between God, the so-called Creator, and the World which is man's environment, physical and social, at the present time, can be maintained neither in theory nor in practice; neither on grounds of reflective thinking nor in religious experience. The barest intellectual consistency inclines the mind to do away entirely with such an unnecessary hypothesis of an absentee God. For cannot a system of existences, which is now getting along so well without any Divinity to shape its ends, given time enough, have developed this ability rather than have been endowed with it some myriads of millions of years ago? And, indeed, if human reason has now no pressing need of the Absolute and Infinite to explain the dependent and the finite; or of a perfect Ethical Spirit as the present source and satisfaction of its moral, artistic and religious experiences; why confess to such a need at all?

If now we exclude from our consideration the various forms of atheism and agnosticism, there is still left a conception with a very complex and variable content, which has been developed by human thought and imagination in the effort to conceive of the relations existing *in perpetuo* between God and the World. Pantheism, says Professor Flint (Antithe-

istic Theories, p. 334) "has been so understood as to include the lowest atheism and the highest theism—the materialism of Holbach and Büchner, and the spiritualism of St. Paul and St. John." But, then, "there is probably no pure pantheism."

Pantheism has its origin in a profound and even deeply religious view of the world, and of the relations which its varied finite existences and transactions sustain to the Universe of which they are only parts and on which they all depend. The feelings which contribute to excite and to support the pantheistic view are vague, but legitimate and powerful; they are chiefly these two: The feeling of the unity of the world, both of things and of selves, and the feeling of the mystery of the world. It is for this reason that the more reflective forms of pantheism arise in reaction against an extreme form of dualism (like that, for example, of John Stuart Mill) which posits a good but not omnipotent and absolute Deity in only a limited control of the world; or, the rather, in reactions against the conceptions of a Deism that aims to banish the feeling of mystery by presenting to the intellect precise and apparently final definitions of God and purely mechanical conceptions of his relation to the world. The same reasons account for the fact that a certain form of Theism,—for example, that advocated by Schleiermacher, who reduced religion itself so completely to a vague and mystical feeling of dependence upon the Unity of the World—so easily becomes almost or quite indistinguishable from certain forms of pantheism.

The fundamental difference between the theistic and the more purely pantheistic positions concern the work of reason in representing to itself the nature of the relations which exist, in fact, between the system of finite things and selves as known by the particular sciences and the Object of religious faith;—that is, between the World and God. As applied to the religious experience of man the question becomes: Does the world, conceived of as a totality, account for the origin

and development of self-conscious and self-determining spirits, who pursue an ideal of a spiritual order and attribute to it a supreme worth; or must this world itself be conceived of as having its ground and the law and goal of its evolution, in an Absolute Ethical Spirit? To this question, Pantheism replies by a theory of identification: Theism answers with the conception of dependent manifestation, supplemented by a theory of Divine self-revelation.

As soon, however, as pantheism begins to explain what it means by identifying the World and God, it is apt to introduce distinctions which profoundly modify, or perhaps completely destroy, its own doctrine of identification. As soon, on the other hand, as the theistic conception begins to enlarge itself, and to abandon the limitations and obvious errors of a quite untenable dualism, it seems compelled to modify, by extending, the conception of "dependent manifestation." Thus certain very significant approaches of the two views—the pantheistic and the theistic—are certain to show themselves in all their conflicting answers to the difficult problem: How shall the relations of the World to God be so conceived of as, on the one hand, to satisfy the postulates and conclusions of science and philosophy, and on the other hand, do justice to the convictions, sentiments, ideals, and practical life of religion?

In the strictest sense of the word, all *identification* of the World and God is atheistic. The world, as we are now using the word, is the sum-total of existences, physical and psychical, of which man has experience. To say that this *is* God, and then to refuse to explain either subject, predicate, or copula,—that is, to make the judgment one of identification in the simplest form possible—is equivalent to denying the Being of God, in any meaning of the word God which the religious experience can tolerate, or of which the teachings and practical life of religion can make use. Even the most ignorant fetish-worshipper or the worshipper of some rela-

tively insignificant and transitory natural phenomenon, knows better than this. The fetish or phenomenon is never wholly identified with what he worships. For he knows himself as a spirit; and he at least dimly knows that his god is a spirit, too.

On the other hand, all the greater religions, as they develop advanced monotheistic views under the influence of reflective thinking and of the various forces that are constantly at work to produce a more complete unification of human experience, feel themselves impelled to admit certain important truths which the various forms of pantheism try to incorporate into their theories of identification. The very predicates and attributes of God, as a philosophical monotheism conceives of Him, are dependent for their meaning and validity upon the recognition of these truths. As we have already seen, for example; "God is omnipotent," can mean nothing less than that there is no form of energy, physical or psychical, that has not its source and ground in the Divine Power. "God is omnipresent," can mean nothing less than that there is nowhere in the world, where God is not, in the fullness of the Divine Being; all wheres are equally his whereabouts; there is for Him no here nor there, which is exclusive of any other here or there. "God is omniscient" can mean nothing else than that there is no existence or happening outside of his cognitive consciousness; no movement or change in any thing, no phase of any animal or human consciousness, that escapes his all embracing co-conscious mind. All these relations of dependence, and all the manifestations of the Divine Being which these relations are, apply to the *whole* world. Collectively and individually—with an "all" which is what the logicians are accustomed to style the universal and, as well, the distributive all—is it true that finite beings "live and move and have their being" in God.

The philosophical criticism of every form of pantheism must, therefore, begin its work with an examination into what

is really meant by applying the conception of *identification* to the relations of the World and God. Such an examination takes the mind back to a problem in the theory of knowledge; or in the application of abstract logical categories to real beings and to actual events. Logic was formerly accustomed to symbolize the so-called principle of identity, as it was supposed to underlie and to limit in a perfectly absolute way all thinking and knowing, by the abstract formula: *A* is *A*; or *A* = *A*. But, as we have already seen (p. 102f.) this formula, even when taken as a mere abstraction, turns out not to be strictly true. *A* in the place of subject to any sentence cannot be identical with, or precisely equal to *A* in the place of predicate. Nor can any conceivable meaning be given to the copula—whether this copula be the word “is” or the sign =, unless some *difference* be recognized between the two terms which the copula unites. The much profounder logic of the modern mathematics has therefore come to affirm that no relations can be stated, as relations merely, and without specifying or defining what objects are thus related; and that, between any two real objects, there is always postulated at least one relation which obtains between no other knowable or conceivable objects. We cannot even say “I am I,” without implying an important difference between the “I” that is subject and the “I” that it predicates of itself; and of which it somehow affirms an essential and living unity with itself. For, to be really *self*-identical can be nothing else than actually to live the life of a *self*-differentiating and *self*-identifying being. And one moment of such a life is given to a finite Self whenever it knows itself as *self*-conscious and *self*-determining.

The attempt, therefore, to apply the category of identity to the Absolute and the sum-total of cosmic existences and happenings is above all other attempts of this sort illogical and absurd. And, indeed, this is never what pantheism, when it tries to take its terms out from behind the misty vail of

feeling which envelopes them, really does. The World which it affirms to *be* God is never conceived of, in all its terms, *precisely the same as God*. The affirmation, when strictly interpreted, turns out to be one of relations and not of a strict identification. And the relations especially apt to be selected for expounding the real meaning of the copula—is, or equals to—are those of dependence and manifestation. Otherwise it would be quite as effective to say, "The World is the World"; or "God is the World"; or to say "God is God"; as to say "The World is God." To identify the sum-total of existences and events, as known or knowable by man, with the Absolute or World-Ground, is to destroy the absoluteness of the Absolute, by making it dependent wholly upon the exercise of man's faculties of knowing. Whereas, to regard this world, and all that man can discover about or know of it, as only a very partial and temporary but real, dependent manifestation of God, is to make rational and consistent the beliefs and feelings which are appropriate to the Divine Absoluteness and Infinity.

There is one class of relations, however, to which the category of identity, in its more strictly pantheistic signification, has absolutely no applicability whatever. Such are the relations which arise and maintain themselves between persons. But religion, whether as belief, sentiment, or cult,—on the side of man at least,—is essentially a personal affair. Only a being which has developed some capacity for knowing itself as a person, and for entering voluntarily into personal and social relations with other beings, can be religious. Only as this same being attributes to cosmic existences the *quasi-personal* and spiritual qualities which he recognizes in himself, does he regard these beings as objects of religious belief and worship. But personal beings cannot be unified. As long as I remain I, or am *self-identical* at all, I cannot wholly identify myself, or be identified by others, with any other thing or person. This power of self-identification, with its reverse or

complementary power of distinguishing the Self from others, may indeed be lost; but when it is lost, the Self ceases, either temporarily or permanently, to exist at all. In a word, the conception of two persons, identical as persons, is a purely negative conception; it cannot be stated in terms that are not self-contradictory. *Selves cannot be identified otherwise than by self-identification and self-differentiation.* Both Pantheism and Theism, then, are forced to use such terms as communion or union, in order to express the most intimate and valuable relations which can exist between finite persons and the Divine Being. Or if such terms as absorption or re-entrance into the Divine Being, be made the goal of pious desire and endeavor; unless these terms continue to bear a wholly inappropriate and purely physical signification, they cannot be interpreted as any species of identification. To say that the human Self becomes at death so absorbed in God as to return to the condition of an unconscious, or non-self-conscious part of Divine Being, is simply to deny to the finite Self a continued existence.

When, therefore, the conceptions of Pantheism and Theism are examined, in order to discover in what important respects they differ concerning the relations of God and the World, it is discovered that the differences all center about the idea of personality. To say that the World is God, or may be identified with God, is equivalent to affirming that the sum-total of cosmic existences and processes implies for its explanation only an impersonal Ground. In brief, the only pantheism which is not also a-theism, differs from theism, in failing to rise to the full-orbed conception of the personality of God. In its sight the Being of the World is, indeed, somehow worthy of the mystical and worshipful feelings, and even of the devoted service, which is due to a Divine Nature. In the view of pantheism, however, this Being is degraded by the attempt to give to it the predicates and attributes of an Absolute Person.

Yet here again it is true that pantheism has many shades of meaning and degrees of approach to the highest thoughts of theism. It often also has the figurative and flowery way of dealing with its conception of the world, which makes it correspond to the theory of mechanism as God. In this way the Divine Being of the World may come to be identified with all the cosmic existences and processes taken together, when conceived of after the analogy of a personal World-Soul, or of an Idea which the cosmic processes are realizing, or of a Universal but unconscious Life which is immanent in the phenomena. The God which the World really is, now becomes thought of as somehow transcending—potentially at least—all the phenomena of the universe, whether considered in their temporal, their spatial, or their more especially dynamic, relations. But this view brings the thought hopefully near to the theistic position. And from this view we need not be disturbed, and cannot be dislodged, by being told that God, when “qualified by his relation to an Other is distracted finitude.” We may even admit that the Absolute is not “merely personal”; until, at least, the term personal has itself been interpreted in a higher than the ordinary sense.

While, then, Theism needs constantly to incorporate into itself those profound considerations which are emphasized by the more spiritual forms of the pantheistic theory, and to which certain religious sentiments of the highest value promptly and naturally respond, it cannot loosen its grasp upon the conception of a personal God; it cannot adapt itself to the impersonal, or imperfectly personal, Deity which Pantheism offers in its stead. To do this is to dream rather than to think; the dreamer, if he continues sane and logical, is sure to awaken from his dream to find that he has embraced no more reality than that of a vanishing cloud. On this cardinal point the real and final issue between Theism and Pantheism is joined; the *ultimatum* is stated, upon the basis of which, if at all, a lasting peace can be secured. A final choice must

be made between the ideal of self-conscious, rational, and Ethical Spirit, as the Ground of all Reality, and all the many vague conceptions which the pantheistic theory has to oppose to this ideal.

Further in favor of maintaining a firm tenure of the complete theistic position is that inevitable vacillation between atheism and the extreme of mysticism to which the more fervidly religious forms of pantheism are constantly liable. Spinoza, for example, in his doctrine of God as universal Substance, or of a *natura naturans* devoid of personal qualities, was correctly judged to be atheistic by the orthodoxy of the seventeenth century. In the last chapter of his *Ethica*, however, he states the theory of the Divine Love as the true moral bond and real union of all souls, in a manner which might well seem acceptable to the Christian mystics of all ages of Christianity.

The imperfect or erroneous conception of personality, which differences the pantheistic from the theistic notion of the Divine Being, becomes particularly obvious in the conceptions regarding man's nature and relations to God. By pantheism the personality of which the human individual is capable is not conceived of in its true, full, and highest significance. This defective conception is expressed in various figures of speech which are not only taken from physical relations but which are appropriate only to things and to the relations of things. Thus, for example, the Hindu doctrine, in its more purely pantheistic form, although it regards man's ātman, or soul, as some sort of an indestructible entity, represents its relation to the Atman, or World-Soul, as that of a portion or fragment to the whole. Union of the two is then made complete by the absorption of one in the Other to the loss of its own personal existence. All is Atman; and my ātman is part of the impersonal All-Being; which may, indeed, as properly be called Brahma as Atman. The Buddhistic doctrine of the non-reality of the soul, on the contrary, destroys the personality

of man in another way;—namely, by resolving it into a *mere* series of states, having moral significance indeed, but not implying or revealing that self-active, self-personifying power which is the essence of even finite personality. In a similar way, the modern pantheism of Schopenhauer and his followers and successors, where it does not vacillate—as, indeed, it is constantly doing—between the theistic and the strictly pantheistic relations which man sustains, for his origin, continued existence, moral welfare, and destiny, toward the Absolute, is equally defective and confused.

But Theism, while it regards man, like all other finite beings, as a dependent product of Nature,—a child of the World, so to say,—also places him in other and quite distinctly different relations than those which things and animals have, to the personal Ethical Spirit who is the Object of religious faith and worship. From the point of view of religion, man is “God’s child” in a peculiar sense; his nature is the inchoate and undeveloped image of God, as a self-determining spirit; and therefore God and man may come into more definitely reciprocal relations. These relations it is the end of religion to establish and perfect. Thus man’s personality, instead of being lost in the impersonal World-Ground, may be *saved* and raised to a higher potency by a voluntary, moral union with God, the perfection of Ethical Spirit. Reflective thinking, when influenced by ethical, æsthetical and more purely religious considerations, although not departing from a solid basis of approved truths of science and history, appreciates and defends this supreme good for humanity; while the religious life aims at its practical attainment by the individual and by the race.

The debate customarily summed up in the term “Nature and the Supernatural” offers, in the main, substantially the same problem to reflective thinking as that which has already been repeatedly discussed. The words employed in this term are complex and abstract; they cover conceptions which need

analysis and the making of distinctions, before any theory defining and relating the two can even be proposed with a fair show of reasons. In Kantian terminology, *nature* is the sum-total of known, or knowable, "phenomenal realities." Since we do not believe in such mythical beings as "phenomenal realities," we have taken the term as it is accepted, employed for purposes of research, and made constantly available, in the development of the particular sciences. Nature is, then, the sum-total of all known and knowable concrete and individual existences, considered as forming in their relations some sort of a system. To add the word phenomenal would now mean only this; that, inasmuch as these existences are known or knowable, they are, of course, perceptible, or imaginable,—that is, capable of appearing to us. But when the naïve metaphysics which is necessary to the very constitution and development of all human knowledge of natural objects, is subjected to critical reflection, it discloses its own deeper meaning. Such conceptions as order, force, law, and evolution—leading as they do to the assumption of some kind of Unity in Reality that shall interpret and explain the reasons for such a Nature as man knows, or conceives of—impel the mind to adopt the belief in a *Something-more*, a *Super-Being*, of the World.

The word *super-natural* suggests primarily a spatial relation. But to use the word in this way when applied to the World-Ground, to the Absolute Person, of philosophy, or to the Object of religious faith, is not only childish but intolerable to reflective thought. Nature and the supernatural are not to be thought of as two mutually exclusive spheres, lying either one above the other, or side by side. In interpreting the conception of the Supernatural, however, we have only to recall how all the particular sciences, when pressed for a definition of the postulates on which they base their particular explanations, are obliged to confess to the presence, as immanent in nature, of a *Something-More*. Such a necessity was found

to be true, not only of the system of things and selves, considered as a self-contained and self-consistent whole, but also of each particular Thing or individual Self. In the restricted use of the word "natural," and in a confessedly legitimate use of the word "supernatural," there is no need of conflict between the two. Were there not something-more, something *super* or *supra*, something over and above (in the logical and not spatial meaning of these words), in every natural existence and in Nature as a whole, no particular real being could exist in, or could belong to, this natural System of real beings. Instead of the two terms—nature and supernatural—being antithetic and mutually exclusive, therefore, they are supplementary; and both conceptions are necessary for even making any approaches to an explanation that shall seem full and satisfactory. Indeed, the particular sciences proceed in this way. The Thing as considered by chemistry and biology is not a different being, in reality, from the same Thing as considered by physics or from the point of view of its practical uses by man.

Every being in the world, as this world is empirically known, must therefore have its nature considered from an indefinite number of points of view. As known from a superior point of view, its whole nature often appears changed; but the change is not one which opposes its new nature to its old; its superior nature does not conflict with or do away with, its inferior nature. *The one Thing really has these different natures*, as aspects of its one nature; and no thing is so poor as not to share in this infinite, and infinitely complex, wealth of natures rising "above" all particular natures; and all of which have their ground in the all-comprehending Nature. The scientific conception of what is properly to be included under the term natural is, indeed, far more comprehensive and rich now than it has ever been before. Just on this very account it is claimed that the natural no longer needs to be supplemented by the supernatural; that, indeed, the former

positively excludes the latter. This claim could be justifiable only on two conditions. Of these conditions, one is that the conception of Nature shall be so illogically expanded as to include those points of view which belong more properly to the Supernatural; and the other is, that the natural and the supernatural shall be regarded as mutually exclusive spheres. But it has been agreed to limit the conception of the natural to that system of existences which is described and descriptively explained by the positive sciences. And this very system has been shown to have a Being Supernatural as its own explanatory real Principle, of which natural objects and events are all a dependent manifestation.

More emphatically true is it that religion cannot dispense with the conception of the Supernatural. But with religion the Supernatural is God,—not more, but then no less. Religion cannot afford to hold this conception in antagonism to modern science and philosophy. According to its larger Ideal, then, every existence and every event is capable of being regarded from two different but not antithetic points of view, as both natural and supernatural. For the totality of human experience, in the realm of scientific endeavor, and in the realm of ethical, æsthetical, and religious beliefs, sentiments, and ideals, demands the satisfaction afforded by *both* points of view.

In further interpretation of the conception connected with the term Supernatural, these three truths should be borne in mind: First, Nature, as known or knowable by man is not, and never can be, exhaustive of the Supernatural. Nature as known, or conceivable, is finite; God is infinite. Nature, as known or conceivable, is dependent and limited; God is absolute. Man's world is not, and never can become, a manifestation of all that God really is. Second: God is worthy to be called the Supernatural One; since Absolute Personality, and perfect Ethical Spirit is, ever and essentially, over and above and more than, the sum-total of its own particular mani-

festations. For, third, in God as the Supernatural One, as Absolute Will and Reason, religion finds the ultimate source and explanation of all existences and all events. In a word, it is the conception of an Absolute Person, who is perfect Ethical Spirit, which unites and harmonizes the two otherwise conflicting conceptions of the immanency and the transcendency of God.

From the same points of view the conceptions of God as Absolute Person and of a world in a process of natural evolution, become more easily reconciled. The theological objections that were brought against all theories of evolution, some half-century ago, have now—fortunately for both science and theology—largely been answered; or they have fallen into desuetude. The characteristic scientific tenet of this period is Evolution. But, quite as truly as ever, at the present time there are two forms of holding all such theories, that stand in distinctly different relations to the theistic conception of the world as a dependent manifestation of God. One of these makes the process of development, as observed, imagined, or merely conjectured, altogether self-explanatory. It posits a self-determined (but not self-like) evolution, which results from “the self-generation of natural law”; in a word, it substitutes the conception of Mechanism for the conception of Absolute Person; it, therefore, leaves the Being of the World stripped of any characteristics which can satisfy man’s ethical, æsthetical or religious ideals. It is essentially metaphysical; and as such, it is essentially anti-theistic. As a descriptive history, however, and so long as it remains *merely scientific*, in the accepted meaning of these words, the theory of evolution does not move along the same levels as Theism. It may easily clash with the alleged historical statements of the sacred writings of any particular religion, or with its traditions, standard conceptions, and dogmas, of the creation type. But it cannot, when thus confined to its own line of movement, conflict either with the fundamental conceptions of religion regarding the

relations of the World and God, or with the rational and dutiful practice of the religious life. For the philosophy of religion, *no theory of evolution can be anything more than a partial and incomplete descriptive history of the way in which God has been and still is, creating the World.* For piety, the picture of the process, which the modern theory of evolution draws, is far grander and more provocative of the æsthetical sentiments of awe and mystery, of the ethical impressions of wisdom, patience, and reserve of power, and of the religious feelings of dependence, gratitude, and ethical love, than any of the traditions or stories of any of the world's sacred writings have ever been. However much these traditions and stories may in the past have ministered to a child-like faith, they cannot at all compete with the modern theory of evolution in their ministry to a manly and mature faith.

It should be borne in mind that to give even a quite complete history of the order of the development of any individual or of any species is a very different achievement from giving a satisfactory explanation of the real causes of this development. In general it may be said that no more can come out at the end than has been, either openly or secretly, provided for at the beginning. But the barriers which are met by the theory in its effort to explain any individual product of evolution, are yet higher and more insuperable when the proposal is made to explain in terms of evolution the sum-total of all existences and all events, through infinite time and boundless space. It then appears evident that the very factors which the theory claims as its own rightful and necessary postulates, themselves imply, for their real existence and effective application to the task of world-building, the co-ordinating influence of an intelligent Will. Or, the rather, these factors are themselves only so many different aspects of the manifested Power, the self-determining Mind, which is the Ground of the World as it is known in human experience. Thus the same line of scientific research which leads to the theory of evolu-

tion, when reflected upon and understood in its deeper significance, leads to the conclusion of the philosophy of religion: *Evolution itself cannot even be conceived of except in connection with the postulate of some Unitary Being, immanent in the evolutionary process, which reveals its own Nature by the nature of the Idea which, in fact, is progressively set into reality by the process.*

Every attempt, however, to apply the conception of evolution to the Divine Being, when more closely examined and thoroughly thought out, is seen to defeat itself. If the conception of God is to serve as an explanatory principle, as a real "World-Ground," God must be conceived of as the adequate First Cause of this world as we actually find it. But the world, as we actually find it, is in a process of evolution. Any conception of a self-evolution of God, therefore, turns out to be a resort to the lower form of an unconscious and impersonal Mechanism, or a semi-personal and undeveloped World-Soul, as a substitute for the theistic conception of God as Absolute Person and perfect Ethical Spirit.

The popular conceptions of God's relations to the World, as Creator, Preserver, and Moral Ruler, must all be interpreted in the light of the truths which have already been sufficiently discussed. In the lower forms of religion, natural phenomena are regarded as directly produced by some one of the gods, in furtherance of his particular purposes; natural objects are looked upon as either the works, or the seats and hiding-places, of the invisible, and divine spirits; and animals and men are either divine themselves or are descended from super-human ancestors. But even in some of these lower religions there are traces of a belief in some one truly "creator god," or heavenly power, or heavenly father. Modern science regards the world as now known to be a ceaseless Becoming. But this conception is not at all destructive of, or even injurious to, the religious conception of God as creator and preserver, so long as this ceaselessly becoming world is regarded

as a ceaselessly dependent manifestation of the Divine Will and the Divine Mind.

The conception of Moral Rule involves, of necessity, more purely and expressly personal relations between God and the human race. But the Divine moral rule is not to be thought of as something supernatural, in the sense of being conducted quite apart from all the physical and social conditions of man's environment and development in history. On the contrary, the so-called Divine Government of the world is to be conceived of as immanent and operative in all these conditions. Through nature and society God rules the world. Or, the rather, the influences which shape man's nature, development, and destiny, as effective in his physical and social environment, *are* God's government of man. Such a view by no means excludes the conception, so choice and essential to the highest religious experience and to the most consistent and effective life of piety, of God as the Father and Redeemer of mankind. These figures of speech taken,—as all human language when employed to express the more purely personal relations of God and man must be taken—from man's relations to his fellows, both appeal to, and cultivate in their support, a large amount of trustworthy experience. But to deal with this subject critically, and in accordance with the methods of philosophical investigation and argument, would take us too far into the fields of the psychology of religion, of theology and of religious dogma.

Similar considerations apply to the religious conceptions of revelation and inspiration as viewed from the point of standing of philosophy. Their legitimacy in any sense whatever depends upon the conception of God as self-conscious, self-determining Ethical Spirit. Their validity can, therefore, neither be denied by a non-theistic and purely mechanical conception of the relations of God to the world; nor can it be restricted and confined in the interests of some particular department of truth, some single branch of human develop-

ment, or some one form of religion or of theological dogma. God is the Revealer of all truth; the Inspirer of all spiritual excellences. And always, in some form and to some degree, when the reflective thinking of the "men of revelation"—whether in science, morals, art, or religion,—considers fairly and develops fruitfully the ontological meaning and value of these ideals of humanity, philosophy gives its authorization to the conception which they suggest and embody, of the Being of the World. That which the race experiences, and which the positive sciences partially reduce to formulas that state the observed relations of the phenomena, is indeed the manifestation to finite spirits, in a process of historical evolution, of the reality of Infinite Spirit. But religion, with an assured confidence in its own experience, which is also a most important form of the evolution of humanity, extends its ideals onward beyond the place where art and morality feel obliged to stop. It thus affirms its conviction that this very process of evolution itself must be regarded as the manifestation of the divine purpose to bring humanity into a blessed state of ethical union and communion with that perfect Ethical Spirit whom religion calls God.

With regard to another very important religious doctrine,—namely, the immortality of the individual,—philosophy has only one decisive consideration to propose, in addition to what has been already said (p. 244f.), more particularly from the psychological point of view. This consideration depends upon the conception of God as perfect Ethical Spirit. It implies the moral continuity of the life of the finite personality; and also the belief that, if this personality survives the shock of death and continues its self-conscious and self-determining existence, it will continue to be under the moral government of God.

Neither science nor philosophy is at present able to propose any certain, or even highly probable, solution for the problem of the future destiny of the race. In reality, this

problem, too, depends for its solution upon the will of the Divine Being. And since religion conceives of God as perfect Ethical Spirit, it looks also into the future in the assurance of faith, that society will finally be redeemed,—a conception which religion offers to thought and imagination in the form of its doctrine of the Coming of the Kingdom of God.

CHAPTER XXIV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

PHILOSOPHY aims to reach a point of view from which all the various aspects, and indeed the entire history, of human experience shall appear as forming some sort of a Unity. As a speculation, it strives after a synthesis that shall seem to harmonize the conflicting thoughts and imaginings to which human life, under its present conditions, unceasingly gives rise. As a so-called "science of the sciences," it would gladly afford a sympathetic and authoritative interpretation to each one of the particular sciences, in such manner as to satisfy and confirm them all. But from its very nature, the aims and efforts of philosophy are destined to only an incomplete fulfillment. The problems of human life and of physical nature, as they appear to the unscientific mind, are sufficiently complicated. But all the researches and discoveries of the positive sciences only serve to disclose even more perplexing and profound problems. So far, however, as these belong within the sphere of science, strictly so-called, they admit, more or less freely, of the application to their solution of scientific methods. These are the methods of direct observation of facts or the critical examination of historical evidence, and of generalization on the basis of these facts,—aided, whenever this is applicable to the subject, by mathematical calculations, and verified or corrected by experimental demonstration. Where science ends, and philosophy begins—although it must be confessed that in practice no clear line of demarcation is universally available—such strictly scientific methods cannot be employed. Critical and reflective thinking over the material provided by the various aspects of human experience, as al-

ready subjected to the methods of the positive sciences, is the only way open to philosophy for carrying on its efforts at a supreme and supremely harmonizing, but speculative synthesis of the assumptions and generalizations of all these more definite forms of human knowledge. At the best, then, philosophy can only aim at a more or less acceptable arrangement in a system, of rational opinions respecting the ultimate problems afforded by the experience of man, as a race.

The considerations which justify the pursuit, and dignify the office of philosophy for the individual and for the culture and satisfaction of mankind, need not be repeated in this place. They can be scorned only by the ignorant, neglected only by the flippant; and they fail of being appreciated only by those who have no adequate views of the meaning of Nature and of the mystery and values of Human Life. As a matter of fact, too, philosophy has never ceased to be of vital interest and compelling charm to the human mind. Nor is there the slightest danger that in the future it will diminish in interest or sacrifice its charm.

But the devotees of philosophy must observe two conditions, if they wish it to receive its deserts under its own name. They must neither think nor teach with arrogance and conceit of superior and conclusive wisdom; nor must they imagine by partial views, and verbal antics, or tricks of fancy, to satisfy fully the cravings of the human soul for truth and for reality. It is well also to remember that there is room for common-sense even in the very midst of the profoundest thinking and the loftiest speculations. The philosopher's walk may be under the sky and in the open air; but it should not be in the ring of the circus or of the menagerie. The philosopher's chair may be placed in the woods, or in the study, or on the academic platform; but it should not be placed on the theatrical stage, or in the cell of the mad-house. If ever there was an age which needed sane, methodical thinking, based upon a due regard for the claims of science, history, morals, art, and

religion; it is the present age. That the verdict of the future will confirm the judgments arrived at by such thinking is as sure as the unity of reason, through all time and under all conditions, can make anything sure.

When, now, we come to consider the conclusions of philosophy with regard to the nature, limitations, and guaranty, of human knowledge, we find ground for neither of two extremes. Man's cognitive powers, actual and potential, are not such as to justify the assumption of perfect and cock-sure knowledge,—whether of any simplest truth or of the meanest example of nature's products and performances. But, on the other hand, the extreme of agnosticism, or of the sceptical distrust of knowledge, as concealed under such terms as relative, anthropomorphic, etc., is equally unjustifiable. That there is no knowledge for man but *human* knowledge, and that such knowledge is essentially conditioned by the nature of the knowing subject, as well as of the object known, would seem to be a truth so primitive and obvious that none of its general corollaries need be questioned or made the subjects of dispute. Inasmuch as all cognitive activity implies actual relations between real beings, and is itself an activity of relating on the part of the knower; to emphasize the relativity of all knowledge in the interests of philosophical agnosticism or scepticism is a mere begging of the question. Moreover, there is only one conceivable form of knowing which can be called absolute, even as respects the way in which the relating activity involved in all human cognition can reach its highest terms. This is the development of knowledge which we call self-consciousness. But this form of knowledge, at its highest stage of development and in the case of the most trustworthy knower, is an "absolute," or assured and logically indisputable guaranty of only the present existence, in the present phase of mental life, of the knower himself. By self-consciousness at the best, I only know that I am here-and-now existent as thinking, feeling, acting or suffering, in a certain way. And

even this absolute knowledge is, when further considered, found to be like all other knowledge, an achievement implying growth that is behind it on the part of the individual and of the race. This growth, like all mental growth, is conditioned upon innumerable forgotten experiences and unconscious influences; and it is all shot through and through with unrecognized and unverifiable assumptions and instinctive or rational faiths. Such, then, is the acme, the supreme achievement, the incontestable conclusion, of human cognitive experience.

The moment, however, that the uncritically agnostic or sceptical attitude is assumed toward man's cognitive faculty and achievements in general, the mind is doomed either to a course of the most glaring logical inconsistency, or to one in the pursuit of which, with the effort to be logically consistent, it lands itself in the hopelessly absurd. Such are the exactions demanded by the faith which reason has in itself, whether this faith have respect to the claims of science in its discoveries of fact and of truth, or to the aspirations of morality, art, and religion, after their respective ideals.

In their critical processes, the conclusions of the Kantian criticism are as self-contradictory and self-destructive as are those of any other form of philosophical scepticism. The very description of the cognitive act which limits it to phenomena is psychologically inadequate and false. And to speak of the world of Things and Selves, as known by common experience and by the positive sciences, as *merely* the intellect's projection, in the objective form, of a system of judgments concerning "phenomenal realities," is to misrepresent the nature of the cognitive process and to falsify the achievement of man's growing knowledge of nature and of himself. For, indeed, the very term "phenomenal realities," is a gross misnomer. Phenomena are *of* realities, and *to* realities. Knowledge is, essentially considered, such an actual commerce of realities as implies kinship, between the knowing subject, to whom the

appearance (or "phenomenon") is, and the object known, from which the appearance comes. Neither can these two be separated in the act of knowledge, in any such manner as to make it possible to regard the one as only the temporary product, or modification, of the other.

The study of the metaphysics of the cognitive relation also makes clear the truth, that all theories of an unknown and unknowable "noumenal reality," which is underneath or back of both knowing subject and object known, as a sort of sustaining substance, only serve to provide a ghost-like abstraction which is not needed; and which, if it were needed, is not fitted to describe the dynamic relations between the beings involved in every act of knowledge.

All human knowledge is, therefore, of necessity not only a growth, but also a matter of degrees as respects its completeness and its certainty. Moreover, all human knowledge rests on certain assumptions, to dispute which is impossible; upon certain faiths and tendencies, or appetencies, partly of a biological and physiological, and partly of a conscious and more distinctly rational kind. It is all relative, imperfect, more or less infringed upon by uncertainties, and forever limited by the constitution of the Universe as related to the constitution of the human mind. We ourselves are really much richer in content than we can know ourselves to be. And there is nothing in nature so poor and mean as not to be possessed of a wealth, as yet undiscovered and probably forever inappreciable by the human mind.

In spite of these limitations, however, the learner may approach the problems of metaphysics with a wise measure of confidence and no small stock of good cheer. And since metaphysics is only another term for man's crude or thoroughly reflected notions as to what he means by calling himself and others, both things and selves, *real*; and by distinguishing between *actual* events and relations and those which are only conjectured or imagined; all men are compelled to be either

unconsciously or designedly metaphysical. Philosophy aims only at a truer, more profound, more critical and systematic theory of reality, than is either current in the popular mind, or is espoused and cultivated by the positive sciences. The first thing to be noticed in pursuit of this aim is this: When considered from the psychological point of view, all objects of human knowledge, in the very act or process of becoming known, are more or less definitively personified. Things known by the Self are made more or less self-like. They are known as dynamically related to the knower, and as actively and passively related to one another. They stand in relations of space; occupying—each one—so much room, and attracting to itself, or repelling from itself, the others of like or unlike natures or affinities. Translated into the only terms of human experience which can give real meaning to such abstractions:—Things have significance for Selves, only as they appear to be wills, that resist, or oppose, or yield with more or less of effort on our part, to our wills; and that do this in accordance with more or less, to us, intelligible ideas. How far things do all this in the pursuit of conscious ideas of their own, we are increasingly puzzled to say. About some of them, which give to us satisfactory signs of being like what we come to know ourselves to be—namely, self-conscious and self-determining minds—we have no doubt. They are our true *fellows*, the completed (?) selves, which we know ourselves to have become. The convincing signs of common bodily structure, common instincts, impulses, desires, and mental habits and mental development, are crowned by the unmistakable sign of articulate and logically constructed language. As to the other animals besides man, there is still, and perhaps always will remain, a considerable measure of doubt. From some points of view, they may be considered to be mere machines; from others, it is easy for primitive or ignorant man to look upon them as gods. Comparative psychology and biology are slowly finding their way to the truth which lies between the two.

But down below these organisms, lies the mystery of the self-like nature and behavior of such things as the bacteria, the white blood-corpuscles, the living cells, the crystals, the molecules, the atoms, the ions; as well as of the planets or the so-called fixed stars. All these, if known at all, must be anthropomorphically known; that is, they must be known as more or less self-like in nature and behavior. But the mystery as to how far they know themselves, or determine themselves, in this way, remains either wholly unsolved, or else a matter chiefly of quite uncertain conjecture.

But no Thing, and no Self, can be known as apart from the world of Nature whose child it is, and in which it "lives and moves and has its being." And all the positive sciences, as incorporating the growing experience and deepening convictions of the race, teach the comprehensive truth that this Nature is some sort of a Unity of Reality. It *really* is such a Unity; it is not merely made to appear to be, in orderly and systematic form, by the creation or compulsion of man intellectual powers. The monstrous theory that man's intellect creates, rather than apprehends and appreciates, the oneness of the world by which he is environed, whether in the form given to it by Kant, or by Schopenhauer, or by the doctrine of Mâyâ, is intolerable both to common-sense and to the modern, positive sciences. But what all these philosophies have insisted upon—namely, that the conception of Nature, in its collective form, is anthropomorphic, cannot possibly be denied. *A fortiori*, then, it follows that this conception involves the postulate of a Universal Will, controlling the particular existences in time and space, in accordance with immanent ideas. This is what must really be meant by all talk of Causation, Order, Law and Evolution,—conceptions without which, in their metaphysical import, the positive sciences cannot advance a single step as explanatory of actual existences and events, in a System that claims Reality for its own. Without these conceptions, all the sciences are mere *Schein*,—fancies,

ghosts of abstractions, dreams, myths. But all this amounts to saying that the Being of the World, as represented by this conception of Nature, so far as known by man at all, is known as a Being of self-like characteristics.

When the metaphysical eye is again turned inward, and the ontological consciousness emerges from its stage of naïveté and becomes self-conscious, then the Self becomes aware of the meaning and the value of its own reality and of its own real place in the system of realities. It knows itself, by a process of development such as characterizes all human knowledge, and with varying degrees of fullness and accuracy, as, essentially considered, a self-conscious and self-determining Mind. It does not need "to go behind the returns" for this information. It discovers with certainty that it has been chosen by a decree of all-comprehending Nature for this high estate. What more effective way of showing appreciation and gratitude than by paying Nature back in her own coin of pure gold? Nature herself, in order to be worthy and competent for all this, must be conceived of as self-conscious and self-determining Mind. The larger, and the largest conceivable, possession of will, reason, and self-sufficiency, is allotted to that Universal Being which is regarded as the source and controller of all particular, related beings, in all spaces and all times.

This extreme of anthropomorphism, if you will, is indeed not a naïve and natural product of the untutored mind. It is, the rather, the achievement of the prolonged and highest development of the reflective thinking of the race. But it interprets to the "plain man" the fuller meaning of his assumptions, conjectures, and practical concerns with Nature; and it explains to the positive sciences the more real and deeper significance of both their ontological assumptions and their acquired principles. In a word, by reading external nature in the light of the revealed reality of the nature of the Self, philosophy substitutes the relatively clear, although frag-

mentary and imperfect conception of an Absolute Person—an infinite, self-dependent, self-conscious and self-determining Mind—for the vague and wholly abstract conception of a Nature of things and selves, to be taken in the large without further definition.

But man is by no means all matter-of-fact, devoted to securing the supply of his material wants and the satisfaction of his intellectual interests. Man is also an idealist,—and this, in several somewhat different ways. His idealism is also matter-of-fact; and in all the history of the race, it has been most important and influential matter-of-fact. Nowhere in space or time do we find human beings who have lived and acted without influence from moral, artistic, and religious ideals. Indeed, without the impulse from these ideals, and the advances made through the actual pursuit of them, no real uplift of the race could ever have taken place. To prefer some kinds of inner states to other kinds, and some classes of deeds done to other classes of deeds,—in a word, to make distinctions in the values of conduct and character,—is to be human. To admire some objects, whether found in nature or made by man, rather than other objects, because the former speaks a language of joy and consolation to the soul, as the latter do not, is also to be human. And so far as we are willing to abide by the testimony of historical fact, rather than accept the unverified conjectures of pseudo-science (whether it takes the form of anthropology or sociology), we nowhere find human beings who do not believe in and worship invisible and superhuman spirits, under the impulse to secure their own weal or avoid somewhat of impending woe.

But man steadily refuses to believe that he has created these ideals wholly without any warrant in the larger Nature which begat and encompasses his own nature. He will have it that the invisible, superhuman spirits, who in large measure control human destiny, themselves approve or disapprove of him and his doings, on grounds which correspond more or less

perfectly to the ethical sentiments and judgments which he cherishes as his own. In the case even of those men who profess no belief in such spiritual agencies as noting, or affecting, the conduct of man, the conception of Nature is almost sure to be endowed with more or less open or concealed, but genuinely ethical attributes. Or perhaps, some special part of the World-All, called Heaven, or Fate, or a "Power-not-ourselves," is treated as a moral being. But the ideal of monotheistic religion personifies boldly this Being of the World in terms of the perfection of Ethical Spirit. What is true of the moral consciousness of the race is also true, making the appropriate changes in verbal expression, of its æsthetical consciousness. Nature is really beautiful. Her products are worthy of æsthetical admiration. The being, called man, who appreciates and enjoys these objects, and who feels the impulse within him to produce by his own brain and hand something which shall share with nature its valuable artistic creative skill, is Nature's child.

The summing-up of all the highest ideals of beauty, especially in those forms which excite the sentiments of sublimity, mystery, awe, and the tragic passions and other experiences, is the Universe itself. Toward the Being of the World, therefore, man feels himself compelled to take the supremely æsthetical attitude, both of sentiment, and of judgment. Its awful catastrophes, its seemingly merciless destruction of its own choicest works, including its own spiritual children, do not lessen, but the rather greateren, this kind of æsthetical attitude. And when Nature heals again the frightful wounds she has made, and with smiles endures the travail of producing from her own bosom higher races, or better species and specimens of the same race, the human soul is in turn conquered by the obverse forms of this æsthetical admiration.

It is with no concession to fanaticism, or unnecessary mystifying, and with no respect or tolerance for cant—religious or otherwise—that we have used such terms as spirit and

spiritual, as attributed to nature in the large. But fanaticism and cant ought not to avail to abolish such terms as these. To become a self-conscious and self-determining mind, under the influence of ethical and æsthetical sentiments and ideals, is to attain the reality of a spiritual existence, and the possibility of a spiritual development. In the definition of values there is no higher conception possible than this; in the kingdom of values, its realization is the supreme goal of human endeavor. To be a true and valid person, this is the type which, progressively and with nearer or more distant approaches to perfection, must be realized.

Now it is not by intellectual cultivation and achievement solely, or through the progress of the positive sciences alone, that the truth about the Being of the World is to be apprehended and, being truly apprehended, appropriated in such manner as to realize the supreme values of human life and human development. Even the positive sciences, when cultivated in the most "coldly intellectual" manner possible, reveal the presence of the spiritual in the material, of the *self-like* in things, of the personal in nature, of Spirit in Matter, of God immanent in, and yet the transcendent First Principle of, the World. They are, however, accustomed to wink at all this, and to pass it by on the other side. And, so far as they conform to the claim to be engaged in discovering facts, classifying them, and arranging them in orderly sequences under the categories of causation and time, this course is perfectly justifiable. But no man, by becoming a so-called scientist, ceases to be human; and the chances are that he is also bound to feel the more positively the call to become also something of a philosopher. As human, he is a moralist, an artist, and a religious being. And if he carries his philosophical instincts and impulses far in the direction of an attempt at unifying experience on its many sides by some sort of a speculative synthesis, he is compelled to take the doctrine of values largely into the account in forming his conception of the Universe whose child, among other children, he himself is.

But man's conception of the Being of the World must attain to some kind of unity. We cannot tolerate the thought of two Universes, to be kept forever and essentially considered, apart; one a world of pure mechanism and blind (?) law and meaningless force, rushing onward to an irrational goal; and the other a world controlled by personal Will in the pursuit, and progressive realization of moral and æsthetical ideals. Man's spirit, as a totality, craves the satisfactions of a reality that provides for these ideals. Himself a spirit in the world, he will have Spirit in his World; and this, in order that the World may the better answer to his total Self. But the evidence for the reality of human ideals is confessedly not of the same character as that with which the physical and natural sciences deal. Nor can the methods for testing its presence and estimating its value be precisely the same. It will not do, however, to say that morals, art, and religion, are matters of mere conjecture, fields of experience in which any individual may hold with assurance and safety such opinions as he will. On the contrary, many kinds of the facts upon which opinion must be based are more abundant and more sure in ethics, æsthetics, and the philosophy of religion, than they are in the general field of the more positive sciences. But since both the underlying postulates and the ultimate conclusions of morality, art, and religion have rather to do with a doctrine of values and with the construction of truths valid for conduct and for life; it is the profounder sentiments and higher flights of imagination which are given more influence in forming a philosophy of the ideal. Thus the whole spirit of man, while consciously remaining faithful to the conclusions of the particular sciences as to the nature and laws of those concrete realities with which they, respectively deal, is stimulated by moral, artistic, and religious needs and aspirations to frame a conception of the World-Ground as the Ideal-Real. More definitely, and by uniting the claims of every form of his idealizing, he regards the Being of the World as essentially that of a Personal Spirit who is æsthetically and ethically perfect; and all the

phenomena, both physical and psychical, then become interpreted as a dependent manifestation of Him.

Philosophy, however speculative it may seem or really be, is not properly designed, or safely employed, for purposes of speculation only. Its problems are not questions to be considered in the mood of the reckless adventurer or of the uninterested dilettante. There are no other fires so dangerous for the soul to play with as those that burn in the bosom of reflection. Friends may pardon, and society may not care, if the treatment accorded to them is persistently flippant. But philosophy never. Its test of truth is not pragmatic, in any definite and intelligible meaning which can be attached to that much-abused word. But its teachings, although they require hardships, the renunciation of an absorbing passion for the things of subordinate value, and even oftentimes the scorn of ease and pleasure, are meant for the comfort, guidance, and uplift, of human life. We are all pupils; we shall never know otherwise than dimly, and except in part. And God's Universe is our great Teacher, although we are indeed small enough part of it. But if we have the philosophic, which is also the truly scientific spirit, we shall raise our voice to It and say, in words of ancient wisdom:

“From the unreal lead me to the real.
From darkness lead me into light.
From death lead me to immortality.”

THE END

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
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